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ABSTRACT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
This work examines dispute resolution in the construction industry, namely arbitration 
under the Arbitration Act 1996 and adjudication under the Housing Grants 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, in the light of The Right Honourable the 
Lord W oolfs definition of access to justice.1 Both a theoretical and an empirical 
approach have been adopted by this study so as to provide a robust analytical 
methodology.
The theoretical analysis of arbitration and adjudication conducted by this work 
highlights both the potential successes and failures of the reforms with regard to the 
promotion of access to justice. Broadly speaking, whilst both statutes were compliant 
with W oolfs criteria for affording access to justice, three main areas of concern were 
highlighted, calling into question the compliance of the mechanisms with the civil 
procedure reforms. These areas of concern were identified as relating to: procedure; 
cost; and juridification.
Turning to consider the procedural concerns, loopholes were uncovered in both Acts 
that demonstrated a potential avenue for exploitation by disputing parties who were 
seeking to gain a tactical advantage over their opponent. For example, the speed with 
which proceedings must be conducted once notice to arbitrate or adjudicate has been 
given provides parties with the ability to prepare their case in advance and then 
ambush their opponent with dispute resolution proceedings. In a complex dispute, 
such ambushing tactics may confer a procedural advantage that may be exploited so 
as to confer a unilateral benefit.
With regard to issues of cost, the financial structure of arbitration and adjudication 
was seen to raise issues as to the equal access of parties to proceedings. That is, 
without state aid, can it be said that all parties to a dispute have an equal opportunity 
to pursue the method of dispute resolution of their choice?
1 See Lord Justice Woolf “Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales / By the Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls” (1995) HMSO
II
In so far as the juridification element is concerned, the role of the legal profession in 
methods of dispute resolution outside the realm of the court, may be seen to be an 
influencing factor that colours the nature of alternative dispute resolution. That is, 
will the involvement of a legal practitioner in arbitration and / or adjudication serve to 
over-formulise proceedings that are in essence designed to facilitate an 
understandable and responsive mechanism?
The empirical research subsequently undertaken answers these and other theoretical 
questions posed, by comparing arbitration and adjudication to litigation and then 
examining such in the light of W oolfs eight criteria for access to justice. In short, 
whilst arbitration and adjudication were broadly compliant with W oolfs criteria, the 
theoretical concerns highlighted above were proved to be factors of varying 
significance that may serve to prevent access to justice as prescribed by Woolf.
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PREFACE
Modem civil procedure has been shaped by the period of reform that began in earnest 
in the early 1990’s. The construction industry in particular, has been at the forefront 
of that reform. Latham’s report into modernising the industry culminated in the first 
statutory embodiment of adjudication under the Housing Grants Construction and 
Regeneration Act 1996. At the same time, arbitration law in general was reformed by 
way of the Arbitration Act 1996. Court procedure also received statutory attention by 
way of the Woolf Reforms that established the new Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
Given the inherent nature of disputes in the construction industry, it was foreseeable 
that this particular industrial sector of Britain would provide the setting in which such 
statutory reform may be monitored and evaluated. Furthermore, given that Latham’s 
Report preceded the Woolf reforms, an analysis of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry would enable the robustness of the CPR to be tested in a 
particular context.
The empirical data presented in this work is the result of primary empirical research 
that was undertaken during the period 2002/2003. This research sought the views and 
experiences of respondents post-reform and up to the present date. The purpose of 
this research was to highlight by way of theoretical evaluation, the likely success / 
failure of the 1996 reforms as they apply to the construction industry. Due to their 
forming the basis upon which civil procedure in general was reformed under the CPR 
1998, W oolfs eight criteria for access to justice were adopted as the benchmark by 
which such theoretical evaluation would take place. The empirical research would 
then investigate and answer the issues raised by the theoretical examination and
XVI
would provide a profile of litigation in the construction industry against which the 
ability of arbitration and adjudication to facilitate access to justice could be measured.
Despite the reforms having some success, this study has highlighted that many 
difficulties persist still and many questions have been raised that await to be 
answered, namely: issues of funding and juridification.
This is the law as at 1st June 2005.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY & DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
The contemporary construction industry in Britain is responsible for the building and 
maintenance of the infrastructure of the country, including roads, airports and 
domestic, commercial and public accommodation. Not only is the industry of social 
importance in the provision of such facilities, but it is also of economic importance, in 
that approximately 3% of the total working population in Britain is employed in the 
construction sector at present.1 As shall become clear, however, it was not until the 
post-industrial revolution period that there could be said to have been a construction 
“industry”.3 Until this time, building and construction works were conducted on a 
less structured and less regulated basis.
1 Based upon Standard Occupational Code of “Construction Trade” Period March -  May 2003. See 
Office for National Statistics.
2 Arnold Toynbee coined the phrase 'Industrial Revolution' in 1882
3 For a detailed exposition of the industrial revolution and the history of the construction industry in 
Britain, see Berg “The Age of Manufacturers, 1700 -  1820: Industry, Innovation and Work in Britain” 
(1994) Routledge; Bowley “British Building Industry” (1966) Cambridge University Press; Earle 
“Black Top: A History of the British Flexible Roads Industry” (1974) Blackwell; McCord “British 
History: 1815 -  1906” (1991) OUP; Pearce & Stewart “British Political History, 1867 -  2001: 
Democracy and Decline” (2002) Routledge; Powell “An Economic History of the British Building 
Industry, 1815 -  1979” (1980) Architectural Press; Pragnel “Industrial Britain: An Architectural 
History” (2000) Ellipsis; Wrigley “Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of the Industrial 
Revolution in England” (1988) Cambridge University Press.
1
The Legislative Development of the Construction Industry In 
Context
Until the 1700s much of England and Wales was rural, with only traditional village 
industries such as farming, com milling and blacksmithing.4 Agricultural engineering 
industries were predominantly confined to larger towns and so a nexus of national and 
international trade existed in only a limited form. Indeed, due to the inability to 
compete with continental technology, British manufacturers repeatedly experienced 
difficulties expanding in to European markets and so woollen cloth comprised the 
only significant export.5 Correlated with the development of factories, the expansion 
of manufacturing and the increasing importance of heavy industry in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, was the requirement for an 
effective transport and communication system. Thus, railways, canals and docks were 
built, bringing with them new opportunities for economic growth. Brick and cement 
industries amongst others emerged across Britain and electricity was discovered and 
was in general use by the late 1870’s. This in turn led to the invention of electric
4 See Addyman & Roskams (ed.) “Medieval Europe, 1: Urbanism” (1992) York; Blair & Ramsay (Eds.) 
“English Medieval Industries” (1991,) Hambledon Press; Britnell “The Commercialisation of English 
Society: 1000-1500” (1993) Manchester University Press; Crossley (Ed.) “Medieval Industry” (1981) 
CBA Research Report no.40; Green “Town Life in the Fifteenth Century” (1894) Macmillan; Hatcher 
“Plague, Population and the English Economy: 1348-1530” (1977) Macmillan; Hatcher & Britnell 
(eds.) “Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller” (1996) 
Cambridge University Press; Hatcher & Bailey “Modelling the Middle Ages: The History and Theory 
of England's Economic Development” (2001) Oxford University Press; Hodges “Dark Age Economics: 
The Origins of Towns and Trade, 600-1000” (1982) Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd; Miller & Hatcher 
“Medieval England - Rural Society and Economic Change: 1086-1348” (1978) Longman; Miller & 
Hatcher “Medieval England, Towns, Commerce & Crafts: 1086-1348” (1995) Longman; Palliser (ed.) 
“The Cambridge Urban History of Britain Vol 1: 600 -  1540” (2000) Cambridge University Press; 
Sawyer (ed.) “English Medieval Settlement” (1979) Arnold; Short (ed) “The English Rural Community: 
Image and Analysis” (1992) Cambridge University Press; Taylor “Village and Farmstead: A History of 
Rural Settlement in England” (1983) G. Philip.
5 See Carus-Wilson "The English Cloth Industry in the Late Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries" 
(1944) XTV Economic History Review; Higham "Some Evidence For 12th- and 13th-Century Linen 
and Woollen Textile Processing" (1989) XXXIII Medieval Archaeology; Miller "The Fortunes of the 
English Textile Industry in the Thirteenth Century" (1965) XVIII Economic History Review 1; 
Pritchard "Late Saxon Textiles from the City o f London" (1985) XXVIII Medieval Archaeology.
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motors, generators and turbines, which sparked further technological innovation, the 
motor vehicle being perhaps the most significant. Gas works, water works, power 
stations, mills, machine houses and other such industrial architecture developed, 
creating new economies on previously green field sites. In short, the nature of British 
industry began to move away from reliance upon village enterprise, to encompass 
new and diverse technology that depended upon an extensive and organised nexus of 
national and international trade. Clearly, such developments impacted upon the 
infrastructure of the Country. Not only was there a demand for commercial buildings, 
but also the migration of workers increased the demand for housing. As hamlets and 
villages grew into towns and cities, so the demand for public buildings increased. 
Indeed, by 1851 Britain had become urbanised - half the population6 of Britain 
inhabited towns and cities, increasing to three-quarters of the population by 1901. 
With the increase in building activity, came an increase in legislation affecting the 
work of tradesmen.
Legislation affecting the work of tradesman can be traced back to the middle ages. In 
1189 the first recorded attempt to legislate for fire safety took place, whereby the 
Mayor of London stated that houses in the city were to be built of stone, thatched 
roofs were not permitted, and party walls were to be of a minimum height and 
thickness.7 Following the Great Fire of London in 1212, in which an estimated 3000 
people died, requirements affecting the construction of alehouses, bakeries and brew- 
houses were also established. From hereon, numerous local acts continued to be
6 Britain had a population of nearly 21 million in 1851, increasing to 37 million by 1901. See Census 
of Population 1851 and Census of Population 1901.
7 The Assize of Buildings Planning Act 1189. See Knowles & Pitt “History of Building Regulation in 
London: 1189 -  1972” (1973) Architect; Schofield “The Building of London: From the Conquest to the 
Great Fire” (1999) Sutton Publishing.
3
I
passed, giving the authorities in larger towns power over public health.8 For example, 
the Royal Proclamation of 1580 enacted into law in 1592, forbade any new building 
within three miles of the city of London and forbade the subdivision of houses. 
Following the Second Great Fire of London in 1666, London acquired its first 
complete code of building regulations and the means for its implementation. On
th  0September 13 1666, King Charles II issued a proclamation that prohibited the
rebuilding of houses after the Great Fire of London without conforming to the 
General Regulations contained therein. For example, it was stated that the walls of all 
new buildings were to be formulated of brick or stone, the main streets were to be 
widened to prevent the spread of fire and existing narrow alleyways were to be 
reduced in number. It was also proclaimed that a survey of every ruin and ownership 
of every plot was to be conducted. Following the proclamation, on the 8th February 
1667 the Act for the Rebuilding of the City of London received Royal Assent. The 
Act concerned the construction of streets, buildings and the movement of traffic. 
Scheduled tables set out the thickness of the brick walls, heights from floor to ceiling, 
the depth of cellars, the sufficiency of party walls and scantlings of timber for each 
type of house as defined by the Act. Stipulations were made for the construction of 
sewers and spouting gutters were abolished and replaced with down pipes. Conduits 
causing an obstruction to the ffee-flow of traffic were also to be removed and most of 
the principle streets of London were widened. Thames Street and the land between it 
and the River Thames were to be raised by three feet and building within a distance of 
forty feet from the Thames was prohibited. A prohibition on noisome trade was also
8 See Garside “Capital Histories: A Bibliographical Study of London” (1998) Ashgate; Lubbock “The 
Tyranny of Taste: The Politics of Architecture and Design in Britain 1550-1960” (1995) Yale 
University Press; Tittler “For the Re-Edification of Townes: The Rebuilding Statutes of Henry VIII” 
(1990) Appalachian State University.
9 See Birch “The Historical Charters and Constitutional Documents of the City of London” (1897) 
Whiting. See also Reddaway “Rebuilding o f London After Great Fire” (1951) E Arnold.
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introduced by the Act. Indeed, the Great Fire provided the catalyst that addressed the 
long-term concerns that previous administrations had failed to attend.10
Further legislation affecting the construction of buildings came into being by way of 
The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774.11 This Act listed buildings into seven 
categories with the thickness of external walls and party walls laid down for each 
class. The Act also included provisions that determined the maximum area of 
warehouses and London boroughs were to appoint Surveyors. In 1884 the seven 
classes were reduced to three, namely Dwelling Houses, Warehouses and Public
Buildings and the class of Warehouse was limited to a size of 200,000 cubic feet
1
(undivided). Thus, with demographic and economic change, came piecemeal 
reform that sought to ensure the safety of those residing and operating in populous 
towns.13
The origins of modem building legislation did not emerge however, until 1845 when 
the first general14 Public Health Act was passed. The Public Health Act 1845 sought 
to reduce the risks to the public posed by damp conditions, inferior construction, 
insanity conditions and the risk of fire, as well as the lack of adequate light and 
ventilation. This was to be achieved, for example, by discouraging the building of
10 See Hobhouse & Saunders “Good and Proper Materials: Fabric of London Since the Great Fire” 
(2004) London Topographical Society; Perks “Essays on Old London” (1927) Cambridge University 
Press.
11 See Mort & Ogbom “Transforming Metropolitan London: 1750-1960” (2004) 43 Journal o f British 
Studies 1.
12 See The Metropolitan Building Act 1884
13 For example, prohibition of building houses without privies (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Burnley, 1846); 
provision of public lavatories (Northampton 1843; Chester 1845; Southport 1846); regulations for 
minimum size of cellar dwellings (Liverpool 1842, Wallasey 1845); prohibition on building houses 
without drains and authority to inspect new drains (Sr. Helens, 1845; Chester 1845; Wallasey 1845; 
Burnley 1846); appointment of local sanitary inspectors (Manchester 1845, Southport 1846); minimum 
height of rooms in new houses (Liverpool 1842, Wallasey 1845; Belfast 1845); inspection of lodging 
houses (Glasgow 1843, Manchester 1845).
14 The Act applied only to areas outside London. See Ley “A History of Building Control in England 
and Wales: 1840 -  1990” (2000) RICS Books.
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houses in tightly confined spaces and the encouragement of the use of sanitation 
facilities - every newly built house had to have a water-closet, privy or ash pit. The 
next twenty-five years witnessed rapid reform. For example, the Public Health Act of 
1858 disbanded the General Board of Health that had been established under the first 
Act and required the formation of public boards to oversee water supply, sewage,15 
highways and lighting and to deal with infectious diseases and nuisances. The 1858 
Local Government Act also gave urban authorities the power to make building bye- 
laws subject to confirmation by the Home Office. However, in 187216the country 
was divided into rural and urban districts17 for the purposes of sanitation and building 
bye-laws and the power of the urban authority to make building bye-laws was 
transferred to the Local Government Board who drafted the model bye-laws which
1 ftwere intended as a guide to councils constructing new streets and buildings. In 1875 
the law was digested by way of the Public Health Act 1875. Local authorities were 
conferred the right to make local bye-laws controlling the standard of building 
construction relative to safety, fire prevention, health and sanitation. So as to ensure 
the enforcement of these building standards by local councils, legislation was 
introduced in 1936 that required all local authorities to make and enforce their own 
building bye-laws,19 although it was not until 1952 that a new set of bye-laws outlined
90a range of mandatory measures to be followed by all councils. These measures set 
out the minimum structural standards and performance of a number of materials, 
helping to enforce national, rather than regional standards. So as to further pursue a
15 Following this Act, drainage was introduced in London in 1865
16 See Public Health Act 1872
17 In terms of sanitation, in urban areas the Local Board was the sanitary authority, whilst in rural areas 
the Board of Guardians was the sanitary authority. Building bylaws also differed in their requirements 
so as to suit rural and urban areas.
18 The Model Bylaws were first issued in 1887 and were subsequently extended under the Public 
Health Act of 1890. See Gaskell “Building Control: National Legislation and the Introduction of Local 
Bye-laws in Victorian England” (1983) Phillimore & Co Ltd.
19 The Public Health Act 1936
20 These were known as the Model By-Laws
f s
more uniform approach to building standards across the nation, a new set of building 
regulations for England and Wales were included in the 1961 Public Health Act. 
These regulations permitted the creation of one set of building regulations to replace 
the 1400 sets of local byelaws. These were finally codified in 1965 and implemented 
by law on 1 February 1966, thereby creating the first building regulations for England 
and Wales.21 In the intervening period until the present day, these “Building 
Regulations” have undergone a series of changes and revisions. For example, the 
adoption of metric measurements in Great Britain in the early Seventies required a 
redrafting of the 1966 regulations. Furthermore, in an attempt to make the regulations 
more comprehensible, they subsequently underwent a period of major restructuring, 
culminating in the current Building Regulations 2000, which came into force on 1 
January 2000.
As this complicated nexus of trade and regulation grew, so institutes representing the 
work and interests of specific tradesmen were established. For example, in the early 
and late nineteenth century, the Institute of Civil Engineers and the Royal Institute of 
Chartered Surveyors were formed, each seeking to educate, train and regulate the 
activities of their members. Many other such interest groups have since been formed 
and have more recently sought to work together under representative forums such as
99the Construction Industry Council. Thus, whilst the origins of the industry may 
have its roots in the pre-industrial revolution era, the concept of the “construction 
industry” as a diverse yet cohesive body that is both dynamic and self-regulating is a 
fairly recent phenomenon.
21 Building Regulations 1965
22 Formed in 1988, the Construction Industry Council is a pan-industry body that is concerned with all 
aspects of the built environment. It is the representative forum for the industry’s professional bodies, 
research organisations and specialist trade associations.
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The Structure of the Contemporary Construction Industry
The structure of the contemporary construction industry is somewhat complex. In 
terms of business ownership, construction businesses may be categorised into four 
groups: sole proprietorships; partnerships; companies and public corporations; and 
general government and non-profit making businesses. Upon analysis of VAT based 
enterprises in the construction industry in the year 2003, it can be seen that sole 
proprietorships accounted for 46% of such businesses, with companies and public 
corporations accounting for 37%, partnerships making up 17% of the industry and 
general government and non-profit making businesses accounting for less than 1%.
However, whilst the majority of VAT based construction enterprises are sole 
proprietors, it is interesting to note that their turnover in 2003 was by and large 
limited to below one million pounds.24 Indeed, less than 1% of VAT based sole 
proprietors recorded a turnover in excess of one million pounds, with 65% of such 
businesses recording a turnover of less than £99k. Conversely, although accounting 
for a lesser percentage of business ownership structures, the turnover sizeband of 
partnerships, companies and public corporations and general government and non­
profit making businesses were largely concentrated in the £100 -  249 thousand 
sizeband. In short therefore, whilst the sole proprietor accounts for a large percentage
23 Statistics derived from ONS “Commerce, Energy and Industry: Size Analysis of UK Businesses Data 
for 2003” ONS June 2003.
24 Ibid
8
o f  the construction industry, the turnover generated by such a group is largely limited 
to the lower-end o f the turnover scale.
M icro-analysis o f  the construction sector, whereby the turnover o f VAT based 
enterprises is analysed according to SIC code divisions, demonstrates that in tenns o f 
finances, the industry is dominated by three industrial categories: the General 
Buildings and Civil Engineering sector (accounting for 34% o f the industry’s 
turnover); the Electrical sector (accounting for 12% o f the industry’s turnover); and
25
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the Plumbing sector (accounting for 11% o f the industry’s turnover).26 Further 
analysis o f the construction industry according to Employment Sizeband, shows that 
78% o f VAT based enterprises employed between 0-4 employees. When analysing 
such figures on a regional basis, it becomes clear that a significant proportion o f both 
the turnover and employment for the year 2003 was found to be located in the south 
o f England.
In combining the macro and micro data, a generalised picture o f the construction 
industry emerges. That is, the industry is based largely upon the Small to Medium 
Sized Enterprise*17 (hereafter SME) and as such functions upon a complicated nexus o f 
trade between the main-contractor and sub-contractor, who then tenders work to the 
sub-sub contractor. Whilst businesses from every construction discipline are active 
within the industry, there are few main parties and in terms o f both turnover and 
employment, the South o f England is the most active. It is due to such a complex 
structure that disputes are an inevitable part o f the construction industry. Given the 
SME focus o f the construction sector, any factor likely to impinge upon free cash
1 Construction Industry SIC divisions by Turnover Sizeband (£ Thousand) in 2003
11 130 195 295 185 165 225 60 1250
12 15 50 35 20 10 15 0 140
21 9960 14525 16615 8150 5135 4995 1425 60805
22 715 1895 1785 730 455 440 60 6075
23 160 305 445 265 195 265 90 1725
24 20 35 35 30 20 20 10 170
25 2185 3985 4130 2000 1275 1020 155 14745
31 4970 6695 5265 2255 1435 1235 250 22105
32 90 165 220 165 130 125 25 925
33 3230 7360 4885 1865 1105 1015 170 19625
34 770 1975 1795 775 450 325 25 6120
41 595 915 650 260 215 170 15 2820
42 3090 5150 4075 1675 955 740 150 15835
43 660 1320 1105 545 380 280 30 4315
44 1505 3400 3580 1585 865 510 60 11505
45 875 2290 2125 900 595 430 70 7285
50 1140 670 595 300 185 195 40 3130
Total 30105 50935 47640 21695 13570 12000 2630 178580
21 Defined as being a business or com pany that has fewer than 250 em ployees and a turnover or balance 
sheet total o f  less than Euro 50 million.
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flow that may jeopardise the survival of a commercial enterprise must be quashed. 
Hence effective resolution of disputes is critical to the construction industry and the 
wider British economy.
Disputes -  a By-Product of a Construction Project?
It is often said that disputes28 are a by-product of the construction industry, in that it is 
an expected part of any building contract that a disagreement will emerge between the 
parties. This is largely due to the nature of the construction industry itself. The scope 
of construction works is so diverse so as to range from purely building work, to pure 
engineering, with a host of activities in between. Thus, a single construction project 
will require the provision of a variety of materials and plant from a number of 
specialist merchants and suppliers, not to mention the technical knowledge and skill 
of the main contractor, as well as a plethora of specialist sub-contractors. In short, the 
professional parties involved in building and engineering works, will often be as 
numerous as they are diverse. Indeed, such technical diversification poses a threat to 
the success of the construction project in that the high number of participating parties 
means that there will be split responsibility between specification of the project on the 
one hand and design on the other. It is not difficult to envisage the situation whereby 
the final “product” is defective, giving rise to the question where should the liability 
fall? As with all questions of liability, determination is not always easy, but in a case 
where there is a division between the very similar functions of specification and 
design, where there are numerous sub-contracts and string contracts each seeking to
28 See Miller & Sarat “Grievances, Claims & Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture” (1981) 15 
Law & Society Review p525 where it is contended that “[a] dispute exists when a claim based on a 
grievance is rejected in whole or part”.
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restrict and / or defer liability and where more often than not the work will be of a 
prototypical nature, the question may be near impossible to resolve.
In evidentiary terms the resolution of such disputes may be problematical. Latent 
defects in the standard of work may not arise for several years, meaning that evidence 
may have been destroyed or misplaced and those personnel involved in the building 
and engineering works are no longer traceable. Even if the defect becomes apparent 
relatively soon after completion, the diversity and volume of evidentiary material will 
still render the task of resolving the dispute a complex one, as evidential documents 
range from site investigation reports to weather reports, all of which may be 
haphazard and may not assist the determination of liability in any meaningful way. 
Thus, before work has even begun, the problem of contractual liability poses the 
threat of a long and complex dispute.
The nature of a construction project also renders a dispute likely, in that the delivery 
of a product in a construction contract is a “process” and not an “event”. Indeed, due 
to the number of contractual parties, the sequencing of activities may become 
somewhat difficult, thereby giving rise to delay. This is especially so given that each 
party to a construction contract depends upon the activities of others to complete their 
work and a single missed deadline may forestall the completion date by several 
months, if not years. Practical difficulties such as adverse weather conditions, strikes 
and the demands of Health and Safety legislation, all serve to exert external pressure 
that may also frustrate the contract. Consequently, disputes as to the financial 
responsibility for such delays thereby arise and are further exacerbated by the fact that 
many sub-contractors work on “day rates” and thus disputes are expanded so as to
concern the efficiency of work carried out and the record of hours worked. 
Additionally, the essence of construction in the UK is to allow the customer to change 
its mind once work has commenced, as variations and programme changes are 
accepted under the contract. Since the documents allow employers to alter the scope 
of the work and since that turn of events allows claims for additional costs, disputes 
often arise as to the sums liable for those additional costs.
Given its common law tradition and the similarity of the American and British
•  90  •economies , an analysis of the nature of legal society in the United States of America 
may be seen to be an indicator of future trends in the United Kingdom. Indeed, due to 
the inter-play of factors such as over-legislation, the over-litigation of citizens and the 
subsequent over-involvement of the judiciary, a “culture of dispute” has emerged in 
America that has become so entrenched so as to be almost impossible to reverse.30 
Recent developments affecting the British construction industry may provide an 
opportunity for such a cycle of dispute to be replicated in England and Wales if they 
are left unchecked. For example, as already demonstrated, the twentieth century 
witnessed an increase in the legislation and regulations affecting construction works. 
Furthermore, the re-growth of internationalism within a nation state and the 
emergence of corporations have meant that the close-knit community that used to be 
the construction industry, has been superseded by an international market that is both 
anonymous and distrustful and one which has served only to compound the numbers
29 The origins and industrialisation of the American economy was greatly influenced by the Industrial 
Revolution in the United Kingdom, as it was encouraged as a means for ensuring both the political 
independence and economic well-being of the United States. Both the United Kingdom and America 
share the economic theories o f capitalism, free trade and free markets. The official policies o f the 
Roosevelt and Johnson administrations involving deficit spending and its various corollaries were 
based on the theories of British economist John Maynard Keynes. See Fallon “UK -  USA: The British
Character of America” (2001) 3 The Social Contract Press p91
30 See Galanter “Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think 
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious & Litigious Society” (1983) 31 UCLA Law Review p.6
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of disputes.31 Should such factors be met with a the over-litigation of the citizen and 
the subsequent over-involvement of the judiciary in such disputes, then it is 
conceivable that the culture of dispute as witnessed in the United States may become 
entrenched in British construction. This is not to say, however, that disputes are a 
phenomenon of contemporary society alone. Indeed, as will become clear, legal 
history demonstrates that dispute resolution mechanisms have been of concern to the 
industrial sector for many centuries.
The Development of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms In Context
Dispute resolution mechanisms have been of paramount importance to the 
commercial sector since the establishment of a formalised system of trade. Indeed, 
the origins of the British courts are long established32 and it was out of commercial 
need that the first seeds of alternatives to court proceedings, namely arbitration33 and
31 Ibid
32 For a full exposition of early litigation see: Avery “The History of the Equitable Jurisdiction of 
Chancery Before 1460” (1969) XLII Bulletin o f the Institute o f Historical Research p. 129-44; Blatcher 
“The Court of the King’s Bench 1450 -  1550: A Study in Self-Help” (1978) Athlone Press; Bonfield 
“The Nature of Customary Law in the Manor Courts of Medieval England” (1989) 31 Comparative 
Studies in Society and History p. 514-34; idem “Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in 
Medieval English Manorial Courts” (1992) 10 Law and History Review p. 197-252; idem “Trial by 
Ordeal: the Key to Proof in the Early Common Law” in M. Arnold et al., eds, On the Laws and 
Customs of England. Essays in Honour of Samuel E Thorpe (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981) 90 -  126; 
Chapman “Litigation in the Boroughs: the Shrewsbury Curia Parva 1480 -  1730” (1994) 15 Journal o f  
Legal History 3 p.201-222; Davies and Fouracre “The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval 
Europe” (1992) Cambridge University Press; Harding “The Law Courts of Medieval England” (1973) 
Allen and Unwin; Johnstone “Disputes and Democracy: The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient 
Athens” (1999) University of Texas Press.
33 For a full exposition of the development of arbitration see: Asouzu “International Commercial 
Arbitration and African States: Practice, Participation and Institutional Development” (2001) 
Cambridge University Press; Beckerman “Towards a System of Medieval Manorial Adjudication: The 
Nature of Customary Judgements in a System of Customary Law” (1995) 13 Law and History Review 
p. 1-22; Kavass and Lilvak “UNCITRAL Model Law of Intemation Commercial Arbitration: A 
Documentary History” (1985) William S Hein & Co; Kellor “American Arbitration: Its History, 
Functions and Achievements” (1972) Kennikat Publishing; Moore “International Adjudications 
Ancient and Modem History and Documents Together With Mediatorial Reports, Advisory Opinions 
and Decisions of Domestic Commissions” (1996) William S Hein & Co; Sir M. J. Mustill “Arbitration: 
History and Background” (1989) 6 Journal o f International Arbitration p.43-56; Parker “The History 
and Development of Commercial Arbitration and Recent Developments in the Supervisory Powers of
14
later adjudication, were sown. As analysis will demonstrate, contemporary 
alternatives to litigation have in effect returned to their medieval beginnings: 
following a period in which dispute resolution was strictly confined by the hand of the 
State, contemporary mechanisms now seek to employ less rigid, more industry-led 
solutions.
The use of dispute resolution methods outside the commercial courts can be traced to 
the initial emergence of national and international trade.34 During the Middle Ages, 
merchant traders were extensively engaged in the importing and exporting of goods 
such as cloth and metals, basing much of their trade on credit terms via bills of 
exchange which were valid throughout Europe. The emergence of such a complicated 
nexus of trade and finance obviously brought with it disputes concerning goods and 
payment. However, the concern of the early Royal Courts primarily involved 
disagreements over land and conduct detrimental to the King’ peace. Thus, any 
contract or commercial credit formed with a foreign trader was almost wholly 
unenforceable in England. Moreover, any writ that was issued against a tradesman 
was of little practical effect, as the writ issuing procedure was so lacking in 
expedition, that by time the aggrieved party had obtained the writ, the offending 
tradesman had already passed through the jurisdiction and onto another town. Worse 
still, should the trading agreement involve a foreign party, the jurisdiction of the 
English Court could be ousted from the outset by the necessity to prove venue in
the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” (Lionel Cohen Lectures, 5th Series) (1959) Oxford University Press; 
Powell “Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England” (1984) 2 Law and 
History Review p.21-43; idem “Arbitration and the Law in England in the later Middle Ages” (1983) 33 
Transactions o f the Royal Historical Society 5th Ser. p.49-67; Roebuck “Sources for the History of 
Arbitration: A Bibliographical Introduction” (1998) 14 Arbitration International 3 p.237- 343; Sanders 
“New Trends in the Development of International Commercial Arbitration and the Role of Arbitral and 
Other International Institutions” (1983) ICC A Congress Series, Kluwer Law International.
34 See Parker “The History and Development of Commercial Arbitration and Recent Developments in 
the Supervisory Powers of the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” (Lionel Cohen Lectures, 5th Series) 
(1959) Oxford University Press p5
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England. Thus, the lack of support from the Royal Courts meant that the merchant 
traders began to rely upon specialised tribunals to resolve their domestic and 
international trading disputes - The Borough Courts,35 The Fair Courts36 and The 
Staple Courts.37
The Development and Evolution of the Specialist Tribunals
Whilst The Borough Courts were not concerned solely with commercial matters, 
commercial disputes did prevail at The Fair Courts and the Staple Courts and it is here 
that the first seeds of contemporary arbitration were sown. For whilst usually under 
the control of an officer of the manor or borough where the trading fair was held, on 
occasion, The Fair Court did permit the declaration of the law and its subsequent 
enforcement by the merchants themselves.38 Moreover, the desire for expediency in 
such cases led to the gradual relaxation of strict procedure, such as the commencing 
of pleas without writ.39
35 So called as they were convened under the jurisdiction of the surrounding locality.
36 Often referred to as “piepowder” courts as the procedures were so swift that the participants still had 
dust from the fairground on their feet. See Stewart “Arbitration and Insurance Without the Common 
Law” (2004) 3 ARIAS-US Quarterly
37 So called as they were convened in staple towns.
38 See Baker “The Law Merchant and The common Law Before 1700” (1979) 38 Cambridge Law 
Journal 295; Bermen “Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition” (1983) 
Harvard University Press; Bewes “The Romance of the Law Merchant” (1923) Sweet &Maxwell; 
Mitchell “An Essay on the Early History o f the Law Merchant: Being the Yorke Prize Essay For the 
Year 1903” (1904) Cambridge University Press; Teetor “England’s Earliest Treaties on the Law 
Merchant: The Essay on Lex Mercatoria From the Little Red Book of Bristol (circa AD 1280)” (1962) 
6 American Journal o f Legal History 178
39 See Burdick “What is the Law Merchant?” (1902) 2 Columbia Law Review 470
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Similarly, the Staple Courts under the Statute of Staples 1353, provided for the 
determination of merchant disputes according to the Law Merchant.40 Most 
significant, however, was that whilst the tribunal usually consisted of the Mayor who 
had a knowledge of the law merchant and two “convenienable constables”, where the 
interests of an alien merchant were affected, they were to be associated with two 
“merchant strangers” who had been elected by the merchantile community. Where 
the dispute concerned the quality of a good, six commercial assessors were to be 
appointed,41 the decision of whom was to be final and binding upon the mayor and 
constables. Interestingly, this theme of industrial self-regulation was continued by the 
merchant guilds themselves, who often maintained arbitral tribunals for the use of 
their members.
With the social, political and economic turbulence of the sixteenth century, however, 
there began a gradual decline of industrial self-regulation and the introduction of 
greater state regulation and control. Following the industrial revolution came the 
evolution of the financier, the entrepreneur and the joint stock company and there 
began the resolve of the common law courts to involve themselves with commercial 
matters.42 Contrary to popular mythology, state regulation of arbitration did not 
emerge so as to merely further the interests of an all-prevailing government. Rather, 
it developed in response to the business community’s distrust and dislike of court 
intervention in arbitral proceedings.43 Despite the fact that the common law conferred
40 See Parker “The History and Development o f Commercial Arbitration and Recent Developments in 
the Supervisory Powers of the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” (Lionel Cohen Lectures, 5th Series) 
(1959) Oxford University Press p5
41 Four of whom were to be of non-English origin.
42 See Parker “The History and Development o f Commercial Arbitration and Recent Developments in 
the Supervisory Powers of the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” (Lionel Cohen Lectures, 5th Series) 
(1959) Oxford University Press p5
43 By the Seventeenth Century, the common law courts had passed enough judgements on the nature 
and character of arbitration, that a detailed body of law on the elements necessary for arbitration could
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great power upon the arbitrator and gave to him the freedom to judge according to 
legal and non-legal principles,44 the courts assertion of a role in the settlement of 
business disputes was not universally accepted by an industry that had functioned on 
the basis of self-regulation. By utilising statutory regulation, Parliament initially 
attempted to forge a partnership between legal professionals on the one hand and the 
business community on the other. Indeed, in 1571 legislation was passed to confer 
bankruptcy jurisdiction upon a tribunal of commissioners composed partly of lawyers 
and partly of merchants. Such coalition legislation was furthered in 1601, when a 
special court consisting of both lawyers and merchants was established for the 
settlement of insurance issues in London. Thus, prima facie, an equal balance was 
struck between the desire of the common law Courts to intervene and the desire of the 
business community for self-regulation.
By the turn of the Eighteenth Century, however, judicial intervention began to extend 
beyond the bounds of coalition. The exact reason for such is unknown, but three 
differing theories have been espoused in explanation: nature; nurture; and necessity.45 
The naturalist theory of court intervention presumes that the extension of court 
jurisdiction was a result of the natural desire of the judiciary to keep all adjudications 
within their sphere. Similarly, the nurture theory purports that the extension of 
judicial intervention was in reaction to the fear that a new system of law was 
developing beyond their control. So as to regulate such and thereby maintain the
be identified. Indeed, many of these “elements” remain a requirement of contemporary arbitration. For 
example, it remains the case that the arbitral award must be lawful and must not interfere with an Order 
of the Court. Moreover, legislative provision has frequently identified the fact that an arbitral award is 
to be final and binding on the parties and must be produced within a specified period o f time.
44 See Davis & Fouracre “The Settlement o f Disputes in Medieval Europe” (1992) Cambridge 
University Press; Powell “Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth Century England” (1984) 
2 HLR 21-43
45 Loc Cit 42
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position of the court in the legal hierarchy, the court began to extend its jurisdiction 
over arbitral proceedings. More convincing than such theories of insecurity, however, 
is the theory that the growing intervention of the court was due to the need of arbitral 
parties to secure the assistance of the courts in pursuing their claim, which in turn led 
to the courts exacting a price for their assistance. That is, although there were several 
means of pursuing a claim through arbitration,46 the only method that afforded any 
success was in making a submission to arbitration an Order of the Court, as failure to 
abide by the arbitral award could then result in prosecution for contempt of Court. In 
utilising the powers of the judiciary, therefore, compliance with arbitral proceedings 
was almost guaranteed.
The importance of judicial powers to the success of arbitration was recognised by the 
Arbitration Act 1698 which extended the scope of submission to arbitration. For as 
Lord Mansfield exemplified in Markham v Wilton47 the Act served to “put 
submissions to arbitration in cases where there was no cause depending, upon the 
same foot as those where there was a cause depending”. This meant that informal 
arbitrations that were previously seen to be mere personal obligations assumed by the 
parties were accorded status by the 1698 Act. In addition to such statutory 
recognition, however, legislative provision was also made as regards supervision of 
the proceedings. That is, the Act provided that “any arbitration or umpirage procured 
by corruption or undue means shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect 
and accordingly be set aside by any court of law or equity”. Thus, the introduction of 
the 1698 Arbitration Act marked the introduction of greater judicial intervention into 
arbitral proceedings.
46 By covenant; condition; parol contract; or by consent at Assizes, the submission being made a Court 
Order.
47 (1759) 2 Burr 701
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Such judicial intervention soon extended to encompass the monitoring of arbitrators 
so as to ensure that they acted within the submission.48 As exemplified in the 1703 
case of Morris v Reynolds49 it was not long before the integrity of an arbitrator could 
also be examined via the judicial process. Whilst such examination was initially 
confined to whether or not the arbitrators were “manifestly corrupt”,50 it was not long 
before the judiciary were willing to “take into consideration such legal objections as 
appear on the face of the award and such as go to the misbehaviour of the 
arbitrators”. 51 However, as stated by Lord Commissioner Wilson in Morgan v 
Mather , in order for the arbitral award to be set aside on the grounds of mistake as to 
law, the arbitrator need first admit his mistake. By 1802 the rules had widened 
further, enabling an arbitral award to be set aside for mistake where the mistake was 
apparent on the face of the award or in the reasoning provided by the arbitrator at the
o
time of the award. However, it was not until the Common Law Procedure Act 1854
that the control of the commercial tribunal came to fall under the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary law courts. Under the 1854 Act, authority was conferred upon the judiciary 
to stay proceedings to arbitration where arbitration was the agreed method of dispute 
resolution, thus avoiding the pursuit of unnecessary claims through the courts. 
Moreover, provision was made so as to permit the court to appoint both arbitrators 
and umpires in the event of difficulties arising on default and authority was conferred 
so as to enable the judiciary to remit an award back to an arbitrator who was then able
48 It should be noted that questions of procedure affecting “natural justice” were not considered 
(Matthew v Ollerton (1693) 4 Mod 226)
49 (1703) 2 Ld Rayon 857
50 Anderson v Coxeter (1720) 93 ER 534
51 Lucas ex d  Markham v Wilton (1759) 2 Burr 701
52 (1792) 2 Ves Jun 15 atp.18
53 Kent v Elstob (1802) 3 East 18 (Kings Bench in banc. See also Blennerhasset v Day (1811) 2 Ball & 
B. 104; Steff v Andrews (1816) 2 Mad. 6; Ames v Milward (1818) 8 Taunt. 637; Stimpson v Emmerson 
(1847) 9 L.T. (O.S) 199; Hodgkinson v Fernie (1857) 3 CB (N.S) 189.
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to state a question of law for the determination of the court.54 Thus, as can be seen, it 
was the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 that marked the true beginning of “state 
controlled arbitration”.
Ironically and as will become clear, it was commercial development that led to the 
further extension of state restrained arbitration. With the increasing complexity of 
commercial matters came the need for the implementation of greater comprehensive 
provisions to govern the resolution of disputes. An example of such can be seen in 
the development of the steam ship which made London the capital of the trading 
world, as the increase in trade brought about by more expedient transportation led to 
an increase in disputes that required speedy resolution.55 Indeed, dissatisfaction with 
the arbitration process during the industrial revolution was apparent in that when 
discussing the resolution of an insolvency dispute, it was stated that:
“..something better might be found than arbitration, which is well known to 
all who have tried it to be at once costly, uncertain, and unsatisfactory”.56
The Development of the Modern Law
So as to alleviate the situation whereby commercial matters were being dealt with in 
an arena unsuited to the needs of industry, the closing stages of the Nineteenth 
Century witnessed several reforms. Codification of the commercial law heralded a 
new approach to the method by which the law was created, interpreted and
54 Known as the Case Stated Procedure
55 See Parker “The History and Development of Commercial Arbitration and Recent Developments in 
the Supervisory Powers of the Courts Over Inferior Tribunals” (Lionel Cohen Lectures, 5th Series) 
(1959) Oxford University Press p i9
56 Letter to the Editor, The Times, Thurs, Apr 04, 1872; pg. 6; Issue 27342; col B
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implemented. In short, codification sought to both state and reform the existing law. 
Specialist courts were also developed to deal with the specific needs of an 
increasingly diverse economy and in addition to such centralised reforms, the 
commercial sector developed it own solution to the increasing numbers of disputes - 
the standard form contract.
The codification of the Law
Given the profound social, political and economic effects of the industrial revolution, 
continental countries and later the United States of America, sought to codify the 
entire body of their mercantile law. Such codification attempted to lay down abstract 
principles that were of general application so as to present the law in a logical and 
easily accessible fashion. Due to the effects of legal precedent, however, the 
codification of British law was less complete. Rather than codify an entire body of 
law, it was anticipated that codification could be achieved by passing legislation on 
specific topics. It is often believed that Sir MacKenzie Chalmers was responsible for 
the codification of commercial law. Indeed, it was he who drafted the Companies Act 
1862, the Bills of Exchange Act 1882,57 the Sale of Goods Act 189358 and the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906.59 However, codification was also enacted on the impetus of 
other interest groups. For example, Sir Frederick Pollock drafted The Partnership Act
57 The Bills of Exchange Act was the first Act to codify any branch of common law. The formation of 
the Bill was instructed by the Institute o f Bankers and the Associated Chambers of Commerce. It was 
introduced into the House of Commons by Sir John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury) and was 
referred to a committee of lawyers and bankers over which Herschell presided. Its passage through 
Parliament was rapid. See Chalmers “Bills o f Exchange Act 1882” (1967) Waterlow.
58 In consultation with Lord Herschell, Chalmers drafted the Bill that led to the creation of the Act. It 
substantially formulated the method of transfer of personal property. See Mackenzie, Dalzell, Edwin, 
Stewart & Chalmers “Sale of Goods Act, 1893, including the Factors Acts, 1889 & 1890” (1957) 
Butterworth.
59 See Ivamy and Hardy “Chalmers Marine Insurance Act 1906” (10th Ed) (1993) Witherby’s 
Publishing
1890 and the legislation appertaining to arbitration in 1889 was both initiated by and 
prepared at the expense of the London Chamber of Commerce. In short, codification 
o f the commercial law in the nineteenth century was personality-led.60
Turning to consider the codification of arbitral law, although a contentious decision, it 
was perhaps a consequence of the decision of the Court in Scott v Avery,61 together 
with the procedural shortfalls experienced by the commercial community when 
utilising arbitration, which highlighted the need for the consolidation of the law of 
arbitration. Thus, in 1889, statutory legislation was introduced in the form of the “Act 
for Amending and Consolidating the Enactments Relating to Arbitration”. The 
passage of the Arbitration Bill through Parliament was rapid. Presented for a first 
reading on the 22nd February 1889, the Bill received royal assent on the 26th August. 
The 1889 Arbitration Act repealed all previous legislation on arbitration and sought to 
extend the power and authority of the court. This was achieved by conferring upon 
the court a statutory power to set aside an arbitral award on the grounds of 
misconduct and enabling the court to require an arbitrator to state his award in the 
form of a special case, thereby permitting the court to “adjudicate on any point of 
law arising in the reference”. Thus, in so doing, intentionally or otherwise, the British 
judiciary were in effect promoted to the position of “state police” of the arbitral 
process.
60 See Alan “The Codification of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain” (1992) 108 LQR p.570-90; 
Boss and Fry “Divergent or Parallel Tracks: International and Domestic Codification o f Commercial 
Law” (1992) 47 The Business Lawyer p. 1505-15; Goode “The Codification of Commercial Law” (1988) 
14 Monash University Law Review p. 135-57
61 In 1856 the House of Lords decided in Scott v Avery that an arbitration agreement that attempted to 
oust the court’s jurisdiction would be contrary to public policy and thereby void. However, it was held 
that a provision making the arbitrator’s award a condition precedent to the right to bring an action 
before the court, was enforceable. In short, under Scott v Avery the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be 
ousted, but it may be deferred. See Thomas “Scott v Avery Agreements” (1991) 4 Lloyd’s Maritime & 
Commercial Law Quarterly p.508-30.
62 Sl l
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Aside from the ensuing theoretical issues, such judicial intervention brought with it 
problems of a practical nature. For the court system was already in undated with trial 
cases on practice and procedure that resulted from the introduction of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court 1883 and not enough preparation had been made to deal with the 
resulting caseload that emerged from the special case procedure. This situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that many judges dealing with commercial cases were 
ignorant of commercial matters. Indeed, as Lord Justice Scrutton contended in 
Butcher, Wether by & Co Ltd v Norman:64
“One of the objects of justice is to satisfy the litigants that their cases are fairly 
and properly heard, and unfortunately, some classes of commercial cases are so 
complex in their nature that a Judge who is not conversant with that class of 
commercial business has to have a great many explanations made to him in the 
course of a case...”
The Introduction of Specialist Courts
Given the increasing complexity of commercial disputes and the difficulties thereby 
created, two new offices were introduced in the closing stages of the nineteenth 
century. In 1873 the office of the Official Referee was created and further reform 
followed in 1895 with the introduction of the commercial “court” and publication of 
the rules for commercial causes.
The office of the Official Referee was created by s83 of the Judicature Act 1873 and 
was initially strictly limited to the investigation and reporting on matters of fact which
64 47 LI LR 324
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had been referred by the Court to the Official Referee for that purpose.65 In so far as 
the commercial court was concerned, its inception was largely accounted for by the 
will of the judiciary of the Queens Bench Division who determined that cases which 
had been commenced in their division and which contained commercial matters 
should be transferred to a special list known as the “commercial list”. The list was 
managed by a single Queens Bench judge who alone took charge of the list and heard 
applications for transfer to that list and the interlocutory matters and trials of the cases 
which were subsequently entered on it. It was anticipated that in providing a 
specialist judge to identify the issues involved at an early stage without protracted 
hearings or multiple interlocutory applications, then the swifter resolution of 
commercial disputes would be achieved.66 Indeed, it would prima facie appear that 
upon its creation, the commercial court achieved its ambition:
“It is gratifying to have to record at a time when so much complaint is being 
made about the stagnation of business in the Queen’s Bench Division, that the 
Commercial Court is at any rate an exception to the general rule. Mr Justice 
Matthew had set down for hearing yesterday morning a list of 45 summonses in 
commercial causes, all of which he disposed of in about two hours and a-half.”67
65 See His Honour Edgar Fay QC “Official Referees Business” (2nd ed) (1988) Sweet & Maxwell p9 -  
22 .
66 It is interesting to note that within fifty years of its inception, the number of trials entering the 
commercial list began to decline. Indeed the numbers fell from 32 cases in 1952 to 15 in 1957. Given 
this rate of decline, a Commercial Court User’s Conference was convened to investigate the decline 
and to determine the future of the commercial court. In 1962 it concluded that subject to certain 
reforms, the Commercial List should continue. Following provision for the direct entry onto the list, a 
steady increase in numbers of actions entered on the List and the numbers o f actions listed for trial 
ensued. By way of example, the numbers of cases listed for trial rose from 128 in 1975 to 408 in 1980.
67 See The Times Saturday Dec 14th 1895; pg 7; Issue 34760; col B
The Development of the Standard Form Contract
It is interesting to note that as the cost and duration of commercial litigation increased 
and as the hand of the state further extended into arbitral proceedings, so the 
construction industry devised another mechanism of self-governance that remains 
today -  the standard form contract.
68 For an exposition of the need, use and role of standard form contracts, see: Abdel-Latif and Nugent 
“Transaction Cost Impairments to International Trade: Lessons from Egypt” (1996) 14 Contemporary 
Economic Policy 2 p i-14; Ayres and Gertner “Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules” (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 4 p729-74; Banwell “The Placing and 
Management of Contracts for Building and Civil Engineering Works” (1964) HMSO; Beale and 
Dugdale “Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies” (1975) 2 
British Journal o f Law and Society p45-60; Becker “The Cost of General Conditions” (1993) AACE 
Transactions; Bennett “Construction Project Management” (1985) Butterworths; Bick “Statutory 
Reform of Aspects of Construction Law in Australia” (1997) 15 Construction Management and 
Economics 6 p549-58; Bourn “Modernizing Construction” (2001) HC 87 Session 2000-1, London: 
National Audit Office; Bowdery “New age contract” In UfF (Ed.) “Contemporary Issues in 
Construction Law 2 - Construction Contract Reform: A Plea for Sanity” (1997) Centre for Construction 
Law and Management; British Standards Institution “Design Management Systems - Part 4, Guide to 
Managing Design in Construction” (1997) British Standards Institution; Cabinet Office Efficiency Unit 
“Construction Procurement by Government: An Efficiency Office Scrutiny (the Levene report)” (1995) 
HMSO; Construction Industry Board “Constructing Success: Code of Practice for Clients of the 
Construction Industry” (1997) Thomas Telford; Cooter “Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The 
Model of Precaution” (1985) 73 California Law Review 2 p. 1-51; Cox and Thompson “Is the NEC 
Going to Succeed? An Examination of the Engineering and Construction Contract” (1996) 13 
International Construction Law Review p.327-37; Cox and Townsend “Latham as Half-Way House: A 
Relational Competence Approach to Better Practice in Construction Procurement” (1997) 4 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 2 p. 143-58; Eggleston “The New 
Engineering Contract: A Commentary” (1996) Blackwell Science; Emmerson “Survey o f Problems 
Before the Construction Industry” (1962) HMSO; Gaitskell “Is Latham Correct? A Survey of 
Construction Industry Opinion” In: Uff (Ed.) “Construction Law Yearbook” (1995) Chancery Law 
Publishing Ltd; Galbraith “Designing Complex Organizations” (1973) Addison-Wesley; Gray and 
Flanagan “The Changing Role of Specialist and Trade Contractors” (1989) Chartered Institute of 
Building; Greenwood “Contractual Arrangements and Conditions of Contracts for the Engagement of 
Specialist Engineering Contractors for Construction Projects” (1993) University of 
Northumbria/Confederation of Associations of Specialist Engineering Contractors; Grimsey and 
Graham “PFI in the NHS” (1997) 4 Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 3 p.215- 
31; Hughes “Analysing Plans of Work” (2001) 8 Engineering, Construction and Architectural 
Management 4 p.272-83; Hughes and Greenwood “The Standardization o f Contracts for Construction” 
(1996) 13 International Construction Law Review 2 p. 196-206; Hughes and Maeda “Construction 
Contract Policy: Do We Mean What We Say?” (2001) 6 RICS Research Papers 7; Hughes, Gray and 
Murdoch “Specialist Trade Contracting: Report” (1997) Special Report SP 138, Construction Industry 
Research and Information Association; Huxtable “Corruption of the Commercial Process. Report from 
the Confederation of Construction Specialists” (1983) CCS Services Ltd; Langford and Murray 
“Construction Reports 1944-1998” (2003) Blackwell Publishing; Latham “Constructing the Team: 
Final Report of the Government/Industry Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in the 
UK Construction Industry” (1994) HMSO; Lingard, Hughes and Chinyio “The Impact of Contractor 
Selection Method on Transaction Costs: A Review” (1998) 4 Journal o f  Construction Procurement 2 
p.89-102; Matthews, Tyler and Thorpe “Pre-Construction Project Partnering: Developing the Process” 
(1996) 3 Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management (1/2) p. 117-31; McGowan, Homer, 
Jones and Thompson “Allocation and Evaluation of Risk in Construction Contracts” In: Harlow (Ed.)
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The purpose behind the introduction of standard form contracts was so as to remove 
the necessity for each building or engineering contract to be individually negotiated 
and drafted. Not only were such contracts intended to lessen the expense incurred in 
the formulation and administration of the project, but they also served to ensure an 
equal balance of power between the parties in the apportioning of responsibility and 
contractual expectations. Furthermore, such contracts were seen to improve project 
co-ordination and were thought to be an efficient method of reducing information and 
documentation requirements. However, the use of such contracts has been and 
remains controversial in that they do not force parties to a contract to think about roles 
and responsibilities at the outset of each project and as such, are a barrier to effective 
risk allocation.69 Furthermore, doubt has been expressed as to whether standard 
contractual terms could simultaneously be clear, flexible and fair.70 Indeed, it would 
appear that the standard form contract has done little to reduce the numbers of 
disputes. A precursory glance at the nature of the construction industry provides an 
explanation, in that construction practices frequently change, thereby subjecting
“CIOB Occasional Papers” (1992) Chartered Institute of Building; Nettleton “Best Value and Direct 
Services” (2000) 139 ICE Proceedings: Municipal Engineer 2 p.83-90; Omoto “A Comparative Study 
of British and Japanese Construction Contracts” (1996) 13 International Construction Law Review 4 
p.451-81; Pasquire and Collins “The Effect of Competitive Tendering on Value in Construction” (1996) 
2 RICS Research Papers 5 p. 1-32; Posner and Rosenfield “Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis” (1977) 6 Journal o f Legal Studies p.83-118; Rooke and 
Seymour “The NEC and the Culture of the Industry: Some Early Findings Regarding Possible Sources 
of Resistance to Change” (1995) 2 Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 4 p.287- 
305; Royal Institution of British Architects “Plan of Work for Design Team Operation” (1997) RIBA 
Publications Ltd; Sidney “Japanese Construction: An American Perspective” (1990) Van Nostrand 
Reinhold; Thompson and Perry Eds. “Engineering Construction Risks: A Guide to Project Risk 
Analysis and Risk Management” (1992) Thomas Telford; Uff “Contract Documents and the Division 
of Risk” In: Uff and Odams (Eds.) “7th Annual Construction Law Conference: Risk Management and 
Procurement in Construction, King's College, London” (1994) Centre for Construction Law and 
Management p49-69; Uff “Compulsory Adjudication and its Effects on the Construction Industry” In: 
Uff (Ed.) “Construction Contract Reform: A Plea for Sanity” (1997) Centre for Construction Law and 
Management; Weame “Contract Administration and Project Risks” (1992) 10 International Journal o f 
Project Management 1; Yates “Standard Business Contracts: Exclusion and Related Devices” (1986) 
Sweet and Maxwell; Yule “Back to Back Contracting” In: Harlow (Ed.) “Construction Papers” (1995) 
Chartered Institute of Building.
69 See Thompson and Perry “Engineering Construction Risks: A Guide to Project Risk Analysis and 
Risk Management” (1992) Thomas Telford; Yule “Back to Back Contracting” (1995). In: Harlow (Ed.) 
48 “Construction Papers” Ascot: Chartered Institute of Building.
70 Ibid.
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projects to many new situations that a standard form contract cannot deal with, or 
cannot deal with without legal interpretation. Furthermore, whilst standard form 
contracts may stipulate payment provisions, disputes will always continue as to 
whether such payment is indeed due under the terms of the contract. Thus, whilst 
standard forms may lessen the initial financial outlay in the negotiation stage, they 
cannot be seen as a guarantee of a dispute-free project.71
Legislative Reform in the Twentieth Century
Despite the attempts to reform the civil justice system in the Nineteenth Century, 
difficulties in the resolution of commercial disputes persisted. Thus, in 1950 and 
1979 arbitration received significant statutory attention once more. However, it was 
not until the closing stages of the twentieth century that legislation was enacted so as 
to effectively reform access to justice: namely the Arbitration Act 1996, The Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.
71 So as to minimise the effects of such, standard form contracts are periodically reviewed and 
recent history has witnessed the overhaul of a number of such documents. Furthermore, in 
recognition of the limitations of such contractual undertakings, the JCT has recently endorsed a 
new approach to contract formation and is expected to adopt such an approach as the basis of 
their future contract-drafting policy.
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The Arbitration Act 1950
When debating the effect of the Arbitration Bill that was presented to Parliament in 
1950, it was stated that:
. .1 think a very good job has been done. It was a job which required doing. 
It will be of great help to the legal profession and will give help to the 
public”.72
It is clear from such sentiment that the intention of the 1950 legislation was to 
simplify the law surrounding arbitration proceedings so as to render arbitration 
accessible to all. However, whilst the 1950 Act did consolidate the Arbitration Acts 
1889 to 1934, a number of legislative lacunas remained, producing undesirable 
results.
Primarily, the drafting of the statute was such that its structure was illogical. Rather 
than following the process of arbitration and beginning with the appointment 
procedure of the arbitral tribunal, for example, the 1950 Act began with the 
irrevocability of the authority of arbitrators, moving on to the effect of the death of a 
party in s2 and proceeding on to the effect of bankruptcy in s3. Moreover, the powers 
of the Court to deal with challenges to the arbitral process were spread out over four 
non-consecutive sections. Thus, parties wishing to use the Act for clear and concise 
guidance as to how the arbitral process ought be conducted were left confused. 
Furthermore, not only was the language of the 1950 Act obscure and unnecessarily 
complicated, but some of the principles enshrined in the Act were also unintelligible 
to the layman. For example, so confusing was the “deeming provision” to foreign
72 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1950 Vol 478 p824
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users of the 1950 Act that several arbitration agreements in England and abroad were 
rendered unenforceable.
Despite being a long established mechanism of dispute resolution, the 1950 Act also 
failed to provide a definitive code of arbitration law. For example, slO73 failed to 
confer a power upon the court to appoint an arbitrator where the contract specified an 
appointing body that subsequently failed or refused to make an appointment.74 The 
1950 Act also said little about the powers of the arbitrator and failed to provide 
guidance as to the conduct of the reference and the procedural problems incurred 
therein. Indeed, whilst the 1950 legislation conferred upon the arbitrator a number of 
discretionary powers,75 it failed to give guidance on when and how these powers 
should be exercised. Rather, these issues and more were left to the individual contract 
and the interpretation of the arbitrator. Such practice led to a number of very different 
and far-reaching problems. Firstly, due to the structure of arbitration being based 
upon both common law and statute, the resolution of technical disputes necessarily 
became the province of those skilled in the law, rather than those with expertise in the 
construction industry. Secondly, in not providing a complete and methodical 
exposition of the law, the legislature served only to permit excessive judicial 
intervention into the arbitral process, as the lack of legislative provision gave forth to 
the belief amongst some contracting parties that the arbitrator lacked ’legislative
73 SlO empowers the High Court to appoint an arbitrator or umpire in the case various circumstances.
74 See National Enterprises Ltd v Racal Communications Ltd [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Reports 21. It is 
interesting to note that s9(l) was also unpopular with the commercial sector in that where an arbitration 
agreement provides that the reference to arbitration should be to three arbitrators, one to be appointed 
by each of the parties to the dispute and the third to be appointed by those arbitrators, s9(l) converts 
the third arbitrator into an umpire. The effect of such a conversion is that the third appointee is devoid 
of jurisdiction unless and until there is a disagreement between the two party-appointed arbitrators. 
Commercial entities were dissatisfied with such a provision on the grounds that had they wanted an 
umpire, they would have appointed one. In short, Parliament had denied parties of their right to 
determine how their dispute is to be resolved.
75 For example, the power to make an interim award and an award as to costs.
10
authority'. This situation was worsened by the fact that under the auspices of the 1950 
Arbitration Act, contracting parties had wide grounds to appeal an arbitrator's actions. 
Not only could an arbitrator's interpretation of the law be challenged by 
implementation of the stated special procedure under s21 of the 1950 Act, but any 
subsequent award could also be challenged by appeal to the Court, either to remit the 
award to the arbitrator for re-consideration, or to set it aside for his 'misconduct'.77
Whilst the case stated procedure suited the needs of industry in that it reduced the 
time and resources lost to the complete re-arbitration of proceedings upon the 
quashing of an appeal and also served initially to provide consistency, coherence and
<70 «7A
predictability, the procedure soon came to be abused. For as the Solicitor-General 
later asserted, although the Arbitration Act 1950 prima facie gave the arbitrator a
OA
discretion as to whether or not to state his award in the form of a special case, the 
reality was that the arbitrator usually adopted the special case procedure on the 
application of any of the parties to the arbitration. Indeed, case law suggested that 
where a point of law arose, the arbitrator should adopt the special case stated 
procedure even if the financial sums involved were minimal, no point of general 
importance was raised, or even where the answer to the question was reasonably
76 The Special Case Stated Procedure was a nineteenth century adaptation of a similar procedure 
utilised by the criminal courts of Quarter Sessions and was originally applied to arbitration by the 
Common Law Procedure Act 1854. S21 applied to all arbitrations conducted within England and 
Wales where the question concerned English law. Under this section, an arbitrator may, and if  so 
directed by the High Court, must state his award or part of that award or any question of law arising in 
the course of the reference, in the form of a special case for the opinion of the High Court. Under 
Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt and Company [1922] 2 K.B. 478 it was determined that on public policy 
grounds, parties to an arbitration agreement could not contract out of their statutory right to obtain an 
order for an arbitrator to state his award in the form of a special case.
77 In contrast to the suggestion of such terminology, misconduct does not simply apply to dishonesty or 
a breach of business morality on the part of the arbitrator. It also applies to errors of procedure, fact or 
law. Consequently, the use of such terminology was both unpopular and misleading.
78 So as to ensure the certainty o f rights and duties in a system in which individual arbitrators are not 
bound by the decisions of others, extensive judicial review was seen to be essential.
79 Solicitor-General p.637 Hansard 14/3/79
80 Subject to a discretion in the High Court to order him to do so.
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clear.81 Moreover, where an arbitrator refused, the Court would invariably order him 
to do so. As a result, it soon became clear to unscrupulous parties involved in large 
disputes, that such a system could be manipulated for financial gain.82 For in delaying 
the date upon which the award made by the arbitrator would become due, the interest 
added to the sum in question would far outweigh the financial implications of pending 
litigation. Thus, frivolous and vexatious claims were launched so as to delay the day 
of reckoning, adversely affecting the dynamics of the commercial market.
Indeed, in challenging the arbitrator's decision, the appealing party lengthened the 
time required to bring the dispute to a full conclusion. This obviously had financial 
implications, for not only were the parties responsible for the payment of the court 
fees incurred whilst pursuing the appeal, but they also had to remunerate the arbitrator 
for his time at court and any subsequent expenses incurred. The cost of arbitration, 
therefore, began to substantially rise and it was not inconceivable that the cost of 
settling a dispute could exceed the value of the claim. Indeed, the rising arbitral costs 
often meant that the wealthier the contracting party, the more able the party to pursue 
the case to a unilaterally favourable conclusion. Thus, as with pure litigation, 
contracting parties ran the risk of arbitral proceedings dispensing what can only be 
termed, "rough justice". A further damaging consequence was that not only did such 
activity create uncertainty as to the finality of the arbitral award, but it also 
undermined the valuable effect that privacy had upon the arbitration proceedings. 
Indeed, parties could no longer be assured that the disclosure given in the course of 
arbitration would remain inaccessible to non-contracting parties and thus there was a
81 See Halfdan, Grieg & Co. A.S. v Sterling Coal Navigation Corp (The Lysland) [1973] 1 QB 843.
82 See Diplock “Use and Abuse of the Case Stated” (1978) 44 Arbitration 107
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general reluctance to co-operate fully with the arbitrator. As Sir Patrick Neil QC83 
later stated:
"It would be difficult to conceive of any greater threat to the success of English 
arbitration than the removal of the general principles of confidentiality and 
privacy".
Upon examination, therefore, it becomes clear that arbitration under the Arbitration 
Act 1950, failed to encompass the traditionally perceived arbitral advantages over 
litigation, namely speed, low costs, finality and the ability to select the individuals 
who are to resolve the dispute. Due to the inconsistency of the reality of arbitration 
with the needs and desires of businessmen, British arbitration began to lose its 
attractiveness to those at home and abroad.
The Arbitration Act 1979
Towards the end of the 1970’s it had become clear that the process of judicial review 
was undermining the usefulness of tribunal decisions. Academic writers, interest 
groups such as the London Arbitration Group, the Institute of Arbitrators and the Joint 
Committee of the London Court of Arbitration, together with the judiciary84 voiced 
their concerns with regard to arbitration and proposed methods for its reform. 
Significantly, in 1977 the Lord Chancellor established the Commercial Court
83 Bernstein Lecture 1995, as cited at p.9 of DAC Report 1996.
84 The judiciary voiced their concerns and methods of reform in the exercise of both their judicial 
duties (see for example, Hodgkinson v Fernie (1857) 3 C.B. (N.S.) 189 at pp.202, 205 as per Williams 
and Willes JJ; Champsey Bhara & Co Ltd v Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co [1923] AC 480, 
487 as per Lord Dunedin; R v Northunberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal [1951] 1 K.B. 711, 721 
as per Lord Goddard CJ; Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Yuval Insurance Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
357, 362 as per Lord Denning MR; Provimi Hellas A.E v Warinco A.G [1978] 1 LR 67, 80 as per 
Mocatta J; Tradax Export SA v Andre & Cie SA [1978] 1 LR 639, 642-643 as per Donaldson J) and 
their extra-judicial undertakings (see letter by Donaldson J to The Times, 3 March 1978. Of particular 
importance, see the Alexander Lecture delivered by Lord Diplock “The Case Stated -  Its Use and 
Abuse” (1978) 44 Arbitration 107-116).
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Committee, the purpose of which was to establish a link between the Commercial 
Court and its users. It was the recommendation of this Committee that reform be 
made to the system of arbitration and a Report ensued highlighting several 
recommendations.85 As a result, Lord Hacking commenced parliamentary debate86 
upon the issues identified and the Report of the Commercial Court Committee was 
published as a Command paper. Indeed, the value of arbitration to the British 
economy was widely recognised by Parliament and was succinctly described by the 
Solicitor-General Mr P Archer who stated:
‘The UK is a country which lives by trade to an extent greater than does any 
other major industrialised country, and for that reason alone it is important that 
our arbitration law and procedure should be efficient and effective. But there is 
a further important reason why our arbitration arrangements should compare 
well with those of other countries. Efficient arbitration is a part of the range of 
legal, financial and trading services offered here, particularly in the city of 
London, and, as such, it can be a valuable source of income and foreign 
exchange”.87
However, case law and a change in arbitral practice had demonstrated that arbitration 
under the 1950 Act was unable to provide for the changing needs and wishes of the 
commercial community. Indeed, it was stated by the Solicitor-General88 that the 
“case stated procedure... has become a real deterrent to the use of London as an 
arbitration centre” both in terms of the abuse of the provision by unscrupulous parties 
and the reluctance of foreign governments who were often involved in the trading 
disputes of supranational concerns, to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign power. 
Moreover, the English system of arbitration was at procedural odds with its foreign 
counterparts. Whereas foreign systems of arbitration advocated arbitral autonomy,
85 Cmnd.7284
86 In the House of Lords
87 Parliamentary Debates, House o f Commons, 1979 p.636
88 Ibid at p.637. See also Diplock “The Case Stated -  Its Use and Abuse” (1978) 44 Arbitration 107; 
Hacking “A New Competition -  Rivals For Centres of Arbitration” [1979] LMCLQ 435
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the historical approach of English and Welsh arbitration was that of growing judicial
89interventionism.
Thus, a new Arbitration Bill was introduced into Parliament, which rapidly became 
the Arbitration Act 1979. The Act sought to strike a balance between competing 
needs by reducing the deterrents to arbitration in England and Wales, whilst allowing 
the continued development of commercial law on a coherent basis. It was observed 
that the resulting Arbitration Act 1979 “ ...stands as a significant milestone in the 
history of English arbitration law” and has served as a model which has been 
replicated in many foreign common law jurisdictions. 90 Whilst this may be so, 
analysis demonstrates that fundamental flaws remained still.
Reforming the Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal
In an attempt to promote procedural efficiency and reduce the cost incurred in arbitral 
proceedings, the 1979 Act made several amendments to the Arbitration Act 1950 in so 
far as matters relating to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal were concerned. 
Under the 1950 Act,91 an implied term was incorporated into every contract that 
where a reference was to two arbitrators, upon their appointment the arbitrators 
should immediately appoint an umpire.92 Given the required immediacy of such an 
appointment, no provision could be made to avoid the situation whereby such an 
appointment was subsequently rendered unnecessary by the agreement of the two 
party-appointed arbitrators as to the nature of the Award to be made. S6(l) of the
89 See Kerr “Arbitration and the Courts -  The UNCITRAL Model Law” (1984) 50 Arbitration 4.
90 See Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From Arbitration Awards” (1994) LLP pvii
91 S8(l)
92 Such an implied term could be displaced by an express term to the contrary.
1979 Act avoided such unnecessary appointments by requiring two arbitrators to 
appoint an umpire only in the event of non-agreement as to the terms of the Award, 
prior to which the appointment of an umpire is a discretionary power only.
In so far as three-arbitrator tribunals were concerned, in an attempt to accurately 
reflect the intentions of the arbitral parties, the 1979 Act removed the legal rule / 
implied term that favoured umpirage where the third arbitrator was appointed by two 
party-appointed arbitrators. In short, where it was the intention of arbitral parties to 
appoint a three arbitrator tribunal, s6(2) facilitated such intention regardless of the 
procedure adopted for their appointment. Not only did the Act seek to reduce 
unnecessary tribunal appointments, therefore, but also it sought to remove the 
bureaucracy that created an arbitral tribunal whose constitution was not in line with 
party expectation.
Reform Affecting the Judicial Review of Awards
Of greater importance to arbitral efficiency, the 1979 Act sought to realign and 
restructure the functionality of the court and the arbitral process with regard to 
questions of law by introducing a new, constrained appellate procedure where a 
question of law arose from an arbitral award. Indeed, judicial review' of an award 
based upon the common law proposition of “errors of fact or law on the face of the
Q 'J
award” and the statutory provided “special case procedure”, were both repealed by 
the 1979 Act in favour of a limited appeal procedure from reasoned awards based
93 The consultative case procedure was maintained, however, albeit with procedural changes (s2). The 
advantage of this procedure is that it enables disputed questions of law to be determined at an early 
stage in the arbitral process so as to facilitate the speedy conclusion of arbitral proceedings and so as to 
increase the likelihood of a final settlement to the dispute.
upon unanimous party consent94 or leave of the High Court.95 This new appeal 
procedure had two distinct phases: the first being application for leave to appeal;96 
and the second being the substantive appeal.97 Whereas the first stage of appeal was 
summary in nature, the second stage was conducted in line with traditional court 
hearings, with the employment of full legal argument in an open court environment. 
When determining such an appeal, the court had the power to confirm, vary or set
QO
aside the award in question or it could remit the award to the reconsideration of the 
arbitrator together with the courts opinion on the question of law that was the subject 
of the appeal.99
Not only did such reforms restructure the links between the arbitrator, the award and 
the court with regard to questions of law, but the Act also redefined the relationship 
between the arbitrator and the court, creating a greater acceptance of both the finality 
of arbitral decisions with regard to questions of law and the autonomy of the arbitral 
process.100 This was achieved in two ways: firstly, application to the court and 
appeals from awards on a question of law could be excluded by agreement between 
the parties;101 and secondly, appeals without consent were required to be given leave
94 S(l)(3)(a)
95 Sl(3)(b)
96 If leave to appeal was refused, the matter came to a conclusion subject to a limited right o f appeal 
contained in sl(6)(a). The restriction of on-appeals was based upon the policy decision that to prevent 
cases ascending the hierarchy o f the courts, only in exceptional circumstances should leave be granted 
to appeal a decision of a commercial judge. See Kerr “The Arbitration Act 1979” (1980) 48 MLR 45 
p.52. See also the opinion of Lord Wilberforce in Campagnie d ’Armement Maritime SA v Campaigne 
Tunisiemme de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572 p600.
97 It was necessarily the case that the second stage of the appeal process only applied where leave to 
appeal (the first stage) had been granted.
SI (2)(a)
"  Sl(2)(b)
100 See Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From Arbitration Awards” (1994) LLP
101 This was a clear change in public policy. See Mann “Private Arbitration and Public Policy” (1985) 
4 CJQ 257; Mustill “Transnational Arbitration in English Law” ppl5-35, in “International Commercial 
and Maritime Arbitration” (ed Rose) (1987) Sweet & Maxwell; Staughton “Arbitraton Act 1979 -  A 
Pragmatic Compromise” [1979] N U  920; Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From 
Arbitration Awards” (1994) LLP Chapter 13
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by the High Court.
In respect of the first point, by way of an exclusion agreement, parties were able to 
contractually exclude the right to apply for leave to appeal a question of law arising 
out of an award,102 the right to seek leave to apply for an order for reasons or further 
reasons,103 as well as the right to request the court to determine a preliminary question 
of law arising in the course of a reference under s2.104 Whilst the power to enter into 
such an agreement was constrained by the A ct,105 the possibility of contractual 
severance of the arbitral process from the intervention of the court with regard to 
questions of law and reasoned awards, rendered some arbitrators the authoritative 
word on both questions of law and fact.
With regard to the second point, in requiring appeals without consent to be given 
leave by the High Court, an opportunity was afforded to the judiciary to affirm the 
finality of arbitral awards.106 This opportunity was seized and as a result, the ability 
to appeal an award for error of law was significantly reduced.107 Indeed, as stated by
102 Under sl(2) and sl(3)
103 Under s i (5) and s i (6)
104 S3(l)
105 S3 requires the agreement to be in writing (s3(l)). Whether the agreement constitutes an exclusion 
agreement will be a question of construction (3(4)), as will be any question as to the scope of a valid 
exclusion agreement (s3(2)). It is important to note, however, that an exclusion agreement cannot 
affect the review powers of the court that arise under statutory provisions or common law. The two 
qualifications with regard to exclusion agreements that arise under the Act are: firstly, where an award 
is made on or a question of law arising in the course of a reference and which arises under a domestic 
arbitration agreement, an exclusion agreement is of no effect unless entered into after the 
commencement o f the arbitration in which the award is made or the question of law arises (s3(6)). 
Secondly, where an award or question o f law relates to a special category case (defined as Admiralty 
jurisdiction of the High Court, contracts of insurance, or commodity contracts), exclusion agreements 
are of no effect unless either the exclusion agreement is entered into after the commencement of 
arbitral proceedings or the award or question of law relates to a contract which is expressly governed 
by a system of law other than that of England and Wales (s4(l)).
106 See Home and Overseas Insurance Co Ltd v Mentor Insurance Co (UK) Ltd [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 
473,479 per Hirst J
107 See Schmitthoff “Commerical Arbitration and the Commercial Court” in “Commercial Law in a 
Changing Economic Climate” (2nd ed) (1981) Sweet & Maxwell
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Sir Thomas Bingham MR:108
“It is generally accepted that those who entrust decisions to arbitrators do so 
because they wish to rely on the judgement, skill and fairness of those 
arbitrators. If a decision of the court was what the parties had wanted they 
would not have chosen to arbitrate. While, therefore, a power in the courts to 
review arbitral awards on grounds of legal error is preserved, it is, as the 
authorities show, a power to be exercised with the utmost caution.”
This is not to say, however, that the 1979 Act created a wholly autonomous arbitral 
process. Rather it sought to balance much of the historical ethos of interventionism 
with the need for greater freedom and finality, producing what has been termed, a 
legislative compromise.109
Such a balance can be seen when examining the interpretation by the judiciary of their 
discretion to grant leave for judicial review. Prima facie, the discretion accorded by 
the Act appears unfettered. S I(4) simply states that a Court may grant leave where 
“the determination of the question of law concerned could substantially affect the 
rights of one or more of the parties to the arbitration agreement” and in granting leave 
the court may attach any conditions it “considers appropriate”. The phrase 
"substantially affect" was not given a statutory definition and it was left to the Courts 
to establish its criteria. Despite the discretion afforded, the judiciary interpreted such 
so as to be in line with the greater finality of arbitration awards, although the criteria 
subsequently established was so numerous and generalised, so as to allow little 
predictability about the susceptibility of the award to judicial review.110
108 Everglade Maritime Inc v Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Detlef von Appen M.B.H (The Maria) [1993] 3 All 
ER 748, 754
109 See Kerr “The Arbitration Act 1979” (1980) 43 MLR 45; Kerr “Commercial Dispute Resolution” in 
Bos & Brownlie “Liber Amicorum for Lord Wilberforce” (1987) OUP; Staughton “Arbitration Act
1979 -  A Pragmatic Compromise” [1979] NLJ 920
110 Ibid
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The Conferring of a New Judicial Discretionary Power - Reasoned Awards
The balance between the need for interventionism on the one hand and freedom on the
other was furthered in so far as the appeal procedure was implicitly based upon
“reasoned” awards. The need for a reasoned award is clear: without documentary
evidence as to the reasons of the arbitrator in reaching the award, an exposition of an
error of law becomes impossible. So as to effect the new appeal provisions, the 1979
Act conferred upon the judiciary a new discretionary power to direct an arbitrator to
give reasons where none have been m ade,111 or to give further reasons where
1
insufficient or inadequate reasons have been provided. However, the Act stipulates 
that the court may not intervene and make such an order on its own volition - the
1 t  <5
jurisdiction is exercisable only on the instigation of a party to the reference.
An application under this section was usually a precursor to an appeal from an award 
on a question of law.114 However, the granting of an order under s i (5) by no means 
guaranteed that leave to appeal a question of law would be granted -  the Court still 
retained its discretion under s i (3) to refuse leave to appeal. Given that the provision 
of reasons may serve to validate the legal correctness of the arbitral award, the 
independence of these two statutory provisions is wholly justifiable. It is important to 
note however, that s i (5) did not establish a general statutory obligation to make a 
reasoned award. The common law position whereby an arbitration award would be
111 Where no reasons have been provided by the arbitrator, the Court must be satisfied that before the 
award was made, a party to proceedings gave notice to the arbitrator that a reasoned award was 
required or otherwise that there exists a special reason why such notice was not given. SI(6).
112 Sl(5)
113 The application for such must be made with the consent of all parties to the proceedings, or leave of 
the Court is required. SI(5)
114 See Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From Arbitration Awards” (1994) LLP
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considered legitimate without the provision of reasons, together with the right of the 
parties to contract for unreasoned awards if they so wished, was preserved. It is 
arguably the case, however, that the effect of s i(5) was to encourage the provision of 
such. In failing to require an arbitral award to be supported by documented reasoning, 
English and Welsh arbitration remained at odds with foreign arbitral proceedings.
The Limitations of the 1979 Act
Whilst the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1979 may be seen to accord the arbitral 
process a greater finality and certainty than was previously the case, rather than 
resolving the difficulties created by the 1950 Arbitration Act, the 1979 Act had a 
number of serious consequences upon the construction industry in particular. 
Although the frequency of appeal against an arbitral award may have been high, 
before the passing of the Arbitration Act 1979 relatively few opportunities were taken 
by the construction industry to require an arbitrator to state a case for the decision of 
the High Court. Thus, unlike the field of maritime law, the construction industry 
failed to obtain wide ranging judicial comment and interpretation of the standard 
documents so as to make the contracting parties aware of the approved meaning of the 
contractual terms and provisions. Importation of principles and procedures from other 
industrial sectors was not possible due to the unique character of the construction 
industry. Thus, as a consequence of the 1979 Arbitration Act, the construction 
industry was denied the means of clarifying difficult issues of law on a case-by-case 
basis and in submitting to arbitration, disputing parties ran the risk of being subjected
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to inconsistent arbitral decision-making.115
Moreover, it is expressly stated in s i (2) that the substantive appeal procedure is 
confined to “any question of law arising out of an award made on an arbitration 
agreement”. However, despite the fact that the section stipulates the parameters 
within which the new appeal process was to operate, statutory definition as to what 
constituted a “question of law” was not provided.116 Consequently, such a concept 
was defined by reference to general principles and case law that had arisen 
surrounding the distinction. However, authority on the distinction was often 
incoherent, irreconcilable and without uniformity117 and given its origins outside the 
field of arbitration law, its applicability and relevance to arbitration proceedings was 
doubtful.118 Given the close relationship between the concepts of fact and law, even 
arbitral case law on the point was unable to indisputably clarify the distinction. Thus, 
it often became the case that questions of fact and law were inextricably linked and as 
such, both were theoretically capable of being open to judicial review.119
Further damaging the interests of certainty, the 1979 Act left unaffected the power of 
the High Court to remit an award for 'misconduct' by the arbitrator. The effect o f such
• • 19Aan error of judgement can be seen m King v Thomas McKenna Limited where it 
was stated by the Court of Appeal that the powers of the Court to remit an award for
115 It was determined in The Chrysalis [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 503, 508 per Mustill J, however, that in 
submitting to arbitration, parties voluntarily agreed to assume the risk of inconsistent decision making.
116 Neither was it provided by way of a residuary definition, as the concept of a “question o f fact” was 
also left without statutory definition.
117 See Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From Arbitration Awards” (1994) LLP 
p.86. See also De Smith “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” (4th ed) (1980) Stephens & Son 
Ltd, Chapter 3.
118 See Geogas S.A v Trammo Gas Ltd (The Baleares) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 215, 231 Steyn L.J “what 
is a question of law in a judicial review case may not necessarily be a question of law in the field of 
consensual arbitration”.
119 See Torbell Investments Ltd v Williams (Inspector o f Taxes) (1986) 56 T.C 357
120 [1991] 2 QB 480
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misconduct were 'open-textured'. Indeed, in Antaios Cia Naviesa SA v Salen
191Rederierna AB the Court made clear that where an arbitrator had acted ex aequo et 
bono, the Court would consider itself to have jurisdiction to intervene in the award. 
Moreover, the confusion that surrounded the legality of 'equity clauses', meant that 
arbitrators did not apply principles of fairness and justice at the expense of legal rules, 
for fear of the award being struck out for misconduct. Thus, in reality, there were no 
practical boundaries beyond which the Court could stray and this had a profound 
affect upon the execution of arbitral proceedings.
There were other procedural problems too. For the 1979 Act left unaddressed many 
of the reforms called for by the Departmental Advisory Committee in 1979. 
Principally, in failing to provide for arbitral procedure, it was left to the Courts to 
intervene once more. For example, the Act neglected to specifically provide the 
default powers of arbitrators, leaving this area of arbitration incompletely developed
1 99and uncertain. Indeed, due to the omission of the Act, such jurisdiction could only 
be derived from the express or implied terms of the contract. As it was unusual for 
default jurisdiction to be expressly provided for by the terms of the contract, the 
question often became whether an implied default jurisdiction had been conferred
1 9 9upon the arbitrator. In short, despite the efforts of the 1979 Act, arbitration law 
remained both “incoherent and fragmentary”.124 Moreover, it was not until the Courts 
and Legal Services Act 1990 that arbitrators were granted the power to terminate a 
reference on the grounds of unreasonable delay. Thus, until very recently, contractual
121 [1985] AC 191 as cited in Davies “Textbook on Commercial Law” (1992) Blackstone Press at p.468
122 See Thomas “Default Powers of Arbitrators” (1996) LLP
123 See Kirkawa Corp v Gaitoil Overseas Inc [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 154. See also Bremer Vulkan 
Schiffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corp Ltd [1981] AC 909
124 See Mustill “Transnational Arbitration in English Law” in “International Commercial and Maritime 
Arbitration” (ed Rose) (1987) Sweet & Maxwell p. 18
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parties were free to invoke arbitral proceedings after prolonged periods and unless the 
individual contract provided for such, arbitrators were powerless to object - even 
where the delay meant that a fair hearing of the dispute was impossible.
Thus, as can be seen, both the 1950 Act and the 1979 Act marked the culmination of 
centuries of judicial growth. For now the arbitral process was under the complete 
scrutiny and control of the state, leaving little room for arbitral manoeuvre. This 
clearly affected the operation of arbitration as an efficient system of commercial 
dispute resolution and thus an investigation was launched into the dispute resolution 
process in both the commercial field generally and the construction industry in 
particular. Indeed, in commenting upon the state of the civil justice system, Lord 
Irvine declared:
“Delay and procedural complexity, ridiculed by Dickens a century-and-a-half 
ago, are largely unchecked, despite the attempts to remedy them. Expense can 
run out of control, the client on a financial rollercoaster. Of themselves, these 
are bad enough. But what if one party is richer than the other? They can exploit 
every procedural device to add to their opponent's financial woes. And it is not 
only people of average means who are suffering; business is becoming more 
and more conscious of the cost of litigation, both in purely financial terms and 
in terms of management time. Moreover, it is always in one or the other party's 
interest to prolong the proceedings to the greatest extent: money withheld is 
money which can be put to other uses.”125
Such an opinion was reflective of the attitude of society at large and ultimately led to 
a far-reaching investigation of the civil justice system, culminating in the 
Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, the Latham Report and the 
Woolf Report. All three investigations concluded that meaningful reform was 
urgently needed. However, the conclusions of such work differed as to the practical
125 Lord Irvine of Lairg “How I'll Give the Law Back to the People” The Times, Sat October 18,1997
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means of achieving such.
Towards the Modern Position
As one would expect in times of change, those wishing to revise the system of British 
arbitration suggested a number of possible reforms. Perhaps the most popularly 
advocated means of reform suggested, was the adoption of the UNCITRAL126 Model
126 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. UNCITRAL is the core legal body of 
the United Nations system in the field of international trade law, specialising in commercial law reform 
on an international basis. The ambition of UNCITRAL is to formulate a modem, fair and harmonised 
system of rules appertaining to commercial transactions, so as to facilitate a global market in which 
restrictions on trade are minimised. Clearly, the arbitration of international disputes plays a significant 
part in the reduction of obstacles to trade and hence in 1979 the UNCITRAL Rules for International 
Arbitration were published, with the final text of a Model Law being published in 1985. The function 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law is to assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral 
procedure so as to meet the needs o f international commercial arbitration. The Model Law has been 
enacted into law by a large number of jurisdictions -  almost 40 states - from both developed and 
developing countries. However, such enactment typically occurs where there is no long standing 
arbitral tradition, or where the domestic experience of arbitration is within recent history, for example 
Canada, Cyprus, New Zealand and Ireland. Countries with a long-standing arbitral history such as 
England, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, have not enacted the Model Law but it has served as 
a useful tool against which domestic arbitral reform may be measured. There are of course exceptions 
to such a trend, for example Germany enacted the Model Law by incorporating it in the reform of Book 
10 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).
See Annan “The 1958 New York Convention as a Model for Subsequent Legislative Texts on 
Arbitration” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 3 p.319-321; Ashman. “UNCITRAL: Evolving Issues 
in International Commercial Arbitration” (1999) 222 New York Law Journal 48 p. 1-4; Asouzu “The 
Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Nigeria: Implications on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards” (1999) 3 Journal o f  Business Law p. 185-204; Baker and Davis “The UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules in Practice: the Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal” (1992) Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers; Bakshi “UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law and Indian Law 
[Arbitration Act, 1940]” (1995) 29 ICA Arbitration Quarterly: Journal o f  the Indian Council o f  
Arbitration 4 p.1-5; Becker “For an Autochthonous Federal Arbitration Act” (1991-1992) Arbitration 
& the law: AAA General Counsel's Annual Report (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.) p.240-249; 
Beraudo “The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and 
Arbitration” (1994) 5 ICC International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin p.60-64; Berger “The 
Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany” (1998) 2 Tijschrift Voor Arbitrage ('s- 
Gravenhage) p.41-46; Bezen “Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration in 
Turkey” (2001) 16 Mealey's International Arbitration Report 3 p.32-64; Binder “International 
Commercial Arbitration in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions. An International Comparison o f the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration” (2000) Sweet & Maxwell; Biukovic 
“Impact of the Adoption of the Model Law in Canada: Creating a New Environment for International 
Arbitration” (1998) 30 Canadian Business Law Journal 3 p.376-414; Bockstiegel “Experiences as an 
Arbitrator Using the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” in Dominice, Patry and Reymond, eds. Etudes de 
Droit International en L'honeur de Pierre Lalive: Recueil (1993) Helbing & Lichtenhahn; 
Bumard“The New Zealand Law Commission's Report on the UNCITRAL Model Law” (1992) 8 
Arbitration International 3 p.281-285; Caron and Reed “Post Award Proceedings Under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (1995) 11 Arbitration International 4 p.429-454; Ceccon “UNCITRAL 
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings and the Conduct o f Evidence: A New Approach to
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Law on International Arbitration into British law. Indeed, the Model Law provides a 
comprehensive set of procedural rules upon which parties may agree for the conduct 
of arbitral proceedings arising out of their commercial relationship. However, in June
1 ^ 71989, the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law recommended 
against such. For it was considered that the substantially different nature of the 
Model Law compared to domestic law, would be a serious detriment to be weighed 
against the potential benefits of enacting the Model Law. That is, the significant 
amount of case law and legal rules built up by centuries of practice, would become 
obsolete upon the adoption of the Model Law into British society, throwing the law 
into turmoil and chaos until new legal rules and procedures could be established. 
Thus, it was recommended that there should be a new and improved Arbitration Act 
for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
International Arbitration” (1997) 14 Journal o f International Arbitration 2 p.67-79; Chibueze and 
Oraeki “The Adoption and Application of the Model Law in Canada: Post-Arbitration Challenge” 
(2001) 18 Journal o f International Arbitration 2 p. 191-210; Christie “The UNCITRAL Model Law in 
Southern Africa” (1998) 64 Arbitration 4 p.272-274; Cobb “Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law: the Related Doctrines of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and Separability” (2001) 16 Mealey's 
International Arbitration Report 6 p.32-40; Coulson “A Critique of the UNCITRAL [Arbitration] 
Rules” (1992/93) 4 Arbitration Times: American Arbitration Association Dispute Resolution News New 
York 8; Daly and Brooks “Correction and Interpretation of Arbitral Awards Under the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration” (2002) 13 7CC International Court o f Arbitration Bulletin 1 p. 61-71; Davidson “The new 
Arbitration Act : a Model Law?” (1997) 3 Journal o f Business Law p. 101-129; Dervaird“The 
UNCITRAL Model Law and Judicial Control of Arbitration in Scotland” (1993) 9 Arbitration 
International 1 p. 97-102; Gharavi “The 1997 Iranian International Commercial Arbitration Law: the 
UNCITRAL Model Law a l'iranienne” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 1 p.85-96; Hacking and 
Baron “Arbitration Law Reform: the Impact o f the UNCITRAL Model Law on the English Arbitration 
Act 1996” (1997) 63 Arbitration 4 p.291-299; Herrmann and Sekolec “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
Under Sniper Fire Prove to be Fire-Proof: Rebuttal to R. Coulson” (1993) 4 World Arbitration & 
Mediation Report: Covering Dispute Resolution in the United States and Around the World 4 p.93-96; 
Herrmann “Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 Freshfields 
Lecture” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 3 p.211-226; Kwok “The Meaning of ‘Commercial’ and 
‘International’ in the UNCITRAL Model Law: the Status in Ontario” (1998) 3 Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal 224-240; Warren “A Response to R. Coulson: Rebuttal II” (1993) 4 World 
Arbitration & Mediation Report: Covering Dispute Resolution in the United States and Around the 
World 4 p.96.
127 DAC “Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law: Report on the Arbitration Bill” 
(1989) p.10
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To such an end, the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law issued a 
statement of the features that a new Arbitration Act would require.128 Firstly, it was 
considered that the new legislation should comprise a statement of the more 
important, uncontroversial, legislative and common law principles of arbitration. 
Secondly, the new legislation should be required to set out the law in a logical order, 
using clear language that was free from technicality so as to be readily 
comprehensible to the layman. To facilitate such, consideration should be given to 
ensuring that any new statute should, so far as possible, follow the structure and 
language of the Model Law so as to enhance its accessibility to those who are familiar 
with the Model Law, although the scope of the new legislation should not be limited 
to the contents of such. It was advanced that by enacting such provisions, not only 
would there be a consolidation of the law, but that the numerous inadequacies that 
time and practice had illuminated, would be amended and eradicated. Thus, after 
substantial amendment, the Department of Trade and Industry introduced an 
Arbitration Bill into Parliament in the latter half of 1995. February 1996, witnessed 
the publication of the Departmental Advisory Committee's Report on Arbitration 
Law, illustrating the reasoning behind the proposed reforms. Four months later, the 
Bill was enacted, becoming perhaps the greatest overhaul of arbitration law in all time 
- the Arbitration Act 1996.129
Just as the need for reform of arbitral procedure and practice became apparent, so the 
needs of the construction industry came to the forefront. The catalyst for the review 
of the industry was principally the effect of the economic recession in the early 1990s
128 Op Cit at paragraph 108
129 See generally Tweeddale and Tweeddale “Arbitration of Commerical Disputes: International and 
English Law and Practice” (2005) Oxford University Press.
47
upon the British economy in general and the construction sector in particular.130 
Whilst the construction industry had been plagued by difficulties for many years,131 
such perplexities were exacerbated by the downturn in the economic climate. For 
example, much domestic construction work is ultimately determined by government 
policy. In a depressed economic climate, public expenditure is reduced, thereby 
diminishing the amount of work available. When work is scarce, parties to a 
construction project may not produce consistent quality and value for money, 
adversely affecting the Client -  Contractor relationship.
* thGiven such a scenario, on 5 July 1993 the Joint Review of Procurement and 
Contractual Arrangements in the United Kingdom Construction Industry was 
announced in the House of Commons.132 The initial stages of the Review sought to 
identify the main issues affecting the industry and as such, invited comments and 
proposals, culminating in the publication of an interim report on 13th December 
1993.133 In 1994 the Final Report134 was published, recommending methods by which 
the problems identified in the consultation process could be tackled.
130 By 1993 construction output for the construction sector was 39% below its 1990 peak. Compare 
against the manufacturing sector, where the reduction in output was only 3% and as against the service 
sector, which rapidly regained its lost growth.
131 As already outlined in the Chapter
132 Hansard Written Answers, Column 4. Government and the construction industry, with the 
participation of Clients, commissioned the Report jointly
133 Latham “Trust and Money: Interim Report of the Government / Industry Review of Procurement 
and Contractual Arrangements In The UK Construction Industry ” (1993) HMSO. The main areas 
identified were namely the need to improve industry performance and teamwork, the need to provide 
better value for money and the need to move away from the adversarial culture that had permeated the 
sector. Indeed, the consultation revealed that it was the view of the Client that the performance of the 
industry is unreliable as projects run neither to time nor budget and that too much effort and resource is 
invested in making good defects, premature repair and replacement and in commencing / defending 
litigation proceedings.
134 Latham “Constructing The Team: Final Report of the Government / Industry Review of 
Procurement and Contractual Arrangements In The UK Construction Industry” (1984) HMSO
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With regard to the inherent nature of disputes in the construction industry, Latham 
contended that the primary solution was to combat the adversarial culture that 
permeated the sector. Clearly, this required improved procedures for procurement 
and tendering, placing a contractual emphasis upon teamwork and partnering to solve 
problems, and the pre-pricing of variations so as to reduce the causes of conflict. 
Where conflict did arise, however, the use of adjudication was advocated as an 
efficient and cost effective mechanism of resolution. As exemplified by Latham,135 
such an approach to contractual grievances and disputes was founded by the 
judgement of Lord Justice Lawton who stated:
“The Courts are aware of what happens in these building disputes; cases either 
go to arbitration or before an official referee; they drag on and on; the cash flow 
is held up... That sort of result is to be avoided if possible”.
Indeed, the consultation had revealed that arbitration was seen as being slow and 
nearly always deferred until after the contract was completed. Thus, Latham 
submitted that arbitration should remain as a respected mechanism of appeal, but not 
as the main method of dispute resolution. Due to their consensual nature, it was 
concluded that conciliation and mediation were not suitable mechanisms of 
compulsory dispute resolution. Rather, following widespread consultation it was 
concluded that adjudication was the key. For whilst existing in only limited form, 
organisations that represented both main contractors and specialist contractors lent 
their support to such a mechanism.
135 Latham “Act of Wisdom” 27 Building 2002
136 In the case Ellis Mechanical Services v Wates Construction Limited [1976] 2 B.L.R. 57
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Consequently, recommendations for the operation of adjudication were established. 
Firstly, there should be no restriction on the issues that may be referred to 
adjudication. Secondly, the award of the adjudicator should be implemented 
immediately, with appeals being deferred until after the completion of the contract, 
unless immediate and exceptional issues arise requiring immediate referral to the 
court. For example, immediate resort to the Court should be available if a party to the 
dispute refuses to implement the award of the adjudicator. It was also recommended 
that a training procedure be devised for adjudicators, with the establishment of a Code 
of Practice in due course. Following the Latham review was the Egan Report,137 
which continued the momentum of reform. Consequently, adjudication received its 
first statutory footing by way of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration 
Act 1996, which gave adjudication its first statutory footing.
It was not, however, merely consensual methods of dispute resolution that attracted 
legislative attention in the final years of the Twentieth Century. Markedly, there was 
a high degree of acceptance by the Government, the judiciary, legal practitioners, 
administrators and the public of the need to reform litigation procedure and practice. 
It had been recognised that for many years, the court system had become excessively 
protracted and costly, creating a two-tier system of justice with access being conferred 
only upon those at the most disadvantaged end of the social spectrum in receipt of 
public funds, or upon those of significant private finance. Given the financial 
implications of court action, even the latter group only commenced litigation where
137 Egan “Rethinking Construction: The Report of the Construction Task Force to the Deputy Prime 
Minister, on the Scope for Improving the Quality and Efficiency of UK Construction” (1998) DTI. 
The Report was commissioned by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and recommended a 
commitment to the continuous improvement of the construction process with the whole supply chain 
involved. That is, through the application of best practices, the industry and its clients must 
collectively act to improve their performance.
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considerable sums of money or fundamental principles were involved and even then 
the protracted length of proceedings rendered some such actions uneconomic to 
pursue or defend. Clearly such denial of access to the courts created many an 
injustice.
As such, accompanying the reforms to arbitration and adjudication, were the 1994138 
1 1 0and 1995 amendments to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which made commercial 
litigation in Britain a more attractive prospect. More importantly, on 28 March 1994 
Lord Woolf was appointed by the Lord Chancellor to review the rules and procedures 
of the civil courts in England and Wales. The aims of his review were threefold. 
Firstly, to improve access to justice and reduce the cost of litigation, secondly to 
reduce the complexity of the rules and modernise terminology, and lastly to remove 
any unnecessary disticntions of practice and procedure.140 Following the publication 
of an interim report and an extensive period of consultation,141 in July 1996 the final 
report on access to civil justice was published.142 The fmal report included draft 
general rules for the reformation of the civil justice system and advocated the case 
management of disputes by the judiciary. Whilst not universally endorsed,143 such 
recommendations were largely accepted by the Conservative Government of the time
138 The amendment abolished the rule of law relating to the sale of goods in open market. Thus, s22(l) 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was repealed.
139 The law relating to the sale of unascertained goods forming part of an identified bulk and the sale of 
undivided shares in goods was amended.
140 Lord Woolf “Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and 
Wales / By the Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls” (1995) HMSO pi.
141 Attention was focused on the civil justice system in general, in addition to the specialist jurisdictions 
and special areas of litigation that were deemed to be problematical.
142 Woolf “Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales / By 
the Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls” (1996) HMSO.
143 See the series of speeches and articles by Professor Michael Zander QC where doubt was cast upon 
the prudence of extensive case management by the judiciary. Concern was also expressed by those 
engaged with clinical negligence issues, such as The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. The Law 
Society, in addition to members of the judiciary, requested that the introduction of such measures be 
delayed. Despite such concerns, however, the reforms pressed ahead.
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and following review by Sir Peter Middleton,144 were subsequently accepted by the 
new Labour Government. As such, the recommendations formed the core of the new, 
combined code of rules for civil procedure - the Civil Procedure Rules 1998145- which 
amounted to the most significant overhaul of the civil justice system since the great 
reforms of 1872 and 1875.
Thus, the final stages of the twentieth century opened new possibilities for the 
construction industry. For the first time in history, every potential avenue of access to 
justice had received statutory attention and / or reform. Litigation and arbitration had 
been overhauled and adjudication had been given a new statutory footing. Even the 
self-regulatory mechanisms of the construction industry received attention and an air 
of reform emerged. Prima facie one may suggest that dispute resolution was returning 
to its medieval roots. Following centuries of judicial growth, the needs and desires of 
industry required a freer, more flexible resolution of commercial disputes as designed 
in the fourteenth century. The central issue, therefore, is whether the reform of 
consensual dispute resolution mechanisms achieved their ambition. That is, can 
arbitration and adjudication be seen to meet the needs of the industry, whilst securing 
the necessities for access to justice?
In this chapter consideration has been given to the development of the construction 
industry and to the development of dispute resolution mechanisms that were 
necessary to ensure the success of such. In the following Chapter, consideration shall 
now be given to the ability of those mechanisms, namely arbitration and adjudication, 
to achieve civil justice in accordance with the criteria set down by Lord Woolf.
144 Sir Peter Middleton “Review of Civil Justice and Legal Aid” (1997) HMSO
145 On Monday April 26 1999, the new Civil Procedure Rules came into force in England and Wales.
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CHAPTER TWO: ACCESS TO JUSTICE
It is a commonly accepted principle that “civil justice” is the cornerstone of British 
dispute resolution. Indeed, as Brougham has declared:
“...all the establishments formed by our ancestors, and supported by their 
descendants, were invented and are chiefly maintained, in order that justice may 
be duly administered between man and man”.1
Many definitions of justice have been advanced throughout the ages. However, as 
demonstrated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada,3 central to each 
notion of justice is the concept of “access to justice”. In short, if dispute resolution 
mechanisms are to be seen to facilitate civil justice, their outcome must be that they 
provide “access” to such:
"It is an unfortunate fact that legal proceedings in the civil and criminal courts, 
at the trial and appellate levels, have become increasingly lengthy and 
protracted. We must accept and deal with this phenomenon to the extent that it 
simply reflects the increasing complexity of our modem law and modem 
society. But we should maintain a healthy scepticism of the need for longer and 
more protracted proceedings and constantly strive to contain and simplify the 
trial and appellate processes. The aim above all must be that the courts remain 
accessible to the ordinary Canadian. Lawyers should always recall that their 
duty to defend and maintain their client's interest must be balanced with their
1 See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & Maxwell p.215
2 The literature is voluminous and as such the following suggested literature is merely a snapshot. See 
Andrews “English Civil Procedure -  Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice System” (2003) Oxford 
University Press; Damaska “The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the 
Legal Process” (1991) Yale University Press; Fazzalari, Fortin, Eakin “Civil Justice in the Countries of 
the European Union” (1998) Trenton Publishing; Hazard “American Civil Procedure” (1995) Yale 
University Press; Jones-Pauly & Elbem “Access to Justice: Role of Court Administrators and Lay 
Adjudicators in the African and Islamic Contexts” (2002) Kluwer Law International; Rawls “Collected 
Papers” (1991) Harvard University Press; Rawls “A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition” (1999) 
Harvard University Press; Rawls “Justice As Fairness: A Restatement” (2001) Harvard University 
Press; Ed Strang & Braithwaite “Restorative Justice and Civil Society” (2001) Cambridge University 
Press; Ed Zuckerman “Civil Justice In Crisis -  Comparative Perspectives of Civil Procedure” (1999) 
Oxford University Press.
3 From an address on "Access to Justice" to the graduating class of the Faculty of Law, University of 
Windsor on June 8, 1998 by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Right Honourable 
Brian Dickson, P.D. (Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues, Vol 1)
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professional duty, as an officer of the court, to ensure that matters proceed as 
expeditiously as possible."
It was this concept of “access to justice” that underpinned the most far-reaching 
reforms of the English and Welsh civil justice system to date4 and it is to such a 
concept that we now turn.
Defining Access to Justice -  Lord Woolf
In his interim report on the civil justice system in England and Wales, Lord Woolf6 
contended that there are a number of principles that must be fulfilled if access to 
justice is to be facilitated:6
1. The mechanism of dispute resolution must be just in the result that it delivers;
2. It must be fair  in the way that it treats litigants;
3. It must offer appropriate procedures at reasonable cost’,
4. It must deal with cases with reasonable speed;
5. It must be understandable to those who use it;
6. It must be responsive to the needs of those who use it;
7. It must also provide as much certainty as the nature of particular cases allow;
8. It must be effective, that is adequately resourced and organised.
4 See the Civil Procedure Rules 1998
5 See Lord Justice Woolf “Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales / By the Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls” (1995) HMSO p2
6 Such principles were derived from his observations of the problems of the civil justice system.
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Should a method of dispute resolution fail to meet one or more of these requirements, 
its ability to facilitate access to justice becomes questionable. Indeed, such a theory is 
reflected in the writings of the civil proceduralist Jacob,7 who advanced that the 
notion of civil justice is founded upon three components: the political aspect;8 the 
social aspect;9 and the moral aspect,10 all o f which seek to establish an effective and 
holistic mechanism of dispute resolution as latterly described by Woolf.
7 See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & Maxwell
8 Jacob contended that “the political aspects of civil justice stem from “the importance of the 
administration of civil justice in the life and culture of a civilised community”. That is, civil justice 
plays a vital societal function that must be maintained and developed, as not only can it be seen to be a 
method of social control, but it also serves as an instrument for the adjusting or regulating of social 
relations within the legal framework. Indeed, the social utility of civil justice was that not only would 
it enhance respect for the law, but any gulf that may exist between the law and social reality will be 
illuminated by the procedures implemented to serve civil justice. Given the importance of civil justice 
therefore, it is a matter of legal and social necessity that the administration of such lies in the hands of 
the state, as effective administration of justice requires that dispute resolution mechanisms fall under 
the remit of a single accountable body and not under the control of numerous and possibly fractious 
interest groups and organisations. This being so, what better agency to maintain and develop dispute 
resolution in Britain than the state, whose agents have been democratically elected by the people for the 
people? This is not to say, however, that dispute resolution is a form of state monopoly without 
exception. For as Jacob has conceded, arbitration is a mechanism of dispute resolution which falls 
under only supervisory jurisdiction of what he terms the “Third Branch of Government” - the judiciary 
- whose only role is to ensure that there has been due compliance with the relevant rule of law. Thus, 
Jacob would seem to suggest that within the political aspect of civil justice, a two-tier system of dispute 
resolution - the court system and alternatives to such - is theoretically justifiable.
As to what is to be deemed to be fulfilling of the political aspect of civil justice, Jacob contended “the 
state must provide an effective and efficient system of courts and tribunals to enable the members of its 
society to seek and obtain justice as between themselves and as between any of them and the State 
itself’. Thus, not only must the state afford the resolution of disputes between citizens and citizens and 
the state, but it must also strive to improve the quality of the administration of justice by such 
mechanisms. This would seem to suggest the employing of both state funds and the revision of 
procedure and practice at regular intervals. Moreover, in addition to providing access to justice, the 
method of dispute resolution must also provide for the impartial resolution of disputes. In the absence 
of a definition of “impartial” from Jacob, it is contended that by “impartial” the process should be free 
from bias and issue-obscuring procedures. See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) 
Sweet & Maxwell p216-218.
9 Dispute resolution mechanisms must enable members of the community to “assert and maintain their 
reasonable and well-founded rights or claims, or to defend themselves against unreasonable or 
unfounded claims”. In short, civil wrongs must not be conferred impunity and resolution mechanisms 
must be accessible, expedient and efficient. That is, the state, corporations and individuals alike must 
be afforded the same opportunities and experience o f the dispute resolution process. See Jacob “The 
Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & Maxwell p218
10 The civil justice system should not be regarded as having a merely legal connotation or application, 
but should also be taken to reflect and respond to social and moral utility. Thus, dispute resolution 
should promote the good or greater happiness of the community and should operate towards the 
attainment of justice between man and man. Indeed, the moral imperatives that Jacob believed to 
create justice between man and man, require the method of dispute resolution to be “fair and open, 
equitable, efficient and effective, free from mystifying technicalities and formalistic sophistries, simple, 
speedy and cheap, accessible and intelligible”. The justification for such requirements were given to be 
the complementary character of civil justice; the protective character of civil justice; and the remedial 
or practical character of civil justice. See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & 
Maxwell p220-222.
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Given the importance of the Woolf Report to the reformation of Court procedure at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, it is clear that W oolfs prerequisites for access to 
justice have defined the standard by which dispute resolution mechanisms must be 
judged. For if an accurate measure of their outcomes are to be obtained, then court 
proceedings and alternatives to such must be subjected to the same controls. Thus, 
the question to be answered must be whether the legislative reforms affecting 
arbitration and adjudication can be seen to meet W oolfs requirements for access to 
justice?
Arbitration and Access to Justice
As already demonstrated, it was the intention of the Arbitration Act 1996 to develop a 
coherent, responsive and intelligible arbitration system that could afford access to 
justice. In applying each of W oolf s eight criteria11 in turn to the statutory provisions 
embodied in the Act, it may be seen that prima facie, arbitration does in theoretical 
terms facilitate such access.
11 See p.56 above
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The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
It has often been contended that if access to justice is to be facilitated, then procedural 
fairness should be championed and a just result ensured. Such requirements are 
paramount in the pursuit of access to justice, as the resolution of a dispute by a third 
party will result in action that may have far reaching consequences for the disputant. 
As such, any denial of a perceived right must be done on a basis that is both ethically 
and legally correct, lest an unjust conclusion be reached, the dispute is lengthened by 
appeal, or the disputing parties and their representatives lose faith in the dispute 
resolution mechanism creating further discord.
Fundamental to the notions of fairness and justice is the need for the “independence”
and “impartiality” of the arbitrator. Whilst used interchangeably, the notions of
1 ^independence and impartiality are two distinct concepts. For example, an impartial 
tribunal is one that is not biased in favour of, or prejudiced against, a particular party 
or its case.14 An independent tribunal however, is one that does not have a close
12 See generally “Achieving Justice in Arbitration: a Symposium” (1991) 65 Tulane Law Review 
p. 1303-660; Burger “Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice” (1985) 40 Arbitration p.3-6; Charles 
“Natural Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1986) 60 Law Institute Journal p. 1078-82.
13 See Yu & Shore “Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity of Arbitrators -  US and English 
Perspectives” (2003) 52 ICLQ pp 935 -  967. See also Bishop and Reed “Practical Guidelines for 
Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial 
Arbitration” (1998) 14 Arbitration International 395; Redfem and Hunter “The Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration” (1999) Sweet & Maxwell p220-221.
14 When seeking to expressly define the qualitative concept of impartiality, the notion of “neutrality” 
would prima facie seem to be of significance. Indeed, literature on alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms is littered with the phrase. It is both used as a noun to refer to the third party charged with 
resolving the dispute and as an adjective to refer to the dispute resolution process itself. However, 
experience informs belief and as such, individuals cannot be expected to act outside of their value / 
belief system, thereby prohibiting them from behaving in a true neutral state. The use of neutrality as 
an indicator of impartiality should, therefore, be limited in scope to a broad definition. In short, 
impartiality should not be construed so as to imply an absence of values, rather it should be deemed to 
indicate an absence of bias or partiality. See Brown and Marriott “ADR Principles and Practice” 
(1999) Sweet & Maxwell p.460. See also Evans “Of Judges and Arbitrators” (2001) 67 Arbitration 3 
p.254-262; Marriott “Conflicts of Interest” (2002) 68 Arbitration 1 p.31-41; Paulsson “Ethics, Elitism, 
Eligibility” (1997) 14 Journal o f  International Arbitration 4 p. 13-21; Rau “On Integrity in Private 
Judging” (1998) 14 Arbitration International 2 p.l 15-155; Reynolds “Impartiality and Independence of
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relationship with a party or its counsel. In short, impartiality is an abstract concept 
that is difficult to measure but which is best described as an attitude of mind, whereas 
independence is an external manifestation of an attitude that is capable of objective 
examination.15 As summarised by Bishop and Reed:16
“An arbitrator who is impartial but not wholly independent may be qualified, 
while an independent arbitrator who is not impartial must be disqualified... The 
absolutely inalienable and predominant standard should be impartiality”.
Such markers of procedural fairness and a just result were enshrined in the 1996 
legislation. Indeed, the general principles applicable to arbitration as outlined in si of 
the Act, stipulate that the object of arbitration is to obtain the “fair resolution of 
disputes by an impartial tribunal”.17 Guidance as to what shall be deemed to be both a 
fair and impartial resolution can be found in s33, which places a general duty upon the 
arbitral tribunal to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving “each party 
a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent.”18 
Under s37(l)(b) this is extended so as to include that the parties shall be given a 
reasonable opportunity to comment on any information, opinion or advice offered by 
any experts or legal representatives appointed by the tribunal to report to it, or any 
assessors appointed by the tribunal to assist on technical matters. Indeed, the tribunal
Arbitrators” (1998) 3 Construction & Engineering Law 2 p.6-10; Simmons & Simmons “Allegations of 
Bias: Should Umpires be Removed for Being Tainted with Alleged Bias?” (1998) 12 P & I  
International 5 pi 05. See also Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd (Leave to Appeal) [2001] 
QB 451 (CA); Fletamentos Maritimos SA v Effjohn International BV (No 2) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 302 
(CA).
15 See Yu & Shore “Independence, Impartiality, and Immunity of Arbitrators -  US and English 
Perspectives” (2003) 52 ICLQ p396
16 Bishop and Reed “Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration” (1998) 14 Arbitration International p400
17 SI (a).
18 S33(l)(a). See Guardcliffe Properties Ltd v City & St James [2003] EWHC 215
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is required to comply with such a duty both in its decisions on matters of procedure 
and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it.19
So as to ensure compliance with such, s24 enables an arbitral party to apply to the 
Court for the removal of an arbitrator where there are justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality, or where he has refused or failed to properly conduct the proceedings 
causing a substantial injustice to the applicant.21 Furthermore, by virtue of s68 
arbitral awards may be challenged on the grounds of “serious irregularity”, to which 
greater consideration shall be given later. In recognition of the fact that such 
provisions may encourage the arbitral tribunal to adopt overly protracted proceedings, 
a counter-balance is provided in the form of s29, which confers statutory immunity 
upon the arbitrator in the execution of his duties. In short, the 1996 legislation 
strove to achieve a balance between the need for, and enforcement of, a fair procedure 
and just result, as against the possible consequences of such requirements upon the 
process.
The Third and Fourth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed
Inextricably linked to the notions of a fair procedure and a just result are the 
requirements for an efficient system of dispute resolution. Efficiency is essential both
•  I'X « •  •in terms of time and finance. Principally, a delay in the resolution of a dispute will
19 S33(2). See Karali “Procedure and Evidence Under the Arbitration Act 1996” (1998) 12 P & I 
International 4 p.90-91.
20 S24(a)
21 S24(d)
22 Except where an act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith.
23 See Lord Mackay “Why We Should Avoid Spending Public Money Where the Market Can Provide”
(1997) 63 Arbitration 1 p.8-10; Saville “The Origin of the New English Arbitration Act 1996: 
Reconciling Speed With Justice in the Decision Making Process” (1997) 13 Arbitration International 3
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create or exacerbate “primary difficulties”. For example, where the subject of 
arbitration is a defective works dispute under a contract that has yet to be completed, a 
delay in the determination of liability may result not only in the project exceeding its 
contractual completion deadline, but the financial implications of such a delay may be 
disproportionately increased. In short, protracted arbitral proceedings will serve only 
to exacerbate the original, or primary, subject matter of the dispute. Furthermore, 
protracted arbitral proceedings also create “secondary difficulties”. That is, not only 
will arbitral parties have to withstand the financial implications created by the dispute 
itself, should the process of resolving that dispute become unnaturally extended, then 
disputing parties will find themselves subject to further financial penalty in the form 
of increased arbitrator and / or party representative fees. Such procedural delay and 
the financial implications of such, were contributing factors to the decline in the use 
of arbitration under the 1950 and 1979 legislation.24
Indeed, the need for proceedings to be conducted “without unnecessary delay or 
expense” was stated as a general principle of the arbitral process in si of the Act.25 
Both the arbitral tribunal and the parties to the dispute are under a general duty to 
facilitate such.26 Principally, s33(l)(b)27 states that it is a general duty of the arbitral 
tribunal to ensure that the procedures adopted should be tailored to the case in hand so 
as to achieve an expedient resolution to the dispute. As with the duty to act fairly and 
impartially, the necessity to avoid delay and expense is to be implemented by the
p.237-251; Segalla “Survey: the Speed and Cost of Complex Commercial Arbitrations” (1991) 46 
Arbitration p.12-18; “Handling the Complex Commercial Case” (1991) 46 Arbitration p.5-18.
24 See Chapter 1 at pp.32, 33 &44
25 See Reynadson “Reconciling Cost Control With Justice” 1 International Arbitration Law Review 3 
p. 115-120.
6 See Karali “Procedure and Evidence Under the Arbitration Act 1996” (1999) 13 P & I  International 
3 p.60-62.
27 S33(l)(b) states that procedures should “be suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, 
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution o f the matters 
falling to be determined.”
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arbitral tribunal both in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence, and in the 
exercise of all other powers conferred on it.28 Such a duty is empowered by s34(l) 
which provides that it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential 
matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter. So as to further ensure 
expedition on behalf of the arbitrator, s24 permits a party to apply to court for the 
removal of an arbitrator where he has refused or failed to use all reasonable despatch 
in conducting the proceedings or making an award, causing a substantial injustice to 
the applicant.29
A correlating duty is placed upon arbitral parties by s40, which states that parties must 
“do all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitral 
proceedings”. This includes complying without delay with any determination of the 
tribunal as to procedural or evidential matters, or with any order or directions of the 
tribunal, and where appropriate, taking without delay any necessary steps to obtain a 
decision of the court on a preliminary question of jurisdiction or law. So as to 
ensure compliance with such, s41(l) states that the parties are free to agree on the 
powers of the tribunal in case of a party's failure to do something necessary for the 
proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration. In the absence of party agreement 
on the matter, the Act confers a number of powers upon the tribunal. For example, 
party non-compliance may result in an award dismissing the claim, the continuance of 
proceedings in the absence of a party, or, as the case may be, without any written 
evidence or submissions on behalf of the offending party. If without showing 
sufficient cause a party fails to comply with any order or directions of the tribunal, the 
tribunal may make a peremptory order to the same effect, prescribing such time for
28 S33(2)
29 S24(d)
30 See s32 and s45
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compliance with it as the tribunal considers appropriate.31 Such provisions are 
supported by the powers of the Court in relation to arbitral proceedings32 and the
'X'Xarbitral award. Thus, the comprehensive provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 may 
prima facie be said to fulfil W oolfs criteria for expediency and efficiency. All parties 
to proceedings are required to act with expediency thereby limiting the cost of 
proceedings and so as to ensure such, enforcement measures have been provided.
It should be noted, however, that the 1996 Act could be seen to have created an 
opportunity for exploitation that might undermine the attainment of such. Indeed, the 
effect of the 1996 Act is that disputing parties may commence several arbitration 
proceedings on the same dispute, as s35(l) provides that arbitral parties are free to 
agree whether arbitral proceedings shall be consolidated with other arbitral 
proceedings, or whether concurrent hearings shall be held. Thus, disputing parties 
may dissect a single dispute into many component parts and choose to arbitrate each 
part separately if they so wish. Clearly, such a method of dispute resolution places a 
financial burden upon the disputing parties and therefore the question of the 
bargaining position becomes of central importance, as it is conceivable that one party 
to a contract may exert pressure upon another to consent to concurrent proceedings. 
Given the effect of s9,34 such provisions have created a lacuna that does little more
31 S41(5)
32 See ss42-45 which provide powers as to the enforcement of peremptory orders of the tribunal, 
powers as to the securing the attendance of witnesses, court powers exercisable in support of arbitral 
proceedings and powers as to the determination of a preliminary point of law. See Cato “Arbitration 
Practice and Procedure: Interlocutory and Hearing Problems” (2003) 19 Arbitration International 3 
p.405-406. See also Huyton SA V JakilSpA [1998] CLC 937 (CA). For case comment see Chambers 
“Arbitration: Delay in Remitted Arbitration Proceedings -  Delay in Bringing Appeal” (1998) 5 
International Maritime Law 4 p. 121-123.
33 See ss66 -  71 which provide powers as to the challenging and appeal of the award.
34 A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal proceedings are brought (whether by way of 
claim or counterclaim) in respect of a matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration 
may (upon notice to the other parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the proceedings 
have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter. On an application under
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than equip unscrupulous parties with a means of gaining tactical advantage. Whether 
such concerns have manifested themselves in practice remains to be seen.
The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
A motivating force behind the Arbitration Act 1996 was the need to create a 
mechanism that was both understandable and responsive to the needs of disputing 
parties and the wider economic community. Such a desire found embodiment in s 1(b) 
of the Act which provides that parties should be free to agree how their disputes are 
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest. To 
effect such a balance, s4 states the mandatory provisions which have effect 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, together with the non-mandatory 
provisions that allow the parties to make their own arrangements by agreement, but 
which provide rules that apply in the absence of such agreement. In recognition of 
commercial practice in which standard form contracts are often utilised, s4(3) states 
that parties may make such arrangements by agreeing to the application of 
institutional rules or providing any other means by which a matter may be decided.
So as to facilitate a responsive mechanism in which unforeseen events are expediently 
dealt with, the Act confers a number of management powers upon the arbitral tribunal 
and the court. Turning to consider the management powers of the tribunal, s30 can be 
seen as a mechanism by which delay at the outset of proceedings is contained without
this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
inoperative, or incapable of being performed. See Newman “Arbtiration Case Law Still Flowing Fast” 
(2001) 12 Construction Law 9 p.20-23. See also Capital Trust Investments Ltd v Radio Design TJAB 
[2002JEWCA Civ 135; Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [1999] 1 WLR 270 (CA). For 
case comment see Timmons “Appeals From a Refusal of Stay: s9 of the 1996 Arbitration Act” (1999) 
65 Arbitration 2 p. 110-112.
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impinging upon party autonomy to determine how the dispute is to be resolved. 
Indeed, under s30 it is stated that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral 
tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction.35 That is, as to whether there is 
a valid arbitration agreement, whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and what 
matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration 
agreement.36 If procedural delay is to be ousted at the outset, then such an ability to 
determine jurisdictional issues in the first instance is essential. This balance between 
the provision of a reactive mechanism and the need to protect the self-determination 
of arbitral parties is continued under s34, where it is stated that subject to the right of 
the parties to agree to any matter, the tribunal has the authority to decide all 
procedural and evidential matters.37 These include the location, timing and language 
of proceedings, the documentation to be provided, the questions to be answered and 
the nature of proceedings. Crucially, it is specified that the tribunal may decide 
whether to apply the strict rules of evidence,38 whether and to what extent the tribunal 
should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law39 and whether and 
to what extent there should be oral or written evidence or submissions.40 Thus, 
matters of procedure may be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
consideration external factors that may alter the scope of the dispute. Extending the 
powers of the tribunal to respond to matters as they arise, s39 states that the parties 
are free to agree that the tribunal shall have power to order on a provisional basis any 
relief which it would have power to grant in a final award, including the payment of
35 Under s31 parties may raise objections to the substantial jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. See 
Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 1 All ER 476 (QBD (Comm Ct)).
36 It should be noted that under s30(2) any such ruling may be challenged by any available arbitral 
process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions of this Part.
37 See Needham “The Road to Kilkenny” (1996) 62 Arbitration 1 p.25-28.
38 S34(2)(f).
39 S34(2)(g). See Critchlow “Arbitrator’s Power to Procure Third Party Assistance” (1998) 9 Amicus 
Curiae p.22-23.
40 S34(2)(h).
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money or the disposition of property41. Given the complicated nexus of trade that 
forms the basis of the construction industry,42 such case management powers are vital. 
As without interim relief, a restriction in cash flow may adversely affect the financial 
status of a business and in some instances, result in liquidation.
Further to such provisions are the powers of the court. S12 is demonstrative of the 
reactive jurisdiction of the court in that where an arbitration agreement to refer future 
disputes to arbitration specifies that proceedings must be commenced within a fixed 
time lest the claim shall be barred, or the claimant’s right extinguished, an extension 
of time for the beginning arbitral proceedings may be possible. Where the 
circumstances resulting in delay are such as were outside the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties when they agreed the provision in question and where it 
is just to extend the time, or where the conduct of one party makes it unjust to hold 
the other party to the strict terms of the provision in question, the court may extend 
the time for such period and on such terms as it thinks fit. Thus, the circumstances 
leading to a failure of compliance with contractual time limits are taken into account 
before a party is denied the right to resolve their dispute by arbitration. Other external 
factors that may frustrate arbitral procedure are also provided for in the Act. For 
example, under si 8 provision is made for a failure of the appointment procedure43 and 
where issue is had with regard to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, s32 provides that the 
court may44 determine any question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal45
41 Unless the parties agree to confer such power on the tribunal, the tribunal has no such power.
42 See Chapter 1
43 See Virdee v Virdi [2003] EWCA Civ 41 (CA). For case comment, see Dundas “Arbitration 
Agreements and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal: Virdee v VirdV (2004) 70 Arbitration 1 62-68.
44 On the application of a party to arbitral proceedings and upon notice to the other parties.
45 S32(2). It is important to note that an application under this section shall not be considered unless (a) 
it is made with the agreement in writing of all the other parties to the proceedings, or (b) it is made with 
the permission of the tribunal and the court is satisfied- (i) that the determination of the question is 
likely to produce substantial savings in costs, (ii) that the application was made without delay, and (iii)
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Determination of any question of law arising in the course of the proceedings is also 
permitted where the court is satisfied that it substantially affects the rights of one or 
more of the parties46 and powers in support of the tribunal are provided so as to 
counter party non-compliance with proceedings. Indeed, s42 states that unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may make an order requiring a party to 
comply with a peremptory order made by the tribunal. S43 confers upon the Court 
the authority to secure the attendance of witnesses and under s44 the Court may47 
grant orders for the taking and preservation of evidence and orders relating to 
property, including the sale of any goods which are the subject of the proceedings and 
the granting of an interim injunction or appointment of a receiver.48 As with the 
management powers of the tribunal, therefore, statutory provision has sought to 
provide the means by which arbitration proceedings are responsive to the needs of 
disputants and procedural developments, without sacrificing the right of parties to 
determine matters of procedure. Whether such provisions have achieved such a 
balance remains to be seen and may only be uncovered by means of empirical 
research.49
that there is good reason why the matter should be decided by the court. See ABB Lummus Global Ltd 
v Keppel Fels Ltd (Unreported, 1998) (QBD).
46 S45 -  unless otherwise agreed by the parties
47 Unless otherwise agreed by the parties
48 If the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party or proposed party to the 
arbitral proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or 
assets -  s44(3). If the case is not one of urgency, the court shall act only on the application of a party 
to the arbitral proceedings (upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) made with the 
permission of the tribunal or the agreement in writing of the other parties -  s44(4). In any case the 
court shall act only if or to the extent that the arbitral tribunal, and any arbitral or other institution or 
person vested by the parties with power in that regard, has no power or is unable for the time being to 
act effectively (s44(5)).
49 See later chapters
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The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
If a mechanism of dispute resolution is to facilitate the criteria for certainty, then its 
requirements are two fold: firstly, it must be capable of reaching a final and binding 
resolution to disputes in the majority of cases; and secondly it must promote certainty 
in the wider community with regard to case precedent and questions of law.50
Upon initial examination, arbitration may be seen to fulfil the first requirement in that 
in the majority of cases referred a settlement is reached.51 This is because in 
providing a neutral, penetrating and analytical examination of the case in hand, an 
honest view as to the result likely to be attained in court will be provided, laying the 
dispute to rest in most construction cases. This is not to say, however, that every 
dispute shall be settled or finally determined by arbitration. Indeed, economic 
analysis of the arbitral process suggests that arbitration creates a “chilling effect”.52 
That is, arbitration chills the bargaining process as it creates incentives for the parties 
to present information of limited usefulness to the arbitrator, whilst encouraging them 
to present extreme demands. Information presented to an arbitrator can be one of two 
forms: either the information provided by the parties is consistent; or parties to the
50 See Arnold “If You Are Right, You Will Win” (2003) 24 Maritime Advocate p.7-9.
51 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?” (1986) 99 HLR 673
52 See Chappe “Arbitration and Incentives: How to Preclude the Chilling Effect?” (2001) 12 European 
Journal o f Law and Economics 1 p.39-45. See also Ashe “Arbitration Finality: Myth or Reality?” 
(1983) 38 Arbitration Journal p.42-51; Ashenfelter “Arbitration Behaviour” (1987) 77 American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings p.342-346; Benson “Arbitration” in Bouckaert & De Geest 
(eds) Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics (2000) Edward Elgar; Benson “To Arbitrate or Litigate: 
That is the Question” (1999) 8 European Journal o f Law and Economics p.91-151; Bloom and 
Cavanagh “An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators” (1986) 76 American Economic Review p.408- 
422; Brams “Negotiation Games: Applying Game Theory to Bargaining and Arbitration” (1990) 
Routledge; Crawford “The Role of Arbitration and the Theory of Incentives” in Roth (ed) “Game 
Theoretic Models of Bargaining” (1985) Cambridge University Press; Farber and Bazerman “The 
General Basis of Arbitrator Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer 
Arbitration” (1986) 54 Econmetrica 6 p. 1503-1528; Lambert-Mogiliansky “Optimal Arbitration 
Mandates in Joint-Production Contracts” (1997) Mimeo; Rubinfeld and Sappington “Efficient Awards 
and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings” (1987) 18 Rand Journal o f Economics 2 p.308-315
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dispute offer inconsistent information. In such a circumstance, the arbitrator may 
experience difficulty in ascertaining the facts and/or reaching a decision and must 
invoke measures aimed at controlling parties’ incentives so as to effectively manage 
the dispute. For example, where a party to proceedings seems unwilling to comply 
with the spirit of arbitration, the arbitrator may use the prospect of “costs” as a means 
by which compliance may be extracted. Where an arbitrator of experience conducts 
proceedings, then such game theory shall naturally and automatically be employed. 
However, where the arbitrator is of little or no experience in conducting arbitration, 
then the deployment of such measures may prove difficult. Of further consideration is 
the fact that even where an arbitrator has determined fact and a decision is reached, 
one or both parties to the proceedings may be unwilling to accept the result. The 
likelihood of a challenge to the arbitral award is increased where the information 
presented by the parties to the dispute is inconsistent. Thus, the degree to which 
arbitral decisions are final and binding upon the parties becomes of significance. That 
is, what is the scope for the opening up of an arbitral decision to judicial review?
Arguably, the state is under a duty to evaluate whether the grounds upon which 
arbitral decisions are made can be seen to be “just”, for inexpensive, expeditious and 
informal dispute resolution is not always synonymous with fair and just dispute 
resolution. However, this need for evaluation must not be extended so as to confer 
an unlimited right to appeal an arbitral award. Indeed, a balance must be struck 
between the juridicial interest of national governments to ensure the integrity of the 
process and the protection of public interest, as against the rights of participants to
53 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?” (1986) 99 HLR 676
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maintain autonomy of the arbitration process.54 Further, as the object of arbitration is 
to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary 
delay or expense, some limitation must be placed upon the appeal mechanism. Too 
liberal a right of appeal would jeopardise expedition and efficiency, as volumous 
appeals to court would increase the delay and expense in resolving a dispute and 
worse still, may provide unscrupulous parties with a means of gaining tactical 
advantage. Conversely, too restricted a right of appeal may permit a travesty of 
justice to pass unchecked. In short, a balance must be stuck between the need for 
justice and the commercial need for the final and expedient resolution of a dispute. 
To this end the Arbitration Act 1996 provides for the appeal of an arbitral award55 
under the following heads: substantive jurisdiction56; serious irregularity57; and appeal
54 See Chukwumerije “Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: the English Arbitration Act of 
1996” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 2 p. 171-191.
55 See generally Raeside “The Arbitration Act 1996: Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal” (1999) 2 
Commercial Law Journal 2; Sandy “The Arbitration Act 1996 and Appeals on Points of Law: a New 
Approach” (2001/02) 14 European Lawyer Supp (International Arbitration 2001) p. 13-15; Shackleton 
“Global Wanning: Milder Still in England: Part 3” (2000) 3 International Arbitration Law Review 3 
p.59-84; Zekos “The Role of Courts in Commercial and Maritime Arbitration Under English Law”
(1998) 15 Journal of International Arbitration 1 p.51-73.
56 S67 Arbitration Act 1996. See Virdee v Virdi [2003] EWCA Civ 41 (CA). For case comment, see 
Dundas “Arbitration Agreements and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal: Virdee v Virdi” (2004) 70 
Arbitration 1 p.62-68. See also Athletic Union o f Constantinople (AEK) v National Basketball 
Association (Application to Strike Out) [2002] 3 All ER 897 (CA). For case comment see Altaras 
“Right to Appeal: Athletic Union o f Constantinople v National Basketball Association & Others”
(2003) 69 Arbitration 1 p.63-64. See also Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 1 All ER 476 
(QBD (Comm Ct)). For case comment see “Jurisdiction -  Award Under s30 of the Arbitration Act 
1996” (1999) 1 Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal p.47-50.
57 S68 Arbitration Act 1996. See Tweeddale “Recent Cases on Serious Irregularity” (2000) 66 
Arbitration 4 p.313-319. See also Virdee v Virdi [2003] EWCA Civ 41 (CA). For case comment, see 
Dundas “Arbitration Agreements and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal: Virdee v Virdi” (2004) 70 
Arbitration 1 p.62-68. See also Checkpoint Ltd v Strathclyde Pension Fund [2003] EWCA Civ 84. For 
case comment see “Serious Irregularity -  Use if Own Knowledge by Arbitrators” (2003) 3 Arbitration 
Law Monthly 6 p.3-7. See also Hawk Shipping Ltd v Cron Navigation Ltd [2003] EWHC 1828 (QBD 
(Comm Ct)). For case comment see “Serious Irregularity: Procedural Errors” (Dec 2003 / Jan 2004) 
Arbitration Law Monthly p.7-9. See also Icon Navigation Corp v Sinochem International Petroleum 
(Bahamas) Co Ltd [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 405 (QBD (Comm Ct)). For case comment see 
“Arbitration -  Charterparty -  Dispute as to Contractual Responsibility for Temperature of Cargo -  
New Argument Raised at Late Stage” (2003) 3 Shipping and Trade Law 2 p.7-8. See also Ocean 
Marine Navigation Ltd v Koch Carbon Inc (The Dynamic) [2003] EWHC 1936. For case comment see 
Harris “The Arbitration Appeals Debate” (2003) 4 Shipping & Transport Lawyer International 2 p.6-8. 
See also Shackleton “Annual Review of English Judicial Decisions on Arbitration -  2002” (2002) 6 
International Arbitration Law Review 6 p.220-236. See also Gbangbola v Smith & Sherrijf Ltd [1998] 
3 All ER 730 (QBD (OR)).
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• (Oon point of law. Theoretically, such provisions should enable a party to challenge 
the actions and decisions of the arbitral tribunal where an injustice or irregularity may 
have occurred, without opening too wide the floodgates of litigious opposition.59
Given the ability of parties to appeal a decision on a point of law, it may be assumed 
that arbitration also facilitates the second criteria for certainty: certainty as to case 
precedent and questions of law. Indeed, procedural transparency has been of central 
importance to the debate surrounding access to justice, largely due to the principle 
that civil wrongs must not be conferred immunity and members of a community must 
be able to assert and maintain their reasonable and well-founded rights and claims, as 
well as defend themselves against those of others.60 Such a proposition has led to the 
belief that an integral role of dispute resolution mechanisms that seek to administer
58 S69 Arbitration Act 1996. See Needham “Appeal on Point of Law Arising Out of an Award” (1999) 
65 Arbitration 3 p.205-211. See also Virdee v Virdi [2003] EWCA Civ 41 (CA). For case comment, 
see Dundas “Arbitration Agreements and the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal: Virdee v Virdr
(2004) 70 Arbitration 1 p.62-68. See also CMA CGM SA v Beteiligungs KG MS Northern Pioneer 
Schiffah.rtsgesellscha.ft MbH & Co [2003] 1 WLR 1015 (CA); HOK Sport Ltd (Formerly Lobb 
Partnership Ltd) v Aintree Racecourse Co Ltd [2003] BLR 155 (QBD (T&CC)). For case comment 
see Dundas “Appeals on Question of Law: Section 69 Revitalised” (2003) 69 Arbitration 3 p. 172-183. 
See also Skanska Construction (Regions) Ltd v Anglo Amsterdam Corp Ltd 84 Con LR 100 (QBD 
(T&CC)). For case comment, see Dundas “Construction Contracts Made Easy: Who Occupied the 
Site? Skanska Construction (Regions) Ltd v Anglo-Amsterdam Corp L td’ (2003) 69 Arbitration 3 
p.223-235; Thompson & Dundas “Discussion: Hew Dundas’s Casenote” (2004) IQ Arbitration 1 p.41- 
44. See also Holmes & O’Reilly “Appeals From Arbitral Awards: Should s69 be Repealed?” 69 
Arbitration 1 p. 1-9. See also Altaras “Right to Appeal: Athletic Union o f Constantinople v National 
Basketball Association & Others” (2003) 69 Arbitration 1 p.63-64. See also BLCT (13096) Ltd v J  
Sainsbury Pic [2003] EWCA Civ 881; Icon Navigation Corp v Sinochem International Petroleum 
(Bahamas) Co Ltd [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 405 (QBD (Comm Ct)). For case comment see 
“Arbitration -  Charterparty -  Dispute as to Contractual Responsibility for Temperature of Cargo -  
New Argument Raised at Late Stage” (2003) 3 Shipping and Trade Law 2 p.7-8. See also North Range 
Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping Corp (The Western Triumph) [2002] EWCA Civ 405. For case 
comment see “Error of Law: the Application for Permission to Appeal” (2003) 3 Arbitration Law 
Monthly 9 P.7-11. See also Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd 
(Leave to Appeal) [2000] 3 WLR 1824 (CA). For case comment see Ambrose “Court of Appeal’s 
Jurisdiction to Grant Leave to Appeal” (2001) 4 (Nov) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly p.485-486.
59 See Seitler “Levelling the Land” (2004) 18 Lawyer 6 Supp (The Real Estate Lawyer) RE7. Suggests 
that the chance of a rent review arbitration appeal succeeding has risen since 2002, but that does not 
mean that the arbitration process is flawed.
60 See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & Maxwell at p.218. See also CMS 
Cameron McKenna “How Confidential is Arbitration?” (2004) 33 Chartered Institute o f Patent Agents 
Journal 5 p.271-272.
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justice, must be to enhance community involvement in the dispute resolution 
process. For as Lord Hewart contended in R v Sussex Justice ex p  McCarthy , in 
any civil procedure justice must be done and “should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done.” However, an advantage attributed to arbitral proceedings has 
traditionally been that of confidentiality. The reason underpinning the need for 
confidentiality is clear. Many construction disputes concern sensitive information 
such as intellectual property disputes, which if allowed to enter the public domain, 
would cause great financial loss and competitive disadvantage. Consequently, one 
must question whether the aspect of societal certainty of arbitral procedure has been 
compromised by the confidentiality of proceedings?
Indeed, in theoretical terms it should be questioned whether confidentiality of arbitral 
proceedings should be maintained as a matter of course, or whether it should be
61 See Goldberg, Sanders, and Rogers (eds) “Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and Other 
Processes” (1992) Little, Brown and Company. See also Alviano “Environmental Conflict and the 
Failure of Community Participation” (1995) 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 1 p23-42; Bidol, 
Bardwell and Manring (eds) “Alternative Environmental Conflict Management Approaches: A 
Citizen’s Manual” (1986) University of Michigan, School of Natural Resources, The Environmental 
Conflict Project; Bingham “Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience” (1986) 
Conservation Foundation, Donnelly & Sons; Bryson and Crosby “Three Cases Involving Strategies for 
Managing Public Disputes” (1987) National Institute for Dispute Resolution; Burton and Dukes 
“Conflict: Practices in Management, Settlement, and Resolution” (1990) St Martin’s Press (The 
Conflict Series No 4); Carpenter and Kennedy “Managing Environmental Conflict by Applying 
Common Sense” (1985) 1 Negotiation Journal 2 p i49-161; Crowfoot and Wondolleck “Environmental 
Disputes: Community Involvement in Conflict Resolution” (1990) Island Press; Peace Review 
“Development and the Environment & Other Features” (1994) 6 Peace Review: The International 
Quarterly o f World Peace 3; Susskind “A Negotiation Credo for Controversial Siting Disputes” (1990) 
6 Negotiation Journal 4 309-314.
62 [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
63 See Lalonde “Confidentiality in Canada: a Case of the Emperors New Clothes?” (2002) 21 
International Financial Law Review 5 Supp {Experts in Commercial Arbitration) p. 16-17; Oakley- 
White “Confidentiality Revisited: is International Arbitration Losing One of its Major Benefits?” 
(2003) 6 International Arbitration Law Review 1 p.29-36; Packard “To Publish or Not to Publish?”
(1999) 13 P & I International 3 p.59-60; Trakman “Confidentiality in International Commercial 
Arbitration” (2002) 18 Arbitration International 1 p.1-18. For exceptions to the implied / voluntary 
duty of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings see Fortier “The Occasionally Unwarranted 
Assumption of Confidentiality” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 2 p. 131-139; Neill “Confidentiality 
in Arbitration” (1996) 12 Arbitration 3 p.287-317; Sheridan “Private & Confidential: a Benefit of 
Arbitration” (1996) 12 Construction Law Journal 2 p.74-82. See also Ali Shipping Corp v Shipyard 
Trogir [1999] 1 WLR 314 (CA).
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reserved for sensitive cases alone.64 As when seeking to arbitrate upon an 
individual’s rights, surely openness needs to be maintained so as to ensure justice is 
achieved. However, as evidenced by the limited attendance at court by members of 
the public, even when society is given free access to dispute resolution proceedings, 
rarely is the opportunity taken up. Could it be therefore that the need for community 
involvement in the resolution of disputes has been overstated? As whilst the 
opportunity for social regulation of litigation has been provided, rarely has it been 
utilised. Moreover, one needs to consider the validity of this perceived “need” for 
confidentiality. For in maintaining the confidentiality of arbitral awards, any 
opportunity to develop a body of precedent that may expedite arbitral proceedings and 
disputes arising therefrom, together with the opportunity to improve upon procedure 
and practice, will be lost. As a result, the same dispute may be arbitrated several 
times over, with a host of different outcomes. Given that the number of construction 
disputes resulting in litigation is declining in favour of mechanisms such as 
arbitration, the body of law that had developed to guide the construction industry may 
be near to being lost.
Perhaps the answer to such a question lies in seeking to achieve a fine balance 
between the commercial need for privacy on the one hand and society’s / industry’s 
need to monitor justice on the other. The concept of confidentiality in an arbitral 
context does not necessarily undermine the attaining of such a balance, as arbitral
64 Such as matters of national security and matters which the court deems should be dealt with in 
private. See Moscow City Council v Bankers Trust Co [2004] EWCA Civ 314. For case comment, see 
Dundas “Confidentiality in Arbitration: The Story Continues -  Department of Economic Policy & 
Development, City of Moscow v (1) Bankers Trust Company and (2) International Industrial Bank” 
(2003) 69 Arbitration 4 p.296-304. See also Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v 
European Reinsurance Co of Zurich [2003] 1 WLR 1041 (PC (Berr)). For case comment see Altaras 
“Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Ltd v European Reinsurance Co of Zurich” (2003) 69 
Arbitration 3 p.210-213. See also Kalmneft JSC v Glencore International AG [2002] 1 All ER 76 
(QBD (Comm Ct)).
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proceedings are confidential in nature lest an appeal be made to Court.65 Given the 
theoretically limited right of appeal, only in the most deserving of cases will 
confidentiality be breached, thereby opening the procedure to the scrutiny of the 
community and continuing the development of a sustainable body of law. It is 
submitted that it is this commercial / community balance that ensures access to 
justice, as opposed to the concept of openness alone. In short, the preservation of 
confidentiality under the Arbitration Act 1996 can be seen to have little adverse effect 
upon the attainment of certainty as required by Woolf.
The Eighth Criteria: Effective Resourcing and Organisation
Under the terms of The Arbitration Act 1996, it is the responsibility of the parties to 
provide the funding for the arbitral hearing. Unlike litigation, this responsibility does 
not just involve the payment of legal representation and witness fees, but it also 
extends to cover the fees and expenses of the arbitrator himself, as well as the cost of 
securing the premises in which the proceedings may be conducted.
Given the financial implications of arbitration, debate has evolved as to whether 
parties to arbitral proceeding should be self-financing or in receipt of state aid. The 
reasoning for state finance is persuasive. As advocated by Roberts66 “investment in 
dispute management has been a life long involvement for government” and as such 
should be extended to arbitration. When one considers the fact that in litigation, many
65 See Moscow City Council v Bankers Trust Co [2004] EWCA Civ 314 in which it was considered 
whether the judgement of the High Court following a challenge to an arbitrators decision should be 
made public or only made available to the parties themselves.
66 See Roberts “Mediation in the Lawyers Embrace” (1992) 55 MLR p.263
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of those involved in small claims disputes are “one shotters against repeat players”67 
and that inequality in resourcing has led to many an injustice, the case for state 
funding of arbitral proceedings becomes compelling. Indeed, as can be seen in 
American legal culture, the individualistic nature of society has encouraged the 
assertion of legal rights as an entitlement of citizenship, but has distributed them 
according to the ability to pay. 68 If this inequality is not to be repeated and 
exacerbated in the British arbitral process, then it would appear essential that state 
funding of the arbitral process be supplied lest W oolfs definition of access to justice 
fails to be attained.
It should be noted, however, that should the state accept responsibility for the funding 
of arbitral proceedings, it would then be under a duty to the taxpayer to ensure that 
such proceedings are conducted fairly, efficiently and expediently. This will require 
the extensive supervision and auditing of the arbitral process by the courts, a move 
that may prove to be more damaging than good for a number of reasons. Firstly, one 
should have regard to the possible consequences upon society of state funding of the 
arbitral process, as it is conceivable that in making financial assistance open to those 
engaging in arbitration, legal contentiousness will be encouraged, which will in turn 
lead to an increase in social fragmentation. Secondly, if one accepts that arbitration 
emerged as an alternative to litigation that was designed to overcome litigious 
deficiencies, one should question whether it would be prudent to attach arbitral 
proceedings to that which it was intended to escape. Indeed, it was envisaged by 
Sl(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 that “the parties should be free to agree how their 
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public
67 See Flicker & Walker “ADR: State Responsibility or Second Best?”(1994) 13 CJQ p.29 - 49
68 See Auerbach “Justice Without Law: Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers” (1986) Oxford 
University Press p. 10
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interest.” Yet greater court involvement in the arbitral process will not only extend 
the hand of the state further into private affairs, but it may also lead to the 
juridification of the arbitral process. That is, arbitration may become a form of 
government by lawyers that is conducted in the interests of lawyers. Indeed, as 
contended by Auerbach:69
“...the more elaborate and sophisticated our legal culture, the more serious is the 
problem of access to justice”.
Clearly the intention of the 1996 Act was to circumvent such an ambush of procedure
7  rtand as Fricker & Walker have contended:
“..alternative dispute resolution should not become a short-term expedient which 
will only prove to be yet another turn in the process of reinventing the wheel.”
Given the many mechanisms by which parties may fund proceedings, for example by 
way of legal expense insurance and dispute resolution syndicates,71 the effects of the 
burden placed upon parties to finance arbitration are preferable to the circumvention 
of the legislative reforms. On balance therefore, arbitration cannot be seen to fall foul 
of W oolf s criteria for effective resourcing and organisation.
The Limitations of Woolf
It has been seen that in terms of construction, the statutory provisions of the 
Arbitration Act 1996 may be prima facie seen to meet the eight criteria of Woolf for
69 Ibid at p. 140
70 Loc Cit 67
71 See generally Beynon, Davies and Moore “Intellectual Property and Legal Expense Insurance” 
(2003) IP Wales.
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access to justice. However, mere application of statutory phraseology is inadequate if 
a robust theoretical analysis of arbitration is to be conducted. For excluded from such 
analysis are two issues that may serve to frustrate the attainment of W oolfs criteria: 
the theoretical justification for state involvement in the arbitration process; and the 
subsequent juridification debate. Both of these issues shall now be considered in turn.
State Involvement in Arbitration
In theoretical terms, given the historical development of arbitration in which the 
procedure emerged as an alternative to court proceedings, the involvement of the state 
in arbitration via the intervention of the court becomes questionable on two fronts. In 
consideration of the first point, the justification of the formal system of law rests upon 
the notion of justice, yet by definition the notion of justice has an indeterminate 
meaning. Given the absence of a universal definition, it must therefore be questioned 
how is justice ever possible within a legalised setting and further what is there to 
justify its autocratic and centralistic existence? 72 In consideration of the second issue, 
the success of arbitration can be seen to rest on the notion that it is a mechanism 
which effects the resolution of contractual disputes without issue-obscuring 
procedures and which seeks to assert contractual norms, thereby increasing the chance 
that the settlement will be met with party satisfaction. However, should arbitration 
fall under the remit of the state, then such a consensual and co-operative atmosphere 
may be replaced by that of the need for strict adherence to procedure and autocratic 
rules, thereby impairing the efficiency of arbitration as a mechanism which facilitates
72 See Auerbach “Justice Without Law: Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers” (1986) Oxford 
University Press p. 10
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a mutual understanding and respect between parties.73 Thus, given the statutory 
embodiment of arbitration and the powers of the court over arbitral procedure and the 
award, advocates of a system of arbitration free from state governance would question 
the ability of the mechanism to satisfy any one of the eight criteria as determined by 
Woolf.
Prima facie such assertions may seem to hold theoretical weight, requiring the 
freedom of arbitration from state intervention. However, such theories are hedged 
with difficulty. Firstly, to contend that the concept of “justice” has an indeterminate 
meaning is a fiction, for the notion of civil justice is capable of definition. That is, 
whilst the concept may hold varying significance from individual to individual, there 
are a number of common threads detectable in each definition. For example, all 
definitions of civil justice express the need for access to justice: that is a fair and just 
result and a procedure that is expedient and effective. This being the case, there can 
be no justification for the assertion that justice is not possible in a legalised setting. 
Secondly, without extensive empirical research, the contention that by being subjected 
to state regulation arbitration risks adopting both an autocratic and centralistic 
existence, is unconvincing. As already exemplified, on technical construction the 
Arbitration Act provides both for the resolution of a dispute according to legal and 
non-legal considerations.74 This dual approach to dispute resolution was a deliberate 
attempt by the legislature to prevent arbitration from adopting an autocratic and 
centralistic character. Rather, it was the ambition of the Arbitration Act 1996 to 
encourage party autonomy and the resolution of disputes according to commercial
73 See Wemer “When Arbitration Becomes War. Some Reflections on the Frality of the Arbitral 
Process in Cases Involving Authoritarian States” (2000) 17 Journal o f  International Arbitration 4 p.97- 
103. See also Benson “The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State” (1990) Pacific Research 
Institute.
74 S46(l)(b)
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practice.
There are many other justifications for state involvement in the arbitral process. 
Principally, it has been contended that the state is not only under a duty to provide 
dispute resolution mechanisms, but that it is also under a duty to improve upon legal 
procedure. It is doubtful whether it could convincingly be argued that to maintain and 
develop litigation as the sole method of resolving disputes would adequately fulfil 
such an obligation. Thus, the state is necessarily required to both introduce and 
support new methods of dispute resolution, such as arbitration for example. Indeed, 
the provision and development of an efficient and diverse system of dispute resolution 
may be achieved either by: providing a choice of resolution processes; by requiring 
litigants to use alternatives to litigation; or by subsidising such alternatives.75
The merits of providing a “choice” of resolution processes are indisputable, as in 
legislating for alternatives to litigation such as arbitration, the individual is 
empowered to determine how their dispute shall be resolved, which is undoubtedly a 
natural right. Moreover, the state via both legislation and the judiciary may also 
ensure that independent bodies are not encouraging abuses of justice. The 
“requirement” for litigants to use alternatives to litigation cannot, however, be so 
readily justified. To compel a disputant to concede their vested legal rights or 
expectations of legal conventions is a coercion against will which cannot administer 
justice. Indeed, it is submitted that such “compulsion” may either be by active 
encouragement by the state or the judiciary, or by restrictive legislation. Recent 
legislative reforms affecting arbitration may be seen to be a combination of the two.
75 See Flicker and Walker “ADR: State Responsibility or Second Best?” (1994) 13 CJQ p. 32-34.
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For s9 of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides the judiciary with the power to stay legal 
proceedings to arbitration, with or without the consent of the parties. Moreover, 
under the Civil Procedure Rules 1999, litigating parties are obliged to consider 
alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration. At first glance, it would therefore appear 
that contemporary arbitration cannot be seen to facilitate procedural fairness, in that 
the freedom to determine how a dispute is to be resolved has been removed. If this is 
indeed the case, then s9 may be seen to frustrate the purpose behind sl(b) of the very 
same legislation. However, it must be noted that the power of the judiciary to stay 
proceedings to arbitration, may only be enforced where there is an arbitration clause 
in the contract. Consequently, it may be argued that party consent to arbitration had 
already been granted and that the use of s9 cannot be seen to represent the compelling 
of disputants to concede vested legal rights or expectations of legal conventions, so as 
to achieve procedural efficiency. In short, the process of commencing arbitration and 
the encouragement of such by the state cannot be said to be an aberration of justice.
A further consideration lending weight to the need for state involvement in arbitral 
proceedings is that state regulation of the arbitral process is necessary so as to prevent 
the erroneous arbitration of public law issues that may lead to the replacing of the rule 
of law with non-legal values.76 That is, in a construction dispute for example, it may 
be alleged that a contravention of environmental protection standards has occurred. 
Should this dispute be arbitrated, the strict standards necessarily imposed by 
legislation may be compromised by the imposition of weaker standards, leading to the 
application of values that are inconsistent with the rule of law.77 So as to ensure that 
the arbitral result attained is consistent with the public interest and that standards are
76 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?”(1986) 99 HLR 676
77 Ibid at p.677
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maintained, intervention by the court via appeal is essential. Moreover, without 
express regulation to govern it’s functioning, the arbitral process may become the 
victim of ‘bullyboy’ tactics. That is, should arbitration seek to function outside the 
statutory arena, what incentive is there for parties to accept the validity of the award? 
Parties to the proceedings may seek to pressure the arbitrator into deciding a certain 
way, lest the resulting award be referred to court and the arbitrator rendered liable for 
negligence, breach of contract or some other claim. In contemplation of arbitration as 
an absolute autonomy, Kerr78 perceived judicial review to be a:
“bulwark against corruption, arbitrariness, bias, improper conduct and -  where
necessary -  sheer incompetence”.
Only by statutory intervention can the sanctity of arbitration be ensured and the 
arbitrator accorded sufficient legislative protection so as to execute his duties in a just 
and fair manner without fear of reprisal. Thus, not only can the state be said to be 
under a duty to provide access to arbitration, but it can also be said to be under a duty 
to regulate arbitration. But if arbitration is to meaningfully satisfy W oolfs criteria for
• • 7 0access to justice, one must question how far should state regulation of arbitration go 
and how are the powers of the Court in relation to arbitration under the 1996 Act to be 
perceived? It is anticipated that empirical research shall provide some guidance to the 
answering of such a question.
78 See Kerr “Arbitration and the Courts -  The UNCITRAL Model Law” (1984) 50 Arbitration 4. See 
also The Derby [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 325, 333 per Kerr LJ
79 Precisely where the balance is to be struck between arbitral autonomy and judicial review is a matter 
of debate and one on which national laws differ. See Park “The Lex Loci Arbitri and International 
Commercial Arbitration” (1983) 32 ICLQ 21; Staughton “Arbitration Act 1979 -  A Pragmatic 
Compromise” [1979] N U  920; Thomas “The Law and Practice Relating to Appeals From Arbitration 
Awards” (1994) LLP.
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Juridification
As already exemplified, a concern with the legislative reform of arbitration was to 
avoid the over-extension of the hand of the judiciary and the legal profession into 
arbitral proceedings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such concerns may be well- 
founded, as many have asserted that juridification of the arbitral process has already 
taken place. Juridification usually occurs when under sl(b) of the Act, parties 
abdicate their decision-making powers to their legal representatives. For as 
exemplified by Parratt80 some lawyers are unfamiliar with arbitration procedure and 
thus:
“feel out of their depth with anything other than standard court procedures and 
tend to resist any suggestions for methods which have a prospect of achieving 
rapid progress by innovative means.”
As a result, arbitration may fall victim to expensive and long-winded procedures. 
Given that Parratt explained such a mischief as stemming “primarily from a culture of 
conflict where winning is more important than finding a fair solution at minimum 
cost”, turning the tide of juridification may be difficult.
Indeed, when seeking to apply W oolfs prerequisites for access to justice, it becomes 
clear that the requirements overlap one another, causing a potential conflict of
O -I
interest. That is, W oolfs criterion for successful arbitration includes both issues of 
procedure and substantive issues and examination of arbitration in practice has shown 
a marked polarisation of the two. This polarisation of substance and procedure can be
80 See Parratt “Is Construction Arbitration Failing?” (2001) 17 Const.U3 p.209
81 Tyler “Procedure or Result: What Do Disputants Want From Legal Authorities?” in Mackie 
“Handbook of Dispute Resolution: ADR in Action” (1991) Routledge
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89  «seen in the results of Tyler’s research and gives cause for concern. For upon 
examination of the attitudes of those involved in the dispute resolution process, Tyler 
discovered that it was the perception of the lawyers that it was the end result which 
was of greatest importance to not only themselves in a professional capacity, but also 
in so far as the client was concerned. Ironically however, examination of client 
attitude to dispute resolution indicated that it was the process itself and not the result 
that was of greatest significance. That is, in contradiction of the lawyers perception, 
clients were relatively unconcerned with the result attained, provided the process was 
procedurally fair. Whether or not a procedure was deemed to be “fair” was 
inextricably linked to the opportunity to participate in the process.
As one will appreciate, the results of such a study may indicate that a grave future lay 
ahead for arbitral proceedings, as it was the over-concern of the legal profession with 
substantive issues that created the situation in America whereby litigation statistics 
were mushrooming, despite the fact that the majority of cases were being settled out 
of court. 83 Such a phenomenon can be accounted for by the view of the legal 
profession that to compromise was tantamount to an admission of weakness. Thus, 
the initiation of negotiation was delayed as long as possible, so as to place the onus of 
suggesting a settlement upon opposing counsel.84 Moreover, this culture of 
“substantiveness” led to the situation whereby lawyers became so convinced of the 
merits of their Client’s case, that they developed unrealistic expectations as to the 
result that should be attained. 85 What this means for arbitration in England and 
Wales, is that whilst s9 of the Act ‘may’ be utilised so as to prevent an inordinate
82 Ibid
83 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?” (1986) 99 HLR 669
84 Ibid at p.670.
85 Ibid
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delay in the commencing of arbitral proceedings, once proceedings have commenced 
and an arbitral award has been made, such legally represented parties may seek to 
appeal the tribunals’ decision on the grounds of a serious irregularity86 or point of
07
law . Such action motivated only by a culture of substantiveness, would clearly 
delay the resolution of the dispute, thereby undermining the purpose of the Act.
However, an examination of the American attitude to justice has illustrated that there 
are also dangers in becoming too concerned with issues of procedure. For in 
contemporary American society, the notion of justice has become in essence about 
giving the least offence to the most people.88 This has created the opposite situation 
to Tyler’s research, whereby it is the legal profession who are concerned with the 
bargaining and negotiating process itself, rather than the result that it brings. As
OQ
Levine has contended, this has led to the situation whereby justice in a commercial 
age is “merely a problem of correct book keeping”.
It must be questioned, however, whether the removal of legal representatives from the 
arbitration process would alleviate such a situation. That is, given the extent of the 
arbitral tribunals jurisdiction and powers of determination, is it justifiable for the legal 
profession to share their monopoly of the dispute resolution process with lay people? 
Is it justifiable, for example that an arbitral tribunal convened to determine a 
contractual dispute, may consist solely of quantity surveyors or other construction 
professionals, who are devoid of any formal legal training? Such a question clearly
86 S68 Arbitration Act 1996
87 S69 Arbitration Act 1996
88 See Auerbach “Justice Without Law: Resolving Disputes Without Lawyers” (1986) Oxford 
University Press p.l 1
89 See Manuel Levine “The Concilliation Court of Cleveland” (1918) 2 Journal o f Arner Judicial 
Society 10
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underpins the validity of the arbitral process. However, it should be noted that given 
the parties freedom to select the identity of an arbitrator and / or the method by which 
an arbitrator is to be appointed, it is the disputants alone who may hold the key to 
such a question. Given the complexity of construction disputes and the conventions 
surrounding the industry, an individual free from legal constraints may be best placed 
to determine a commercial dispute. Moreover, it would be foolhardy to suggest that 
non-legal arbitrators do not have an understanding of the law - given the number of 
regulations and requirements that a construction project may encompass, it is a 
prerequisite for construction professionals to undertake basic legal training. Thus, the 
tide of juridification must be countered, as it is without both theoretical and practical 
justification. That is not to say, however, that the last vestiges of the law need be 
removed from the arbitral process, for injustice within the law is a travesty, but 
injustice without law is worse still.90
90 Loc Cit 88
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The Human Rights Act -  A Further Difficulty Facing the Arbitration Act 1996?
Interestingly, the Human Rights Act 199891 can be seen to embody the principles of 
justice as described by Woolf. The three main provisions of the Act are: that in so far 
as it is possible, the Courts must interpret legislation consistently with the 
Convention; where such a consistent interpretation is not possible, the judiciary must 
apply existing legislation but the High Court, Court of Appeal, or the House of Lords 
are free to make a declaration of incompatibility which will assist Parliament in the 
decision as to whether the law needs amending; and lastly that except where 
legislation compels otherwise, all public authorities must act compatibly with the 
Convention. Significantly for the purposes of resolving a dispute, incorporated into
M
the Act is Article 6 of the Convention, which relates to the “right to a fair trial”. 
Indeed, Article 6 states that:
91 This Act was introduced on the 2 October 2000 and incorporates the provisions of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter the Convention) 
into UK domestic law. The treaty was created in 1950 and the UK signed up to it in 1951. Until the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act in 2000, liberties in England and Wales were residual rather than 
fundamental and positive in nature. That is, apart from the Magna Carta (1297), the Petition of Right 
(1627), the Bill of Rights, and the Act o f Settlement, which stated general provisions ensuring the 
peaceful enjoyment of property and the freedom of the individual from legal detention, duress and 
punishment of taxation -  in effect regulating relations between the Crown and the people -  and apart 
from legislation conferring particular rights, the fundamental rights and liberties of British individuals 
were not expressly defined in any law or code. In short, theory indicated that one was permitted to do 
anything that was not expressly prohibited. Indeed, before the implementation of the Act (and after 
1966), individuals who considered that their rights or freedoms under the Convention had been 
infringed and who could not obtain adequate redress through the UK courts, could bring their case 
before the Commission (now abolished) and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This 
was clearly a costly and time consuming practice. With the introduction of the Human Rights Act 
however, the Convention can now be enforced in England and Wales without the need to travel to 
Strasbourg. It should be noted that the Act confers rights upon both natural and legal persons, 
including companies, against the state / public authorities.
92 Rights incorporated from the Convention and the Protocols were, amongst others: Article 2, Right to 
Life; Article 3, Prohibition of Torture; Article 4, Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour; Article 5, 
Right to Liberty and Security; Article 6, Right to a Fair Trial; Article 7, No Punishment Without Law; 
Article 8, Right to Respect Private and Family Life; Article 9, Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion; Article 10, Freedom of Expression; Article 11, Freedom of Assembly and Association; 
Article 12, Right to Marry; Article 14, Prohibition of Discrimination. It is interesting to note that 
Article 13 -  the Right to an Effective Remedy -  was not incorporated into the Act, as the Government 
perceived the Act itself to provide an effective remedy and hence the provision was deemed 
unnecessary.
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“in the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... every one is entitled 
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced 
publicly...”
There is a right of appeal to anyone who can show that the tribunal has failed to 
conduct proceedings in a fair and impartial way or to ensure that submissions, 
arguments and evidence are properly examined. Further, Article 6 requires that a 
party has real and effective access to Court, has a reasonable opportunity equal to his 
opponents to present his case and is given a reasoned decision.
Should the Act apply to arbitration, the implications are clear. For example, not only 
will the confidentiality of such proceedings be deemed to be unlawful, but also if the 
statutory period for the completion of proceedings is too short for a fair hearing, then 
the time must be extended lest the outcome be deemed unlawful. The capping of 
costs and the exercise by the arbitrator of his power to determine his own jurisdiction 
may also be called into question. Indeed, under the Act the Courts may grant any 
relief or remedy or make orders as it considers just and appropriate, provided the 
remedy is within the power of the judiciary.93 If for example, the judiciary were to 
hold that the arbitral timescale as provided under the Arbitration Act was 
incompatible with the convention, the Court may order that the legislation be 
amended so as to remove the incompatibility. In short, if the Human Rights Act were 
to apply to arbitration, the ramifications for the construction industry would 
potentially be wide reaching.
93 Damages are exceptionally allowed -  where the Court has the power to award damages and 
considers such an award necessary to afford satisfaction to the person whose rights have allegedly been 
infringed.
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In so far as the applicability of the Act to arbitration is concerned, there are two issues 
that need to be considered. Firstly, is the arbitral tribunal subject to the provisions of 
the Convention and secondly, aside from any obligation placed upon the arbitral 
tribunal, what impact does the Human Rights legislation have upon the statutory 
supervisory and enforcement role of the Court in arbitration proceedings? Given that 
the Human Rights Act provides for the taking into account of the jurisprudence of the 
former Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, the answer to such 
questions must lie in the jurisprudence of those institutions.
In Mousaka Inc v Golden Seagull Maritime Inc and Another94 the judge observed 
that:
“The tentacles of the Human Rights Act 1998 reach into some unexpected 
places. The Commercial Court, even when it is exercising its supervisory 
jurisdiction as regards arbitration, is not immune”.
Furthermore, in Bramelid and Malmstrom v Sweden?5 the Commission noted that a 
distinction must be drawn between voluntary and compulsory arbitration and that:
“If ... arbitration is compulsory in the sense of being required by law, ... the 
[arbitration] board must offer the guarantees set forth in Article 6 paragraph 1 ”.
Thus, both the Court and the arbitral tribunal of a compulsory arbitration required by 
law can be seen to be subject to the provisions of the Convention.
94 Commercial Court, 30 July 2001
95 Application Nos 8588/79; 8589/79 Report and Opinion of Commission 12 December 1983
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Given that arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1996 is a consensual and thereby 
“voluntary” process, this would seem to prima facie indicate that such arbitration is 
not directly subject to the provisions of the Human Rights Act. Moreover, as noted 
by the judge in Mousaka Inc,:
“The parties have agreed to arbitrate their disputes. They have thereby largely 
renounced (in the interests of privacy and finality) the application of Article 6 
(albeit some incidents of this Article are of course preserved by s68 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996)”.
Indeed, in Deweer v Belgium96 and KR v Switzerland97 it was stated that an arbitration 
agreement entered into voluntarily should be treated as a waiver of Article 6(1) to the 
extent that it amounts to a renunciation of the right to have a dispute dealt with by an 
ordinary court of the land. However, it was stated by the ECHR in Suovaniemi v 
Finlandm that a convention right may be waived only where the waiver is both “clear” 
and “permissible”. In certain circumstances, for example where public policy 
dictates, the waiver may be deemed to be ineffective. Furthermore, the Court stated 
that whilst a clear and voluntary waiver of public court proceedings in favour of 
arbitration is generally permissible under Article 6, it should not necessarily be 
considered to be a waiver of all rights under that Article as there were minimum 
levels of procedural safeguards which the state must guarantee in relation to 
arbitration.
Indeed, when examining the supervisory and enforcement powers of the Court in 
relation to arbitral proceedings, a divergence of opinion can be seen to emerge. In
96 (1980) 2 EHRR 439
97 Application No. 10881/84: Decision of the Commission as to Admissibility 4 March 1987
98 Application No. 31737/96: Decision of HER Court (sitting as a Chamber) as to Admissibility 23 
February 1999. See also Welex AG V Rosa Maritime Ltd [2003] LR 509 for an example of the 
application of such a principle by the British court.
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Nordstrom v Netherlands99 it was held that the convention cannot require national 
courts to ensure that arbitration proceedings are conducted in accordance with Article 
6. However, in Jakob Boss Sohne KG v Germany100 it was stated that the role of the 
national courts required them to guarantee the correctness and fairness of arbitral 
proceedings and to ensure that proceedings are carried out in accordance with 
fundamental rights, principally the right to be heard. This latter view was supported 
by the case of Suovaniemi and the role of the court was further extended in Axelsson 
and Others v Sweden101, Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadi v Greece102 and 
Molin v Turkey103 so as to place a duty upon the national court when exercising their 
supervisory or enforcement function in relation to arbitral proceedings, to comply 
with Article 6 (saved to the extent specifically waived by a party). Indeed, the British 
courts have adopted this latter view, stating that Article 6 can be invoked during the 
appeal process from arbitration, even where the party seeking to rely on such is a 
company situated outside the United Kingdom.104
In short, therefore, a standard arbitration agreement should be interpreted as a waiver 
of the right to a public court hearing alone and should not be perceived to be a waiver 
of the right to a fair trial. Whilst not directly subject to Article 6, the arbitral tribunal 
must have regard to the principles contained therein and the state, via the national 
courts, has a duty to ensure such compliance. Furthermore, the state is also under a 
duty to ensure that in the exercise of its supervisory and enforcement powers, the 
court also adheres to such principles. Further litigation on this point is expected,
99 Application No. 28101/95: Decision of the Commission as to Admissibility 27 November 1996
100 Application No. 18479/91: Decision of Commission as to Admissibility 2 December 1991
101 Application No. 11960/86: Decision of Commission as to Admissibility 13 July 1990
102 (1994) 19 EHRR 293
103 Application No. 23173/94: Decision of Commission as to Admissibility 22 October 1996
104 See North Range Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping Corporation [2002] 2 LR 1.
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although it should be noted that if arbitration is to satisfy the criteria for justice as 
established by Woolf, then regard to such principles as enshrined by the Human 
Rights legislation will be necessary in any event.
Adjudication and Access to Justice
As already demonstrated in Chapter One, it was the intention of the Construction Act 
1996 to develop a coherent, responsive and intelligible adjudication system that could 
afford access to justice. In applying each of W oolfs eight criteria in turn to the 
statutory provisions embodied in the Act, it may be seen that in theoretical terms, 
adjudication prima facie facilitates such access. However, as will be illustrated, 
concern has been expressed as to the operation of adjudication that may serve to 
undermine the requirements of access to justice as established by Woolf
The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
In defining access to justice, Jacob stated that if civil wrongs are not to be conferred 
immunity, then members of a community must be able to assert and maintain their 
reasonable and well-founded rights and claims, as well as defend themselves against 
those of others.105 In short, procedural fairness should be ensured so as to facilitate a 
just result. It has been contended by Mr Justice Forbes106 that the quantitative 
assessment of procedural fairness may be achieved via a three-stage test. Firstly, 
regard must be had to the terms of adjudication agreement as contained in the contract
105 See Jacob “The Reform of Civil Procedure Law” (1982) Sweet & Maxwell at p.218
106 Stated extra-judicially at a recent meeting of the Adjudication Society, as reported by Bingham 
“Keep It Clean” Building Magazine 6th December 2002.
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between the parties. Secondly, the events that occurred during the adjudication 
procedure must then be established. That is, one must question whether the 
adjudicator, when forming a decision, has regard to the principles of natural justice 
before denying a man of his rights.107 For example, when conducting proceedings, 
does the adjudicator ensure that all parties have been conferred an equal opportunity 
to present their case and to answer that of the other?108 As stated by Judge Seymour 
in RSL (South West) Ltd v Stansell Ltd:109
"It is absolutely essential, in my judgment, for an adjudicator, if he is to observe 
the rules of natural justice, to give the parties to the adjudication the chance to 
comment upon any material, from whatever source, including the knowledge or 
experience of the adjudicator himself, to which the adjudicator was minded to 
attribute significance in reaching his decision".
Moreover, does he further guard against any bias that may result in the final decision? 
As stated by the Court of Appeal in Director General o f  Fair Trading v Proprietary 
Association o f Great Britain,110 culpable bias should be defined as including both 
"actual bias" and "apparent bias".111 Once these steps have been executed, a
107 Essentially, the rules of natural justice comprise two principles. Firstly, nemo judex in causa sua 
(no man should be a judge in his own cause -  this element is often defined to include bias) and 
secondly, audi alteram partem (no man should be condemned unheard). See Halsbury's Laws of 
England, Volume 1(1) at para. 4. See also Sheridan & Helps “Construction Act Review” (2004) 20 
Construction Law Review 4 p.206-214. See also Project Consultancy Group v Trustees o f the Gray 
Trust [1999] B.L.R. 377 (QBD (T&CC)); Homer Burgess LtdvChirex (Annan) Ltd [2000] S.L.T. 277 
(OH); Discain Project Services Ltd v Opecprime Development Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 285 (QBD (T&CC)); 
Glencot Development & Design Co Ltd v Ben Barrett & Son (Contractors) Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 207 
(QBD (T&CC)); Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland Securities Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 272 (QBD 
(T&CC)); Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth LBC [2002] EWHC 597; [2002] B.L.R. 288 
(QBD (T&CC)); Edmund Nuttall Ltd v RG Carter Ltd [2002] EWHC 400; [2002] B.L.R. 312 (QBD 
(T&CC)); Try Construction Ltd v Eton Town House Group Ltd [2003] EWHC 60; [2003] B.L.R. 286 
(QBD (T&CC)); RSL (South West) Ltd v Stansell Ltd [2003] EWHC 1390; [2003] C.I.L.L. 2012 (QBD 
(T&CC)); Dean & Dyball Construction Ltd v Kenneth Grubb Associates Ltd [2003] EWHC 2465 
(QBD (T&CC)).
108 See Woods Hardwick Ltd v Chiltern Air Conditioning Ltd [2001] BLR 23; London & Amsterdam 
Properties Ltd v Waterman Partnerships Ltd [2003] EWHC 3059
109 See [2003] EWHC 1390
1,0 [2000] All E.R. 2425
111 The Court of Appeal observed that “apparent bias” would be an appropriate finding where the court 
decides that, looking at the matter objectively, the material facts give rise to a "legitimate fear" that the 
tribunal may not have acted impartially. See also Discain Project Services Ltd v Opecprime
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‘control’ will then be created by which a comparison may be made between the events 
surrounding the adjudication procedure and the terms of the contract. Natural justice 
demands that adjudication operates as "a transparent process sensibly and 
pragmatically agreed by the parties". If the turn of events is deemed to have 
exceeded the agreement between the parties, then procedural fairness will not have 
been achieved.
Clearly, if adjudication is to facilitate access to justice under this head, then it must be 
seen to operate as a shield with which to prevent any man from being deprived of or 
suffering any loss of his rights, except by due process of law. This requires that 
procedural equality is championed and privilege and unfairness is vanquished. 
Practical application of such necessities can be found in sl08(2)(e) which confers 
protection upon disputing parties by way of imposing a duty upon the Adjudicator to 
act “impartially”. Not only does such impartiality protect against attitudinal bias, but 
it also serves to protect against procedural bias by ensuring that both parties have been 
conferred an equal opportunity to present their case and to answer that of the other. It 
would appear therefore, that statutory provision provides for a fair procedure that 
culminates in a just result. It is important to note however, that the ability of 
adjudication to provide for such may be undermined on two counts. Firstly, such 
requirements include both issues of procedure and substantive issues and an emerging
in
trend in the adjudication process is for there to be a polarisation of the two. Indeed,
Development Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 285 (QBD (T&CC)); Glencot Development & Design Co Ltd v Ben 
Barrett & Son (Contractors) Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 207 (QBD (T&CC)); Pring & St Hill Ltd v C. J. Hafner 
[2002] EWHC 1775.
112 See H.H. Judge Wilcox Try Construction Ltd v Eton Town House Group Ltd [2003] B.L.R. 295, 
para. [63].
113 See Tyler “Procedure or Result: What Do Disputants Want From Legal Authorities?” in Mackie 
“Handbook of Dispute Resolution: ADR in Action” (1991) Routledge.
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a legitimate fear was recently expressed at an adjudication conference114 that due to 
their duty of “impartiality”, adjudicators would find themselves subjected to claims of 
bias or procedural impropriety. This it was agreed, focused the minds of the 
adjudicator upon procedural issues, rather than the final decision. Conversely, it was 
stated that the main concern of construction parties was the final decision of the 
adjudicator. Only where the decision was unfavourable and there were clear 
implications of bias, were proceedings invoked by construction parties to overturn the 
decision. Given this potential conflict of interest, the fulfilment of W oolfs criteria 
for access to justice becomes questionable.
Notwithstanding such, the attainment of procedural fairness and a just result may also 
be undermined by sl08(2)(a). That is, under this section a party is enabled to give 
notice “at any time” of his intention to refer a dispute to adjudication. Whilst such a 
provision will not be problematic in most instances, unscrupulous parties who are 
seeking tactical advantage may come to abuse it. For example, having decided to 
refer a dispute to adjudication, a disputing party may stall the referral until preparation 
for proceedings has been concluded. In other words, sl08(2)(a) may be utilised as an 
“ambush” tactic, which unless countered by the courts, will thereby confer unilateral 
advantage.115 Furthermore, even where an adjudication clause has not been included 
in the construction contract, s i08(5) provides that parties to the contract may invoke 
adjudication proceedings under the Scheme for Construction Contracts. Thus, for a 
dispute to be referred to adjudication, it needs only the consent of one party and 
should the other party disagree with such, they will nonetheless be compelled to
114 RICS CPD March 2002
115 See Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland Securities Ltd [2001] BLR 272; Edmund Nuttall Ltd v R.G. 
Carter Ltd [2002] BLR 312; R.G. Carter Ltd v Edmund Nuttall Ltd (No 2) [2002] BLR 359; London & 
Amsterdam Properties Ltd v Waterman Partnership Ltd [2003] EWHC 3059 (QBD (T&CC))
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comply. It would appear, therefore, that the element of consent has been removed 
from the adjudication process, calling into question the ability of the mechanism to 
treat disputants “fairly”.
However, it should be noted that s i08 may be seen to merely protect a party’s right to 
invoke adjudication. That is, if a statutory right to adjudication did not exist, larger, 
wealthier companies may seek to take advantage of their smaller counterpart and 
bypass adjudication altogether, as they may see an advantage to invoking the threat of 
expensive litigation proceedings so as to extract a unilaterally beneficial outcome to a 
dispute.116 Moreover, s i08 only provides parties with an option to invoke 
adjudication, it by no means requires all disputing parties to take their disputes to an 
adjudicator -  positive action is required on behalf of a disputing party, lest the 
provisions of the Construction Act lay dormant. On balance, the statutory provisions 
affecting the right to adjudication should be seen to give teeth to the sentiment behind 
the civil justice reforms -  that the adverse effects of bargaining position should be 
countered so as to ensure that disputants have an equal access to justice in the 
resolution of their dispute.
Whilst adjudication under the Construction Act may be seen to give rise to a “fair 
procedure”, judicial administration of the process has cast doubt upon the ability of 
adjudication to facilitate a “just resolution”. Namely, there are an increasing number 
of reported cases in which the courts have enforced the decision of an adjudicator
116 See Menkel-Meadow “For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference” (1985) 33 UCLA LR 485
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even where it is demonstrably erroneous and wrong.117 Authority for such a stance 
has been derived from the case of Nikko Hotels (UK) Ltd v MEOC Pic118 in which 
Knox J stated:
“If he has answered the right question the wrong way, his decision will be 
binding. If he has answered the wrong question, his decision will be a nullity”.
Clearly in adopting such an approach, there is a risk that a party will be subjected to 
an irreversible injustice. For example, the wrongly disenfranchised party may 
become insolvent during the intervening period prior to any corrective judgement or 
award.
However, as illustrated by the judgement of Bowsher J in Director General o f  Fair 
Trading v Proprietary Association o f  Great Britain119, the application of such a stance 
is not a blanket rule and the court may depart from it where adjudicators have failed to 
comply with the rules of natural justice120:
"... I do not think it right that the court should enforce a decision reached after 
substantial breach of the rules of natural justice. I stress that an unsuccessful 
party in a case of this sort must do more than merely assert a breach of the rules 
of natural justice to defeat the claim. Any breach proved must be substantial and 
relevant."
117 See Bouygues (United Kingdom) Ltd v Dahl-Jensen (United Kingdom) Ltd [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 
1041; Macob; VHE Construction Pic v RBSTB Trust Co Ltd [2000] BLR 187; Civil Engineering Ltd v 
Morrison Construction Ltd [1999] CLC 739.
118 [1991] 2 EGLR 103 (Ch D)
119 [2000] All E.R. 2425.
120 Whilst a plethora of case law has emerged on the application of the first rule of natural justice, the 
nemo judex in causa sua principle, to adjudication, there remains relatively little case law dealing with 
the applicability of the second rule o f natural justice, the audi alteram partem principle. However, there 
have been recent indications that where an adjudicator acts in breach o f that rule the courts may, 
depending upon the circumstances of the case, characterise such a breach as a failure to act impartially. 
See Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v The Mayor and Burgesses o f the London Borough o f Lambeth 
[2002] EWHC 597
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It is important to note, that we still await clarity on the extent of the application of the 
rules of natural justice to adjudication. Although at present, authority exists to 
support the proposition that breaches of natural justice will be ignored unless they are 
sufficiently serious that they can be treated as likely to have influenced the outcome 
of the decision.121 Indeed, the applicability of natural justice has been placed under 
practical limitation by the courts. For as stated by H.H. Judge Wilcox in Try 
Construction Ltd v Eton Town House Group Ltd;122
"I accept that the principles of procedural fairness (or the need to observe the 
rules of natural justice) are not to be regarded as diluted for the purposes of the 
adjudication process. In an individual case, however, they must be judged in the 
light of such material matters as time restraints, the provisional nature of the 
decision and any conclusion or agreements made by the parties as to the nature 
of the process in a particular case".
As such, when seeking to determine whether adjudication proceedings have complied 
with W oolfs requirements for fairness and justice, one must take an analytical view 
in light of the constraints of the process. Given the intended interim nature of 
adjudication, one may assume that such a stance is correct. However, as empirical 
research shall demonstrate, adjudication is often the final resolution to a dispute.123
The Third and Fourth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed
Annexed to the need for procedural fairness and a just result are the requirements of 
expediency and efficiency and the provisions of the Construction Act seek to 
eliminate or reduce delays, cost and vexation in the machinery of the civil justice
121 See for example, Discain Project Services v Opecprime Development Ltd [2000] BLR 402 and Try 
Construction Ltd v Eton Town House Group Ltd [2003] BLR 286 which demonstrate that the question 
as to a breach of natural justice is one of fact and degree in each case.
122 See [2003] B.L.R. 292, para.[50].
123 See Chapter Five
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process which can be fatal to a just claim or defence. Indeed, sl08(2)(b) of the Act 
requires the appointment of an adjudicator and referral of the dispute to him within 7 
days of the giving of notice of intention to refer the dispute. Moreover, sl08(2)(d) 
requires the adjudicator to reach a decision within 28 days of the referral, extendable 
to 42 days with the consent of the referring party, or such longer period as is agreed 
by the parties after the dispute has been referred (sl08(2)(c)).124 It will be appreciated 
that such timescales are exceedingly expeditious. Given the efficiency with which the 
proceedings are dealt, it is contended that adjudication will also limit the financial 
costs incurred by disputing parties.
However, as cautioned by Edwards, “inexpensive, expeditious and informal 
adjudication is not always synonymous with fair and just adjudication”.125 Indeed, 
complex technical cases may not lend themselves to resolution within such an 
expeditious timescale and there have been widespread claims that adjudicators will 
have little choice than to reach a hurried, or rather ill-considered decision. The 
economic ramifications of such for the construction parties concerned are clear and 
need little explanation. However, it should be remembered that the Construction Act 
does confer upon adjudicating parties, the ability to extend the time limit sufficiently 
so as to enable the adjudicator reach a fair and just decision. It is anticipated that 
when faced with such a technical dispute, the adjudicator himself shall request such 
an extension and in the majority of cases his request will be granted. Thus, only 
where parties are not prepared to sufficiently extend the time will any threat be posed
124 For the effect upon an award where the adjudicator has failed to strictly comply with the time limits 
see Blunt “Adjudicators Time Defaults” (2001) 17 Construction Law Journal 5 p.371-377. See also 
Simons Construction Ltd v Aardvark Developments Ltd [2003] EWHC 2474; [2004] T.C.L.R. 2 (QB 
(T&CC))
125 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?” (1986) 99 HLR 679
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to justice. However, as exemplified by Judge Humphrey Lloyd126, when faced with 
such a circumstance the adjudicator could decline to make a decision and resign. In 
any event, equity and justice should not, therefore, fall victim to the twenty-eight day 
timescale.
The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
Legislative provision to provide for an understandable and responsive procedure can 
be found in sl08(2)(f) of the Construction Act which enables the adjudicator to “take 
the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law.” 127 Such a provision, when 
coupled with the fact that the adjudicator appointed may be of either a legal or 
construction background, shall facilitate an expert tailoring of adjudication procedure 
to the case in hand, so as to meet the needs of disputants. Indeed, the adjudicator may 
adopt either an inquisitive128 or adversarial approach to matters of procedure 
depending upon the facts of the case. For example, in a technical dispute, the 
adjudicator appointed may be of a professional construction background and given 
their ability to determine matters of procedure, may dispense with oral hearings so as 
to adopt a document only procedure. Alternatively, where the dispute relates to a 
contractual issue such as payment, the adjudicator appointed may be of a legal 
background and circumstances may dictate the production of witness evidence and 
site investigation reports. In short, procedural issues will be decided by the nature of 
the dispute in hand and parties to adjudication should not find themselves subjected to 
formalistic and legalistic procedures that are both unintelligible and inappropriate. In
126 Balfour Beatty Construction Limited v London Borough o f Lambeth [2002] EWHC 597
127 See Block & Parker “Decision Making in the Absence of Successful Fact Finding: Theory & 
Experimental Evidence on Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Systems o f Adjudication” (2004) 24 
International Review o f Law and Economics 1 p.89
128 See Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd [1999] C.L.C. 739
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theory, therefore, adjudication should fully comply with W oolfs requirements for 
access to justice under this head.
The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
If a mechanism of dispute resolution is to facilitate the criteria for certainty, then its 
requirements are two fold: firstly, it must be capable of reaching a final and binding 
resolution to disputes in the majority of cases; and secondly it must promote certainty 
in the wider community with regard to case precedent and questions of law.
A traditional benefit associated with adjudication is that it facilitates the settlement of 
a dispute in many cases. For in providing a neutral, penetrating and analytical 
examination of the case in hand, an honest view as to the result likely to be attained in 
court will be provided. This, it is submitted, would be sufficient to lay the dispute to 
rest in most construction cases.129 What is of concern, however, is the degree to 
which adjudication decisions are final and binding upon the parties. That is, what is 
the scope for opening up an adjudicator’s decision to judicial review?
The rationale of the Construction Act was to provide expedient interim resolution to 
disputes, as should adjudicators’ decisions be evaluated before they could be 
enforced, then the effect of interim relief would be undermined. To this end, s i08(3) 
provides that the decision of the adjudicator is binding until the dispute is finally 
determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration
129 See Edwards “ADR: Pancea or Anathema?” (1986) 99 HLR 673
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or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement.130 However, the parties 
may agree to accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally determining the dispute. 
Thus, state involvement in the adjudication process via the court is theoretically and 
largely restrained until the issuing of the decision and the decision of the adjudicator 
is binding unless and until it is challenged.
Given the potential for a single dispute to proceed to adjudication, arbitration and
1 o  I
litigation, it is essential that a fine balance between the assertion of rights on the 
one hand and the right not to be subjected to a costly onslaught of dubious claims on 
the other, must be struck. Such a balance would appear to have been achieved in 
practice, as in a number of construction disputes, adjudication has become the final 
decision making process. As exemplified by Henchie,132 whether the parties are 
satisfied with the adjudicator’s decision or not, they rarely challenge the decision by 
way of arbitration or litigation -  largely due to issues of cost. There have been 
instances however, where the prospect of bringing an application for Summary 
Judgement has been raised for purely tactical reasons. Commencing such proceedings 
can be attractive to an unsuccessful adjudicating party, as it might be seen as a lever 
by which a settlement at an amount lower than that awarded may be extracted. 
Further still, commencing such proceedings might be sufficient to dissuade the 
successful party from initiating enforcement proceedings on the grounds of cost. In 
simple terms, either by might or by right, adjudication often concludes the dispute.
130 See Nissen “The Format for Litigation and Arbitration After Adjudication” (2003) 19 Construction 
Law Journal 4 p.179 -  186; Tweeddale “Challenging Jurisdiction in Adjudication Proceedings” (2001) 
17 Construction Law Journal 1 p.3-13.
131 For the effect upon adjudication of concurrent court proceedings see Herschel Engineering Ltd v 
Breen Property Ltd [2000] B.L.R. 272.
132 See Henchie “Redmond’s Recipe For Fudge” Building Magazine 6th December 2002
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Even where the actions of an adjudicator have been challenged, the intervention of the
court has not been met with unanimous approval. Indeed, concern has been expressed
as to the reluctance of the Court to overturn the decision of an adjudicator on a
summary judgement application, even where it is established to have been legally
incorrect or subject to mistake. For as witnessed in Bouygues UK Ltd v Dahl-Jensen 
1 ^UK Ltd where an Adjudicator makes a mistake in reaching his Award, his award 
will still be binding and enforceable provided that the Adjudicator acted within the 
scope of his terms of reference. Thus, unless an adjudicator has acted outside his 
jurisdiction or has failed to comply with the principles of natural justice,134 the Courts 
will not overturn the decision of an adjudicator on summary judgement application. 
Rather the issue can only be overturned upon the final resolution of the dispute at 
Court or via arbitration, which as has been seen, is an uncommon event in the 
construction industry. Thus, adjudication may be seen to fulfil the first criterion for 
certainty. Although if access to justice is to be holistically ensured, then perhaps the 
focus of the question should become are parties to adjudication proceedings accepting 
rough justice on the grounds of economic necessity, so as to undermine the assertion 
of their valid rights or the defence against illegitimate claims?135
133 [2001] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 1041
134 As already exemplified, natural justice requires the adjudicator to act impartially and to give each 
party an equal opportunity to present their case and respond to that of their opponent.
135 Such shall be the subject of empirical research.
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In so far as the second aspect of certainty is concerned, given the contention that 
justice must be done and should “manifestly and undoubtedly” be seen to be done,136 
whether adjudication can be seen to promote certainty in the wider community with 
regard to case precedent and questions of law, is a matter of construction. Indeed, 
adjudication proceedings are confidential unless and until they are challenged by way 
of court proceedings.137 If “public assessment” is to be defined as requiring the 
conducting of procedures in an “open-house” environment, then adjudication cannot 
be seen to be compliant. If the establishment of case precedent is to include the 
official reporting of each adjudication decision then adjudication cannot be seen to be 
compliant. If, however, “public assessment” is to be determined as assessment by the 
Court of adjudication procedure, then adjudication may well fall within the bounds of 
“public justice”. For should a party to adjudication proceedings allege a breach of 
adjudicator impartiality as imposed by s i08, Court examination of the adjudication 
procedure will commence. Furthermore, if the establishment of case precedent is to 
be defined as the provision of guidance as to contentious issues, then given the ability 
to refer the dispute to court for final resolution, adjudication may be seen to fulfil the 
requirement for certainty. It is important to note, however, that for any assessment of 
adjudication proceedings, an action has to be brought by one of the parties. Thus, a 
carte blanche opportunity to evaluate adjudication practice and procedure does not 
exist. In short, whether adjudication can be seen to comply with the public justice 
aspect to certainty, is a matter of definition and circumstance.
136 Lord Hewitt in R v Sussex Justice ex p McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
137 See Pring & St Hill Ltd v C. J. Hqfher [2002] EWHC 1775.
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The Eighth Criteria: Effective Resourcing and Organisation
As with arbitration, parties to adjudication proceedings are responsible for the 
financial implications of the mechanism on two fronts. Not only must the costs of any 
professional representation be met, but the costs of the adjudicator and associated 
costs must also be met by the parties to the dispute. The exact apportionment of 
financial liability depends upon the terms of the contract. Turning to the first 
financial element, most contractual provisions provide that the parties cannot recover 
their own costs in the adjudication. That is, neither party can claim any fees incurred 
by lawyers, experts or other parties who have assisted in the preparation of the case.139 
Whilst the Scheme is silent on the parties’ own costs, it has now been decided that 
whilst there is no implied term that the adjudicator may decide on payment of the 
parties costs, he can be given the power to do so during proceedings, for example by 
both parties claiming their costs. In so far as the second element is concerned, under 
the Scheme and most standard form contracts, the adjudicator may determine the 
liability for his fees and reasonable expenses in his decision. Usually, the successful 
party is not required to pay the adjudicator’s fees,140 although factors such as party 
behaviour and whether any other issues were won during the procedure may result in 
an apportionment of his fees between the parties. Alternatively, the adjudicator may 
apportion his fees equally between the parties.
138 See Faithful and Gould Ltd v Areal Ltd (2001) TCC; Griffin v Midas Homes Ltd (2002) 18 
Construction Law Journal 67; Paul Jensen v Staveley Industries Pic [2001] WN 101245; R.G. Carter 
Ltd v Edmund Nuttal Ltd (No 2) [2002] BLR 359; Stubbs Rich Architects v W.H. Tolley & Son Ltd 
(2001).
139 See Total M&E Services Ltd v ABB Building Ltd [2002] EWHC 248. Contrast R.G. Carter Ltd v 
Edmund Nuttall Ltd [2002] B.L.R. 359.
140 But should an unsuccessful party refuse to pay the adjudicator, he may lawfully claim the fee from 
the successful party.
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Where the disputing parties are of equal and secure financial standing, such financial 
responsibility will not undermine the attainment of access to justice, as the costs are 
likely to be borne without financial implication. However, where there is an 
inequality of financial position, or where both parties to proceedings are not 
financially secure, then the costs incurred may limit such access to justice. Indeed, 
where there is an inequality in resourcing capability, the contractual provisions 
appertaining to financial liability may be exploited so as to gain unilateral tactical 
advantage. For example, the costs of adjudication proceedings may be artificially 
increased by a party so as to extract a unilaterally beneficial settlement to the dispute. 
Given that investment in dispute management has been a lifelong involvement for 
government and given the financial burden placed upon adjudicating parties should 
they be self-financing and the inequalities that this may bring, it should be questioned 
whether state finance should extend to cover adjudication.141 Prima facie, the benefits 
of state investment in the adjudication system would seem to suggest that it must. For 
if access to justice is to be facilitated, then disputing parties should enter proceedings 
on a level footing and factors of cost should not prohibit the pursuance of a dispute to 
a fair and just conclusion.
However, it should be noted that if the state were to accept responsibility for the 
funding of adjudication proceedings, it would be under a duty to the taxpayer to 
ensure that such proceedings are conducted fairly, efficiently and expediently. This, it 
is submitted, would require the extensive supervision and auditing of the adjudication 
process by the courts, a move which may prove to be more damaging than good for a
141 The Arbitration Act 1996 states that it is the responsibility of the parties to provide the funding for 
the hearing. Unlike litigation, this responsibility does not just involve the payment of legal 
representation and witness fees, but it also extends to cover the fees and expenses of the arbitrator 
himself, as well as the cost of securing the premises in which the proceedings may be conducted. See 
Roberts “Mediation in the Lawyers Embrace” 1992 55 MLR p.263
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number of reasons. Firstly, one should have regard to the possible consequences upon 
society of state funding of the adjudication process. For it is conceivable that in 
making financial assistance open to those engaging in adjudication, legal 
contentiousness will be encouraged, which will in turn lead to an increase in social 
fragmentation. For if the minds of parties are not forced to focus upon the financial 
implications of invoking adjudication, frivolous and vexations claims could be 
referred to adjudication for reasons none other than tactical purpose. This, it is 
contended, will serve only to undermine the relationships of those participating in the 
construction industry and bring about an atmosphere of distrust, as opposed to one of 
cohesion. Secondly, if one accepts that adjudication emerged as an alternative to 
litigation that was designed to overcome litigious deficiencies, one should question 
whether it would be prudent to attach adjudication proceedings to that which it was 
intended to escape. It is not difficult to imagine the scenario whereby regulation of 
adjudication by the courts led to the permeation of adjudication by litigious 
procedures and practices. Indeed, greater court involvement in the adjudication 
process would not only extend the hand of the state further into private affairs, but it 
may also lead to the juridification of the adjudication process. That is, adjudication 
may become a form of government by lawyers which is conducted in the interests of 
lawyers.
Juridification -  A Potential Barrier to the Attainment of Access to Justice
It is important to note, however, that such concerns may be of little practical 
significance. For many have asserted that juridification of the adjudication process
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has already taken place. Indeed, as exemplified by Bingham142, there are already 
signs of “judgitis” creeping into the adjudication process:
“More than a few new boys are behaving as though the adjudicator is a 
magistrate in a big hat and low-cut dress. There is a bit of "lording it over" 
going on. They are playing at being adjudicator as if it were a Gilbert and 
Sullivan court process. Witnesses are heard; hearings held; expert reports 
ordered; some even ask for affidavits. There are formal submissions on law, 
opening statements, closing reports. Worse still is the idea of being terrified of 
meeting or even talking to one party without the other being present. That's not 
the idea at all.”
Furthermore, as elucidated by Foster143 not only are adjudicators holding full oral 
hearings of cases, but they are also being served with excessive documentation by the 
parties and frequently exceed the twenty-eight / forty-two day timescale. Thus, it may 
be contended that prima facie, adjudication has already begun to ape the worst aspects 
of both litigation and arbitration. If empirical research proves such to be the case, 
then not only will the ambition of the Construction Act and W oolfs criteria for access 
to justice have failed to be met, but the case for state funding of adjudication becomes 
a little more persuasive.
The Human Rights Act -  A Further Difficulty Facing the Construction Act 
1996?
As already illustrated above, the application of the Human Rights legislation to 
alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution may have far reaching consequences for 
the British Construction Industry. It has been generally assumed, however, that the 
Human Rights Act does not apply to adjudication. For in the preamble to Article 6 it
142 See Bingham “Adjudication in Drag” Building Magazine 11 August 2000
143 See Foster “Losing the Plot” Building Magazine 17 May 2002
106
states that the Act shall only have jurisdiction over decision-making bodies that are 
"public authorities" and over "any person, certain of whose functions are of a public 
nature". The Home Office defined a “public authority” as being government 
departments, local authorities, the police, prisons, immigration officers, public 
prosecutors, courts, tribunals and those who exercise a public function. In short, the 
Act allows for three kinds of body. Those which are obvious public authorities144 and 
quasi public bodies145 which are subject to the provisions of the Convention and those 
organisations that do not hold a public function and upon which the Act shall have no 
direct application.
In so far as adjudication is concerned, whilst the adjudicator by definition decides 
upon the “rights” of the parties and gains his authority to determine the dispute by 
virtue of an Act of Parliament, it cannot be said that he is a “public authority” nor are 
his duties of a “public nature”. This is because the Construction Act does not confer 
upon the adjudicator any judicial powers, rather the adjudicator can be seen to be little 
more than a contract administrator. That is, the adjudicator only has authority to 
apply the rules in a contract to the dispute in hand and to announce the requirements 
of that contract. Indeed, s6(5) of the Human Rights Act states: "A person is not a 
public authority if the nature of the act is private." Adjudication is by definition a 
private procedure: the adjudicator is a private person performing a private function 
merely for the parties to the contract. .
144 Such as the police, courts, and Government departments.
145 Such as the BBC and other bodies that spend taxpayers money, fulfil a statutory function, or has 
government appointees on its governing body
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Such opposition to the applicability of the Act was asserted in Elanay Contracts Ltd  v 
The Vestry146 where it was argued that the timescale of the adjudication procedure 
breached Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, as it was too quick and therefore, not 
reasonable. Vestry pointed to a phrase found in the judgment of a case in the 
Netherlands, which explained the requirement of "equality of arms" for the purpose of 
a fair hearing:
"Each party must be offered a reasonable opportunity to present his case, 
including his evidence, under conditions that do not place him at a substantive 
disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent."
The High Court judge in Vestry, Mr Justice Havery stated,
"The question is whether article 6 applies to proceedings before an adjudicator. 
In the first place, the proceedings before an adjudicator are not in public, 
whereas the procedure under article 6 has to be in public. I can see that 
problems arise over whether one refers to a decision as a final decision or 
whether one has to consider whether article 6 applies to a decision that is not a 
final decision. But it seems to me that if article 6 does apply to proceedings 
before an adjudicator, it is manifest that a coach and horses is driven through the 
whole of the Housing Grants Construction & Regeneration Act... in my 
judgment, article 6 does not apply to an adjudicator's award or to proceedings 
before an adjudicator, because although they are a decision or determination of a 
question of civil rights, they are not in any sense a final determination."
Similarly, in Austin Hall Building Ltd v Buckland Securities Limited147 it was argued 
by the Defendant that the adjudication process was incompatible with the convention 
in that it denied him the right to a fair and public hearing. Whilst declining to 
consider the general issue of whether the adjudication process was compatible with 
the Convention, HHJ Bowsher QC established four important principles. Firstly, it 
was held that because adjudication was intended to avoid, rather than constitute legal
146 [2000] WL 1421243
147 [2001] BLR 272
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proceedings, an adjudicator exercising the functions required by the Construction Act 
1996 was not a public authority, thereby excluding the need to be compatible with the 
Convention. Indeed, the judge explained:
"I do not regard an adjudicator under the 1996 act as a person before whom 
legal proceedings may be brought. Legal proceedings result in a judgment or 
order that in itself can be enforced. If the decision at the end of legal 
proceedings is that money should be paid, a judgment is drawn up that can be 
enforced. That is not the case with an adjudicator. The language of the 1996 act 
throughout is that the adjudicator makes a decision. He does not make a 
judgment. Nor does he make an "award” as an arbitrator does, although he can 
order that his decision be complied with. Proceedings before an arbitrator are 
closer to court proceedings because an award of an arbitrator can in some 
circumstances be registered and enforced without a judgment of the court. But 
the decision of an adjudicator, like the decision of a certifier, is not enforceable 
of itself. Those decisions, like the decisions of a certifier, can be relied on as the 
basis for an application to the court for judgment, but they are not themselves 
enforceable."
Secondly, in rebuffing the contention that the 28 day time limit within which the 
adjudicator must act was too short, HHJ Bowsher QC held that the exception in 
s6(2)(a) of the Human Rights Act applied. That is, s6(l) of the Human Rights Act 
does not apply where the provisions of primary legislation mean that the public 
authority could not have acted differently. As the time limits imposed upon the 
adjudicator were necessary so as to comply with the provisions of the Construction 
Act, s6(l) of the HRA was not applicable and as such a breach could not have 
occurred. Moreover, even if an adjudicator were a public authority, as court 
proceedings are needed so as to enforce his decision, the hearing as required by 
Article 6 would take place. Fourthly, in rebuking the contention that adjudication 
lacks publicity, it was held that parties consenting to adjudication proceedings had 
waived their rights to a public hearing by failure to request one when the opportunity 
was available.
109
Thus, the courts reluctance to apply the provisions of the Human Rights legislation 
may be seen to stem from the policy considerations that led to the introduction of the 
Construction Act -  namely that construction disputes must be resolved both 
expediently and efficiently. However, the view that the Act does not apply to 
adjudication, is not a view that is shared by all. Indeed, the adjudicator’s decision 
does affect the rights of the parties and the contention that it does so only on an 
interim basis has proved to be unfounded in the construction industry. As already 
demonstrated, the decision of the adjudicator is final and binding in the majority of 
cases. Thus, it is likely that further litigation shall be commenced and only time will 
bring further clarification.
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
In Chapter Two, a theoretical analysis of arbitration and adjudication was undertaken 
in the light of W oolfs requirements for access to justice. To put such analysis in 
context however, primary empirical data on how these mechanisms operate in practice 
must also be collated and invigilated. Such data will then permit the assessment as to 
whether arbitration and adjudication meet W oolfs requirements in both theory and 
practice.
In the first instance, reference should be had to two other significant empirical works 
on the subject of dispute resolution: the Report of the Construction Industry Council 
(hereafter CIC) on Adjudication under the Construction Act;1 and the longitudinal 
study of Caledonian University.2 It is interesting to note that the focus of both the 
Construction Industry Council research and the work of Caledonian University was 
not only limited to that of adjudication, but also to the experiences of the adjudicator 
alone.
1 CIC “Adjudication The First Forty Months: A Report on Adjudication Under the Construction Act”
(2002) Construction Industry Council Adjudication Board
2
Following the introduction of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, the 
Adjudication Reporting Centre was established at Glasgow Caledonian University. The ambit of the 
Centre was to gather data on the progress of adjudication via detailed questionnaires that were 
periodically distributed to adjudicator nominating bodies.
Report No 4 of The Adjudication Reporting Centre was issued in January 2002 and Report Number 5 
in February 2003. Both Reports considered firstly the trends in the numbers of adjudicators and the 
number of adjudication referrals and secondly the nature of disputes and the adjudication process.
The first set of data was derived from feedback from the adjudicator nominating bodies (hereafter 
ANBs) and the second data set from information gathered from adjudicators themselves.
It must be noted, however, that due to the longitudinal nature of the study, reporting of the data has not 
always been consistent. Hence the statistics referred to must be treated with caution, particularly when 
seeking to establish a trend.
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To summarise the findings of these two studies, the data collated would seem to 
suggest that on balance, adjudication complies with the definition of civil justice as 
espoused by Woolf. Indeed, it can be inferred that adjudication provides for the 
impartial resolution of disputes, as analysis of the data would appear to suggest that 
adjudicators are displaying evidence of impartiality and a desire to reach a balanced 
conclusion. Furthermore, the data can be taken to indicate that adjudication is also 
accessible, expedient, efficient and free from mystifying technicalities.4
Despite such research outcomes however, the report of the CIC has highlighted an 
area of concern in that 68% of adjudicator’s decisions are found in favour of the 
referring party.5 Whilst such a phenomenon may encourage parties to refer their 
disputes to adjudication, such a fact may also serve to dissuade the responding party 
from engaging in such. Rather, they may prefer to negotiate to the point of 
settlement. It is not difficult to envisage that the soundness of such a settlement may 
be questionable, as the referring party may refuse to abort adjudication proceedings 
unless the offer made is one that is overly advantageous to their interests. In 
justification, one may seek to contend that it is the lower end of the contractual chain 
that is by and large engaging adjudication proceedings6. Thus, it is they who will 
benefit by any such action, not the larger, wealthier and potentially more aggressive 
party. However, such a contention may be refuted on three fronts. Firstly, any such 
inequality of bargaining power can never be justified, regardless of the beneficiary. 
Secondly, parties at the lower end of the contractual spectrum do not account for
3 See Figures 3, 11, 12 and 13, Annexe 1
4 See Figures 1,4 and 9, Annexe 1 and Figures 14 and 15 Annexe 2
5 See Figure 10 Annexe 1
6 See Figure 7 Annexe 1
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every adjudication referral.7 Moreover, given that 3% of decisions were reportedly
o
based upon an oppressive agreement the smaller contractual party may still suffer at 
the hands of injustice. For even upon a settlement, a party to the dispute may still 
insist on compliance with any payment conditions contained in the terms of the 
original dispute resolution clause.
Furthermore, the issue as to “costs” remains an item of controversy and one that casts 
doubt on the procedure’s compliance with W oolfs definition of civil justice. As 
reflected in the data collated by Caledonian University, the procedural cost9 of the 
adjudication process was frequently greater that the sum in dispute. Given that the 
procedure was intended to provide recourse against abuse for the sub-contractor, the 
implications of such excessive costs will be far reaching. Indeed, is it possible that 
the declining rate of adjudication as invoked by domestic sub-contractors10 is due to 
the financial implications of the procedure? Whilst on balance the data from both the 
CIC and Caledonian University may seem to suggest that adjudication attains W oolfs 
definition of civil justice, those issues giving cause for concern must be effectively 
monitored before any assertion of fact can be made. The primary empirical research 
that follows expands upon such questions and seeks to place adjudication alongside 
both arbitration and litigation, so as to afford a robust analytical framework under 
which dispute resolution in England and Wales may be analysed in accordance with 
W oolfs requirements for access to justice.
7 As evidenced by Figure 7 Annexe 1
8 See Figure 2 Annexe 1
9 Excluding the costs of each party preparing their case and the costs of their advisors or managers 
spent on preparation.
10 See Figure 7 Annexe 2
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The Pilot Study
As with any empirical research, before executing the final research tranche, a pilot 
study was undertaken so as to test the validity of the questions drafted, to test the 
usability of the questionnaires and so as to test the usefulness of the information 
returned.
Objectives
So as to determine whether W oolfs eight criteria for access to justice had been 
satisfied, the pilot study identified four main objectives:
1. To assess the impact of the legislative reforms upon the practical mechanics of 
arbitration and adjudication. This would then facilitate an assessment as to the 
cost effectiveness, speed, clarity and responsiveness of the mechanisms. To 
this end litigation was included in the research as a mechanism of “control”.
2. To determine the attitudes of those using such dispute resolution mechanisms, 
thereby illuminating any possible unilateral advantage conferred upon one 
particular type of “user”, for example the main contractor. This would 
highlight any procedural unfairness and / or deficiency.
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3. To determine the answers to the theoretical questions and fears that had been 
raised by many leading scholars in the field of dispute resolution.11
4. To facilitate a meaningful comparison between the mechanics of arbitration, 
adjudication and litigation.
Methodology - Pre-Questionnaire
So as to compile an accurate questionnaire which was capable of attaining the above 
mentioned objectives, several informal meetings were undertaken with legal 
professionals from each discipline: 2 firms of solicitors based in Swansea; 1 District 
Judge based in Swansea; and 1 Barristers’ Chambers situated in Temple, London. 
The remit for each of the meetings was the same - each group of professionals were 
asked to recount their experiences and subsequent views of the arbitration, litigation 
and adjudication processes. In addition, half a day was spent in Court with the 
District Judge so as to gain first hand experience of the new litigation procedures.
By undertaking such, it was anticipated that the greatest areas of importance requiring 
investigation would be illuminated, thereby directing the questions to be raised in the 
questionnaire itself. Indeed, from reviewing the notes taken during the course of 
these meetings, it became clear that although of differing views, several common 
threads emerged during the discussions as regards arbitration, adjudication and 
litigation:
11 See Chapter 2
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1. The role of the judge / arbitrator / adjudicator
2. Concerns with regard to issues of procedure
3. Concerns with regard to the quality of the decisions / awards made
4. The expense incurred in pursuing the resolution of a dispute
5. The juridification of dispute resolution mechanisms
Methodology - The Pilot Questionnaire
Initially, in preparation for the pilot study, a general questionnaire concerning 
adjudication, arbitration and litigation was designed. This questionnaire was to 
encompass questions to be raised across the respondent groups, together with 
questions targeted at specific groups, such as the arbitrator for example. However, 
this was found to be too lengthy and complicated a questionnaire and thus several 
specific questionnaires were designed aimed individually at disputing parties, legal 
representatives and judges / adjudicators / arbitrators. Due to the depth of the 
information needed to be obtained, however, the length of these questionnaires were 
still substantial and it was for this reason that it was decided to undertake a postal 
questionnaire, as opposed to a telephone interview.12
In so far as the undertaking of the pilot study was concerned, “Chambers and
1 ^ • • • Partners” was utilized to compile a comprehensive list of those legal professionals
who had experience of construction dispute resolution in the London and Swansea
areas. It was decided to select London as a target area due to the extensive expertise
present in all areas of dispute resolution: adjudication; arbitration; and litigation. If
12 An example of the pilot questionnaires used in the research can be found at Annexe 3.
13 “Chambers and Partners Directory of the Legal Profession” (1995) London
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the results of the questionnaire were to be representative of the UK in general, a 
provincial target area need also be selected. The authors own locality therefore led to 
the random decision to select Swansea as the second target area.
The selection of construction parties was not such a straightforward task. After much 
discussion with construction professionals, it was decided that the criteria by which to 
codify the construction parties by size, must be that of sales figures. This was due to 
the anomaly that the turnover of a company did not always equate to the number of 
employees and the profit margin of the firm and vice versa. Moreover, due to modem 
technology, the traditional method of analysis by which the number of plant was taken 
into account, could no longer be employed. Thus, the most practical mode of 
codification was felt to be that of annual sales figures.
Upon analysis of “Key British Enterprises”,14 it was determined that a distinction 
need be made between not only large, medium and small businesses, but between 
international and domestic companies also. Of the 223 companies listed in the 
publication, 71 fell into the category 300 million sales to 100 million sales. As such 
figures accounted for 32% of those companies listed in the publication, it was taken 
that this figure equated to the medium sized company. To determine the international 
and domestic sales figures of the medium sized business, the highest and lowest sales 
figures for international and domestic organizations respectively were taken and an 
average was calculated.
14 “Key British Enterprises” (2000) Dun & Bradstreet
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To compute the sales figures of the large international and large domestic 
organization, the lowest figures above that of the medium sized company were taken 
and an average was calculated. Similarly, to determine the sales figures of the small 
international and small domestic firm, the highest sales figures of an international and 
domestic company that fell below the medium level threshold, were taken to be the 
upper limit of what constituted a “small” company.
The selection of adjudicators, arbitrators and members of the judiciary was somewhat 
more straightforward. The Academy of Construction Adjudicators kindly agreed to 
forward the questionnaires to a randomly chosen cross-section of their members, 
whilst the identity of arbitrators were obtained from The Society of Construction 
Arbitrators web-site. The identity of the judiciary was also gleaned from the Internet, 
via the Technology and Construction Court web site.
Those chosen to be the subjects of the pilot study were chosen at random from the 
above mentioned comprehensive lists. That is, 20 construction parties and 20 lawyers 
(10 barristers and 10 solicitors) were each sent questionnaires on adjudication, 
arbitration and litigation. 10 adjudicators, 10 arbitrators and 10 members of the 
judiciary were each sent a copy of the relevant questionnaire.
O f the 50 arbitration questionnaires piloted, 14 responses were received: 4 arbitrators; 
5 lawyers; and 5 construction parties. Of the 50 adjudication questionnaires piloted, 
there were 12 responses composed as follows: 6 adjudicators; 4 lawyers; and 2 
construction parties. Of the 50 litigation questionnaires piloted, 9 responses were 
received: 6 lawyers; and 3 parties. As was to be expected given their heavy workload
118
and need to maintain impartiality, the judiciary in its entirety declined to answer the 
litigation questionnaire. Hence the overall responses rate for arbitration, adjudication 
and litigation was 28%, 24% and 18% respectively.
Quantitative Analysis -  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
So as to achieve scientific findings of fact, it was decided to undertake a quantitative 
analysis of the questionnaire, as opposed to a qualitative analysis. To this end, a data 
set was created in SPSS into which the responses to the questionnaire were input. 
Statistical analysis was then undertaken on the data held. The results of the Pilot 
Study, together with the discussion thereof can be found in Annexe 4 to this Report.
The Final Tranche
Following completion of the pilot study and analysis of the results, the final research 
tranche was prepared. As will become clear, so as to extract more meaningful 
information and a greater response rate, several methodological changes were 
introduced.
Methodology
As exemplified in Annexe 4, the pilot study indicated two areas in which reform had 
to be introduced. Firstly, the variations of questionnaire according to party identity 
for arbitration, adjudication and litigation would be replaced by a singular 
questionnaire for each mechanism. Secondly, so as to engage a large sample
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audience, electronic questionnaires, rather than postal, would be utilised. These were 
to be sent via e-mail.
Given that a singular questionnaire was to be utilised for each of the dispute 
resolution mechanisms, several questions contained in the pilot study had to be re­
phrased so as to ensure universal applicability. Furthermore, following analysis of the 
pilot study results, those questions that had proved to be of little practical significance 
were discarded and several of the multiple-choice answers were re-categorised, 
thereby ensuring a more robust and analytical outcome.15
Selection of the Target Audience
The methodology of target audience selection was also further refined. Legal 
professionals listed in Chambers and Partners as being proficient in both construction 
law and various dispute resolution methods were sampled in their entirety. This it is 
submitted would secure both a representative and considered response to the research.
Using the Kompass Directory to select those listed under the category of 
“construction”, information was provided as to the identity of construction 
professionals who were subsequently selected in their entirety.16 In utilising such a 
sampling technique, it was anticipated that the representative nature of the results 
would be ensured.
15 A hard copy of the electronic questionnaire for each mechanism can be found at Annexe 5.
16 Where e-mail contact addresses had been provided
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The identity of arbitrators and adjudicators was obtained via the nominating body 
websites for each region. So as to ensure a representative sample, in addition each of 
the nominating bodies were also contacted and asked whether they would participate 
in the research by forwarding the electronic questionnaires to their listed members.17
The Design of the Questionnaires and the use of Information Technology
It has already been seen that a quantitative approach was employed so as to generate 
data that could be invigilated via statistical analysis. To this end, the refined 
questionnaires were sent to their intended recipients via e-mail. Visual Basic 
Programming was utilised in Microsoft Access so as to create an executable 
questionnaire that would require the respondent to complete all questions before 
proceeding on to the next page and returning the form. This was so as to secure as 
complete a data set as possible. However, due to the fire-walls employed by some 
companies, not every recipient could receive such a version of the questionnaire. 
Thus, a more basic version was created in Microsoft Word that did not contain 
coding. This meant that recipients to the questionnaire would not have to complete 
each question before returning the form and as such the value -8  has been entered into 
SPSS where incomplete answers occurred.18
The use of SPSS
So as to invigilate the data collated, the responses to the questionnaire were codified 
and input into SPSS for analysis. The programming in Microsoft Access
17 A list of participating bodies can be found in the acknowledgements at p.XVII.
18 The use of such a value shall ensure that incomplete answers will not affect the validity of the 
statistics produced.
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automatically codified the responses and hence they were input directly into SPSS. 
However, those responses collated by Microsoft Word required manual coding. So as 
to ensure that errors had not been generated which that would nullify the results, a 
rigid checking of manually input data was undertaken. Due to the format of the data 
generated, the statistical tests undertaken were Frequencies,19 Cross-tabulations20, 
Mann-Whitney U Tests21 and Independent Sample T-Tests.22
The Chapters that follow provide details of the information collated, together with the 
statistical analysis of the data conducted via SPSS where appropriate. For ease of 
reference, the results of the arbitration questionnaire are considered in Chapter Four, 
adjudication is considered in Chapter Five and the litigation findings are outlined in 
Chapter Six.
19 In terms of the statistical hierarchy, frequencies fall into the category of “descriptive statistics”. That 
is, they are utilised so as to describe the occurrence of a variable, as opposed to testing the statistical 
significance of it. Frequencies were calculated on all variables contained in the questionnaire. With few 
exceptions (due to the minimal number of respondents who purported to have made a claim under an 
intellectual property insurance scheme, frequencies concerned with the claim making process have not 
been reported), all frequencies calculated were of interest and have been presented in diagrammatic 
form
20 Cross-tabulations are also deemed to be descriptive statistics. Their use is comparative, in that they 
demonstrate the occurrence of a variable within particular sectors. In this instance, cross-tabulations 
facilitate the comparison of the views o f legal professionals as against the beliefs of the SME. As with 
frequencies, cross-tabulations do not purport to test the statistical significance of a variable. They are 
of reflective or “descriptive” use alone. Cross-tabulations were calculated on those variables, which 
according to frequency analysis, were o f interest and benefit.
21 A nonparametric equivalent to the t test. Tests whether two independent samples are from the same 
population. It is more powerful than the median test since it uses the ranks of the cases. Requires an 
ordinal level of measurement. U is the number of times a value in the first group precedes a value in the 
second group, when values are sorted in ascending order.
22 Unlike frequencies and cross-tabulations, t-tests do seek to test the statistical significance of a 
variable. There are many forms of T-Test that may be performed, but due to the nature of the data 
generated by the empirical research, the independent sample t-test was employed. T-tests were 
calculated only on those variables, which from frequency and cross-tabulation analysis indicated a 
statistical difference between the legal professional sector and the SME. Those t-tests that were 
relevant at the 10% level of probability or lower have been reported.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH - ARBITRATION
Set out below is the result o f the final research tranche into arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act 1996 as it operates within the construction industry. Following there 
from, is an analysis o f the results to ascertain the compliance o f arbitration with 
W o o lfs  eight criteria for access to justice.
The Nature of Respondents
The identity o f questionnaire respondents can be seen in Figure 1. Indeed, 48% of 
respondents stated that their occupation was that o f lawyer, 27% stated that they were 
construction professionals working for a small business, with 19% representing 
themselves as arbitrators, 5% as construction professionals employed by a large 
business and 1% as construction professionals employed by a medium sized business.
Figure 1
Nature of Respondents
970/, 19% □  Arbitrator
□  Lawyer
□  Con Prof Large
□  Con Prof Medium 
■  Con Prof Small
--------------
48%
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However, it should be noted that some respondents fell into more than one 
employment category. As demonstrated by Figure 2 below, two respondents fell into 
three employment categories, eight respondents fell into two employment categories 
and fifty-two respondents fell into one employment category.
Figure 2
SCORE
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 7.00 2 3.2 3.2 3.2
8.00 8 12.9 12.9 16.1
9.00 52 83.9 83.9 100.0
Total 62 100.0 100.0
Taking this crossover of employment category into account, the full nature of 
questionnaire respondents can be seen to be as follows:
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Figure 3
Nature of Respondents
53%
□  Arbitrator, Lawyer & Small Con Prof ■  Arbitrator & Small Con Prof
□  Arbitrator & Large Con Prof □  Arbitrator
■  Law yer □  Large Con Prof
g  Medium Con Prof □  Small Con Prof
Indeed, as exemplified by Figure 3 above, 53% o f questionnaire respondents were 
lawyers, 18% were construction professionals employed by a small organisation and 
11 % were respondents acting both as an arbitrator and a construction professional 
employed by a small business. Arbitrators accounted for 6% o f questionnaire 
respondents, with those construction professionals employed by a large business 
accounting for 5%. 3% o f questionnaire respondents fell into three employment
categories (arbitrator, lawyer and construction professional working for a small 
business), with respondents employed both as an arbitrator and a construction 
professional working for a large business accounting for 2%, as did the construction 
professional acting for the medium sized business.
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Respondents Experience of Arbitration
So as to assess familiarity with arbitration proceedings, respondents were asked to 
quantify their familiarity with the Arbitration Act 1996. As can be seen from Figure 
4, 63% o f questionnaire respondents stated that they were very familiar with the 
provisions o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
Figure 4
Familiarity with Act
6%
31% □  Very familiar 
B Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
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When broken down by employment group, it can be seen that 86% o f arbitrators 
professed to be very familiar with the provisions o f the Act (Figure 5).
Figure 5 
Familiarity with Act - Arbitrator
14%
□  Very familiar
□  Fairly fam iliar
86%
As demonstrated by Figure 6, 68% o f lawyers professed to be “very familiar”, with 
29% stating that they were “fairly familiar” and 3% that they were “unfamiliar” with 
the provisions o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
Figure 6 
Familiarity with Act - Lawyers
3%
□  Very familiar 
■  Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
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Figure 7 demonstrates that 100% o f construction professionals employed by a large 
business were “very familiar” with the Act, whereas the construction professional 
employed by a medium sized business professed to be “unfamiliar” with such. 
However, a greater diversity can be found amongst those construction professionals 
employed by small businesses: 50% professed to be “very familiar”; 40% were “fairly 
familiar” ; and 10% were “unfamiliar” .
Figure 7
Familiarity with Act - Construction Professionals
mr Con Prof Small 
Con Prof Large
□  Con Prof Large 
* C o n  Prof Medium
□  Con Prof Small
Very Unfamiliar
Familiar
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When comparing the familiarity levels of base employment group1 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. As exemplified by the crosstabulation 
contained in Figure 8, whereas 86% of arbitrators stated that they were “very 
familiar” with the provisions of the Act, only 56% of non-arbitrators professed such a 
level of familiarity.
Figure 8
arbitrator * familiarity with Act Crosstabulation
Count
familiarity with Act
Totalvery familiar fairly familiar unfamiliar
arbitrator yes 12 2 14
no 27 17 4 48
Total 39 19 4 62
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 9, such a 
difference in the level of familiarity can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of 
probability. Thus, arbitrators are statistically more likely to be “very familiar” with 
the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996, than non-arbitrators. It is interesting to 
note that no such level of statistical relevance was found when calculating the 
responses of lawyers as against non-lawyers.
1 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 9
Ranks
arbitrator N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
familiarity with Act yes 14 24.14 338.00
no 48 33.65 1615.00
Total 62
Test Statistics1
familiarity 
with Act
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
233.000
338.000 
-2.040
.041
a Grouping Variable: arbitrator
In addition to their familiarity with the provisions o f the Arbitration Act 1996, 
questionnaire respondents were also asked to describe their level o f participation in 
arbitration proceedings for the year 2001. As exemplified by Figure 10, 43% of 
respondents described their level o f participation in arbitral proceedings for 2001 as 
being “ infrequent”, with 23% describing it as “frequent” .
Figure 10
Participation in Arbitration in 2001
15% 23%
□  Frequent 
■  Fairly frequent
□  Infrequent
□  None
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When comparing the participation levels of base employment group2 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. Indeed, as exemplified in the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 11, whereas 31% of lawyers described their 
involvement as being “frequent” for the period 2001, only 11% of non-lawyers 
proclaimed such.
Figure 11
lawyer * participation in arb 2001 Crosstabulation
Count
participation in arb 2001
frequent fairly frequent infrequent none Total
lawyer yes 11 8 15 1 35
no 3 4 12 8 27
Total 14 12 27 9 62
As demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 12, such a 
difference in the level of participation can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of 
probability. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely to have been engaged 
“frequently” or “fairly frequently” in arbitration proceedings in the year 2001, than 
non-lawyers.
2 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 12
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
participation in arb 2001 yes 35 25.84 904.50
no 27 38.83 1048.50
Total 62
Test Statistics?
participation 
in arb 2001
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
274.500
904.500 
-2.970
.003
a Grouping Variable: lawyer
So as to ascertain the impact o f the Arbitration Act 1996 upon the level o f arbitral 
proceedings employed by the industry, questionnaire respondents were then asked 
whether they had experienced an increase in arbitration since the introduction o f the 
Act. As can be seen by Figure 13, 56% stated that their level o f involvement in 
arbitration had remained the same since the introduction o f the Act, with 23% 
reporting a decrease and 21% an increase in their level o f involvement.
Figure 13
Participation Increased Since Act?
□  Yes - it has increased
■  No - it has remained 
the same
□  No - it has decreased
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The Nature of Disputes & Disputants
So as to ascertain information as to the type o f disputes that proceed to arbitration, 
questionnaire respondents were asked to quantify the subject matter o f  their 
arbitration proceedings. As exemplified by Figure 14 below, 55% o f arbitrations 
concerned financial disputes, with 32% accounting for contractual disputes.
Figure 14
Types of Arbitration Disputes
□  Financial disputes
2%
3 2 % ^ - ------- v SI .------ 13 Defective works
disputes
□  Contractual disputes
11%
□  Other
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The contractual position o f arbitral users was also o f interest. Thus, respondents were 
asked whether the contractual position o f arbitration users was that o f employer, main 
contractor, and / or sub-contractor.’ As can be seen in Figure 15, 90.2% of 
respondents stated that arbitral users were main contractors, with 34.4% stating that 
arbitral users were employers and only 18% identifying them as being sub­
contractors.
Figure 15
Contractual Position of Arbitration Users
Number (%)
Employer Main Sub Contractor
contractor
Contractual Position
’ M ore than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each contractual 
position be treated as an independent variable.
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Similarly, respondents were asked to describe the size o f organizations that in their 
experience use arbitration as a means o f resolving disputes.4 It can be seen in Figure 
16 that 69.5% o f respondents reported medium sized organisations as utilising 
arbitration, with 44.1% identifying large organisations as using the process and only 
20.3% identifying small organisations as being users o f arbitration.
Figure 16
Size of Organisation Using Arbitration
80 
70 
60 
50
N u m be r (%) 40
30 
20 
10 
0
Large org Medium org Small org 
Size
4 More than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each organisational 
size be treated as an independent variable
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The level o f procedural experience o f each arbitral party was also o f interest.^ As 
elucidated by Figure 17, 50.8% of respondents stated that both arbitral parties were 
infrequent users o f the process, with 26.2% stating that both parties were frequent 
users o f the procedure and 24.6% identifying a repeat user arbitrating against an 
infrequent user o f the mechanism.
Figure 17
Experience of Arbitration
50
N um ber (%) 40
30
20
Both parties Both parties R epeat use r v 
repea t use rs  infreq use rs  Infreq use r
Once more respondents were free to select more than one answer. Thus, percentages have been 
worked on the basis that each com bination o f  arbitral experience be treated as an independent variable
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When comparing the procedural experience of arbitral users as described by the base 
employment group6 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. 
Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 18, whereas 34% of 
lawyers had reportedly been engaged in proceedings where both arbitral parties were 
“repeat users” of the process, only 15% of non-lawyers proclaimed such
Figure 18
lawyer * both arb parties repeat users Crosstabulation
Count
both arb parties repeat 
users
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 12 23 35
no 4 22 26
Total 16 45 61
As demonstrated by the T-Test7 contained in Figure 19, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely to encounter arbitral parties who are both repeat users of the 
process, than non-lawyers.
6 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
7 The Independent-Samples T Test procedure compares means for two groups o f cases.
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Figure 19
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both arb parties yes 35 1.66 .48 8.14E-02
repeat users no 26 1.85 .37 7.22E-02
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both arb parties Equal variances 
repeat users assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
13.269 .001 -1.670
-1.738
59
58.936
.100
.088
-.19
-.19
.11
.11
-.42
-.41
3.74E-02
2.87E-02
Furthermore, whereas 40% of lawyers had been engaged in proceedings where both 
arbitral parties were “infrequent users” of the process, 65% of non-lawyers had 
reportedly experienced such (Figure 20).
Figure 20
lawyer * both arb parties infreq users Crosstabulation
Count
both arb parties infreq 
users
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 14 21 35
no 17 9 26
Total 31 30 61
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As demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 21, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at approximately the 5% level of probability. Thus, non­
lawyers are statistically more likely to encounter arbitral parties who are both 
infrequent users of the process, than lawyers.
Figure 21
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both arb parties yes 35 1.60 .50 8.40E-02
infreq users no 26 1.35 .49 9.51 E-02
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both art) parties Equal variances 
infreq users assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
.736 .394 1.993
2.000
59
54.722
.051
.050
.25
.25
.13
.13
-1.07E-03
-5.63E-04
.51
.51
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When asked to recount the representation status o f parties to arbitration, 95.1% of 
respondents stated that in their experience, both arbitral parties were legally 
represented. There were no instances in which respondents reported both parties as 
being self-representing at proceedings (Figure 22).
Figure 22
Party Representation at Proceedings
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□  Yes
140
The Nature of Proceedings
As elucidated by Figure 23, when asked the origin o f arbitral procedure, 50.80% of 
respondents stated that the arbitration procedures followed were those contained in a 
standard form contract. 26.20% identified the construction contract as being the 
source o f  arbitral procedure, with 23% o f respondents stating that arbitral procedures 
followed were determined by “other” .
Figure 23
Arbitration Procedures Followed Are:
23% 26.20%
50.80%
□  Provided in contract
□  Contained in sfc
□  Other
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When comparing the source of arbitral procedure as described by the base 
employment group8 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 24, whilst 34% of lawyers 
stated that the arbitral procedure followed was that provided by “other”, only 8% of 
non-lawyers proclaimed such.
Figure 24
lawyer * arbitration procedures followed are Crosstabulation
Count
arbitration procedures followed are
Total
those 
provided by 
con contract
those 
contained 
in sfc other
lawyer yes 5 18 12 35
no 11 13 2 26
Total 16 31 14 61
8 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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As exemplified by Figure 25, this difference in experience may be accounted for by 
the response of the construction professional employed by a small business. For 
whilst 45% of such respondents identified the construction contract as being the 
source of arbitral procedure, only 17% of non-such professionals identified the 
contract as providing procedural provisions.
Figure 25
construction prof - small * arbitration procedures followed are 
Crosstabulation
Count
arbitration procedures followed are
Total
those 
provided by 
con contract
those 
contained 
in sfc other
construction yes 9 8 3 20
prof - small no 7 23 11 41
Total 16 31 14 61
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O f equal importance to the source o f arbitral procedure, is the driving force behind 
proceedings. As identified by Figure 26, 41% o f respondents stated that the arbitrator 
was the driving force behind the procedure, with 34.40% identifying legal 
representatives as being such. Only 16.40% identified both arbitral parties as being 
the driving force behind proceedings, with 8.20% identifying one arbitral party as 
being such.
Figure 26
Driving Force Behind Procedure
□  Both construction
parties
16.40%
■  1 Construction party
□  Arbtirator
41%
□  Legal reps
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Having determined the source o f arbitral procedure and the driving force behind such, 
respondents were asked to describe arbitration proceedings. As demonstrated by 
Figure 27, 55.70% o f respondents stated that they believed arbitral proceedings to be 
“adversarial” in nature, with 42.60% o f respondents describing the procedure as being 
“ legalistic and formalistic”.
Figure 27
Description of Arbitral Procedure
1.60%
----- A R [ "'s.42.60% □  Legalistic & formalistic
h - —
□I Adversarial
55 □  Inquisitive
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So as to gain information on the way in which proceedings were initiated, respondents 
were asked to categorise the time spent by parties in preparation for arbitration pre­
commencement o f proceedings. As elucidated by Figure 28, 78.70% o f respondents 
stated that both parties spent “much tim e”9 in preparation for proceedings, with 
19.70% o f respondents claiming that only the party intending to commence arbitral 
proceedings spent “much tim e” in preparation.
Figure 28
Time Spent by Parties in Preparation for
Arbitration, Pre-Commencement of
Proceedings
□  Both parties spend
much time
19.70%
1 6 0 % ^  I |------ — Bj Both parties don’t
'  ............ -  ^ spend much time
78.70% □  Only commencing
party spends much
time
9 Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-com m encem ent o f proceedings.
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To further enhance the information concerning the initiation o f arbitration 
proceedings, respondents were asked to recount the appointment procedure for 
arbitrators. As demonstrated by Figure 29, 72.10% o f respondents stated that it was 
usual for an arbitrator to be appointed by a nominating body that was specified in the 
contract. 23% o f respondents stated that the parties nominated an arbitrator once a 
dispute had arisen and only 4.90% reported that the identity o f an arbitrator was 
specified in the construction contract.
Figure 29
Identity  o f A rbitrator Specified  By:
23%  4.90%
72.10%
□  Construction contract
aAppointing body 
named in contract
□  By parties once 
dispute arisen
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In addition to the appointment o f the arbitrator, respondents were also asked to 
provide information on the background o f  arbitrators. That is, are they generally o f a 
legal or construction background? As demonstrated by Figure 30, 67.20% of 
respondents reported that in their experience, arbitrators were o f a construction 
background.
Figure 30
Background of Arbitrators
32.80% □  Legal background
67.20%
Q Construction 
background
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When comparing the background of arbitrators as described by the base employment 
group10 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As can be seen 
by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 31 whilst 100% of arbitrators stated that 
they were of a construction background, only 57% of non-arbitrators stated that in 
their experience the arbitrator was of a construction background.
Figure 31
arbitrator * background of arbitrators Crosstabulation
Count
background of arbitrators
Total
legal
background
construction
background
arbitrator yes 14 14
no 20 27 47
Total 20 41 61
Indeed, the experience of the lawyer-respondents may be seen to account for such a 
difference. For as exemplified by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 32, whilst 
46% of lawyers stated that in their experience the arbitrator was of a legal 
background, only 15% of non-lawyers experienced such. Thus, lawyers are more 
likely to encounter arbitrators of a legal background than other groups.
10 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 32
lawyer* background of arbitrators Crosstabulation
Count
background of arbitrators
Total
legal
background
construction
background
lawyer yes 16 19 35
no 4 22 26
Total 20 41 61
So as to assess the procedural efficiency o f arbitration, information was also sought 
on the timescale within which the arbitrator was appointed once the notice o f 
intention to proceed to arbitration had been given. It can be seen from Figure 33 that 
85.20% o f respondents reported a duration o f 8+ days from the issuing o f notice until 
the appointment o f an arbitrator.
Figure 33
Period of Time From Giving of Notice of Intention, 
Until Appointment of Arbtirator
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2-3 days 4-5 days 6-7 days 8+
Number of Days
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To further enlighten the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked 
to define the period o f time from the commencement o f arbitral proceedings, until the 
consideration o f the award by the arbitrator. As exemplified by Figure 34, 88.50% o f 
respondents stated that in their experience, it took 57+ days after commencement o f 
proceedings for the arbitrator to be in the position to consider the award.
Figure 34
Time from Commencement of Proceedings Until 
Consideration of Award by Arbitrator
100%,/  I____________________________ *II | j
80%
60%
40%
20%
_ P  w  1— wno/
15-28 days 29-42 days 43-56 days 5 7 + days 
Number of Days
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When asked to speculate on the reasoning for such a timescale as stated in Figure 34 
above, 43.30% o f respondents suggested that the adducement o f  complex evidence 
might provide the answer (Figure 35).
Figure 35
Reason For Time Between Commencement of 
Proceedings & Consideration of Award
□  Over-complex procedures ■  Delay or non-compliance by one party
□  Delay or non-compliance by both parties □  Adducement of complex evidence 
■  Simple & effective procedures □  Full compliance by parties
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So as to place the above information in context, respondents were asked to quantify 
their opinion o f the time taken from the commencement o f proceedings until the 
consideration o f the award. As can be seen in Figure 36, 52.50% o f respondents 
stated that in their opinion such a timescale could be described as being “ lengthy”.
Figure 36
Description o f T im e Taken From Com m encem ent 
of Proceedings to Consideration of Award
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Swift Moderate Lengthy
Respondent Description
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When comparing the time taken from commencement of proceedings to the 
consideration of the award as described by the base employment group11 
questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. For it can be seen that 
whilst 70% of construction professionals employed by a small business viewed the 
period of time from commencement of proceedings to consideration of the award as 
being “lengthy”, 44% of non-such respondents reported such a view (Figure 37).
Figure 37
construction prof - small * time btwn commencement & consid of award
is Crosstabulation
Count
time btwn commencement & consid 
of award is
Totalswift moderate lengthy
construction yes 1 5 14 20
prof - small no 3 20 18 41
Total 4 25 32 61
Indeed, as exemplified by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 38, such a 
difference in perception can be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. 
Thus, construction professionals employed by a small business are statistically more 
likely than non-such professionals, to consider the time between the commencement 
of proceedings until the consideration of the award, as being “lengthy”.
11 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 38
Ranks
construction prof - small N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
time btwn yes 20 36.22 724.50
commencement & no 41 28.45 1166.50
consid of award is Total 61
Test Statistics’
time btwn 
commencem 
ent & consid 
of award is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
305.500
1166.500
-1.810
.070
a Grouping Variable: construction prof - small
The Arbitral Award
So as to continue the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked to 
state the average time taken by an arbitrator to reach a decision. It can be seen from 
Figure 39 that 50% o f respondents reported a timescale o f 57+ days as being required 
for the arbitrator to reach his decision.
Figure 39
Average Time Taken By Arbtirator to Reach a 
Decision
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Less 15-28 29-42 43-56 57+days 
than 15 days days days
days
Num ber of Days
155
So as to place the timescale into context, respondents were asked to quantify their 
opinion o f the time taken by arbitrators to reach their decision. 56.70% o f 
respondents viewed such a timescale as “moderate” (Figure 40).
Figure 40
Description of Time Taken by Arbitrator to Reach a 
Decision
Swift Moderate Lengthy
Respondent Description
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When comparing the time taken by arbitrators to reach a decision as described by the
1 0base employment group questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 41, whilst 21% of 
arbitrators described the time taken to reach a decision as “swift”, 4% of non­
arbitrators described the time taken as being such.
Figure 41
arbitrator * time taken by arb to reach decision is Crosstabulation
Count
time taken by arb to reach decision 
is
Totalswift moderate lengthy
arbitrator yes 3 9 2 14
no 2 25 19 46
Total 5 34 21 60
As exemplified by the Mann-Whitney Test in Figure 42, this difference of opinion can 
be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, arbitrators are statistically 
more likely to view the time taken to reach a decision as being “swift”, than non­
arbitrators.
12 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 42
Ranks
arbitrator N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
time taken by arb to yes 14 22.25 311.50
reach decision is no 46 33.01 1518.50
Total 60
Test Statistics?
time taken by 
arb to reach 
decision is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
206.500
311.500 
-2.293
.022
a Grouping Variable: arbitrator
In addition to assessing the procedural efficiency o f arbitration proceedings, it was 
also important to establish the grounds upon which arbitral decisions were made. As 
elucidated by Figure 43, 81.70% o f respondents reported that arbitral awards were 
made according to legal principles.
Figure 43
Grounds on Which Arbitral Decisions Made
18.30%
□  According to law
■  According to other 
considerations
81.70%
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Respondents were also asked to quantify their opinion o f the validity o f the award. 
As demonstrated by Figure 44, 90% o f respondents viewed the arbitral award as being 
“fair and ju st” .
Figure 44
Opinion of Arbitral Award
1.70%8 30%
□  Fair & Just
■  Unfair & Unjust
□  Biased
Having provided information on the way in which the Award was reached and the 
resulting impression it thereby created, respondents were then asked to estimate the 
percentage o f  arbitral awards that result in appeal. 63.30% o f respondents stated that 
under 5% o f arbitral awards result in appeal (Figure 45).
Figure 45
Percentage of Awards that Result in Appeal
Responses (%)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Under 5% 6%-10% 11%-15% 16%-20% 
Opinion of Respondents
21%+
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When asked their opinion o f the rate o f appeal, it can be seen by Figure 46 that 
83.30% o f respondents viewed such as being satisfactory.
Figure 46 
Opinion of Rate of Appeal
16.70%
□  S atis factory 
■  U nsa tis fac to ry
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When comparing the rate of appeal from arbitral awards as described by the base 
1 ^employment group questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 47, whilst 100% of arbitrators 
viewed the rate of appeal from arbitration as being “satisfactory”, 79% of non­
arbitrators described the rate of appeal as such.
Figure 47
arbitrator * the rate of appeal from arb is Crosstabulation
Count
the rate of appeal from arb is
Totalsatisfactory unsatisfactory
arbitrator yes 13 13
no 37 10 47
Total 50 10 60
As exemplified by the Mann-Whitney Test contained in Figure 48, this difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. Thus, arbitrators 
are statistically more likely than non-arbitrators to be satisfied with the rate of appeal 
from arbitration.
13 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 48
Ranks
arbitrator N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
the rate of appeal yes 13 25.50 331.50
from arb is no 47 31.88 1498.50
Total 60
Test Statistics?
the rate of 
appeal 
from arb is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W  
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
240.500
331.500 
-1.807
.071
a- Grouping Variable: arbitrator
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So as to assess the importance placed upon issues o f  procedure and the resulting 
award by the various parties to arbitration, respondents were asked to identify which 
they believed to be o f  greatest importance to arbitral proceedings: procedure; result; 
or procedure and result. It can be seen from Figure 49 that 83.60% o f respondents 
believed both issues o f  procedure and the resulting award to be o f importance in 
arbitral proceedings.
Figure 49
G rea tes t Im portance to Arbitral P roceedings:
9 .80°/(5 60%
□  Procedure 
[3 R esu lt
□  P rocedure & R esu lt
83 .60%
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When comparing the importance of arbitral procedure and the arbitral award as 
described by the base employment group14 questionnaire respondents, an interesting 
result can be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 50, 
whilst 65% of construction professionals employed by a small firm believed that both 
the procedure and the result was important to arbitral proceedings, 93% of non-such 
respondents reportedly held such a view. Thus, construction professionals employed 
by a small business are less likely to believe both the procedure and result to be of the 
greatest importance to arbitral proceedings, than non-such professionals.
Figure 50
construction prof - small * greatest importance to arb proceedings is
Crosstabulation
Count
greatest importance to arb 
proceedings is
Totalprocedure result
procedure 
& result
construction yes 5 2 13 20
prof - small no 1 2 38 41
Total 6 4 51 61
14 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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T h e  F in a n c ia l  I m p l ic a t io n s  o f  A r b itr a t io n
So as to assess the financial impact o f arbitration, respondents were asked to quantify 
the outlay involved in engaging proceedings. As can be seen by Figure 51, 96.70% o f 
respondents viewed arbitration as being “costly” .
Figure 51
Financial Implications of Arbitration
3.30%
□  Costly 
■  Inexpensive
96.70%
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To put the financial implications o f  arbitration into context, respondents were asked to 
compare the financial burden o f arbitration as compared to litigation. 55.70% o f 
respondents viewed arbitration as being “just as expensive” as litigation, with 24.60% 
reporting it as being “more expensive” (Figure 52).
Figure 52
As Compared to Litigation, Arbitration is:
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
More expensive Just as Less expensive 
expensive
Opinion of Respondents
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When comparing the financial implications of arbitration and litigation as described 
by the base employment group15 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can 
be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 53, whilst 40% 
of lawyers viewed arbitration as being “more expensive” than litigation, only 4% of 
non-lawyers viewed arbitration in such a light.
Figure 53
lawyer * as compared to litigaiton, arb is Crosstabulation
Count
as compared to litigaiton, arb is
Total
more 
expensive 
than litigation
just as 
expensive 
as litigation
less 
expensive 
than litigation
lawyer yes 14 19 2 35
no 1 15 10 26
Total 15 34 12 61
As demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test in Figure 54, such a difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely than non-lawyers, to view arbitration as being “more 
expensive” than litigation.
15 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 54
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
as compared to yes 35 24.01 840.50
litigaiton, arb is no 26 40.40 1050.50
Total 61
Test Statistics?
as compared 
to litigaiton, 
arb is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W  
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
210.500
840.500 
-3.975
.000
a Grouping Variable: lawyer
Indeed, such a difference in perception may be understood by the response of the 
construction professional employed by a small business. For as can be seen by the 
crosstabulation in Figure 55, whilst 40% of such construction professionals 
considered arbitration to be “less expensive than litigation”, 10% of non-such 
professionals held such a belief.
Figure 55
construction prof - small * as compared to litigaiton, arb is Crosstabulation
Count
as compared to litigaiton, arb is
Total
more 
expensive 
than litigation
just as 
expensive 
as litigation
less 
expensive 
than litigation
construction yes 2 10 8 20
prof - small no 13 24 4 41
Total 15 34 12 61
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As demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test in Figure 56, such a difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, construction 
professionals employed by a small business are statistically more likely to consider 
arbitration as being “less expensive” than litigation, than non-such professionals.
Figure 56
Ranks
construction prof - small N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
as compared to yes 20 39.25 785.00
litigaiton, arb is no 41 26.98 1106.00
Total 61
Test Statistics?
as compared 
to litigaiton, 
arb is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
245.000
1106.000
-2.826
.005
a. Grouping Variable: construction prof - small
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Respondents were also asked to quantify the financial impact o f arbitration as 
compared to adjudication. As exemplified by Figure 57, 90.20% o f respondents 
viewed arbitration as being “more expensive” than adjudication.
Figure 57
As Compared to Adjudication, Arbitration is:
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
More Just as Less Don't know 
expensive expensive expensive
Opinion of Respondents
The Conduct o f Arbitral Players
A factor affecting procedural efficiency and fairness are the actions and attitudes o f 
the various parties to arbitration proceedings. To this end, respondents were asked to 
comment on the actions and attitudes o f arbitrators; representatives; and parties to the 
dispute.
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It can be seen from Figure 58 that 80.30% o f respondents viewed the actions and 
conduct o f arbitrators as being “professional and effective” .
Figure 58 
Actions o f A rbitrators
14.80%
80.30%
□  Professional & Effective ■  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
60% of respondents described the attitude o f the arbitrator towards the dispute as 
being “neutral” (Figure 59).
Figure 59
Attitude o f A rbitrators Towards D ispute
30%
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral60%
10%
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88.30% o f respondents viewed the actions o f  the legal / expert representatives as 
being “professional and effective” (Figure 60)
Figure 60
Actions of Legal I Expert Representatives
1
88.30%
□  Professional & H fective ■  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
81.70% o f respondents viewed the attitude o f the legal / expert representatives 
towards the dispute as being “ litigious” (Figure 61).
Figure 61
Attitude o f R ep resen ta tive s  Towards Dispute
13.30%
5%
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
81.70%
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When comparing the attitude of the party representatives towards arbitral proceedings 
as described by the base employment group16 questionnaire respondents, an 
interesting result can be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in 
Figure 62, whilst 94% of lawyers viewed the attitude of party representatives as being 
“litigious”, 65% of non-lawyers viewed their attitude as being such.
Figure 62
lawyer * attitude of reps towards dispute is Crosstabulation
Count
attitude of reps towards dispute is
Totallitigious neutral conciliatory
lawyer yes 32 2 34
no 17 6 3 26
Total 49 8 3 60
Indeed, as illustrated in the Mann Whitney U Test below (Figure 63) such a difference 
in opinion maybe seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely to view the conduct of party representatives as being 
“litigious” than non-lawyers.
16 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 63
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
attitude of reps yes 34 26.68 907.00
towards dispute is no 26 35.50 923.00
Total 60
Test Statistics?
attitude of 
reps towards 
dispute is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
312.000
907.000 
-2.881
.004
a Grouping Variable: lawyer
When asked to describe the actions o f the arbitral parties, 67.20% o f respondents 
stated that they believed them to be “professional and effective” with 13.10% 
describing them as being “unprofessional and ineffective” (Figure 64).
Figure 64
Actions o f Arbitral Parties
9.80%
□  Professional & Effective ■  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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Similar to the attitude attributed to the legal / expert representative, 83.60% of 
respondents described the attitude o f arbitral parties towards the dispute as being 
“ litigious” (Figure 65).
Figure 65
Attitude of Parties Towards Dispute
3.30%
13.10%
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
83.60%
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When comparing the attitude of the disputing parties towards arbitral proceedings as 
described by the base employment group17 questionnaire respondents, an interesting 
result can be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 66, 
whilst 91% of lawyers viewed the attitude of the disputing parties as being “litigious”, 
73% of non-lawyers viewed the conduct of the disputing parties as being such.
Figure 66
lawyer * attitude of parties towards dispute is Crosstabulation
Count
attitude of parties towards dispute is
litigious neutral conciliatory Total
lawyer yes 32 3 35
no 19 5 2 26
Total 51 8 2 61
As can be seen by the Mann Whitney U Test, such a difference in perception can be 
seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are statistically more 
likely than non-lawyers, to view the conduct of the disputing parties as being 
“litigious” (Figure 67).
17 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 67
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
attitude of parties yes 35 28.53 998.50
towards dispute is no 26 34.33 892.50
Total 61
Test Statistics?
attitude of 
parties 
towards 
dispute is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
368.500
998.500 
-1.962
.050
a. Grouping Variable: lawyer
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So as to place the actions and attitude o f the parties to arbitration into context, 
respondents were asked to select one o f three commonly held views concerning the 
nature o f arbitration. As can be seen from Figure 68 below, 55.70% of respondents 
believed arbitration to be a mechanism that was based on defined and formal 
principles and procedures, with 41% o f respondents believing it to be a flexible 
mechanism that had regard to defined principles and procedures.
Figure 68
R esp o n d en t O v e rv ie w  of Arbitration
3.30%
□  Defined & fo rm a l p rinc ip les  & p rocedures
□  Flexible
□  F lexible but w ith regard to to de fined p rinc ip les  & p rocedures
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When comparing the overview of arbitration as described by the base employment 
group18 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As can be seen 
by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 69, whilst 64% of arbitrators viewed 
arbitration as being a flexible procedure that had regard to defined principles and 
procedures, 34% of non-arbitrators held such a belief. Thus, arbitrators are more 
likely than non-arbitrators, to view arbitration as a flexible procedure that has regard 
to defined principles and procedures.
Figure 69
arbitrator * to summarise arbitration, it is Crosstabulation
Count
to summarise arbitration, it is
Total
defined & 
formal 
principles & 
procedures flexible
flexible but 
with regards 
to defined 
principles & 
procedures
arbitrator yes 5 9 14
no 29 2 16 47
Total 34 2 25 61
18 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Discussion -  Does the Empirical Evidence Suggest that Arbitration 
Complies With Woolfs Eight Criteria for Access to Justice?
From the good level of familiarity reported by questionnaire respondents on the 
Arbitration Act 1996,19 one might assume that arbitration in the construction industry 
is operating within the criteria as established by Woolf for effective access to justice. 
Indeed, given that the majority of construction disputes proceeding to arbitration are 
financial in nature, it is essential that arbitration operates to facilitate such. In 
applying the research findings to each of W oolfs eight criteria in turn, an indication 
as to the ability of arbitration to facilitate access to justice shall be achieved.
The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
It can be seen from Figures 1 5 - 1 6  that arbitration is often utilised by the top end of 
the contractual chain. The typical contractual position of arbitral users was reported 
to be that of the main contractor followed by the employer21 and the size of 
organisations using the process was reported to be medium and subsequently large 
organisations.22 When questioned as to the arbitral experience of parties to 
proceedings,23 it was reported that in the majority of cases, both parties to proceedings 
are infrequent users of the mechanism. However, a significant number of proceedings 
were recounted in which both parties to the proceedings were frequent users of the 
process and further, a frequent user arbitrating with an infrequent user. Given the
19 See Figures 4 - 9
20 See Figure 14
21 See Figure 15
22 See Figure 16
23 See Figures 17-21
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possibility for an inequality in bargaining power and the ramifications that this may 
bring, it is essential that arbitration facilitate a fair procedure so as to achieve a just 
result.
As highlighted in Chapter 2,24 a concern with the arbitral process was that it might be 
abused by a party to a dispute as a means of gaining tactical advantage. Evidence 
from the research would suggest, however, that this is not the case. Indeed, as 
elucidated by Figure 28, when questioned as to the time spent in preparation for 
proceedings, 78.70% of respondents stated that both parties spent “much time” m 
preparation for proceedings, with 19.70% of respondents claiming that only the party 
intending to commence arbitral proceedings spent “much time” in preparation. As 
such, the commencement of arbitration is not seen as an ambush tactic designed to 
confer unilateral advantage. Moreover, given that both parties to arbitral proceedings 
are usually legally represented,26 some external safe-guard is afforded against an 
abuse of bargaining position. Further, as indicated by Figure 44, 90% of respondents 
viewed the arbitral award as being “fair and just”. Thus, from empirical data, it would 
appear that under this head arbitration is compliant with W oolfs requirements for 
access to justice.
24 See p57.
25 Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-commencement of proceedings.
26 See Figure 22
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The Third, Fourth and Eighth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed &
Effectiveness
If procedural fairness and a just result are to be obtained, then proceedings must be 
executed with reasonable speed and cost. They must also be “effective”, meaning 
adequately resourced and organised.
Turning to consider the financial implications of arbitration, it can be seen from 
Figure 51 that 96.70% of respondents viewed arbitration as being “costly”. When 
asked to compare the cost of arbitration as against that of adjudication, 90.20% of 
respondents viewed arbitration as being “more expensive” than adjudication.27 
Moreover, when asked to contrast the cost of arbitral proceedings with that of 
litigation, 55.70% of respondents stated that it was “just as expensive” as litigation, 
with 24.60% identifying it as being “more expensive” than litigation.28 It should be 
noted however, that the base employment group of lawyer largely accounted for this
9 0latter finding. Thus, the reasons for such a belief must be considered carefully. For 
example, could such a view be held due to a prejudice against non-judicial methods of 
dispute resolution, due to the fact that legal representation in arbitral proceedings 
excessively escalates the cost associated with the procedure, or due to the fact that 
legal representation was only sought in instances where the financial implications of 
the dispute were severe, thus preventing such respondents from perceiving the true 
cost of the average process? When contrasted with the fact that construction 
professionals employed by a small enterprise were statistically more likely to view
27 See Figure 57.
28 See Figure 52.
29 Lawyers were statistically more likely to view arbitration as being “more expensive than litigation” 
than other groups. See Figures 53 and 54.
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arbitration as being “less expensive” than litigation, than other groups,30 the latter two 
reasons seem persuasive.
In so far as the time element of arbitration is concerned, empirical data would seem to
suggest that arbitration is an efficient mechanism in certain spheres, giving to
protracted proceedings in other areas. Firstly, when questioned as to the appointment
^ 1
procedure of the arbitrator, 72.10% of respondents reported that the nominating 
body that had been named in the contract had appointed the arbitrator. Only 23% of 
respondents reported that the parties appointed the arbitrator once a dispute had 
arisen. Thus, in the majority of proceedings, the appointment of an arbitrator by an 
impartial third party should mean that disagreement as to the identity of the arbitrator 
should not delay the onset of dispute resolution. However, when questioned as to the 
timescale within which the arbitrator was appointed once the notice of intention to 
proceed to arbitration had been given, matters were conducted on a less efficient 
basis. It can be seen from Figure 33 that 85.20% of respondents reported a duration 
of 8+ days from the issuing of notice until the appointment of an arbitrator.
Further, when asked to define the period of time from the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings, until the consideration of the award by the arbitrator, 88.50% of 
respondents stated that in their experience, it took 57+ days after commencement of 
proceedings for the arbitrator to be in the position to consider the award. 
Adducement of both complex procedures and evidence were seen to be factors 
accounting for such a timescale,33 which was deemed by over fifty per cent of
30 See Figure 55 and 56.
31 See Figure 29
32 See Figure 34
33 See Figure 35
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respondents to be “lengthy”.34 Interestingly, although 50% of respondents reported 
the average time taken by the arbitrator to reach a decision as being in excess of 57 
days, 18.30% of respondents recorded a timescale of 15 to 28 days and 18.30% 
reported a period of 29 to 42 days.35 56.70% of respondents described such 
timescales as being “moderate”, with 35% categorising it as being “lengthy”.36 In 
short, whilst the length of time from the commencement of proceedings until the point 
of consideration of the award may be seen to be protracted in the majority of cases, 
the actual time taken by the arbitrator to reach his decision is not necessarily so.
Thus, in terms of satisfying this head empirical data would seem to suggest that 
arbitration is unsuccessful in providing a cost effective mechanism of dispute 
resolution. With regard to the ability of the mechanism to resolve a dispute with 
reasonable speed, analysis indicates that arbitration suffers from protracted 
proceedings, although the decision-making process itself is temporally satisfactory. It 
is doubtful therefore, whether arbitration could be seen to be effective in either 
organisational or financial terms. As such, arbitration fails to fulfill W oolfs 
requirements for access to justice under all three heads: cost; speed; and effectiveness.
34 See Figures 36- 38
35 See Figure 39
36 See Figure 40. It is interesting to note that arbitrators are statistically more likely to view this 
timescale as being “swift” than other parties to proceedings. See Figures 41 and 42.
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The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
If arbitration is to facilitate access to justice, then arbitral procedure must be 
understandable to those parties engaging in such, and further it must be responsive to 
their needs.
It has already been established37 that a key requisite to the success of arbitration under 
this head, has been to facilitate party autonomy with regard to the method by which 
their dispute is to be resolved. To this end, respondents were asked to recount the 
origins of arbitral procedure. As demonstrated by Figure 23, 50.80% of respondents 
stated that the arbitration procedures followed were those contained in a standard 
form contract. 26.20% identified the construction contract as being the source of
TRarbitral procedure, with 23% of respondents stating that arbitral procedures followed
TOwere determined by “other”. Given the bias towards contractually provided 
procedures, it is suggested that arbitral parties are exercising their ability to chose the 
source of procedure for the resolution of their dispute. As such, the procedures 
selected by the parties must be deemed to be understandable and responsive to their 
perceived future need.
However, when asked to identify the driving force behind matters of procedure, it was 
the arbitrator and subsequently the legal representatives who were identified as such.40 
Whether such a fact is indicative of an abuse of party autonomy to determine matters
37 See Chapter 2 at p.63. See also sl(b) Arbitration Act 1996.
38 Respondents from the base employment group “small construction professional” were statistically 
more likely to select this category. See Figure 25.
39 Respondents from the base employment group “lawyer” were statistically more likely to select this
category. See Figure 24.
40 See Figure 26.
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of procedure, is an issue of construction. If party autonomy is to be defined as 
meaning that arbitral parties must determine each procedural issue, then arbitration 
cannot be compliant with such. Given the impracticality of such a definition in terms 
of expedition and clarity, however, it is suggested that party autonomy should be 
defined to mean that the parties to a dispute determine the broad procedural base, the 
finessing of which should be the responsibility of the arbitrator. Indeed, the 
Arbitration Act itself provides that the tribunal shall decide all procedural and 
evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.41 As such, 
the finding that arbitrators are the driving force behind matters of procedure cannot be 
seen to compromise the requirement for party autonomy and an understandable and 
responsive procedure. The finding that legal representatives play a part in 
determining procedural issues is however, a complicating factor in terms of the 
juridification debate and shall be considered later.
The description of arbitral procedure as “adversarial” and “legalistic and formalistic” 
also complicates matters in so far as the ability of arbitration to meet the requirements 
for access to justice under this head42 For if procedures are formalised and 
regimented, then by definition they cannot be responsive. However, the fact that the 
majority of arbitrators were reportedly of a construction, as opposed to a legal 
background, may provide respite from such a prospect.43 As whilst an arbitrator of a 
construction background may conduct proceedings on a formal basis, they are less 
likely to be prejudiced by court procedure and tradition than an arbitrator who has 
undergone extensive legal training and who concurrently operates within the court
41 See s34 Arbtration Act 1996.
42 See Figure 27.
43 See Figures 30 -  32. It is interesting to note that lawyers were statistically more likely to experience 
an arbitrator o f a legal background than non-lawyers.
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structure. In short, the commercial background of the arbitrator may temper the 
formulism with which proceedings are conducted. It should be noted, however, that 
whilst in possession of the ability to determine the dispute according to legal principle 
or other considerations, arbitrators are not taking advantage of such. For 81.10% of 
respondents stated that the arbitral award was reached according to legal principle.44 
Does this serve to undermine the prospect that arbitration is free from litigious 
influence?
Thus, in terms of the ability of arbitration to satisfy this head, judgement must be 
withheld until the impact of juridification has been considered.
The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
As already exemplified,45 if a mechanism of dispute resolution is to satisfy the 
requirement for certainty, then it must be able to facilitate the final resolution of a 
dispute. Evidence of a binding resolution to a dispute can be found where the rate of 
appeal is minimal. It would appear from Figure 45 that arbitration has satisfied this 
head. For when questioned, 63.30% of respondents stated that under 5% of Awards 
result in appeal. When asked their opinion on such an appeal rate, 83.30% responded 
that it was “satisfactory” in their opinion.46 Thus, not only may arbitration be seen to 
satisfy the need to provide a final and binding resolution to a dispute, but the rate of 
satisfaction amongst parties to arbitration proceedings would seem to suggest that 
only the most deserving of cases are referred to the courts. As such, arbitration may
44 See Figure 43.
45 See Chapter 2 at p.67.
46 See Figure 46. Interestingly, arbitrators are statistically more likely to be satisfied with the rate of 
appeal than other groups. See Figures 47-48.
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also be seen to satisfy the public justice aspect of certainty. Where needed, justice is 
done and is manifestly seen to be done.47
The Barrier to Access to Justice: Juridification
• • ASThe influence of the legal profession over arbitration has already been demonstrated. 
Further, in describing arbitration as being “adversarial” and “legalistic and 
formalistic”, the influence of the court system over the procedure has also been 
seen.49 Analysis of the empirical data uncovers further evidence of juridifcation. 
Firstly, although the actions of arbitrators, legal representatives and parties to the 
dispute were considered to be “professional and effective”,50 when questioned as to 
their attitude towards the dispute, the arbitrator was described as being “neutral”,51 
whereas the legal representatives and arbitral parties were largely described as being 
“litigious”.52 Such a finding would seem to give credit to the notion that the spirit of 
arbitration is being corrupted so as to ape the worst features of litigation.
Further, some evidence to support Tyler’s53 polarisation theory was uncovered. When 
questioned as to the factor of greatest importance to arbitral proceedings, 83.60% of 
respondents stated that both procedure and result were of significance.54 However, 
when analysed according to base employment group, it was discovered that 
construction professionals employed by a small business were less likely to hold such
47 As required by Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justice exp McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
48 For example, see Figures 22 and 26
49 See Figure 27
50 See Figures 58, 60 and 64
51 See Figure 59
52 See Figures 61 and 65. It is interesting to note that the base employment group lawyer was 
statistically more likely to view such parties as being “litigious” than non-lawyers. See Figures 62 and 
63 & 66 and 67. Such a finding may be accounted for as fact or as perception coloured by experience.
53 See Chapter 2 at p.82
54 See Figure 49
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a view than other employment groups.55 This would seem to suggest a polarisation of 
views that may lead the various parties to adopt differing goals and attitudes. 
However, given the fact that the majority of respondents viewed both elements to be 
of significance, as opposed to a singular element, any polarisation is not likely to 
cause significant effect and thus gives little cause for concern. What is significant, 
however, is the fact that when asked to describe arbitration,56 55.70% of respondents 
viewed it as being a defined and formal principle and procedure. Only 41% viewed it 
as being a flexible mechanism that has regard to defined principles and procedures 
and this finding can be largely accounted for by the response of arbitrators.57
Thus, upon evaluation of empirical data, strong indications of juridification emerge. 
Not only is the attitude towards the dispute of parties and their respondents indicative 
of a litigious influence, but the perception of arbitration as a mechanism of dispute 
resolution is clearly coloured by the structure of the court system.
55 See Figure 50
56 See Figure 68
57 See Figure 69
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CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH - ADJUDICATION
Set out below are the results o f the final research tranche into adjudication under the 
Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 as it operates within the 
construction industry. Following there from, is an analysis o f  the results to ascertain 
the compliance o f adjudication with W oo lfs  eight criteria for access to justice.
The Nature of Respondents
The identity o f questionnaire respondents can be seen in Figure 1. Indeed, 37% o f 
respondents stated that their occupation was that o f lawyer, 32% stated that they were 
adjudicators, with 19% representing themselves as construction professionals working 
for a small business, 7% as construction professionals employed by a large business 
and 4% as construction professionals employed by a medium sized business. 1% o f 
respondents accounted for missing values.1 
Figure 1
Nature of Respondents
32%
37%
□  Adjudicator
□  Lawyer
□  Con Prof Large
□  Con Prof Medium 
■  Con Prof Small
□  Missing
' M issing values account for respondents who fail to answer the question -  hence no occupational 
details were supplied in these instances.
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However, it should be noted that some respondents fell into more than one 
employment category. As demonstrated by Figure 2 below, three respondents fell 
into three employment categories, thirty respondents fell into two employment 
categories and seventy-eight respondents fell into one employment category. There 
were two missing values.
Figure 2
SCORE
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid 7.00 3 2.7 2.7 2.7
8.00 30 26.5 27.0 29.7
9.00 78 69.0 70.3 100.0
Total 111 98.2 100.0
Missing -8.00 2 1.8
Total 113 100.0
Taking this crossover of employment category into account, the full nature of 
questionnaire respondents can be seen to be as follows:
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Figure 3
Nature of Respondents
2%1 %2%
□  Adjudicator □  Lawyer □  Con Prof Large
□  Con Prof Medium B  Con Prof Small □  Adjudicator & Lawyer
■  Adj & Con Prof Large □  Adj & Con Prof Small B  Adj, Lawyer & Con Prof Small
□  Adj, Lawyer & Con Prof Large □  Missing
Indeed, as exemplified by Figure 3 above, 37% o f questionnaire respondents were 
lawyers, 13% were adjudicators and 13% were also respondents who were acting both 
as an adjudicator and a construction professional employed by a small organization. 
11% o f respondents were construction professionals employed by a small business, 
with 8% o f respondents acting both as an adjudicator and a lawyer. 5% o f 
respondents can be seen to be construction professionals employed by a medium sized 
business, with 5% identifying themselves as adjudicators who were also employed as 
a construction professional for a large business. 3% o f respondents were construction 
professionals employed by a large business, with 2% acting in a three-way capacity as 
an adjudicator, lawyer and construction professional employed by a small business. 
1% o f respondents acted in a three-way capacity as an adjudicator, lawyer and 
construction professional employed by a large business and 2% o f respondents 
accounted for missing values.
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R e sp o n d e n ts  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  A d ju d ic a tio n
So as to assess familiarity with adjudication proceedings, respondents were asked to 
quantify their familiarity with the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996.“ As can be seen from Figure 4, 85.70% o f questionnaire respondents stated that 
they were “very familiar” with the provisions o f the Construction Act 1996.
Figure 4
Familiarity w ith Act
8.90% 5-40%
□  Very familiar 
■  Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
85.70%
When broken down by employment group, it can be seen that 100% o f adjudicators 
professed to be very familiar with the provisions o f the Act (Figure 5).
Figure 5
adjudicator * familiarity with Act Crosstabulation
Count
familiarity with Act
Totalvery familiar fairly familiar unfamiliar
adjudicator yes 48 48
no 47 10 6 63
Total 95 10 6 111
2 Hereafter referred to as the Construction Act 1996
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As demonstrated by Figure 6, 85% o f lawyers professed to be “very familiar”, with 
9% stating that they were “fairly familiar” and 6% that they were “unfamiliar” with 
the provisions o f  the Construction Act 1996.
Figure 6
Familiarity W ith Act - Law yers
85%
□  Very familiar 
■  Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
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As can be seen from Figure 7, construction professionals also exhibited a good level 
o f familiarity with the provisions o f the Construction Act 1996. For 80% o f 
construction professionals employed by a large business stated that they were “very 
familiar” with the provisions o f the Act, with 10% professing to be “fairly familiar” 
and “unfamiliar” respectively.
83% o f construction professionals employed by a medium sized business professed to 
be “very familiar” with the provisions o f the Act, with 17% stating that they were 
“fairly familiar” .
A similar level o f familiarity can also be seen amongst construction professionals 
employed by small businesses: 83% professed to be “very familiar”; 10% were “ fairly 
familiar”; and 7% were “unfamiliar”.
Figure 7
Familiarity with Act - Construction Professionals
25
□  Con Prof Large 
H C on Prof Medium
□  Con Prof Small
W  Con Prof Small 
Con Prof Medium 
Con Prof Large
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When comparing the familiarity levels of base employment group3 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. As exemplified by the crosstabulation 
contained in Figure 8, whereas 100% of adjudicators stated that they were “very 
familiar” with the provisions of the Act, only 75% of non-adjudicators professed such 
a level of familiarity.
Figure 8
adjudicator * familiarity with Act Crosstabulation
Count
familiarity with Act
Totalvery familiar fairly familiar unfamiliar
adjudicator yes 48 48
no 47 10 6 63
Total 95 10 6 111
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Mann Whitney U Test contained in Figure 9, this 
difference in the level of familiarity with the provisions of the Act can be seen to be 
relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more likely 
to be “very familiar” with the provisions of the Construction Act 1996 than non­
adjudicators. It is interesting that no such statistical significance could be found when 
comparing the familiarity levels of lawyers and non-lawyers.
3 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 9
Ranks
adjudicator N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
familiarity with Act yes 48 48.00 2304.00
no 63 62.10 3912.00
Total 111
Test Statistics?
familiarity 
with Act
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
1128.000
2304.000
-3.746
.000
a Grouping Variable: adjudicator
In addition to their familiarity with the provisions o f the Construction Act 1996, 
questionnaire respondents were also asked to describe their level o f participation in 
adjudication proceedings for the year 2001. As exemplified by Figure 10, 48.20% of 
respondents described their level o f  participation in adjudication proceedings for 2001 
as being “frequent”, with 32.10% describing it as “fairly frequent” .
Figure 10
Participation in Adjudication in 2001
7.10%
12.50%
32.10%
48.20%
□  Frequent
■  Fairly Frequent
□  Infrequent
□  None
197
When comparing the participation levels of base employment group4 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. Indeed, as exemplified in the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 11, whereas 69% of adjudicators described their 
involvement as being “frequent” for the period 2001, only 33% of non-adjudicators 
proclaimed such.
Figure 11
adjudicator * participation in adj 2001 Crosstabulation
Count
participation in adj 2001
Totalfrequent fairly frequent infrequent none
adjudicator yes 33 12 3 48
no 21 23 11 8 63
Total 54 35 14 8 111
As demonstrated by the Mann Whitney U Test contained in Figure 12, this difference 
in the level of participation can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. 
Thus, adjudicators are statistically more likely to have been “frequently” engaged in 
adjudication proceedings in the year 2001, than non-adjudicators. It is interesting that 
no such statistical significance could be found when comparing the familiarity levels 
of lawyers and non-lawyers.
4 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 12
Ranks
adjudicator N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
participation in adj 2001 yes 48 42.94 2061.00
no 63 65.95 4155.00
Total 111
Test Statistics?
participation 
in adj 2001
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
885.000
2061.000
-4.045
.000
a Grouping Variable: adjudicator
So as to ascertain the impact o f the Construction Act 1996 upon the level o f 
adjudication proceedings employed by the industry, questionnaire respondents were 
then asked whether they had experienced an increase in adjudication since the 
introduction o f the Act. As can be seen by Figure 13, 91.90% stated that their level o f 
involvement in adjudication had increased since the introduction o f the Act.
Figure 13
Participation Increased  Since Act?
5.40% 2.70% □  Yes - it has increased
■  No - it has remained the
same
^ ________ □  No - it has decreased
91.90%
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The Nature o f Disputes & Disputants
So as to ascertain information as to the type o f  disputes that proceed to adjudication, 
questionnaire respondents were asked to quantify the subject matter o f their 
adjudication proceedings. As exemplified by Figure 14 below, 82.10% o f 
adjudications concerned financial disputes, with 13.40% accounting for contractual 
disputes.
Figure 14
Types of Adjudication Disputes
13.40% 0 90% □  Financial disputes
■  Defective w orks disputes
□  Contractual disputes
□  Other
360%
82.10%
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The contractual position o f adjudication users was also o f interest. Thus, respondents 
were asked whether the contractual position o f adjudication users was that o f 
employer, main contractor, and / or sub-contractor.5 As can be seen in Figure 15, 
73.2% o f respondents stated that adjudication users were sub-contractors, with 47.3% 
stating that adjudication users were main-employers and only 7.1% identifying them 
as being employers.
Figure 15
Contractual Position of Adjudication Users
100
90
80
70
60
Number (%) 50
40
30
20
10
0
□  Yes
□  No
Employer Main-contractor Sub-contractor 
Contractual Position
5 M ore than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each contractual 
position be treated as an independent variable.
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When comparing the contractual position of adjudication users as reported by base 
employment group6 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. 
Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 16, whereas 83% of 
adjudicators stated that adjudication users are “sub-contractors”, 65% of non­
adjudicators proclaimed such.
Figure 16
adjudicator * adj user is sub-contractor Crosstabulation
Count
adj user is 
sub-contractor
yes no Total
adjudicator yes 40 8 48
no 41 22 63
Total 81 30 111
As demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 17, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely to encounter adjudication users who are “sub-contractors”, 
than non-adjudicators.
6 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 17
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
adj user is sub-contractor yes 48 1.17 .377 .054
no 63 1.35 .481 .061
In d ep e n d e n t S a m p le s  T est
L evene's Test for
Equality of V ariances t-test for Equality of M eans
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Mean Std Error Difference
F Siq t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
adj user is sub-contractor Equal variances 
a ssu m ed 21.749 .000 -2.171 109 032 -.18 084 -3 4 9 - 016
Equal variances 
not assu m ed -2 243 108 898 027 -1 8 081 - 344 -.021
Similarly, respondents were asked to describe the size o f organisations that in their 
experience use adjudication as a means o f resolving disputes.7 It can be seen in 
Figure 18 that 73% o f respondents reported small sized organisations as utilizing 
adjudication, with 40.5% identifying medium organisations as using the process and 
only 10.8% identifying large organisations as being users o f adjudication.
Figure 18
Size of Organisation Using Adjudication
Number (%)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
^  Q |
□  Yes 
■  No
Large org Medium org 
Size
Small org
7 More than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each organisational 
size be treated as an independent variable
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Differences in Perception of the Size of Adjudication Users -  Medium-Sized
When comparing the organisational size of adjudication users as reported by base
Q
employment group questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. 
Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 19, whereas 52% of 
lawyers stated that adjudication users are “medium-sized organisations”, 30% of non­
lawyers proclaimed such.
Figure 19
lawyer * adj user is medium org Crosstabulation
Count
adj user is medium 
org
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 28 26 54
no 17 39 56
Total 45 65 110
As demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 20, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely to encounter adjudication users who are “medium-sized 
organisations”, than non-lawyers.
8 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature o f respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 20
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
adj user is medium org yes 54 1.48 .504 .069
no 56 1.70 .464 .062
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
adj user is medium org Equal variances 
assumed 9.410 .003 -2.328 108 .022 -.21 .092 -.398 -.032
Equal variances 
not assumed -2.324 106.471 .022 -.21 .092 -.398 -.032
As demonstrated by Figure 21, this difference in perception may be accounted for by 
the experience of the construction professional employed by a small business. For it 
can be seen that whilst 21% of such professionals reported that adjudication users 
were medium-sized organisations, 48% of non-such professionals reported such.
Figure 21
construction prof - small * adj user is medium org 
Crosstabulation
Count
adj user is medium 
org
Totalyes no
construction yes 6 23 29
prof - small n0 39 42 81
Total 45 65 110
205
As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 22, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, whilst it may be the 
experience of lawyers that adjudication users are medium-sized organisations, 
construction professionals employed by small businesses are statistically more likely 
to disagree with such.
Figure 22
Group Statistics
construction prof - small N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
adj user is medium org yes 29 1.79 .412 .077
no 81 1.52 .503 .056
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
adj user is medium org Equal variances 
assumed 40.616 .000 2.638 108 .010 .27 .104 .068 .481
Equal variances 
not assumed 2.897 59.823 .005 .27 .095 .085 .464
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Differences in Perception of the Size of Adjudication Users -  Small-Sized
Statistical relevance was also found when comparing the test variable of “small-sized 
organisation” by the grouping variables of adjudicator and lawyer. As exemplified in 
the crosstabulation contained in Figure 23, whereas 85% of adjudicators stated that 
users of the mechanism are “small-sized organisations”, 65% of non-adjudicators 
proclaimed such.
Figure 23
adjudicator * adj user is small org Crosstabulation
Count
adj user is small org
yes no Total
adjudicator yes 40 7 47
no 41 22 63
Total 81 29 110
As demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 24, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely to encounter adjudication users who are “small-sized 
organizations”, than non-adjudicators.
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Figure 24
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
adj user is small org yes 47 1.15 .360 .052
no 63 1.35 .481 .061
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
adj user is small org Equal variances 
assumed 
Equal variances 
not assumed
27.710 .000 -2.398
-2.499
108
107.995
.018
.014
-.20
-.20
.084
.080
-.366
-.359
-.035
-.041
As demonstrated by Figure 25, this difference in perception may be accounted for by 
the experience of the lawyers. For it can be seen that whilst 59% of lawyers reported 
that adjudication users were small-sized organisations, 87.5% of non-lawyers reported 
such.
Figure 25
lawyer * adj user is small org Crosstabulation
Count
adj user is small org
yes no Total
lawyer yes 32 22 54
no 49 7 56
Total 81 29 110
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As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 26, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, whilst it may be the 
experience of adjudicators that users of the mechanism are small-sized organisations, 
lawyers are statistically more likely to disagree with such.
Figure 26
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
adj user is small org yes 54 1.41 .496 .067
no 56 1.13 .334 .045
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
Mean Std. Error
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
adj user is small org Equal variances 
assum ed 53.204 .000 3.515 108 .001 .28 .080 .123 .442
Equal variances 
not assum ed 3.491 92.406 .001 .28 .081 .122 .443
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The level o f procedural experience o f each adjudicating party was also o f interest.9 
As elucidated by Figure 27, 52.3% o f respondents stated that both adjudication parties 
were infrequent users o f the process, with 38.7% identifying a repeat user 
adjudicating against an infrequent user o f the mechanism. 23.4% o f respondents 
reported that both parties were repeat users o f the procedure.
Figure 27
Experience of Adjudication
80 
70 
60 
50
Num ber (%) 40
30 
20 
10 
0
Both parties Both parties Repeat user v 
repeat users infrequent Infreq user 
users
9 Once more respondents were free to select more than one answer. Thus, percentages have been 
worked on the basis that each com bination o f  arbitral experience be treated as an independent variable
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Differences in Perception of the Experience of Adjudication Users - Both Parties 
Are Repeat Users
When comparing the procedural experience of adjudication users as reported by base 
employment group10 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. 
Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 28, whereas 11% of 
construction professionals employed by a small organisation stated that “both parties” 
to adjudication are “repeat users” of the mechanism, 28% of non-such professionals 
proclaimed such
Figure 28
construction prof - small * both adj parties repeat users 
Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties repeat 
users
Totalyes no
construction yes 3 25 28
prof - small no 23 59 82
Total 26 84 110
Indeed, as demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 29, this difference in 
perception can be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. Thus, 
construction professionals working for a small-sized business are statistically less 
likely to encounter proceedings in which both parties are repeat users of the 
mechanism, than non-such professionals.
10 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
211
Figure 29
Group Statistics
construction prof - small N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both adj parties yes 28 1.89 .315 .060
repeat users no 82 1.72 .452 .050
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both adj parties Equal variances 
repeat users assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
20.978 .000 1.877
2.231
108
67.241
.063
.029
.17
.17
.092
.078
-.010
.018
.356
.328
Differences in Perception of the Experience of Adjudication Users - Both Parties 
Are Infrequent Users
Statistical relevance was also found when comparing the test variable of “both parties 
are infrequent users of adjudication” by the grouping variables of adjudicator and 
lawyer. Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 30, whereas 
66% of adjudicators stated that both parties to adjudication are infrequent users of the 
process, 43% of non-adjudicators proclaimed such.
Figure 30
adjudicator * both adj parties infreq users Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties infreq 
users
Totalyes no
adjudicator yes 31 16 47
no 27 36 63
Total 58 52 110
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As demonstrated by the T-Test contained in Figure 31, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely to encounter proceedings in which both parties are infrequent 
users of the mechanism, than non-adjudicators.
Figure 31
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both adj parties yes 47 1.34 .479 .070
infreq users no 63 1.57 .499 .063
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both adj parties Equal variances 
infreq users assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
3.469 .065 -2.444
-2.458
108
101.337
.016
.016
-.23
-.23
.095
.094
-.418
-.417
-.044
-.045
As demonstrated by Figure 32, this difference in perception may be accounted for by 
the experience of the lawyers. For it can be seen that whilst 37% of lawyers reported 
that adjudicating parties were both infrequent users of the process, 68% of non­
lawyers reported such.
Figure 32
lawyer * both adj parties infreq users Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties infreq 
users
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 20 34 54
no 38 18 56
Total 58 52 110
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As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 33, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, whilst it may be the 
experience of adjudicators11 that adjudicating parties are both infrequent users of the 
mechanism, lawyers are statistically less likely to agree with such.
Figure 33
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both adj parties yes 54 1.63 .487 .066
infreq users no 56 1.32 .471 .063
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both adj parties Equal variances 
infreq users assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
1.124 .291 3.372
3.370
108
107.467
.001
.001
.31
.31
.091
.091
.127
.127
.489
.490
11 The experience of Construction Professionals employed by a small business supported the view held 
by adjudicators
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Differences in Perception of the Experience of Adjudication Users - Repeat User
v Infrequent User
Statistical relevance was also found when comparing the test variable of “repeat user 
v infrequent user of adjudication” by the grouping variable of construction 
professional employed by a small organisation. Indeed, as exemplified in the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 34, whereas 25% of construction professionals 
employed by a small business stated that in adjudication it was a frequent user of the 
process v an infrequent user, 43% of non-such professionals proclaimed such.
Figure 34
construction prof - small * repeat user of adj v infreq user 
Crosstabulation
Count
repeat user of adj v
infreq user
yes no Total
construction yes 7 21 28
prof - small n0 35 47 82
Total 42 68 110
As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 35, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. Thus, construction 
professionals employed by a small business are statistically less likely to encounter a 
situation where a frequent user is adjudicating against an infrequent user, than non­
such professionals.
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Figure 35
Group Statistics
construction prof - small N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
repeat user of yes 28 1.75 .441 .083
adj v infreq user no 82 1.57 .498 .055
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Mean Std Error Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
repeat user of Equal variances 
adj v infreq user assumed 16 903 000 1.669 108 .098 18 106 -033 387
Equal variances 
not assumed 1.771 52.296 082 .18 100 -.023 .377
When asked to recount the representation status o f parties to adjudication, 56.6% of 
respondents stated that in their experience, both adjudicating parties were legally 
represented. 36.3% o f respondents stated that they had encountered a legally 
represented party adjudicating against an expertly represented party and 23% of 
respondents reported that they had engaged in adjudication proceedings where both 
parties were represented by an industrial expert (Figure 36).
Figure 36
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Differences in Perception of the Representation of Adjudication Users - Both
Parties Legally Represented
When comparing the representation status of adjudicating parties as described by the 
base employment group12 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. As exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 37, whereas 67% of 
lawyers had reportedly been engaged in proceedings where both adjudicating parties 
were legally represented, only 46% of non-lawyers proclaimed such
Figure 37
lawyer * both adj parties legally represented Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties legally 
represented
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 36 18 54
no 26 31 57
Total 62 49 111
As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 38, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are statistically 
more likely to encounter proceedings where both parties are legally represented, than 
non-lawyers.
12 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non- 
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 38
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both adj parties yes 54 1.33 .476 .065
legally represented no 57 1.54 .503 .067
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both adj parties Equal variances 
legally represented assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
5.604 .020 -2.264
-2.267
109
109.000
.026
.025
-.21
-.21
.093
.093
-.395
-.395
-.026
-.026
As demonstrated by Figure 39, this difference in perception may be accounted for by 
the experience of construction professionals employed by a small business. For it can 
be seen that whereas 24% of such professionals reported knowledge of proceedings 
where both adjudicating parties were legally represented, 67% of non-such 
professionals proclaimed such
Figure 39
construction prof - small * both adj parties legally 
represented Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties legally 
represented
Totalyes no
construction yes 7 22 29
prof - small no 55 27 82
Total 62 49 111
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As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 40, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, whilst it may be the 
experience of lawyers that adjudicating parties are both legally represented at 
proceedings, construction professionals employed by a small business are statistically 
less likely to agree with such.
Figure 40
Group Statistics
construction prof - small N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both adj parties yes 29 1.76 .435 .081
legally represented no 82 1.33 .473 .052
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
both adj parties Equal variances 
legally represented assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
3.765 .055 4.287
4.460
109
53.028
.000
.000
.43
.43
.100
.096
.231
.236
.628
.622
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Differences in Perception of the Representation of Adjudication Users - Legally
Represented Party v Expertly Represented Party
Statistical relevance was also found when comparing the test variable of “legally 
represented party v expertly represented party” by the grouping variable of 
adjudicator. Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 41, 
whereas 52% of adjudicators stated that they had experienced proceedings in which a 
legally represented party was adjudicating against an expertly represented party, 24% 
of non-adjudicators proclaimed such.
Figure 41
adjudicator * legally rep party v expertly rep party 
Crosstabulation
Count
legally rep party v 
expertly rep party
Totalyes no
adjudicator yes 25 23 48
no 15 48 63
Total 40 71 111
As exemplified by the T-Test contained in Figure 42, this difference in experience can 
be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely to encounter proceedings in which a legally represented party 
is adjudicating against an expertly represented party, than non-adjudicators.
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Figure 42
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
legally rep party v yes 48 1.48 .505 .073
expertly rep party no 63 1.76 .429 .054
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
legally rep party v Equal variances 
expertly rep party assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
17.482 .000 -3.185
-3.116
109
91.912
.002
.002 Ko 
ro
OO 
00 .089
.091
-.459
-.463
-.107
-.102
Differences in Perception of the Representation of Adjudication Users - Legally 
Represented Party v Self-Representing Party
Adjudicators were also found to be statistically more likely to encounter legally 
represented parties adjudicating against self-representing parties. For as exemplified 
by the crosstabulation in Figure 43, whilst 21% of adjudicators reported such an 
experience, only 3% of non-adjudicators reported such.
Figure 43
adjudicator * legally rep party v self rep party 
Crosstabulation
Count
legally rep party v self 
rep party
Totalyes no
adjudicator yes 10 38 48
no 2 61 63
Total 12 99 111
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As can be seen in the T-Test contained in Figure 44, such differences in experience 
are relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more 
likely to encounter legally represented parties adjudicating against self-representing 
parties, than non-adjudicators.
Figure 44
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
legally rep party yes 48 1.79 .410 .059
v self rep party no 63 1.97 .177 .022
Independent Samples Test
Levene’s  Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
legally rep party Equal variances 
v self rep party assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
48.698 .000 -3.066
-2.790
109
60.306
.003
.007
-.18
-.18
.058
.063
-.291
-.303
-.062
-.050
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Differences in Perception of the Representation of Adjudication Users - Expertly
Represented Party v Self Representing Party
Similarly, adjudicators were also found to be statistically more likely to encounter 
expertly represented parties adjudicating against self-representing parties. For as 
exemplified by the crosstabulation in Figure 45, whilst 21% of adjudicators reported 
such an experience, only 6% of non-adjudicators reported such.
Figure 45
adjudicator * expertly rep party v self rep party 
Crosstabulation
Count
expertly rep party v self 
rep party
Totalyes no
adjudicator yes 10 38 48
no 4 59 63
Total 14 97 111
As can be seen in the T-Test contained in Figure 46, such differences in experience 
are relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more 
likely to encounter expertly represented parties adjudicating against self-representing 
parties, than non-adjudicators.
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Figure 46
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
expertly rep party yes 48 1.79 .410 .059
v self rep party no 63 1.94 .246 .031
In dependen t S am p les  T est
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
expertly rep party Equal variances 
v self rep party assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
23.812 .000 -2.311
-2.167
109
72.117
.023
.034
-.14
-.14
.063
.067
-.269
-.278
-.021
-.012
The Nature of Proceedings
As elucidated by Figure 47 when asked the origin o f adjudication procedure, 53% o f 
respondents stated that the adjudication procedures followed were those provided 
under the Scheme for Construction Contracts. 24% identified the construction 
contract as being the source o f  adjudication procedure, with 21% o f respondents 
stating that adjudication procedures followed were those provided under the terms o f 
a standard form contract.
Figure 47
Adjudication Procedures Followed Are:
2% 24%
□  Provided in contract
L---------------- a  Contained in sfc
53%
j
□  Provided by SCC
- 1 —  21% □  Other
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When comparing the source of adjudication procedure as described by the base 
employment group13 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 48 whilst 63% of lawyers 
stated that the adjudication procedure followed was that provided by the Scheme for 
Construction Contracts, 44% of non-lawyers identified the Scheme as being the 
source of adjudication procedure. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely to 
engage in adjudication where the proceedings have been determined by the Scheme 
for Construction Contracts, than non-lawyers.
Figure 48
lawyer * adjudication procedures followed are Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication procedures followed are
Total
those 
provided by 
con contract
those 
contained 
in sfc
those 
provided 
under the 
Scheme other
lawyer yes 9 10 34 1 54
no 18 13 25 1 57
Total 27 23 59 2 111
13 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers o f construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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O f equal importance to the source o f adjudication procedure, is the driving force 
behind proceedings. As identified by Figure 49, 63% o f respondents stated that the 
adjudicator was the driving force behind the procedure, with 19% identifying legal 
representatives as being such. 10% identified one adjudicating party as being the 
driving force behind proceedings, with 5% and 3% identifying expert representatives 
and both adjudicating parties respectively.
Figure 49
Driving Force Behind Procedure
□  Both construction parties 
H 1 construction party
□  Adjudicator
□  Legal reps 
■  Expert reps
5% 3% 10%
63%
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Having determined the source o f adjudication procedure and the driving force behind 
such, respondents were asked to describe adjudication proceedings. As demonstrated 
by Figure 50, 43% o f respondents stated that they believed adjudication proceedings 
to be “adversarial” in nature, with 25% o f respondents describing the procedure as 
being “ inquisitive”, 23% o f respondents stating it to be “ legalistic and formalistic” 
and 9% identifying it as “ informal and commercially orientated”.
Figure 50
Description of Adjudication Procedure
25% 23%
43%
□  Legalistic & Formalistic 
■  Adversarial
□  Informal & Commercially 
orientated
□  Inquisitive
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Differences in Perception of Adjudication Procedure - Adjudication Procedure is 
Inquisitive
When comparing the nature of adjudication proceedings as described by the base 
employment group14 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 51, whilst 31% of adjudicators 
described the procedure as being “inquisitive”, 21% of non-adjudicators described the 
procedure as such. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more likely to consider 
adjudication as being “inquisitive”, than non-adjudicators.
Figure 51
adjudicator * adjudication procedure is Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication procedure is
Total
legalistic and 
formalistic adversarial
informal & 
commercially 
orientated inquisitive
adjudicator yes 8 20 5 15 48
no 18 28 4 13 63
Total 26 48 9 28 111
14 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
228
Differences in Perception of Adjudication Procedure - Adjudication Procedure is 
Adversarial
This difference in perception may be accounted for by the attitude of the lawyer 
respondents. For as demonstrated in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 52, 
whilst 52% of lawyers deemed adjudication procedure to be “adversarial”, 35% of 
non-lawyers perceived such. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely than non­
lawyers, to view adjudication as being “adversarial”.
Figure 52
lawyer * adjudication procedure is Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication procedure is
Total
legalistic and 
formalistic adversarial
informal & 
commercially 
orientated inquisitive
lawyer yes 14 28 3 9 54
no 12 20 6 19 57
Total 26 48 9 28 111
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So as to gain information on the way in which proceedings were initiated, respondents 
were asked to categorise the time spent by parties in preparation for adjudication pre­
commencement o f proceedings. As elucidated by Figure 53, 58% o f respondents 
stated that only the party commencing the action spent “much time” 15 in preparation 
for proceedings, with 36% o f respondents claiming that both parties spent much time 
in preparation and 6% stating that both adjudication parties do not spend much time in 
preparation for adjudication pre-commencement o f proceedings.
Figure 53
Time Spent by Parties in Preparation for Adjudication, Pre- 
C om m encem ent of Proceedings
□  Both parties spend much 
time
n Both parties don't spend 
much time
□  Only commencing party 
spends much time
To further enhance the information concerning the initiation o f  adjudication 
proceedings, respondents were asked to recount the appointment procedure for 
adjudicators. As demonstrated by Figure 54, 88% o f respondents stated that it was 
usual for an adjudicator to be appointed by a nominating body that was specified in 
the contract. 7% o f respondents stated that the parties nominated an adjudicator once 
a dispute had arisen and only 5% reported that the identity o f an adjudicator was 
specified in the construction contract.
15 Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-com m encem ent o f  proceedings.
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Figure 54
Identity of Adjudicator Specified by:
7% 5%
88%
□  Construction contract
■  Appointing body named in 
contract
□  By parties once dispute 
arisen
In addition to the appointment o f the adjudicator, respondents were also asked to 
provide information on the background o f adjudicators. That is, are they generally o f 
a legal or construction background? As demonstrated by Figure 55, 92% of 
respondents reported that in their experience, adjudicators were o f a construction 
background.
Figure 55
Background of Adjudicators
8%
92%
□  Legal background 
■  Construction background
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When comparing the background of adjudicators as described by the base 
employment group16 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 56, whilst 98% of adjudicators 
described the background of adjudicators as being “construction”, 87% of non­
adjudicators described the adjudicator background as such. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely than non-adjudicators, to view the background of adjudicators 
as being that of “construction”.
Figure 56
adjudicator * background of adjudicators Crosstabulation
Count
background of adjudicators
Total
legal
background
construction
background
adjudicator yes 1 46 47
no 8 55 63
Total 9 101 110
16 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers o f construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations o f employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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So as to assess the procedural efficiency o f adjudication, information was also sought 
on the timescale within which the adjudicator was appointed once the notice o f 
intention to proceed to adjudication had been given. It can be seen from Figure 57 
that 35.4% o f  respondents reported a duration 2 - 3  days from the issuing o f notice 
until the appointment o f an arbitrator, with 33.6% and 20.4% reporting timescales o f  4 
-  5 days and 6 - 7  days respectively.
Figure 57
Period o f Tim e From Giving of Notice of Intention, Until 
A ppointm ent of A d judicator
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1 day 2 - 3 days 4 - 5  days 6 - 7 days 8+ days 
Number of days
OQ/
lZO
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To further enlighten the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked 
to define the period o f time from the commencement o f adjudication proceedings, 
until the consideration o f the decision by the adjudicator. As exemplified by Figure 
58, 53.10% o f respondents stated that in their experience, it took between 22 and 28 
days after commencement o f proceedings for the adjudicator to be in the position to 
consider his decision. 29.20% o f respondents reported a timescale in excess o f  29 
days.
Figure 58
Time From Commencement of Proceedings Until 
Consideration of Decision by Adjudicator
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Number of Days
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When asked to speculate on the reasoning for such a timescale as stated in Figure 58 
above, 34.20% o f  respondents suggested that the adducement o f complex evidence 
might provide the answer. 25.20% stated that simple and effective procedures might 
account for the timescale, with 24.30% suggesting full compliance by the parties as 
the answer (see Figure 59 below).
Figure 59
Reason For Time Between Commencement of Proceedings 
& Consideration of Decision
o\o
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□  Over-complex procedures ■  Delay or non-compliance by one party
□  Delay or non-corrpliance by both parties □  Adducement of complex evidence
■  Simple & effective procedures □  Full compliance by parties
■  Adducement of simple forms of evidence
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So as to place the above information in context, respondents were asked to quantify 
their opinion o f  the time taken from the commencement o f proceedings until the 
consideration o f the decision. As can be seen in Figure 60, 56.60% o f respondents 
stated that in their opinion such a timescale could be described as being “swift” .
Figure 60
Description of T im e Taken From C om m encem ent of 
Proceedings to Consideration of Decision
Swift Moderate Lengthy
Respondent Description
When comparing the time taken from commencement o f proceedings until 
consideration o f the decision as described by the base employment group1' 
questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As can be seen by the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 61, whilst 48% o f construction professionals 
employed by a small business viewed the period o f time as being “moderate”, 35% of 
non-such professionals described it as such.
17 That is com paring the answers o f  arbitrators against non-arbitrators, com paring the answers o f 
lawyers against non-lawyers and com paring the answers o f  construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible com binations o f  em ploym ent group com parisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature o f  respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 61
in s tru c tio n  prof - small * time btwn commencement & consid of award
is Crosstabulation
Count
time btwn commencement & consid 
of award is
Totalswift moderate lengthy
construction yes 12 14 3 29
prof - small no 50 29 3 82
Total 62 43 6 111
Indeed, as can be seen from the Mann Whitney U Test below, such a difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, construction 
professionals employed by a small business are statistically more likely than non-such 
professionals, to view the period of time from commencement of proceedings until 
consideration of the decision as being “moderate” or “lengthy” (Figure 62).
Figure 62
Ranks
construction prof - small N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
time btwn yes 29 64.81 1879.50
commencement & no 82 52.88 4336.50
consid of award is Total 111
Test Statistics?
time btwn 
commencem 
ent & consid 
of award is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W  
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
933.500
4336.500
-1.958
.050
a- Grouping Variable: construction prof - small
237
T h e  A d ju d ic a tio n  D ec is io n
So as to continue the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked to 
state the average time taken by an adjudicator to reach a decision. It can be seen from 
Figure 63 that 49.10% o f respondents reported a timescale o f 22 -  28 days as being 
required for the adjudicator to reach his decision, with 25% o f respondents reporting a 
timescale o f 2 -  7 days. 18.80% o f respondents reported a timescale o f  29+ days as 
being required.
Figure 63
Average Tim e Taken by Adjudicator to Reach a Decision
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2 - 7  days 8 -  14 15-21 2 2 - 2 8  2 9 + days
days days days 
Number of Days
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So as to place the timescale into context, respondents were asked to quantify their 
opinion o f the time taken by adjudicators to reach their decision. As demonstrated by 
Figure 64, 61.30% o f respondents viewed such a timescale as “swift” .
Figure 64
Description of Time Taken by Adjudicator to Reach a 
Decision
Swift Moderate Lengthy
Respondent Description
In addition to assessing the procedural efficiency o f adjudication proceedings, it was 
also important to establish the grounds upon which adjudication decisions were made. 
As elucidated by Figure 65, 61.60% o f respondents reported that adjudicators’ 
decisions were made according to legal principles.
Figure 65
Grounds on Which Adjudication Decisions Made
□  According to law
a According to other 
considerations
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When comparing the grounds upon which adjudication decisions were made as 
described by the base employment group18 questionnaire respondents, an interesting 
result can be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 66, 
whilst 79% of adjudicators reported that decisions were formed according to legal 
principles, 48% of non-adjudicators reported such.
Figure 66
adjudicator * grounds on which adj decision made 
Crosstabulation
Count
grounds on which adj 
decision made
Total
according 
to law
according 
to other 
considera 
tions
adjudicator yes 38 10 48
no 30 32 62
Total 68 42 110
As can be seen by the T-Test contained in Figure 67, such a difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are 
statistically more likely than non-adjudicators, to view decisions as being based upon 
legal principle.
18 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers o f construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 67
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
grounds on which yes 48 1.21 .410 .059
adj decision made no 62 1.52 .504 .064
In d e p e n d e n t S a m p le s  T e s t
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig t df Sig (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
grounds on which Equal variances 
adj decision made assumed
Equal variances 
not assumed
31 020 000 -3 439 
-3.530
108 
107 696
.001
001
-.31
-.31
089
087
-485
-.481
-.130 
-135
Respondents were also asked to quantify their opinion o f the validity o f the award. 
As demonstrated by Figure 68, 83% o f respondents viewed the adjudicator’s decision 
as being “fair and ju st” .
Figure 68
Opinion of Adjudication Decision
□  Fair & Just
□  Unfair & Unjust
□  Biased
□  Legally unacceptable
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Differences in Perception of the Adjudication Decision - The Decision is Fair and 
Just
When comparing the opinion of the adjudication decision as expressed by the base 
employment group19 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 69, whilst 98% of adjudicators 
stated that the adjudication decision was “fair and just”, 70% of non-adjudicators 
reported such. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more likely than non-adjudicators, 
to view the adjudication decision as being “fair and just”.
Figure 69
adjudicator * opinion of adj award Crosstabulation
Count
opinion of adj award
fair and just
unfair and 
unjust biased
legally
unacceptable Total
adjudicator yes 47 1 48
no 44 6 6 7 63
Total 91 6 6 8 111
19 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Differences in Perception of the Adjudication Decision - The Decision is Legally 
Unacceptable
Such a difference in perception may be accounted for by the attitude of the lawyer 
respondents. For as can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 70, whilst 
13% of lawyers viewed the adjudication decision as being “legally unacceptable”, 
only 2% on non-lawyers reported such. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely 
than non-lawyers, to view the adjudication decision as being “legally unacceptable”.
Figure 70
lawyer * opinion of adj award Crosstabulation
Count
opinion of adj award
Totalfair and just
unfair and 
unjust biased
legally
unacceptable
lawyer yes 40 3 4 7 54
no 51 3 2 1 57
Total 91 6 6 8 111
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Having provided information on the way in which the Award was reached and the 
resulting impression it thereby created, respondents were then asked to estimate the 
percentage o f adjudication decisions that result in appeal. 74.10% o f respondents 
stated that under 5% o f adjudicators’ decisions result in appeal (Figure 71).
Figure 71
Percentage of Decisions That Result in Appeal
0%
Under 5% 6% -10% 11 % -15% 16% - 20% 21%+
Opinion of Respondents
Differences in Perception of the Appeal Rate - Under 5% of Decisions Result in 
Appeal
When comparing the percentage o f awards that result in appeal as reported by the 
base employment groups questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 72, whilst 87% o f 
adjudicators stated that under 5% o f decisions result in an appeal, 64% o f non­
adjudicators reported such. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more likely than non­
adjudicators, to view the rate o f appeal as being under 5%
2(1 That is com paring the answers o f  arbitrators against non-arbitrators, com paring the answers o f  
lawyers against non-lawyers and com paring the answers o f  construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible com binations o f  em ploym ent group com parisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature o f  respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 72
adjudicator * percentage of awards that result in appeal Crosstabulation
Count
percentage of awards that result in appeal
under 5% 6% -10% 11% -15% 16% - 20% 21% + Total
adjudicator yes 39 5 1 45
no 39 10 4 6 2 61
Total 78 15 4 7 2 106
Differences in Perception of the Appeal Rate - Over 11% of Decisions Result in 
Appeal
Such a difference in opinion may be accounted for by the beliefs of the lawyer 
respondent. For as demonstrated by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 73, a 
greater number of lawyer respondents than non-lawyers, reported the rate of appeal as 
being 11%+. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely to view the rate of appeal 
from an adjudication decision as being higher, than non-lawyers.
Figure 73
lawyer * percentage of awards that result in appeal Crosstabulation
Count
percentage of awards that result in appeal
Totalunder 5% 6 % -1 0 % 11% -15% 16% -20% 21% +
lawyer yes 32 9 4 5 2 52
no 46 6 2 54
Total 78 15 4 7 2 106
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When asked their opinion o f  the rate o f  appeal, it can be seen by Figure 74 that 
79.60% o f respondents viewed such as being satisfactory.
Figure 74
Opinion of Rate of Appeal
20.40%
□  Satisfactory 
■  Unsatisfactory
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When comparing the opinion of the rate of appeal as expressed by the base 
employment group21 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be found. As 
can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 75, whilst 28% of lawyers 
stated that the rate of appeal was “unsatisfactory”, only 13% of non-lawyers reported 
such.
Figure 75
lawyer * the rate of appeal from adj is Crosstabulation
Count
the rate of appeal from adj is
Totalsatisfactory unsatisfactory
lawyer yes 38 15 53
no 46 7 53
Total 84 22 106
Indeed, as can be seen by the Mann Whitney U Test below, such a difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 10% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely than non-lawyers, to view the rate of appeal as being 
“unsatisfactory” (Figure 76)
21 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 76
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
the rate of appeal yes 53 57.50 3047.50
from adj is no 53 49.50 2623.50
Total 106
Test Statistics?
the rate of 
appeal 
from adj is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
1192.500
2623.500 
-1.907
.057
a Grouping Variable: lawyer
Given the availability o f arbitration as a means o f  resolving a dispute, respondents 
were also asked to provide information on where challenges to an adjudicator’s 
decision were made. As can be seen by Figure 77, 72.90% o f respondents stated that 
challenges to an adjudicator’s decision were made to Court.
Figure 77
Challenges to an Adjudicator's Decision Made to:
□  Arbitral tribunal
□  Court
10%
72.
24 8
When comparing the location of challenges to adjudication decisions as reported by 
the base employment group questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 78, whilst 93% of 
adjudicators stated that adjudication decisions were referred to court for a final and 
binding decision, 58% of non-adjudicators reported such.
Figure 78
adjudicator * appeals from adj are made to Crosstabulation
Count
appeals from adj are 
made to
Total
arbitral
tribunal court
adjudicator yes 3 41 44
no 26 36 62
Total 29 77 106
Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 79, such a difference in experience can be seen to 
be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, adjudicators are statistically more 
likely than non-adjudicators, to experience a decision being referred to Court.
22 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 79
Group Statistics
adjudicator N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
appeals from yes 44 1.93 .255 .038
adj are made to no 62 1.58 .497 .063
Independen t S am p les  Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Mean Std. Error Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
appeals from Equal variances 
adj are made to assumed 139.939 .000 4.295 104 .000 .35 .082 189 513
Equal variances 
not assumed 4.749 95.880 .000 .35 .074 .204 .498
So as to assess the importance placed upon issues o f procedure and the resulting 
award by the various parties to adjudication, respondents were asked to identify which 
they believed to be o f greatest importance to adjudication proceedings: procedure; 
result; or procedure and result. It can be seen from Figure 80 that 75% o f respondents 
believed both issues o f procedure and the resulting decision to be o f importance in 
adjudication proceedings.
Figure 80
Greatest Importance to Adjudication Proceedings
14%
11% □  Procedure
□  Result
□  Procedure & Result
75%
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Differences in Perception of What is of Greatest Importance - Procedure and
Result is of Greatest Importance
When comparing the importance of adjudication procedure and result as identified by 
the base employment group questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 81, whilst 83% of 
lawyers viewed both procedure and result as being of the greatest importance, 68% of 
non-lawyers reported such. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely than non­
lawyers, to view both issues of procedure and the resulting decision as being of equal 
importance.
Figure 81
lawyer * greatest importance to adj proceedings is Crosstabulation
Count
greatsst importance to adj 
proceedings is
Totalprocedure result
procedure 
& result
lawyer yes 4 5 45 54
no 12 6 39 57
Total 16 11 84 111
23 That is comparing the answers of arbitrators against non-arbitrators, comparing the answers of 
lawyers against non-lawyers and comparing the answers of construction parties against non­
construction parties. Due to the many possible combinations of employment group comparisons, it 
would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Differences in Perception of What is of Greatest Importance - Procedure is of
Greatest Importance
Such a difference in opinion may be explained by the responses of construction 
professionals employed by a small business. For as exemplified by the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 82, whilst 24% of such construction professionals 
viewed the “procedure” as being of greatest importance, 11% of non-such 
professionals expressed such an opinion. Thus, construction professionals employed 
by a small business are statistically more likely than non-such professionals, to view 
issues of procedure alone as being of greatest importance to the adjudication 
mechanism.
Figure 82
construction prof - small * greatest importance to adj proceedings is
Crosstabulation
Count
greatest importance to adj 
proceedings is
Totalprocedure result
procedure 
& result
construction yes 7 4 18 29
prof - small no 9 7 66 82
Total 16 11 84 111
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The Financial Im plications o f Adjudication
So as to assess the financial impact o f  adjudication, respondents were asked to 
quantify the outlay involved in engaging proceedings. As can be seen by Figure 83, 
60% o f respondents viewed adjudication as being “ inexpensive” .
Figure 83
Financial Implications of Adjudication
□  Costly 
■  Inexpensive
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To put the financial implications o f adjudication into context, respondents were asked 
to compare the financial burden o f adjudication as compared to litigation. 94.70% of 
respondents viewed adjudication as being “ less expensive” than litigation (Figure 84).
Figure 84
As Com pared to Litigation, Adjudication is:
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Respondents were also asked to quantify the financial impact o f adjudication as 
compared to arbitration. As exemplified by Figure 85, 91.10% o f respondents viewed 
adjudication as being “ less expensive” than arbitration.
Figure 85
As Compared to Arbitration, Adjudication is:
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Don't knowMore LessJust as
expensive expensive expensive 
O pinion o f R espondents
More Just as Less Don't know 
expensive expensive expensive
O pinion o f R espondents
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The Conduct o f Adjudication Players
Key to understanding procedural efficiency and fairness, are the actions and attitudes 
o f the various parties to adjudication proceedings. To this end, respondents were 
asked to comment on the actions and attitudes o f adjudicators; representatives; and 
parties to the dispute.
It can be seen from Figure 86 that 80.20% o f respondents viewed the actions and 
conduct o f adjudicators as being “professional and effective” .
Figure 86
Actions of Adjudicators
□  Professional & Effective ■  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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75% o f respondents described the attitude o f the adjudicator towards the dispute as
being “neutral” (Figure 87).
Figure 87
Attitude of Adjudicators Towards Dispute
14.30%
10.70% □  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
75%
85.30% o f respondents viewed the actions o f the legal / expert representatives as 
being “professional and effective” (Figure 88).
Figure 88
Actions of Legal / Expert Representatives
85.30%
□  Professional & Effective ■  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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83% o f respondents viewed the attitude o f the legal / expert representatives towards
the dispute as being “ litigious” (Figure 89).
Figure 89
Attitude of Representatives Tow ards Dispute
16.10%
83.00%
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
When asked to describe the actions o f the adjudicating parties, 68.50% o f respondents 
stated that they believed them to be “professional and effective” with 13.90% 
describing them as being “unprofessional and ineffective” (Figure 90).
Figure 90
Actions of Adjudicating Parties
9.30%
□  Professional & Effective □  Unprofessional & Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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Similar to the attitude attributed to the legal / expert representative, 79.10% of 
respondents described the attitude o f adjudicating parties towards the dispute as being 
“ litigious” (Figure 91).
Figure 91
Attitude of Parties Towards Dispute
14.50%
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
So as to place the actions and attitude o f the parties to adjudication into context, 
respondents were asked to select one o f three commonly held views concerning the 
nature o f adjudication. As can be seen from Figure 92 below, 66% o f respondents 
believed adjudication to be a flexible mechanism that had regard to defined principles 
and procedures, with 29% o f respondents believing adjudication to be a mechanism 
based upon defined and formal principles and procedures.
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Figure 92
Respondent Overview of Adjudication
66%
□  Defined & formal principles & procedures
□  Flexible
□  Flexible but w ith regard to defined principles & procedures
Discussion -  Does the Empirical Evidence Suggest that Adjudication 
Complies With Woolfs Eight Criteria for Access to Justice?
From the good level o f  familiarity reported by questionnaire respondents on the 
Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996,24 one might assume that 
adjudication in the construction industry is operating within the criteria as established 
by W oolf for effective access to justice. Indeed, given that the majority o f
• • 25construction disputes proceeding to adjudication are financial in nature,^ it is 
essential that adjudication operates to facilitate such. In applying the research 
findings to each o f W oo lfs  eight criteria in turn, an indication as to the ability o f 
adjudication to facilitate access to justice shall be achieved.
24 See Figures 4 - 9
2r* See Figure 14
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The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
Adjudication is often utilised by the lower end of the contractual chain. The typical 
contractual position of adjudication users was reported to be that of the sub contractor 
followed by the main contractor26 and the size of organisations using the process was 
reported to be small and subsequently medium sized organisations.27 When 
questioned as to the adjudication experience of parties to proceedings,28 it was 
reported that in the majority of cases, both parties to proceedings are infrequent users 
of the mechanism.29 However, a significant number of proceedings were recounted in 
which a frequent user was engaged in adjudication with an infrequent user.30 Given 
the possibility for an inequality in bargaining power and the ramifications that this 
may bring, it is essential that adjudication facilitate a fair procedure so as to achieve a 
just result.
-I
As highlighted in Chapter 2, a concern with the adjudication process was that it 
might be abused by a party to a dispute as a means of gaining tactical advantage. 
Evidence from the research would suggest that in a significant number of 
proceedings, this may indeed be the case. As elucidated by Figure 53, when 
questioned as to the time spent in preparation for proceedings, 58% of respondents 
stated that only the party commencing proceedings spends “much time” in
26 See Figures 15- 17
27 See Figure 18. It should be noted that Lawyers were more likely to experience medium-sized parties 
than other groups, with particular reference to construction professionals employed by a small firm 
(See Figures 19 -  22). Further, Adjudicators were more likely to experience small-sized organisations 
using the process than other groups, with particular reference to Lawyers (See Figures 23 -  26).
28 See Figure 27
29 Adjudicators were more likely to experience proceedings in which both parties to the dispute were 
infrequent users of the mechanism than other group, with particular reference to Lawyers (See Figures 
3 0-33).
30 Construction professionals employed by a small firm were less likely to experience such than other 
groups (See Figures 34 & 35).
See Chapter 2 at p.93
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preparation,32 with only 36% stating that both parties spend “much time” in 
preparation. As such, in many disputes the commencement of adjudication may be 
seen as an ambush tactic designed to confer unilateral advantage.
A further concern expressed, was that due to the expeditious timescale associated with 
adjudication proceedings, rough justice may be dispensed. Given that in the majority 
of proceedings both parties employed some form of representation, legal or expert, 
external safeguards are afforded against both an abuse of bargaining position by a 
party to proceedings and against bias or unfairness on the part of the adjudicator.33 
However, in 23% of disputes, a legally or expertly represented party was engaged in 
adjudication with a self-representing party.34 Could it be that in such cases rough 
justice is indeed dispensed? When questioned as to the perceived fairness or 
otherwise of the adjudication award, 83% of respondents viewed the majority of 
adjudication awards as being “fair and just”. Thus, from empirical data it would 
appear that whilst there are causes for concern, in the majority of cases adjudication is 
compliant with W oolfs requirements for access to justice under this head.
32 Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-commencement of proceedings.
33 See Figures 36 - 42.
34 See Figure 36. It should be noted that Adjudicators were more likely to encounter legally or expertly 
represented parties adjudicating against self-representing parties than other groups (See Figures 43 -  
46).
35 See Figure 68. It should be noted that Adjudicators were more likely to view the award as being 
“fair and just” than other groups (See Figure 69). Lawyers were more likely to view the award as 
being “legally unacceptable” than other groups (See Figure 70).
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The Third, Fourth and Eighth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed &
Effectiveness
If procedural fairness and a just result are to be obtained, then proceedings must be 
executed with reasonable speed and cost. They must also be “effective”, meaning 
adequately resourced and organised.
Turning to consider the financial implications of adjudication, it can be seen from 
Figure 83 that 60% of respondents viewed adjudication as being “inexpensive”. 
When asked to compare the cost of adjudication as against that of litigation, 94.70% 
of respondents viewed adjudication as being “less expensive” than litigation.36 When 
asked to contrast the cost of adjudication proceedings with that of arbitration, 91.10%
37of respondents stated that it was “less expensive” than arbitration. As such, 
adjudication can be seen to satisfy W oolfs requirements for a procedure to be 
conducted with reasonable cost.
In so far as the time element of adjudication is concerned, empirical data would seem 
to suggest that adjudication is an efficient mechanism in certain spheres, giving to 
protracted proceedings in other areas. Firstly, when questioned as to the appointment 
procedure of the adjudicator, 88% of respondents reported that the nominating body 
that had been named in the contract, appointed the adjudicator.38 Thus, in the 
majority of proceedings, the appointment of an adjudicator by an impartial third party 
should mean that disagreement as to the identity of the adjudicator should not delay 
the onset of dispute resolution. Further, when questioned as to the timescale within
36 See Figure 84.
37 See Figure 85.
38 See Figure 54.
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which the adjudicator was appointed once the notice of intention to proceed to 
adjudication had been given, it was reported that in 92% of cases the adjudicator was 
appointed in under 8 days.39 Indeed, in 35.40% of disputes, the adjudicator was 
appointed within 2 - 3  days of the notice of intention to refer the dispute being issued 
and in 33.60% of disputes, this timescale was reported to be 4 -  5 days.
Further, when asked to define the period of time from the commencement of 
adjudication proceedings, until the consideration of the decision by the adjudicator, 
53.10% of respondents stated that in their experience, it took 22 -  28 days after 
commencement of proceedings for the adjudicator to be in the position to consider the 
decision.40 In 29.20% of cases, this timescale was reported to have been in excess of 
29 days. Adducement of complex evidence, simple and effective procedures and full 
compliance by the parties to the dispute were seen to be factors accounting for such a 
timescale,41 which was deemed by 56.60% of respondents to be “swift” and by 
38.10% to be “moderate”.42 Interestingly, the construction professional employed by 
a small organization was statistically more likely to view this timescale as being 
“moderate” or “lengthy” than other groups.43 Thus, the perception of adjudication 
users as to the expediency of the mechanism, did not directly accord with that held by 
party representatives or adjudicators.
Diversity in the responses appertaining to the time taken by the adjudicator to reach 
their decision can also be seen. Indeed, whilst 49.10% of respondents reported the
39 See Figure 57. It should be noted that s i08(2) requires the appointment of an adjudicator and the 
referral o f the dispute to him within 7 days of the issuing of notice o f an intention to proceed to 
adjudication.
40 See Figure 58
41 See Figure 59
42 See Figure 60
43 See Figures 61 and 62
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average time taken by the adjudicator to reach a decision as being 2 2 - 2 8  days, 25% 
of respondents recorded a timescale of 2 - 7 days and 18.80% reported a period of 29+ 
days.44 However, despite such diversity, 61.30% of respondents described this 
timescale as being “swift”, with 35.10% categorizing it as being “moderate”.45
Thus, in terms of satisfying this head, empirical data would seem to suggest that 
adjudication is successful in providing a cost effective mechanism of dispute 
resolution. With regard to the ability of the mechanism to resolve a dispute with 
reasonable speed, analysis indicates that whilst some disputes suffer from protracted 
proceedings, the majority of adjudication proceedings are conducted expediently and 
largely to the satisfaction of those engaged in the process. As such, adjudication can 
be seen to effective, that is, adequately resourced and organized.
The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
If adjudication is to facilitate access to justice, then adjudication procedure must be 
understandable to those parties engaging in such, and further it must be responsive to 
their needs.
It has already been established46 that a key requisite to the success of adjudication 
under this head, has been to facilitate party autonomy with regard to the method by 
which their dispute is to be resolved. To this end, respondents were asked to recount 
the origins of adjudication procedure. As demonstrated by Figure 47, 53% of 
respondents stated that the adjudication procedures followed were those contained in
44 See Figure 63
45 See Figure 64.
46 See Chapter 2 at p.98.
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the Scheme for Construction Contracts.47 24% identified the construction contract as 
being the source of adjudication procedure, with 21% identifying a standard form 
contract. Only 2% of respondents stated that the adjudication procedures followed 
were determined by “other”. Given the bias towards contractually provided 
procedures, it is suggested that adjudicating parties are exercising their ability to 
chose the source of procedure for the resolution of their dispute. As such, the 
procedures selected by the parties must be deemed to be understandable and 
responsive to their perceived future need.
However, when asked to identify the driving force behind matters of procedure, it was 
the adjudicator and subsequently the legal representatives who were identified as 
such 48 Whether such a fact is indicative of an abuse of party autonomy to determine 
matters of procedure, is an issue of construction. If party autonomy is to be defined as 
meaning that adjudicating parties must determine each procedural issue, then 
adjudication cannot be compliant with such. Given the impracticality of such a 
definition in terms of expedition and clarity, however, it is suggested that party 
autonomy should be defined to mean that the parties to a dispute determine the broad 
procedural base, the finessing of which should be the responsibility of the adjudicator. 
Indeed, the Construction Act itself provides that the contract shall enable the 
adjudicator to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law.49 As such, the 
finding that adjudicators are the driving force behind matters of procedure cannot be 
seen to compromise the requirement for party autonomy and an understandable and
47 Respondents from the base employment group “lawyer” were statistically more likely to select this 
category. See Figure 48.
48 See Figure 49.
49 See sl08(2)(f) Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. It is interesting to note that 
unlike the Arbitraton Act 1996, this power is not qualified by the right of the parties to agree any 
matter.
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responsive procedure. The finding that legal representatives play a part in 
determining procedural issues is however, a complicating factor in terms of the 
juridification debate and shall be considered later.
The description of adjudication procedure as “adversarial” and “legalistic and 
formalistic” also complicates matters in so far as the ability of adjudication to meet 
the requirements for access to justice under this head.50 For if procedures are 
formalised and regimented, then by definition they cannot be responsive. Only 25% 
of respondents described adjudication as being “inquisitive” and as demonstrated by 
Figure 51, the base employment group of adjudicator was statistically more likely to 
return such an answer than other groups. However, the fact that the majority of 
adjudicators were reportedly of a construction, as opposed to a legal background, may 
provide respite from such a prospect.51 As whilst an adjudicator of a construction 
background may conduct proceedings on a formal basis, they are less likely to be 
prejudiced by court procedure and tradition than an adjudicator who has undergone 
extensive legal training and who concurrently operates within the court structure. In 
short, the commercial background of the adjudicator may temper the formulism with 
which proceedings are conducted. It should be noted, however, that whilst in 
possession of the ability to determine the dispute according to legal principle or other 
considerations, adjudicators are not taking advantage of such. For 61.60% of 
respondents stated that the adjudication Decision was reached according to legal 
principle and as demonstrated by Figures 66 and 67, adjudicators themselves were
50 See Figure 50. It should be noted that lawyers were more likely to view the procedure as being 
“adversarial” than other groups. See Figure 52.
51 See Figure 55. It is interesting to note that adjudicators were statistically more likely to describe 
adjudicators as being of a construction background than other groups. See Figure 56.
52 See Figure 65.
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statistically more likely to return such a response than other groups. Does this serve 
to undermine the prospect that adjudication is free from litigious influence?
In terms of the ability of adjudication to satisfy this head, judgement must be withheld 
until the impact of juridification has been considered.
The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
As already exemplified,53 if a mechanism of dispute resolution is to satisfy the 
requirement for certainty, then it must be able to facilitate the final resolution of a 
dispute. Evidence of a binding resolution to a dispute can be found where the rate of 
appeal is minimal. At first sight it would appear from Figure 71 that adjudication has 
satisfied this head. For when questioned, 74.10% of respondents stated that under 5% 
of Decisions are referred. However, when analysed according to base employment 
group, it was discovered that whilst adjudicators were more likely to report that under 
5% of Decisions are referred,54 lawyers were statistically more likely to perceive the 
referral rate as being higher.55 Indeed, lawyers were more likely to perceive in excess 
of 11% of Decisions being referred to arbitration or court. Thus, when examining the 
ability of adjudication to achieve a final and binding resolution to a dispute, account 
must be taken of the employment status of respondents. In short, from analysing the 
responses by base employment group, it would appear that where a lawyer is engaged 
in the adjudication process, the referral of an adjudicators Decision is more likely and 
as such, adjudication is less likely to achieve a final resolution to the dispute.
53 See Chapter 2 at p.99.
54 See Figure 72.
55 See Figure 73.
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Furthermore, as stated in Chapter 2,56 a concern with adjudication was that it could 
potentially exacerbate the time and expense associated with dispute resolution. For 
under the Construction Act, the decision of the adjudicator is binding until the dispute 
is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for 
arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement. Of course 
the parties may agree to accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally determining 
the dispute.57 When questioned as to the destination of a disputed decision, 72.90% 
of respondents stated that an adjudicator’s decision was referred to Court.58 However, 
27.10% of respondents stated that a dispute was referred to arbitration for final 
resolution. From the analysis of arbitration in the previous Chapter it has been seen 
that arbitration is not always final and binding. Thus, the spectre of a single dispute 
being referred to three separate forums for resolution is a reality in some instances. 
Such a prospect must be tempered however, by the fact that when questioned as to 
their opinion on the rate of referral of an adjudicators decision, 79.60% stated that it 
was “satisfactory”.59 Whilst 20.40% of respondents returned a view that it was 
“unsatisfactory”, it can be seen from Figures 75 and 76 that the base employment 
group of lawyer was statistically more likely to return such a view than other groups. 
Thus, there would appear to be a divergence between the views of the users of the 
adjudication process and the opinions of their legal representatives.
Notwithstanding such, from a holistic perspective adjudication can be seen to satisfy 
the need to provide a final and binding resolution to a dispute in the majority of cases. 
Further, due to the overall rate of satisfaction amongst parties with regard to the rate
56 See Chapter 2 at p. 100
57 SI08(3).
58 See Figure 77. It should be noted that adjudicators were more likely to report their decisions as 
being referred to Court than other groups. See Figures 78 and 79.
59 See Figure 74
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of referral, it would appear that only the most deserving of cases are referred to the 
courts or an arbitral tribunal. As such, adjudication may also be seen to satisfy the 
public justice aspect of certainty. Where needed, justice is done and is manifestly 
seen to be done.60
The Barrier to Access to Justice: Juridification
The influence of the legal profession over adjudication has already been 
demonstrated.61 Further, in describing adjudication as being “adversarial” and 
“legalistic and formalistic”, the influence of the court system over the procedure has 
also been seen.62 Analysis of the empirical data uncovers further evidence of 
juridifcation. Firstly, although the actions of adjudicators, legal representatives and 
parties to the dispute were considered to be “professional and effective”, when 
questioned as to their attitude towards the dispute, the adjudicator was described as 
being “neutral”,64 whereas the legal representatives and adjudicating parties were 
largely described as being “litigious”.65 Such a finding would seem to give credit to 
the notion that the spirit of adjudication is being corrupted so as to ape the worst 
features of litigation.
Further, some evidence to support Tyler’s66 polarisation theory was uncovered. When 
questioned as to the factor of greatest importance to adjudication proceedings, 75% of
60 As required by Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justice exp McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
61 For example, see Figure 49
62 See Figure 50
63 See Figures 86, 88 and 90
64 See Figure 87
65 See Figures 89 and 91
66 See Chapter 2 at p.82
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respondents stated that both procedure and result were of significance.67 However, 
when analysed according to base employment group, it was discovered that whilst the 
legal practitioner was statistically more likely to view both issues of procedure and
/ 'O
the result as being of importance, the construction professional employed by a small 
business was more likely to view the procedure alone as being of greatest 
significance.69 This would seem to suggest a polarisation of views that may lead the 
various parties to adopt differing goals and attitudes. However, given the fact that the 
majority of respondents viewed both elements to be of significance, as opposed to a 
singular element, any polarisation is not likely to cause significant effect in terms of 
the juridification of adjudication. Moreover, when asked to describe adjudication, 
66% reported that it was a flexible procedure that had regard to defined principles and 
procedures.70 The recognition that adjudication should not operate as a formal 
procedure, provides some respite from the mounting evidence of juridification and the 
damaging effect this may have on the adjudication mechanism. In short, whilst 
judgitis is creeping into the adjudication system, it has yet to change its character 
beyond recognition.
67 See Figure 80
68 See Figure 81
69 See Figure 82
70 See Figure 92
CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH - LITIGATION
The results o f the empirical research into arbitration and adjudication were 
highlighted in Chapters Four and Five respectively. Below is set out the results o f the 
litigation empirical research, followed by an analysis as to whether the data indicates 
that litigation is fulfilling W o o lfs  criteria for access to justice.
The Nature of Respondents
The identity o f questionnaire respondents can be seen in Figure 1. Indeed, 60% o f 
respondents stated that their occupation was that o f lawyer, 28% stated that they were 
construction professionals working for a small business, with 7% representing 
themselves as construction professionals employed by a medium sized business and 
5% as construction professionals employed by a large business.
Figure 1
Nature of Respondents
□ Lawyer
■ Con Prof Large
□ Con Prof Medium
□ Con Prof Small
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However, it should be noted that one respondent fell into more than one employment 
category, reporting that they were both a lawyer and a construction professional 
employed by a small firm.
Respondents Experience of Litigation
So as to assess familiarity with litigation proceedings, respondents were asked to 
quantify their familiarity with the Civil Procedure Rules. As can be seen from Figure 
2, 46% o f questionnaire respondents stated that they were fairly familiar with the 
provisions o f the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.
Figure 2
Familiarity With CPR
10%
□ Very familiar 
■  Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
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When comparing the familiarity levels of base employment group1 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. As exemplified by the crosstabulation 
contained in Figure 3, whereas 67% of lawyers stated that they were “very familiar” 
with the provisions of the CPR, only 9% of non-lawyers (construction professionals) 
professed such a level of familiarity.
Figure 3
lawyer * familiarity with CPR Crosstabulation
Count
familiarity with CPR
Totalvery familiar fairly familiar unfamiliar
lawyer yes 24 12 36
no 2 15 6 23
Total 26 27 6 59
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 4, such a 
difference in the level of familiarity can be seen to be relevant at the 0% level of 
probability. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely to be “very familiar” with the 
provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules, than non-lawyers.
1 That is comparing the answers of lawyers against non-lawyers. Due to the many possible 
combinations of employment group comparisons, it would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the 
nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 4
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
familiarity with CPR yes 36 22.33 804.00
no 23 42.00 966.00
Total 59
Test Statistics?
familiarity 
with CPR
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
138.000
804.000 
-4.743
.000
a Grouping Variable: lawyer
In addition to their familiarity with the provisions o f the Civil Procedure Rules, 
respondents were also asked to describe their level o f participation in litigation 
proceedings for the year 2001. As exemplified by Figure 5, 39% o f respondents 
described their level o f participation in litigation proceedings for 2001 as being 
“ infrequent”, with 34% describing it as “frequent” .
Figure 5
Participation in Litigation in 2001
10%
□ Frequent 
■ Fairly Frequent
□ Infrequent
□ None
17%
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When comparing the participation levels of base employment group2 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. Indeed, as exemplified in the 
crosstabulation contained in Figure 6, whereas 61% of lawyers described their 
involvement as being “frequent” or “fairly frequent” for the period 2001, only 34.4% 
of non-lawyers proclaimed such.
Figure 6
lawyer * participation in lit 2001 Crosstabulation
Count
participation in lit 2001
frequent fairly frequent infrequent none Total
lawyer yes 13 9 14 36
no 7 1 9 6 23
Total 20 10 23 6 59
As demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 7, such a 
difference in the level of participation can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of 
probability. Thus, lawyers are statistically more likely to have been engaged 
“frequently” or “fairly frequently” in litigation proceedings in the year 2001, than 
non-lawyers.
2 That is comparing the answers of lawyers against non-lawyers. Due to the many possible 
combinations of employment group comparisons, it would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the 
nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 7
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
participation in lit 2001 yes 36 26.50 954.00
no 23 35.48 816.00
Total 59
Test Statistics?
participation 
in lit 2001
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W  
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
288.000
954.000
-2.069
.039
a* Grouping Variable: lawyer
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So as to ascertain the impact o f the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 upon the level o f 
litigation proceedings employed by the industry, respondents were then asked whether 
they had experienced an increase in litigation since the introduction o f the Rules. As 
can be seen by Figure 8, 46% stated that their level o f involvement in litigation had 
remained the same since the introduction o f the Rules, with 39% reporting a decrease 
and 15% an increase in their level o f involvement.
Figure 8
Participation Increased Since Rules?
□ Yes - it has increased
■ No - it has remained the 
same
□  No - it has decreased
15%
46%
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The Nature o f Disputes & Disputants
So as to ascertain information as to the type o f disputes that proceed to litigation, 
respondents were asked to quantify the subject matter o f their litigation proceedings. 
As exemplified by Figure 9 below, 46% o f  litigation proceedings concerned financial 
disputes, with 41% accounting for contractual disputes.
Figure 9
Types of Litigation Disputes
3%
—  \  K\ □ Financial disputes
41 %L
46% ■ D e fe c ts  works disputes
Y □ Contractual disputes
□  Other
10%
278
The contractual position o f litigation users was also o f interest. Thus, respondents 
were asked whether the contractual position o f litigation users was that o f  employer, 
main contractor, and / or sub-contractor. As can be seen in Figure 10, 75.9% o f 
respondents stated that litigation users were main contractors, with 58.6% stating that 
litigation users were employers and only 19% identifying them as being sub­
contractors.
Figure 10
Contractual Position of Litigation Users
Number (%)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Sub ContractorEmployer Main
Contractor 
Contractual Position
□ Yes
□ No
3 M ore than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each contractual 
position be treated as an independent variable.
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Similarly, respondents were asked to describe the size o f organizations that in their 
experience use litigation as a means o f resolving disputes.4 It can be seen in Figure 
11 that 62.1% o f respondents reported large organizations as utilizing litigation, with 
55.2% identifying medium-sized organizations as using the process and only 31% 
identifying small organizations as being users o f litigation.
Figure 11
Size of Organisation Using Litigation
40
N um ber (%) □ Yes
□ No20
Large org Medium org 
S ize
Small org
4 More than one answer could be selected - respondents could select one category only, or select two or 
all three if  they so wished. Thus, percentages have been worked on the basis that each organisational 
size be treated as an independent variable
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The level o f  procedural experience o f each litigating party was also o f  interest.5 As 
elucidated by Figure 12, 40.4% o f respondents stated that both litigating parties were 
repeat users o f  the process, with 35.1% stating that both parties were infrequent users 
o f the procedure and 24.6% identifying a repeat user litigating against an infrequent 
user o f the mechanism.
Figure 12
Experience of Litigation
N um ber (%) 40
Both parties Both parties Repeat user v
repeat users infreq users Infreq user
3 Once more respondents were free to select m ore than one answer. Thus, percentages have been
worked on the basis that each com bination o f  arbitral experience be treated as an independent variable
2 8 1
When comparing the procedural experience of litigation users as described by the 
base employment group6 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can be 
found. Indeed, as exemplified in the crosstabulation contained in Figure 13, whereas 
50% of lawyers had reportedly been engaged in proceedings where both litigating 
parties were “repeat users” of the process, only 24% of non-lawyers proclaimed such
Figure 13
lawyer * both lit parties repeat users Crosstabulation
Count
both lit parties repeat 
users
Totalyes no
lawyer yes 18 18 36
no 5 16 21
Total 23 34 57
As demonstrated by the T-Test7 contained in Figure 14, this difference in perception 
can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely to encounter litigating parties who are both repeat users of the 
process, than non-lawyers.
6 That is comparing the answers of lawyers against non-lawyers. Due to the many possible 
combinations of employment group comparisons, it would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the 
nature of respondents any further than this base level.
7 The Independent-Samples T Test procedure compares means for two groups of cases.
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Figure 14
Group Statistics
lawyer N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
both lit parties yes 36 1.50 .507 .085
repeat users no 21 1.76 .436 .095
Independent Sam ples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the
Mean Std. Error Difference
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper
both lit parties Equal variances 
repeat users assumed 13.135 .001 -1.976 55 .053 -.26 .133 -.527 004
Equal variances 
not assumed -2.057 47.183 .045 -.26 .127 -.518 -.006
When asked to recount the representation status o f parties to litigation, 94.8% of 
respondents stated that in their experience, both parties were legally represented 
(Figure 15).
Figure 15
Party Representation at Proceedings
120 
~  100 
~  80 
|  60 
|  40
z  20 
0
d ju t
94.9 96.6 100 100 98.^ 98.2
i o -
□ No
□ Yes
\<>
v<>
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T h e  N a tu r e  o f  P r o c e e d in g s
As demonstrated by Figure 16, when asked to identify the driving force behind 
litigation procedure, 44.8% o f respondents stated that one construction party could be 
seen to be such, with 27.6% identifying the legal representatives, 17.2% identifying 
the Judiciary and 10.3% stating that both construction parties were the driving force 
behind matters o f procedure.
Figure 16
Driving Force Behind Procedure
27.60% 10.30%
□ Both construction 
parties
■  One construction party
□ Judiciary
17.20% 44.80%
□ Legal representatives
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Respondents were also asked to describe litigation proceedings. As demonstrated by 
Figure 17, 62.1% o f respondents stated that they believed litigation proceedings to be 
“ legalistic and formalistic”, with 36.2% o f respondents describing the procedure as 
being “adversarial” .
Figure 17 
Description o f Litigation Procedure
1.70%
□ Legalistic & Formalistic 
@ Adversarial
□  Inquisitive
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So as to gain information on the way in which proceedings were initiated, respondents 
were asked to categorize the time spent by parties in preparation for litigation pre­
commencement o f proceedings. As elucidated by Figure 18, 70.7% o f respondents
o
stated that both parties spent “much time” in preparation for proceedings, with 29.3% 
o f respondents claiming that only the party intending to commence litigation 
proceedings spent “much time” in preparation.
Figure 18
Time Spent by Parties in Preparation for 
Litigation, Pre-Com m encem ent of Proceedings
□ Both parties spend 
much time
■  Only commencing party 
spends much time
K Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-com m encem ent o f  proceedings.
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Case Management
To determine the effectiveness o f case management by the Judiciary, respondents 
were asked how often the statutory timetable for the service o f statement o f case was 
exceeded. It can be seen from Figure 19 below, that 50% o f respondents reported that 
the timetable for such was “frequently” exceeded, with 29.3% reporting that it was 
“ infrequently” exceeded.
Figure 19
Statutory Timetable for Service o f SOC Exceeded
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Infrequently NoneFrequently Fairly
frequently
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When asked to provide reasoning for such, 44.8% o f respondents reported that it was 
due to the complex evidence and points o f law contained in the Statement o f Case 
(Figure 20).
Figure 20
Reason for Exceeding Statutory Timetable for 
SOC
6.90% 8.60%
29.30%
6.90%
□ Over complex proc for completing/serving soc
■  Non-compliance by one party
□  Non-compliance by both parties
□  Complex evidence & points of law in soc
■ Other
Respondents were also asked their opinion o f the operation o f  the statement o f case. 
It can be seen from Figure 21 below that 63.8% o f respondents viewed such as being 
a mechanism that facilitates a fair resolution to a dispute as it prevents undue delays.
Figure 21
Opinion o f the Statem ent o f Case
□ Facilitates fair resolution as prevents delays 
■ Unrealistically short deadlines prevent proper preparation
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As to the effect o f active case management o f the judiciary upon the settlement o f 
disputes, 60.7% believed that such management resulted in the majority o f cases 
settling before Pre Trial Review (Figure 22).
Figure 22
Effect of Active Case Management by Judiciary
14.30%
□  Majority of cases settle before FTR a  Majority of cases settle at FTR
□  Majority of cases proceed to trial
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So as to obtain information as to the success with which the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998 have encouraged disputing parties to settle their case, respondents were asked to 
assess the impact o f the Civil Procedure Rules upon such. It can be seen from Figure 
23 below, that 46.6% o f respondents believed there to be an increased rate o f 
settlement under the 1998 Rules.
Figure 23
Settlement Rates of Cases Under CPR
More cases settle Equal nos of No experience to 
under CPR cases settle undercompare / Don't 
CPR know
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Information was also sought as to the penalties imposed by the judiciary for breaches 
o f the case management timetable. As demonstrated by Figure 24, 31% of 
respondents reported the use o f  an Unless Order and 25.9% reported the employment 
o f cost sanctions.
Figure 24
Penalties Imposed For Breach of Case Management Timetable
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Unless Striking Out Cost Restriction None 
Order of Part of Sanctions of Use of
Not
applicable
Claim / Evidence
Defence
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Given the need for expediency in any mechanism o f dispute resolution, respondents 
were asked to assess the effect o f the 1998 Rules upon the production o f evidence in 
court proceedings. It can be seen from Figure 25 below, that 44.8% o f respondents 
reported that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 had no effect upon the production o f 
evidence.
Figure 25
Production of Evidence Under CPR
15.50% 10.30%
□  Substantia lly lessened the production of evidence 
■  M arginally lessened the production o f evidence
□  Had no im pact upon the level o f evidence
□  No experience to com pare / Don't know
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Information was also sought on the pre-trial actions used by the Court in construction 
cases. 17.2% o f respondents reported that in their experience, the most commonly 
utilised pre-trial action was that o f summary judgem ent (Figure 26).
Figure 26
Pre-Trial Action Used by Court
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Stay of proc Summary Striking out Security for Other Don’t know
to arbitration judgement of SOC / costs 
part thereof
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As to the effectiveness o f a pre-trial action in reaching a settlement, it can be seen that 
the summary judgem ent was deemed to be the most effective, with the stay o f 
proceedings to arbitration being deemed to be the least effective at reaching a 
settlement (Figure 27).
Figure 27
Effectiveness of PTA in Reaching Settlement
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
■  Least effective 
□  Most effective
Stay of proc Judgement Summary Striking out Not 
to arbitration in default judgement of SOC / applicable /
part thereof Don’t know
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To further enlighten the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked 
to define the period o f time from the commencement o f litigation proceedings, until 
the consideration o f the award by the judiciary. As exemplified by Figure 28, 89.5% 
o f respondents stated that in their experience, it took 57+ days after commencement o f 
proceedings for the judiciary to be in the position to consider the award.
Figure 28
Time From  C om m encem ent o f P roceedings Until 
C onsideration  o f Award by Judiciary
b m b w p w B
1 5- 28  days 29 - 42 days 4 3 - 56 days 57+days
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When asked to speculate on the reasoning for such a timescale, 47.4% o f respondents 
suggested that the adducement o f complex evidence might provide the answer (Figure 
29).
Figure 29
Reason for Time Between Commencement of 
Proceedings and Consideration of Award
15.80% 12.30%
47.40%
□  Over-complex procedures a  Delay / Non-compliance by 1 party
□  Delay / Non-compliance by both parties □  Adducement of complex evidence 
■  Simple & effective procedures q F u II compliance by parties
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So as to place the above information in context, respondents were asked to quantify 
their opinion o f the time taken from the commencement o f proceedings until the 
consideration o f the award. As can be seen in Figure 30, 49.1% o f respondents stated 
that in their opinion such a timescale could be described as being “ lengthy”, with a 
further 49.1% describing it as being “moderate” .
Figure 30
Description of Time taken From Commencement of 
Proceedings to Consideration of Award
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Swift Lengthy
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When comparing the time taken from commencement of proceedings to the 
consideration of the award as described by the base employment group9 questionnaire 
respondents, an interesting result can be found. For it can be seen that whilst 67% of 
construction professionals viewed the period of time from commencement of 
proceedings to the consideration of the award as being “lengthy”, only 39% of 
lawyers reported such a view (Figure 31).
Figure 31
lawyer * time btwn commencement & consid of award is 
Crosstabulation
Count
time btwn commencement & consid 
of award is
Totalswift moderate lengthy
lawyer yes 1 21 14 36
no 7 14 21
Total 1 28 28 57
Indeed, as exemplified by the Mann-Whitney U Test contained in Figure 32, such a 
difference in perception can be seen to be relevant at the 5% level of probability. 
Thus, construction professionals are statistically more likely than lawyers, to consider 
the time between the commencement of proceedings until the consideration of the 
award, as being “lengthy”.
9 That is comparing the answers of lawyers against non-lawyers. Due to the many possible 
combinations of employment group comparisons, it would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the 
nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 32
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
time btwn yes 36 25.99 935.50
commencement & no 21 34.17 717.50
consid of award is Total 57
Test Statistics?
time btwn 
commencem 
ent & consid 
of award is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W  
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
269.500
935.500 
-2.055
.040
a. Grouping Variable: lawyer
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The Judicial Award
So as to continue the assessment o f procedural efficiency, respondents were asked to 
state the average time taken by the judiciary to reach a decision. It can be seen from 
Figure 33 that 47.4% o f respondents reported a timescale o f 57+ days as being 
required for the judiciary to reach a decision.
Figure 33
Average Time Taken By Judiciary to Reach a 
Decision
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Less than 15 15 -28  days 29 - 42 days 43 - 56 days
days
57+ days
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So as to place the timescale into context, respondents were asked to quantify their 
opinion o f the time taken by the judiciary to reach their decision. As demonstrated by 
Figure 34, 57.1% o f  respondents viewed such a timescale as “moderate” .
Figure 34
Description of Time Taken by Judiciary to Reach a 
Decision
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Swift Moderate Lengthy
9
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In addition to assessing the procedural efficiency o f court proceedings, it was also 
important to establish the grounds upon which judicial decisions were made. As 
elucidated by Figure 35, 96.6% o f respondents reported that judicial awards were 
made according to legal principles.
Figure 35
Grounds on Which Judicial Decisions Made
3.40%
96.60%
Respondents were also asked to quantify their opinion o f the validity o f the award. 
As demonstrated by Figure 36, 87.7% o f respondents viewed the judicial award as 
being “fair and ju s t” .
□  According to law
■  According to other 
considerations
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Figure 36
Opinion of Judicial Award
7o/o 3.50% 1.80%
87.70%
□  Fair and Just ■  Unfair and Unjust □  Biased □  Legally Unacceptable
Having provided information on the way in which the Award was reached and the 
resulting impression it thereby created, respondents were then asked to estimate the 
percentage o f judicial awards that result in appeal. 47.4% o f  respondents stated that 
fewer than 5% o f judicial awards result in appeal (Figure 37).
Figure 37
Percentage of Awards That Result in Appeal
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
44%-
Under 5% 6% - 10% 11% -15% 16% -20%
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When asked their opinion o f the rate o f appeal, it can be seen by Figure 38 that 85.7% 
o f respondents viewed such as being satisfactory'.
Figure 38 
Opinion of Rate of Appeal
14.30%
□  Satisfactory 
■  Unsatisfactory
85.70%
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So as to assess the importance placed upon issues o f  procedure and the resulting 
award by the various parties to litigation, respondents were asked to identify which 
they believed to be o f greatest importance to court proceedings: procedure; result; or 
procedure and result. It can be seen from Figure 39 that 87.7% o f respondents 
believed both issues o f procedure and the resulting award to be o f importance in court 
proceedings.
Figure 39
Greatest Importance to Court Proceedings:
8.80%3 50%
^ -------------l j ^
□  Procedure
a  Result
□  Procedure & Result
87.70%
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The Financial Implications of Litigation
So as to assess the financial impact o f litigation, respondents were asked to quantify 
the outlay involved in engaging proceedings. When questioned, 100% o f respondents 
viewed litigation as being “costly” .
To put the financial implications o f litigation into context, respondents were asked to 
compare the financial burden o f litigation as compared to arbitration. 50% o f 
respondents viewed litigation as being “just as expensive” as arbitration, with 29.3% 
reporting it as being “ less expensive” (Figure 40).
Figure 40
As Compared to Arbitration, Litigation is:
More Just as Less Don't know
expensive expensive expensive 
than as than
arbitration arbitraiton arbitration
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When comparing the financial implications of litigation and arbitration as described 
by the base employment group10 questionnaire respondents, an interesting result can 
be found. As can be seen by the crosstabulation contained in Figure 41, whilst 42% 
of lawyers viewed litigation as being “less expensive” than arbitration, only 9% of 
non-lawyers viewed litigation in such a light.
Figure 41
lawyer * as compared to arbitration, lit is Crosstabulation
Count
as compared to arbitration, lit is
Total
more
expensive
than
arbitration
just as 
expensive as 
arbitration
less
expensive
than
arbitration don't know
lawyer yes 3 17 15 1 36
no 8 12 2 22
Total 11 29 17 1 58
As demonstrated by the Mann-Whitney U Test in Figure 42, such a difference in 
opinion can be seen to be relevant at the 1% level of probability. Thus, lawyers are 
statistically more likely than non-lawyers, to view litigation as being “less expensive” 
than arbitration.
10 That is comparing the answers of lawyers against non-lawyers. Due to the many possible 
combinations of employment group comparisons, it would not be statistically viable to sub-divide the 
nature of respondents any further than this base level.
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Figure 42
Ranks
lawyer N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
as compared to yes 36 34.81 1253.00
arbitration, lit is no 22 20.82 458.00
Total 58
Test Statistics?
as compared 
to arbitration, 
lit is
Mann-Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W 
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
205.000
458.000 
-3.333
.001
g Grouping Variable: lawyer
Respondents were also asked to quantify the financial impact o f litigation as 
compared to adjudication. As exemplified by Figure 43, 91.4% o f respondents 
viewed litigation as being “more expensive” than adjudication.
Figure 43
As Compared to Adjudication, Litigation is:
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
More Just as Less Don’t know
expensive than expensive as expensive than 
adjudication adjudication adjudication
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The Conduct o f Litigation Players
Key to understanding procedural efficiency and fairness, are the actions and attitudes 
o f the various parties to court proceedings. To this end, respondents were asked to 
comment on the actions and attitudes o f the judiciary; representatives; and parties to 
the dispute.
It can be seen from Figure 44 that 81.8% o f respondents viewed the actions and 
conduct o f the judiciary as being “professional and effective” .
Figure 44
Actions o f Jud ic iary
5.50% 7 30%
5
□  Professional and Effective EQ Unprofessional and Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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60% o f respondents described the attitude o f the judiciary towards the dispute as
being “neutral” (Figure 45).
Figure 45
Attitude of Judiciary Towards Dispute
□  Litigious
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
90.9% o f respondents viewed the actions o f the legal / expert representatives as being 
“professional and effective” (Figure 46)
Figure 46
Actions o f Legal / Expert R ep resen ta tive s
3.60% 3.60% 1.80%
90.90%
□  Professional and Effective ■  Unprofessional and Ineffective
□  Too hands on □  Not hands on enough
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92.9% o f respondents viewed the attitude o f  the legal / expert representatives towards
the dispute as being “ litigious” (Figure 47).
Figure 47
Attitude of Representatives Towards Dispute
1 ,80°/cM 0%
□  Litigious 
■  Conciliatory
□  Neutral
92.90%
When asked to describe the actions o f the litigating parties, 66% o f respondents stated 
that they believed them to be “professional and effective” (Figure 48).
Figure 48
Actions o f Litigating Parties
13.20%
□  Professional and Effective
□  Too hands on
■  Unprofessional and Ineffective 
□  Not hands on enough
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Similar to the attitude attributed to the legal / expert representative, 87.3% o f
respondents described the attitude o f litigating parties towards the dispute as being
“ litigious” (Figure 49).
Figure 49
Attitude o f Parties Tow ards Dispute
12 70%
□  Litigious
□  Neutral
87.30%
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So as to place the actions and attitude o f the parties to litigation into context, 
respondents were asked to select one o f three commonly held views concerning the 
nature o f court proceedings. As can be seen from Figure 50 below, 87.9% of 
respondents believed litigation to be a mechanism that was based on defined and 
formal principles and procedures, with 12.1% o f respondents believing it to be a 
flexible mechanism that had regard to defined principles and procedures.
Figure 50 
R espondent O v e rv ie w  of Litigation
12 10%
8790%
□  Defined & formal principles & procedures 
■  Flexible but w ith regard to defined principles & procedures
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Discussion -  Does the Empirical Evidence Suggest that Litigation 
Complies With Woolfs Eight Criteria for Access to Justice?
From the good level of familiarity reported by questionnaire respondents on the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998,11 one might assume that litigation in the construction industry 
is operating within the criteria as established by Woolf for effective access to justice. 
Indeed, given that the majority of construction disputes proceeding to litigation are
1 9financial or contractual in nature, it is essential that litigation operates to facilitate 
such. In applying the research findings to each of W oolf s criteria, an indication as to 
the ability of litigation to facilitate access to justice shall be achieved.
The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
Litigation is often utilised by the top end of the contractual chain. The typical 
contractual position of litigating parties was reported to be that of the main contractor 
followed by the employer13 and the size of organisations using the process was 
reported to be large and subsequently medium organisations.14 When questioned as 
to the court experience of parties to proceedings,15 it was reported that in over 40% of 
cases, both parties to proceedings are repeat users of the mechanism. However, a 
significant number of proceedings were recounted in which both parties to the 
proceedings were infrequent users of the process and further, a frequent user litigating 
against an infrequent user. Given the possibility for an inequality in bargaining power
11 See Figures 2 - 4
12 See Figure 9
13 See Figure 10
14 See Figure 11
15 See Figures 12 -14
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and the ramifications that this may bring, it is essential that court action facilitates a 
fair procedure so as to achieve a just result.
As with both arbitration and adjudication, a concern with the court process is that it 
might be abused by a party to a dispute as a means of gaining tactical advantage. 
Evidence from the research would suggest, however, that this is not necessarily the 
case. Indeed, as elucidated by Figure 18, when questioned as to the time spent in 
preparation for proceedings, 70.70% of respondents stated that both parties spent 
“much time” 16 in preparation for proceedings. However, 29.30% of respondents 
stated that only the party commencing court action spends much time in preparation. 
Thus, in approximately a third of proceedings, court action may have been invoked as 
an ambush tactic designed to confer unilateral advantage. External safe-guard is 
afforded against an abuse of bargaining position, however, by the fact that both 
parties to court proceedings are usually legally represented,17. Further, as indicated 
by Figure 36, 87.70% of respondents viewed the Judicial Award as being “fair and 
just”. Thus, from empirical data, it would appear that under this head, litigation is 
compliant with W oolfs requirements for access to justice in the majority of cases.
16 Defined as being 2 weeks or more pre-commencement of proceedings.
17 See Figure 15
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The Third, Fourth and Eighth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed &
Effectiveness
If procedural fairness and a just result are to be obtained, then proceedings must be 
executed with reasonable speed and cost. They must also be “effective”, meaning 
adequately resourced and organised.
Turning to consider the financial implications of litigation, when questioned, 100% of 
respondents stated that litigation is “costly”. However, when asked to compare the 
cost of litigation as against that of arbitration,18 50% stated that it was “just as 
expensive” as arbitration, with 29.30% believing it to be “less expensive” than 
arbitration.19 Only 10% of respondents perceived litigation to be “more expensive” 
than arbitration. When compared to adjudication, however, 91.40% of respondents
90stated that litigation was the “more expensive” process. In short, whilst perceived to 
be expensive, in terms of cost litigation was viewed in a more positive light than 
arbitration, but less favourably than that of adjudication.
In so far as the time element of litigation is concerned, empirical data would seem to 
suggest that litigation is an efficient mechanism in certain spheres, giving to 
protracted proceedings in other areas. When questioned as to the frequency with 
which the Statutory Timetable for the Service of Statements of Case was exceeded, 
50% of respondents reported that it was “frequently” exceeded, with 29.3% of
18 See Figure 40
19 The base employment group of “lawyer” was largely responsible for such a view. See Figures 41 
and 42.
20 See Figure 43
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respondents reporting that it was “infrequently” exceeded.21 Thus, approximately half 
of all proceedings are delayed at the onset. In 44.8% of cases, however, such a delay 
was due to the complex nature of the evidence and points of law to be included in the
Statement of Case - only in 29.3% of cases was the delay attributed to non-
00compliance by one party. Indeed, the provision of a Statement of Case was deemed 
to be a positive requirement by the majority of respondents.23 63.8% of respondents 
reportedly viewed the Statement of Case as both preventing delays in proceedings at a 
later juncture, together with operating so as to facilitate the fair resolution of a 
dispute. Further, 60.7% of respondents believed that case management by the 
judiciary enabled the majority of cases to settle before the Pre-Trial Review.24 Only 
14.3% of respondents reported that despite case management, the majority of cases 
proceed to a full trial. In support of such, over 46% of respondents reported that more 
cases now settle under the CPR, with 37% reporting that the CPR has had little effect 
on settlement rates.25 Perhaps the widespread use of penalties for a breach of the Case 
Management Timetable,26 together with the use of Pre-Trial Action27 provides an 
explanation for such. In short, it would appear that as a result of effective case 
management by the judiciary, litigation proceedings are more expeditious than was 
previously the case.
It is interesting to note, however, that the CPR is perceived as having little effect upon 
the production of evidence. For as demonstrated by Figure 25, 44.8% of respondents 
reported that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 had no effect upon the production of
21 See Figure 19
22 See Figure 20
23 See Figure 21
24 See Figure 22
25 See Figure 23
26 See Figure 24
27 See Figures 26 and 27
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evidence, with 29.3% believing it to have had little effect. Thus, it is conceivable that 
litigation proceedings are still being weighted down by the production of unnecessary 
evidence. Further, when asked to define the period of time from the commencement 
of court proceedings until the consideration of the award by the judiciary, 89.50% of 
respondents stated that in their experience, it took 57+ days after commencement of
OHproceedings for the judiciary to be in the position to consider the award. However, 
adducement of complex evidence was seen to account for such a timescale in the
•  « OQ •majority of cases, which was deemed by nearly fifty per cent of respondents to be 
“lengthy”. Interestingly, although 47.4% of respondents reported the average time 
taken by the judiciary to reach a decision as being in excess of 57 days, 28.1% of 
respondents recorded a timescale of less than 29 days.31 57.10% of respondents 
described such timescales as being “moderate”, with 30.4% categorizing it as being 
“lengthy”.32
In short, the CPR 1998 have dramatically reduced the numbers of disputes proceeding 
to trial. For those cases that do proceed to trial, whilst the length of time from the 
commencement of proceedings until the point of consideration of the award may be 
seen to be protracted in the majority of cases, the actual time taken by the judiciary to 
reach their decision is not necessarily so. Thus, in terms of satisfying this head, 
empirical data would seem to suggest that litigation is successful in encouraging early 
settlement, but in terms of providing an efficient and cost effective mechanism of 
dispute resolution for those cases that remain in the system, it is not so effectual. It is 
doubtful therefore, whether litigation could be seen to be effective in either
28 See Figure 28
29 See Figure 29
30 See Figures 30 - 32
31 See Figure 33
32 See Figure 34.
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organisational or financial terms. As such, litigation fails to fulfill W oolfs 
requirements for access to justice under all three heads.
The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
If  litigation is to facilitate access to justice, then court procedure must be 
understandable to those parties engaging in such, and further it must be responsive to 
their needs.
As with arbitration and adjudication, a key requisite to the success of litigation under 
this head must be that it facilitates party autonomy with regard to the method by 
which their dispute is to be resolved. To this end, respondents were asked to identify 
the driving force behind matters of procedure where a case proceeds towards court. 
As illustrated in Figure 16, 44.8% of respondents reported that one construction party 
was the driving force behind matters of procedure, with 27.6% identifying the legal 
representatives. Whether such a fact is indicative of an abuse of party autonomy to 
determine matters of procedure, is an issue of construction. If party autonomy is to be 
defined as meaning that both litigating parties alone must determine matters of 
procedure, then litigation cannot be compliant with such. If, however, party 
autonomy is to be defined as either one or all parties to proceedings determining 
issues of procedure, with the assistance of their legal representatives where necessary, 
then litigation may be compliant. Given that the CPR fosters a spirit of co-operation 
between parties in the resolution of the dispute and given that it is the role of both the 
legal representatives and the judiciary to ensure that where proceedings are 
unilaterally driven an abuse of position does not result, it is suggested that this latter
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interpretation is perhaps the most appropriate. Thus, on interpretation of the empirical 
data, it may be seen that in nearly 45% of cases, litigating parties are enjoying 
autonomy over issues of procedure. However, the prominent role of the legal 
representatives in the determination of procedural issues in over a quarter of cases 
may pose a complicating factor in terms of the juridification debate and shall be 
considered later.
The description of court procedure as “legalistic and formalistic” also complicates 
matters in so far as the ability of litigation to meet the requirements for access to 
justice under this head is concerned.33 For if procedures are formalised and 
regimented, then by definition they cannot be responsive. Furthermore, whilst in 
possession of the ability to determine the dispute according to legal principle or other 
considerations, the judiciary are not taking advantage of such. For 96.6% of 
respondents stated that the judicial award was reached according to legal principle.34 
Thus, in terms of the ability of litigation to satisfy this head, judgement must be 
withheld until the continuing impact of juridification has been considered.
The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
As already exemplified,35 if a mechanism of dispute resolution is to satisfy the 
requirement for certainty, then it must be able to facilitate the final resolution of a 
dispute. Evidence of a binding resolution to a dispute can be found where the rate of 
settlement is high and where the level of appeal is minimal. It has already been 
demonstrated that litigation under the CPR 1998 facilitates settlement in many
33 See Figure 17.
34 See Figure 35.
35 See Chapter 2 at p.67 & p.99
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cases. Furthermore, in terms of appealing from an award of the court, it would 
appear from Figure 37 that litigation has satisfied this head. For when questioned, 
75.5% of respondents stated that under 10% of Awards result in appeal. When asked 
their opinion on such an appeal rate, 85.70% responded that it was “satisfactory” in 
their opinion. Thus, not only may litigation be seen to satisfy the need to provide a 
final and binding resolution to a dispute, but the rate of satisfaction amongst parties to 
court proceedings would seem to suggest that only the most deserving of cases are 
granted leave to appeal. As such, litigation may also be seen to satisfy the public 
justice aspect of certainty. Where needed, justice is done and is manifestly seen to be 
done.38
The Barrier to Access to Justice: Juridification
The historically protracted and costly nature of court action has been well documented 
through the ages, as has the fact that litigation became the almost exclusive province 
of those skilled in the law. However, it was the intention of the CPR 1998 to 
vanquish the over complexity of court proceedings, to create a more dynamic, 
versatile mechanism of dispute resolution. In essence, the 1998 Rules sought to rid 
the court process of juridification. However, despite such reforms vestiges of 
juridification remain still. For as already demonstrated, litigation is still perceived to 
be “legalistic and formalistic”. Analysis of the empirical data uncovers further 
evidence of juridifcation. Firstly, although the actions of the judiciary, legal 
representatives and parties to the dispute were considered to be “professional and
36 See Figures 22 and 23
37 See Figure 38.
38 As required by Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justice exp  McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
39 See Figure 17
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effective”,40 when questioned as to their attitude towards the dispute, the judiciary 
were described as being “neutral”,41 whereas the legal representatives and litigating 
parties were largely described as being “litigious”.42 The intention of the CPR 1998 
to create a spirit of co-operation would therefore seem to have had little effect to date 
upon the attitude of disputing parties.
However, unlike arbitration and adjudication, little evidence was found to support 
Tyler’s43 polarisation theory. When questioned as to the factor of greatest importance 
to court proceedings, 87.70% of respondents stated that both procedure and result 
were of significance.44 When analysed according to base employment group, no 
significant difference between the views of lawyers and non-lawyers was uncovered. 
What is significant, however, is the fact that when asked to describe litigation,45 
87.90% of respondents viewed it as being a defined and formal principle and 
procedure. Only 12% viewed it as being a flexible mechanism that has regard to 
defined principles and procedures, as desired by the CPR 1998.
Thus, upon evaluation of empirical data, strong indications of juridification emerge. 
Not only is the attitude towards the dispute of parties and their respondents indicative 
of a persisting litigious influence, but the perception of litigation as a mechanism of 
dispute resolution is clearly coloured by the memory of the pre-1998 court structure.
40 See Figures 44, 46 and 48
41 See Figure 45
42 See Figures 47 and 49.
43 See Chapter 2 at p.82
44 See Figure 39
45 See Figure 50
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FUTURE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
As we have discussed, the purpose of this empirical research was to ascertain the 
ability of arbitration and adjudication, as reformed by the respective 1996 legislation, 
to meet W oolfs requirements for access to justice. The inclusion of litigation in the 
research was to act as a “control” -  that is, a standard against which alternatives to 
court procedure may be judged. So as to test the ability of each mechanism to 
facilitate access to justice, we shall now consider the mechanisms in comparison, 
highlighting where necessary the need for reform.
The First Two Criteria: Procedural Fairness and a Just Result
The Typical Users of Arbitration, Adjudication and Litigation
In this work it has been demonstrated that arbitration was being utilised by the same 
category of “user” as those who proceed to litigation -  those located at the top end of 
the contractual chain. In both instances, the typical contractual position of users was 
reported to be that of the main contractor followed by the employer.1 Similarly, the
size of organisations using the process was reported to be medium and subsequently
large organisations in arbitration and vice versa in litigation. Conversely, 
adjudication is often utilised by the lower end of the contractual chain - the typical 
contractual position of adjudication users was reported to be that of the sub contractor
1 See Figure 15 Chapter 4 and Figure 10 Chapter 6
2 See Figure 16 Chapter 4 and Figure 11 Chapter 6
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followed by the main contractor3 and the size of organisations using the process was 
reported to be small and subsequently medium sized organisations.4 Mapping such 
findings onto both micro and macro economic data,5 it would therefore appear that the 
majority of the construction sector do not utilise arbitration and litigation as a method 
of dispute resolution. Given that sub-contractors and sub-sub contractors largely 
comprise the construction industry, the use of arbitration and litigation by the top end 
of the contractual chain would seem to preclude the majority. Rather, adjudication is 
the principal method by which the majority of construction parties seek to formally 
resolve their dispute. Regardless of the identity of parties to proceedings, however, 
procedural fairness and a just result are imperative if the integrity of dispute 
resolution proceedings is not to be called into question.
The Use and Outcomes of Proceedings
As demonstrated in Chapter 2,6 a concern with dispute resolution proceedings is 
whether they facilitate tactical advantage(s) that may be exploited by a party so as to 
confer a unilateral benefit. For example, concern was raised as to whether methods of 
dispute resolution may enable a party to commence proceedings in a way akin to an 
“ambush”, thereby prejudicing the other side by denying them an equal opportunity to 
prepare their case and to comprehensively answer the case of their opponent. In short, 
by denying a party an equal opportunity to prepare for proceedings, the coherence and
3 See Figures 1 5 - 1 7  Chapter 5
4 See Figure 18 Chapter 5. It should be noted that Lawyers were more likely to experience medium­
sized parties than other groups, with particular reference to construction professionals employed by a 
small firm (See Figures 19 -  22). Further, Adjudicators were more likely to experience small-sized 
organisations using the process than other groups, with particular reference to Lawyers (See Figures 23 
-2 6 ).
5 See Chapter 1 at pp. 8 -11
6 See Chapter 2 at p.93
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effectiveness of their submissions will be impaired thereby adversely affecting the 
outcome to the dispute. In such cases the decisions and awards passed by the judge / 
arbitrator / adjudicator may be described as dispensing “rough justice” as whilst the 
individual passing the decision or award believes it to be a fair and just result, the 
circumstances surrounding the action reflect a different perspective.
With regard to litigation, this work would suggest that this is not necessarily the case. 
Indeed, in nearly three quarters of court proceedings, both parties spent “much time” 
in preparation for proceedings. However, approximately one quarter of respondents 
stated that only the party commencing court action spends “much time” in 
preparation, posing the question as to whether such action may have been invoked as 
an ambush tactic designed to confer unilateral advantage. External safe-guard is 
afforded against an abuse of bargaining position, however, by the fact that both
o
parties to court proceedings are usually legally represented, . Further, 88% of 
respondents viewed the Judicial Award as being “fair and just”.9 Thus, from 
empirical data, it would appear that in the majority of litigation proceedings, the court 
process is compliant with W oolfs requirements for access to justice under this head.
Similarly, with regard to arbitration, evidence from the research would suggest that 
the process is not being abused so as to confer unilateral tactical advantage in the 
majority of cases. For example, the use of arbitration as a means of ambush was 
largely disproved by the finding that in over three quarters of proceedings, both 
parties spent similar periods of time in preparation for arbitration.10 However, as with
7 See Figure 18 Chapter 6
8 See Figure 15 Chapter 6
9 See Figure 36 Chapter 6
10 See Figure 28 Chapter 4
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litigation, in just under a quarter of proceedings, only the party commencing the 
action was reported to spend “much time” in preparation, indicating that an 
opportunity for exploitation may exist in a limited number of disputes. Further 
reflecting litigation practice, the fact that both parties to proceedings were usually 
legally represented11 may be seen to afford some external safe-guard against an abuse 
of bargaining position, a proposition which is supported by the finding that 90% of 
respondents viewed the arbitral award as being “fair and just”.12 Thus, from empirical 
data, it would appear that under this head, arbitration is compliant with W oolfs 
requirements for access to justice.
Conversely, with regard to adjudication, evidence was uncovered that may serve to 
suggest that the process is being abused as a means of gaining tactical advantage and 
further that the process has served “rough justice” in some instances. For example, 
when questioned as to the adjudication experience of parties to proceedings,13 it was 
reported that in the majority of cases, both parties to proceedings are infrequent users 
of the mechanism.14 However, a significant number of proceedings were recounted in 
which a frequent user was engaged in adjudication with an infrequent user.15 When 
coupled with the findings that in the majority of cases it was the commencing party 
that spent much time in preparation for adjudication16 and that in a significant number 
of disputes, a legally or expertly represented party was engaged in adjudication with a
11 See Figure 22 Chapter 4
12 See Figure 44 Chapter 4
13 See Figure 27 Chapter 5
14 Adjudicators were more likely to experience proceedings in which both parties to the dispute were 
infrequent users of the mechanism than other groups, with particular reference to Lawyers (See Figures 
30-33) .
15 Construction professionals employed by a small firm were less likely to experience such than other 
groups (See Figures 34 & 35).
16 See Figure 53 Chapter 5
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1 7self-representing party, one must question the potential for an inequality in 
bargaining power. It should be noted however, that the abuse of adjudication 
proceedings may be somewhat tempered by the finding that in the majority of 
proceedings both parties employed some form of representation, legal and expert. 
Thus one may presume that in such cases, external safeguard is afforded against both 
an abuse of bargaining position by a party to proceedings and against bias or
1 ftunfairness on the part of the adjudicator. Indeed, when questioned as to the 
perceived fairness or otherwise of the adjudication award, 83% of respondents viewed 
the majority of adjudication awards as being “fair and just”.19 Thus, from empirical 
data it would appear that whilst there are causes for concern, in the majority of cases 
adjudication is compliant with W oolfs requirements for access to justice under this 
head.
In short, therefore, litigation, arbitration and adjudication can be seen to afford a fair 
procedure and a just result. In terms of user satisfaction with the mechanisms, 
arbitration conferred the highest rate of perceived fairness and justice, with 
adjudication commanding the lowest. However, it should be noted that arbitration 
and adjudication were intended to operate as an alternative to court procedure. 
Analysis of the empirical evidence above would suggest that the juridification
70debate has statistical significance. Indeed, as already demonstrated, in the majority 
of arbitration proceedings and in a significant majority of adjudication proceedings,
17 See Figure 36 Chapter 5. It should be noted that Adjudicators were more likely to encounter legally 
or expertly represented parties adjudicating against self-representing parties than other groups (See 
Figures 43 -  46).
18 See Figure 36 and Figures 37 -  42 Chapter 5.
19 See Figure 68 Chapter 5. It should be noted that Adjudicators were more likely to view the award as 
being “fair and just” than other groups (See Figure 69). Lawyers were more likely to view the award 
as being “legally unacceptable” than other groups (See Figure 70).
20 See Chapter 2 at p.81 & p. 105
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disputing parties are legally represented. Whilst such representation may be seen to 
ensure that an abuse of process does not go unchecked, regard must be had to the 
effect of such representation upon the character of proceedings. That is, does the 
presence of a legal representative colour arbitration and adjudication so as to create a 
litigious process? We shall now consider this further.
The Third, Fourth and Eighth Criteria: Reasonable Cost and Speed 
& Effectiveness
01It was stated in Chapter 2 that if procedural fairness and a just result are to be 
obtained, then proceedings must be executed with reasonable speed and cost. They 
must also be “effective”, meaning adequately resourced and organised.
Financial Implications of Dispute Resolution
In terms of their financial burden, both litigation and arbitration were seen to be 
“costly” mechanisms of dispute resolution.22 It was perhaps a surprising finding, 
however, that out of the two methodologies, arbitration was perceived to be just as 
expensive as and even more expensive to pursue than litigation. Conversely, 
adjudication was largely perceived to be an “inexpensive” method of dispute 
resolution24 and was almost universally perceived to be less expensive than arbitration
21 See Chapter 2 at p.54
22 See Chapters 4 and 6
23 See Figure 52 Chapter 4 and Figure 40 Chapter 6
24 See Figure 83 Chapter 5
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9^and litigation. Thus, the ability of arbitration and to a lesser extent litigation, to 
provide a cost effective mechanism of dispute resolution must be called into question.
The reasoning for the perception of arbitration as being “just as expensive” or “more 
expensive” than litigation was considered in Chapter 4.26 It will be remembered that 
due to such an opinion largely being attributed to the base employment group of
9 7lawyer, the reasons proffered for such were: a prejudice against non-judicial 
methods of dispute resolution; due to the fact that legal representation in arbitral 
proceedings excessively escalates the cost associated with the procedure; or due to the 
fact that legal representation was only sought in instances where the financial 
implications of the dispute were severe. Given that construction professionals 
employed by a small enterprise were statistically more likely to view arbitration as 
being “less expensive” than litigation,28 the latter two reasons seemed persuasive.
However, it has already been demonstrated that litigating parties habitually employ 
legal representatives. Thus, the heightened cost of arbitration cannot be attributed to 
legal representation alone. Furthermore, the perception of adjudication as being a cost 
effective mechanism would discount any theory based upon prejudice attributable to 
legal representatives against non-judicial methods of dispute resolution. What does 
distinguish arbitration, however, is that unlike adjudication, arbitration is not bound to 
resolve a dispute within four weeks. Thus, whereas particularly complex and 
financially valuable proceedings may be dissuaded from adopting adjudication, this is 
not the case with arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, unlike litigation, arbitral parties
25 See Figure 57 Chapter 4, Figures 84 and 85 Chapter 5 and Figure 43 Chapter 6
26 See Chapter 4 p. 182
27 Lawyers were statistically more likely to view arbitration as being “more expensive than litigation” 
than other groups. See Figures 53 and 54 Chapter 4.
28 See Figure 55 and 56.
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must bare the cost of the arbitrator, his expenses and venue hire, together with the 
usual costs associated with pursuing legal action. In short, it is perhaps a myriad of 
factors that operate to preclude arbitration from meeting W oolfs objectives at the 
outset. Such a proposition brings us full-circle to the state funding debate as
90considered in Chapter 2.
Temporal Implications of Dispute Resolution
With regard to litigation, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the CPR 1998 have 
dramatically reduced the numbers of disputes proceeding to trial by providing 
avenues that afford and encourage early settlement. For example, the requirement for 
full and frank disclosure as required by the Statement of Case was seen to be a 
method that afforded early resolution to a dispute. The reason for such is clear, as 
the provision of the facts and legal argument as asserted by the other side enables an 
objective evaluation of the merits of the case and serves to present a basis upon which 
a settlement may be reached. Judicial case management of the dispute was also seen 
to facilitate early settlement.31 Indeed, it is perceived by a significant number of 
respondents that more cases now settle under the CPR 1998 than was previously the 
case.32 For those cases that do proceed to full trial, however, the length of time from 
the commencement of proceedings until the point of consideration of the award may 
be seen to be protracted in the majority of cases, although the actual time taken by the 
judiciary to reach their decision is not necessarily so. Furthermore, the CPR 1998 
have been seen by 74% of respondents to have had little or no effect upon the
29 See Chapter 2 at p.73 & p. 104
30 See Figure 21 Chapter 6
31 See Figure 22 Chapter 6
32 See Figure 23 Chapter 6
33 See Figures 28, 29 and 33 Chapter 6
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production of evidence -  the evidence produced by litigating parties remains 
voluminous.34 Indeed, the litigation process up to and including the trial was 
perceived by the majority of respondents to be a “lengthy” process.35 Thus, empirical 
data would seem to suggest that litigation is successful in encouraging early 
settlement, but in terms of providing an efficient and cost effective mechanism of 
dispute resolution for those cases that remain in the system, it is not so effectual. It is 
doubtful therefore, whether litigation could be seen to be effective in either 
organisational or financial terms. As such, litigation must be seen to fail W oolfs 
requirements for access to justice on all three heads -  reasonable cost, reasonable 
speed and effectiveness.
Similarly, arbitration may be seen to be an efficient mechanism in certain spheres, 
giving to protracted proceedings in other areas. Whilst the appointment procedure of 
the arbitrator reportedly operates efficiently,36 the period of time from the 
commencement of arbitral proceedings until the consideration of the award was 
considered to be a “lengthy” process, albeit that the decision making process itself
0 7
was deemed to be temporally satisfactory. As will become clear, the time-scale 
associated with arbitration is more akin to litigation than to adjudication. Perhaps this 
is due to the nature of disputes that seek to utilise the mechanism in comparison to 
adjudication. Indeed, a reason given for the protracted arbitral procedure was the 
complex nature of the evidence produced.38 Nonetheless, in terms of satisfying this 
head, empirical data would seem to suggest that based upon user opinion of the 
process, arbitration is unsuccessful in providing an efficient mechanism that is
34 See Figure 25 Chapter 6
35 See Figures 30 -  32 and 34 Chapter 6
36 See Figure 29 Chapter 4
37 See Figures 34, 35 and 36, 39, 40 - 42 Chapter 4
38 See Figure 35 Chapter 4
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effective in organisational and financial terms. As such, arbitration fails to fulfill 
W oolfs requirements for access to justice under all three heads: cost; speed; and 
effectiveness.
Conversely, adjudication was seen to be more successful in creating an efficient 
mechanism of dispute resolution. As with arbitration, the appointment procedure was 
seen to be efficient and complied with the time-restraints as required by s i08(2) in the 
majority of cases.39 Contrary to arbitration, however, the majority of cases were 
concluded within the 28-day timescale, although there were a significant number of 
cases in which this time-scale was exceeded.40 Adducement of complex evidence 
accounted for the delays, whilst simple and effective procedures and full compliance
by the parties to the dispute were seen to account for the time-scale compliance.41
Also unlike arbitration and litigation, over half of all respondents to the adjudication 
questionnaire reportedly perceived the procedure to be “swift”.42 Interestingly, the 
construction professional employed by a small organisation was statistically more 
likely to view this timescale as being “moderate” or “lengthy” than other groups.43 In 
short, the perception of adjudication users as to the expediency of the mechanism, did 
not directly accord with that held by party representatives or adjudicators. Thus, in 
terms of satisfying this head, empirical data would seem to suggest that adjudication 
is successful in providing a cost effective mechanism of dispute resolution. With 
regard to the ability of the mechanism to resolve a dispute with reasonable speed, 
analysis indicates that whilst some disputes suffer from protracted proceedings, the
39 See Figures 54 and 57 Chapter 5. It should be noted that sl08(2) requires the appointment of an 
adjudicator and the referral of the dispute to him within 7 days of the issuing of notice of an intention 
to proceed to adjudication.
40 See Figures 58, 63 and 64 Chapter 5
41 See Figure 59 Chapter 5
42 See Figures 60 and 64 Chapter 5
43 See Figures 61 and 62 Chapter 5
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majority of adjudication proceedings are conducted expediently and largely to the 
satisfaction of those engaged in the process. As such, adjudication can be seen to 
effective, that is, adequately resourced and organised.
The Fifth and Sixth Criteria: Understandable and Responsive
It has already been seen in Chapter I 44 that if a method of dispute resolution is to 
facilitate access to justice, then its procedure must be understandable to those parties 
engaging in such, and further it must be responsive to their needs. Clearly, a key 
requisite to such is that the dispute resolution mechanism must facilitate party 
autonomy with regard to the method by which their dispute is to be resolved.
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, under the CPR 1998 litigating parties and their legal 
representatives play an active role in the determination of procedural issues where a 
case proceeds to trial.45 Thus, it would appear that litigation facilitates party 
autonomy in the resolution of a dispute. However, the description of court procedure 
as “legalistic and formalistic” complicates matters in so far as the ability of litigation 
to provide an effective and dynamic mechanism is concerned.46 For if procedures are 
formalised and regimented, then by definition they cannot be responsive. It is also 
questionable as to whether legalistic and formalistic procedures are easily 
understandable to the lay-client utilising the process. Furthermore, whilst in 
possession of the ability to determine the dispute according to legal principle or other 
considerations, the judiciary are not taking advantage of such, preferring to resolve a
44 See Chapter 2 at p.63 & p.98
45 See Figure 16 Chapter 6
46 See Figure 17 Chapter 6.
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dispute on the basis of legal principle alone.47 Thus, whether litigation can truly be 
described as being responsive when it is bound by the principle of case precedent is 
questionable. The ability of litigation to fulfil the criteria under this head must 
therefore be a matter of construction.
Similarly to litigation, arbitration and adjudication may be seen to fulfil the criteria for 
party autonomy, in that the majority of respondents reported that contractually 
provided principals determined arbitral and adjudication procedure.48 Thus, it is 
suggested that arbitral and adjudication parties are exercising their ability to choose 
the source of procedure for the resolution of their dispute and as such, the procedures 
selected by the parties must be deemed to be understandable and responsive to their 
perceived future need. However, evidence of juridification may serve to undermine 
the full benefit that may have been conferred by true independence from litigious 
proceedings. For the description of both arbitral and adjudication procedure as 
“adversarial” and “legalistic and formalistic” 49 serves to undermine any robust 
contention that arbitration and adjudication are understandable and responsive 
mechanisms. Whilst the commercial background of the majority of arbitrators and 
adjudicators50 may serve to temper the formulism with which proceedings are 
conducted, as with the judiciary, arbitrators and adjudicators are not taking advantage 
of their ability to determine the dispute according to legal principle or other 
considerations. Rather, disputes are being resolved according to legal principle.51
47 See Figure 35 Chapter 6.
48 See Figure 23 Chapter 4 and Figure 47 Chapter 5 respectively
49 See Figure 27 Chapter 4 and Figures 50 and 52 Chapter 5 respectively .
50 See Figures 30 -  32 Chapter 4 for arbitration. It is interesting to note that lawyers were statistically 
more likely to experience an arbitrator of a legal background than non-lawyers. See Figure 55 Chapter 
5 for adjudication. It is interesting to note that adjudicators were statistically more likely to describe 
adjudicators as being of a construction background than other groups. See Figure 56.
51 See Figure 43 Chapter 4 and Figures 65- 67 Chapter 5.
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Given the striking similarities between litigation, arbitration and adjudication under 
this head, it is doubtful whether arbitration and adjudication can be said to be free 
from litigious influence and thus they cannot be said to be truly responsive and 
understandable methodologies.
The Seventh Criteria: Certainty
c*y
As already exemplified, if a mechanism of dispute resolution is to satisfy the 
requirement for certainty, then it must be able to facilitate the final resolution of a 
dispute. Evidence of a binding resolution to a dispute can be found where the rate of 
settlement is high and where the level of appeal is minimal.
Litigation and arbitration can be seen to satisfy the criteria for certainty. It has 
already been demonstrated that litigation under the CPR 1998 facilitates settlement in 
many cases. Furthermore, the level of appeal is relatively low in that 76% of 
respondents reported that under 10% of Judicial Awards result in appeal.54 
Arbitration fared better, with 63% reporting that less than 5% of Arbitral Awards 
result in appeal.55 Satisfaction with the appeal rates was also high, with over 80% of 
litigation and adjudication respondents recording the rate of appeal as being 
“satisfactory”.56 Thus, not only may litigation and arbitration be seen to satisfy the 
need to provide a final and binding resolution to a dispute, but the rate of satisfaction 
amongst parties to court and arbitral proceedings would seem to suggest that only the
52 See Chapter 2 at p.67 & p.99
53 See Figures 22 and 23 Chapter 6
54 See Figure 37 Chapter 6
55 See Figure 45 Chapter 4
56 See Figure 38 Chapter 6 and Figure 46 Chapter 4. Interestingly, arbitrators are statistically more 
likely to be satisfied with the rate of appeal than other groups. See Figures 47 - 48.
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most deserving of cases are granted leave to appeal. As such, litigation and 
arbitration may also be seen to satisfy the public justice aspect of certainty. Where 
needed, justice is done and is manifestly seen to be done.57
The situation with regard to adjudication is a little more complex, however. Whilst 
over 74% of respondents stated that under 5% of adjudication Decisions are referred 
for a final resolution,58 when analysed in accordance with base employment group 
status, it was discovered that whilst adjudicators reported such a view, lawyers were 
statistically more likely to perceive the referral rate as being higher.59 In short, from 
analysing the responses by base employment group, it would appear that where a 
lawyer is engaged in the adjudication process, the referral of an adjudicators Decision 
is more likely and as such, adjudication is less likely to achieve a final resolution to 
the dispute.
Furthermore, when questioned as to the destination of a disputed decision, although 
the majority of respondents reported that an adjudicator’s decision was referred to 
Court, over one quarter of respondents reported that a dispute was referred to 
arbitration for a final resolution.60 As illustrated above, arbitral Awards may be 
appealed. Thus, the spectre of a single dispute being referred to three separate forums 
for resolution is a reality in some instances.61 Such a prospect must be tempered 
however, by the fact that satisfaction with the rate of appeal from a Decision was
57 As required by Lord Hewart in R v Sussex Justice ex p  McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at p.259
58 See Figure 71 Chapter 5
59 See Figures 72 and 73 Chapter 5.
60 See Figure 77 Chapter 5. It should be noted that adjudicators were more likely to report their 
decisions as being referred to Court than other groups. See Figures 78 and 79.
61 Such a phenomenon was illustrated as a concern in Chapter 2 at p. 100
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fk'yhigh. Whilst 20% of respondents returned a view that it was “unsatisfactory”, it can 
be seen from Figures 7563 and 7664 that the base employment group of lawyer was 
statistically more likely to return such a view than other groups. Thus, there would 
appear to be a divergence between the views of the users of the adjudication process 
and the opinions of their legal representatives. Notwithstanding such, from a broad 
perspective it can be seen that adjudication, as with litigation and arbitration, can be 
seen to satisfy the need to provide a final and binding resolution to a dispute in the 
majority of cases.
The Future of Dispute Resolution in the Construction Industry
From the analysis above, it is patently clear that litigation, arbitration nor adjudication 
can be seen to comply with each of W oolf s eight criteria for access to justice. Given 
W oolfs intention that each of the eight criteria must be fulfilled for access to justice 
to be facilitated, reform is needed if the construction industry is to be adequately 
served.
Litigation, Arbitration & Adjudication -  The Limitations in Focus
Turning to consider litigation, whilst it may prima facie satisfy the need for a fair 
procedure and just result and whilst it may facilitate certainty in the resolution of a 
dispute, litigation was only able to partially fulfil the criteria for an expedient 
resolution to the dispute by virtue of the fact that it facilitates settlement in the
62 See Figure 74 Chapter 5
63 At Chapter 5
64 Ibid
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majority of cases. Indeed, when examining the duration of a case that proceeds to full 
trial and the impact of such duration upon disputing parties, it is clear that litigation 
lacks expediency. When coupled with the financial impact of proceedings, litigation 
cannot be said to be effective in terms of organisation and resourcing. Whether 
litigation can be seen to be understandable and responsive is also a matter of 
construction in that whether “adversarial” and “legalistic and formalistic” methods of 
dispute resolution are comprehensible to the layperson is disputable.
With regard to arbitration, as with litigation the arbitral process was prima facie seen 
to facilitate a fair procedure and a just result, together with facilitating certainty in the 
resolution of a dispute. However, as with litigation, arbitration also failed to facilitate 
a cost effective and expedient mechanism of dispute resolution and cannot therefore 
be said to afford efficiency. Empirical evidence would seem to suggest that the 
reason for such protracted proceedings and hence escalating costs, is the complex 
nature of disputes that proceed to arbitration, together with the fact that arbitral parties 
must bare the full financial burden of proceedings. Furthermore, by definition, the 
permeation of juridification throughout the arbitral mechanism will necessarily impact 
upon the duration and cost of proceedings, serving to undermine the clarity and 
responsiveness of the procedure to those engaged in the process.
In relation to adjudication, the only criterion that the mechanism substantially failed 
to achieve was to provide an understandable and responsive procedure. This was 
largely due to the impact of juridification upon the process, which created a legalistic 
and formalistic procedure that was composed of litigious-minded parties and their 
representatives.
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Thus, it can be seen that although litigation, arbitration and adjudication are by 
definition different methods of dispute resolution, they each succumb to similar 
difficulties. Set out below are the writer’s thoughts on how such difficulties may be 
overcome.
Education, Training & Funding - Solutions to the Difficulties?
Since the conclusion of the primary empirical research detailed above, the writer has 
been fortunate enough to experience litigation, arbitration and adjudication from a 
“lawyers perspective”. Indeed, the writer has spent some eight months working in 
private legal practice, during which various observations about dispute resolution in 
the construction industry have been made.
Over Documentation & Juridification
As demonstrated by the empirical research, the CPR 1998 failed to adequately reduce 
the amount of documentation that is produced in litigation proceedings. However, 
personal experience has shown that this “over production” is not solely limited to 
litigation -  arbitration and adjudication also suffer from protracted proceedings 
caused by the over-production of “evidence”.
The reasoning behind the apparent need to produce and serve such documentation is 
twofold. Firstly, lawyers are predisposed to seeking “tactical advantage”. That is, 
there is a belief amongst certain sections of the legal community that to inundate the 
opposition with evidence, will serve to ensure that potentially damaging
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documentation is missed by the other side due to the sheer volume of papers through 
which they must read. Furthermore, there is the widespread belief that inundating the 
other side with evidence will take their “eye off the ball” and will adversely affect the 
coherency and competency of their legal argument. Secondly, there is also the belief 
that when a dispute first emerges, the relevancy of particular documentation cannot be 
known and thus so as to ensure that all relevant documents can later be replied upon, 
legal representatives will disclose the majority, if not all of the documentation to hand 
in the opening stages of court, arbitral or adjudication proceedings.
Clearly such conduct is against the spirit of the legislative reforms affecting litigation, 
arbitration and adjudication and serves only to lengthen proceedings and increase the 
cost to the parties. The solution to such a difficulty is clear -  as part of the 
Continuing Professional Development that solicitors are required to undertake, there 
should be a compulsory element focusing upon the production of evidence in 
proceedings. So as to ensure uniformity in approach, the Law Society should set a 
mandatory course content, which should include not only analytical skills in the 
identifying of relevant evidence to be disclosed, but should also focus upon the 
benefits of “considered disclosure”, namely a saving to the parties in terms of time 
and money. Emphasis should also be placed on the fact that by streamlining 
disclosure and thereby dispute resolution mechanisms as a whole, solicitors will not 
suffer from a reduced income stream as some may fear. Rather, those individuals that 
were previously dissuaded from seeking the services of a solicitor due to issues of 
cost, will be more open to employing legal services once comfort is provided as to the 
expediency of dispute resolution mechanisms. This freeing up of fee earners to 
pursue the disputes of new clients will heighten the firm’s opportunity to increase
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their annual turnover -  particularly when one has regard to the ability of the client to 
challenge their legal bill should they feel that an unjust amount of time and money has 
been expended on the resolution of their case.65
Furthermore, whilst CPD courses provided under the auspices of the Law Society 
presently include courses tailored to “alternative dispute resolution” and the 
requirements of the various “pre action protocols” it is submitted that greater 
emphasis should be placed upon the need to be “conciliatory” in all spheres of dispute 
resolution. Indeed, the evidence of juridification uncovered by the empirical research, 
together with observations made over the preceding eight months, has demonstrated 
that whilst willing to adopt arbitration and adjudication as an alternative to litigation 
and whilst willing to acknowledge the existence of the pre action protocols of 
litigation, many legal practitioners are unable to break free from their litigious and 
formulistic heritage. The writer has on numerous occasions heard experienced 
practitioners refer to arbitration and adjudication as “short form of litigation” and has 
further observed practitioners’ advise their clients that litigation needs to be 
approached as if one is a “tiger” seeking to find the loopholes in the pre action 
protocol requirements so as to seize tactical advantage in a show of strength. These 
adversarial attitudes have a propensity to spill over to the lay client who then becomes 
a diluted version of their adversarial legal adviser.
Such aggressive attitudes towards dispute resolution can only hinder the reaching of a 
settlement to a dispute and cannot be in the best interests of the client. Overcoming 
these entrenched attitudes towards dispute resolution will not, however, be an easy
65 See Law Society’s Guide to Professional Conduct Chapter 14
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task and may require strong arm tactics on the part of the Law Society to ensure that 
as a matter of professional conduct, pre action protocols and the rules governing ADR 
are followed to the letter both in terms of action and in terms of attitude. Perhaps a 
more successful long-term approach would be to ensure that all “student solicitors” on 
the Legal Practice Course understand the intricacies of the pre action protocols and 
appreciate the spirit of arbitration and adjudication. If the Law Society and law 
schools together place the need for a conciliatory approach to dispute resolution high 
on the agenda, then future generations of legal practitioners will positively influence 
the way in which disputes are managed and there will be a meaningful shift away 
from the juridification of disputes.
This process of de-juridification can be further enhanced by the development of an 
independent organisation that ranks legal practices, on a voluntary basis, according to 
performance in terms of fees, the time taken to resolve the dispute and the success 
rate. Both large and small legal firms alike could be awarded varying levels of 
accreditation which would inspire customer confidence, whilst simultaneously 
providing the law firm with an enhanced client base and marketing tool. Such a 
scheme would undoubtedly encourage legal practices to adopt a more client friendly 
approach and would focus the mind on dispute settlement, rather than dispute over­
management. It would further remove any preconception that a small firm provides 
an inadequate or inferior service and as such would level the playing field and 
increase competition between service providers, further driving down the cost of legal 
services. This advantage alone would encourage the uptake of such a scheme 
amongst smaller legal practices, which account for the majority of law firms in the 
UK.
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It would be wrong, however, to lay the blame for juridification and the over 
production of documentation solely at the feet of the legal adviser. As already 
indicated by Bingham,66 adjudicators are beginning to conduct proceedings as if they 
are taking place in a court of law. Domestic arbitration is also well known to be 
legalistic in approach and the judiciary in some instances are failing to utilise their 
powers to “scale down” the formality with which court proceedings are conducted. 
Indeed, the writer has observed on many occasions in open court, the failure of the 
judiciary to reprimand parties who produce voluminous evidence, the majority of 
which is never called. Thus, in addition to the re-education of solicitors, arbitrators, 
adjudicators and the judiciary must also turn their minds to the need for reform. The 
nominating bodies for arbitrators and adjudicators have recently placed education 
high on their agenda and time will tell if their over-haul of the training regime has 
impacted upon the legality, formality and litigiousness with which dispute resolution 
mechanisms are frequently conducted.
Funding of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms -  A Hurdle to be Overcome
A frequent complaint of those respondents to the empirical research was the cost 
incurred in pursuing arbitration, litigation and to a lesser extent, adjudication.
Significantly, financial implications go to the heart of access to justice as the 
distribution of legal resources can affect the outcomes of legal disputes, because the 
greater the legal resources available to a party, the more likely they will obtain an
66 See Chapter 2 at page 106
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award / decision in their favour.67 It is self-evident that the quality and quantity of 
legal and expert assistance can greatly impact upon the persuasiveness of a case. The 
greater the financial resources available, the more investigative work can be 
undertaken and greater specialisation of legal and expert talent can be purchased. 
Where resources are limited, a party may be forced into accepting an inadequate out- 
of-court settlement or succumb to a claim which is devoid of any valid legal defence. 
In this context, even the “prospect” of unequal resources may affect the resolution (or 
non-resolution) of a dispute before proceedings have been commenced. The reason 
for this is that where a party to a dispute is unable to afford legal assistance, they may 
choose not to pursue a valid matter or raise a valid defence to a claim.
AftWhilst state funding of the arbitral and adjudication processes has been dismissed, 
there are three potential alternatives which may alleviate the financial burden placed 
upon the parties, namely: legal expense insurance; an industry specific “dispute 
management” pool; and a capping system.
Turning to consider legal expense insurance, such insurance is often considered to be 
a tool by which access to justice is promoted, as insurance can equalise the resources 
between the disputing parties. Any tactical advantage that may be gained by one 
party wielding its financial might over a less wealthy competitor is thereby reduced, 
consequently putting all parties to a dispute on a “level playing field”.
67 See Wertheimer “The Equalisation of Legal Resources” (1988) 17 Philisophy and Public Affairs 4 
p.303
See Chapter 2 at pages 74 -75 and 104 -105
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There are two types of legal expense insurance that may be enjoyed by businesses in 
the UK: before the event insurance; and after the event insurance. Before the event 
insurance is as its name suggests purchased by a business before a dispute has arisen. 
Such insurance can be purchased direct from an insurer either as part of a specific 
legal expense insurance package, or as part of a more generalised insurance package 
for example “contents insurance”. Alternatively, before the event legal insurance can 
be purchased as part of a “legal scheme” operated by a firm of solicitors for example. 
In this scenario, in return for an annual fee the law firm typically offers the client a 
helpline facility which is underwritten by insurance should the client need to pursue 
arbitration, litigation or adjudication to resolve their dispute.
Whilst such schemes initially sound attractive, there are limitations to their
usefulness. The first limitation is the cost of the insurance premium. Economic
theory supports the proposition that those businesses seeking insurance are most often
those businesses that will need to take advantage of it. Furthermore, once in receipt
of insurance cover, businesses often adopt a more hostile manner to dispute resolution
than they otherwise would if funding the proceedings themselves. This dual process
of “adverse selection”69 and “moral hazard”70 means that insurance companies
recognise that the incentives of policyholders change once insurance is purchased,
71leading to an increase in insurance premiums. In short, due to cost, before the event 
legal expense insurance is often beyond the reach of the small enterprise -  and in
69 See Beynon, Davies and Moore “Intellectual Property and Legal Expense Insurance” (2003) IP 
Wales
70 See Lanjouw and Lemer “Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions” (2001) 44 Journal 
o f Law and Economics 573; Wachman “LEI Market Sees a New Dawn” (1996) 10 Lawyer 39
71 See Mayers and Smith “Contractual Provisions, Organisational Structure and Conflict Control in 
Insurance Markets” (1981) 54 The Journal o f Business 3 at p407
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terms of the construction industry in particular, is often beyond the reach of the 
majority of construction firms.
Even those firms that are fortunate enough to be able to afford the insurance premium 
have another hurdle to overcome before they can be assured that their legal expenses 
will be met -  the “reasonable chance of success” clause. The reasonable chance of 
success clause is a term of most legal expense insurance policies and it does serve a 
legitimate purpose in that it ensures that insurers do not have to meet the cost of 
pursuing frivolous or outlandish claims. However, as it is often the legal adviser to 
the insurance company that assesses the merits of a case, it is not unreasonable to 
suspect that insurers “find a way to evade their responsibilities”.72 Indeed, it is 
important to note that the reasonable chance of success clause does not only apply to 
when a claim is first made, but it applies to any time during dispute resolution 
proceedings. This means that having commenced litigation proceedings for example, 
should the insurer consider that the chances of success have reduced, then the party to 
the dispute can be left without insurance cover and will have to meet the cost of 
continuing the litigation themselves. Conversely, should the same party wish to settle 
the dispute outside of court, unless otherwise agreed by the insurer, the party may be 
left without compensation. However, perhaps the biggest challenge to specific before 
the event legal expense insurance is that it is presently an unproven product. As with 
all new products, a period of gestation will be needed before any measurable effect 
can be seen. As such, judgement must temporarily be reserved as to the benefit it may 
offer to construction professionals in the financing of their dispute management 
programmes.
72 See Seijeant “Intellectual Property Patinova ‘99” (1999) 28 Chartered Institute o f Patent Agents 
Journal Issue 11 p989
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The second type of insurance available to construction professionals is “after the 
event” insurance, which as its name suggests, is purchased once a dispute has already 
arisen. Whilst this type of insurance is also subject to the above influencing factors, it 
does have the advantage in that under s29 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, the 
insurance premiums incurred in after the event insurance policies can be recovered 
from the other side at court. Thus, the small sub contractor facing a dispute, who has 
a reasonable chance of succeeding in his case, may well be better served by seeking 
after the event insurance, as opposed to before the event cover.
Of course, adopting such a strategy is risky in that the business may well find that it is 
faced with a dispute that for whatever reason, is in the opinion of the insurance 
company condemned to failure. For example, despite the chances of a successful 
action, where the benefit to the insurance company in pursuing the case is limited, 
cover is unlikely to be provided. In such a scenario, whether or not the sub contractor 
could in fact successfully defend / pursue his case, he will be left without a policy that 
will meet his legal expenses and as such must fund the proceedings himself. It is not 
inconceivable that when faced with such, the party to the dispute may forgo a valid 
legal defence or a legitimate legal claim. Thus, whilst there is a place for legal 
expense insurance in the construction industry, it is by no means a panacea to the 
issue of funding.
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A potentially more successful solution to the funding problem is that of the “dispute 
management pool”. This is a scheme whereby a national organisation such as the 
Construction Industry Council, takes an annual fee from its members in return for 
“dispute resolution services”. In other words, all members of the scheme are bound to 
resolve their disputes by way of adjudication. In return for following the code of 
conduct of the scheme, the scheme would provide free venue hire and would provide 
the services of the scheme’s retained adjudicator without cost to the parties. This 
would greatly lessen the cost associated with pursuing adjudication and would 
increase access to justice for the majority, as opposed to a smaller proportion of the 
construction industry as is presently the case.
Where a dispute arises between a member and a non-member and where the member 
has a reasonable chance of success, then the Scheme would also fund the reasonable 
costs incurred in litigating the dispute. This would remove any incentive for 
companies to opt-out of the scheme and it would reduce the aggressiveness of those 
parties who believe that financial strength is a tactical advantage.
Of course, the success of such a scheme does depend upon the annual fee being set at 
such a rate that the small sub-contractor, who accounts for the majority of British 
construction firms, can afford. One possible solution would be to graduate the annual 
fee so that larger firms, who have a greater profit or some other such suitable criteria, 
pay slightly more than those firms who have a lower profit. This graduated fee 
structure is justifiable on the basis that due to an increased rate of business activity, 
one would expect larger firms to be more likely to incur disputes than those firms who
73 The CIC has a collective membership of 500,000 individuals and 25,000 firms of construction 
consultants
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are engaged in less business activity. This is particularly true of businesses that are 
engaged in numerous sub-contracts.
An alternative to either of the above notions would be to put a cap on legal resources 
expended in the resolution of a dispute. Under this proposal, where expenses are 
likely to exceed £10,000 for example, a capping system would take effect whereby 
each side’s expenses must remain within a fixed percentage of the other.
As is presently required by Law Society rules,74 at the outset of the proceedings and 
after a prima facie examination of the case, the legal adviser for each party would be 
required to provide a realistic estimate (time and materials) as to how much the legal 
costs are likely to be. The capping system comes into effect, in that where the 
expected costs exceed £10,000, provided both parties concur, then the higher estimate 
becomes the cap value which neither side may exceed beyond an acceptable 
tolerance, without express permission of the court. Where there is no agreement to 
accept the higher estimation as the cap value, then the lower of the estimations 
becomes the cap and again an acceptable tolerance is applied. The purpose of the 
tolerance is to provide law firms with an acceptable margin of error when providing 
an estimation of cost, as opposed to being carte blanche to exceed the agreed cap.
A variation of this would be to say that whilst the initial estimate is to be the “target” 
within which the costs should be confined, provided regular financial disclosure has 
been made between the parties and their final costs do not significantly diverge, then 
the exceeding of the cap is permissible without prior reference to the court.
74 See Law Society’s Guide to Professional Conduct Chapter 13
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One might imagine that under such a system, lawyers will artificially inflate their 
costs so as to increase revenue and provide a comfort margin. However, the laws of 
supply and demand will apply and when supplying an estimate for the purposes of the 
capping system, the risk of losing the potential client to an equally effective 
competitor will force the cost of the service to its true market value.
Whilst such a scheme would not prevent legal fees from escalating, it would prevent 
the situation whereby one party’s expenditure is significantly greater than the other. 
This would ensure that all parties to the dispute are able to purchase a similar quality 
of legal provision and given that the British construction industry predominantly 
consists of sub-contractors, such a level playing field is necessary if access to justice 
is to be facilitated. Such a scheme would also encourage legal service providers to 
ensure that they deliver what they are contractually obliged to -  an expedient and cost 
effective dispute resolution service. Indeed, the actual cost of dispute resolution 
would be reflective of the initial estimated cost and the client would have greater 
confidence in the economic value of the proceedings. Client confidence in the legal 
profession would be further enhanced if such a system were to be operated in 
conjunction with the ranking system described above -  those lawyers who deliver 
within their stated costs would be immediately recognisable.
The disadvantage to such a scheme is that larger construction firms usually have “in- 
house” legal services and thus the quantification of their legal expenditure in a dispute 
scenario would be more difficult to calculate due to “hidden costs”. Thus, if a 
capping system were to be employed, specific rules would have to be drafted with
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reference to how time and money is to be calculated where parties employ in-house 
legal resources, as opposed to purchasing external legal services.
Further Research
So it can be seen that whilst arbitration, adjudication and litigation presently suffer 
from issues of both juridification and cost, these difficulties are not insurmountable 
due to the raft of potential reforms open to the construction industry. Whether the 
above proposals for reform would provide the answer, is a question that can only be 
determined by specific and extensive legal and economic research.
Given the focus of this work on access to justice, a further question arising out of the 
empirical research is whether the cost expended on the resolution of a dispute does 
indeed equate to success. It is indisputable that the ability to fund a dispute impacts 
upon the ability of a party to either bring or defend proceedings. However, it is less 
certain as to whether employing expensive legal services affect the chances of 
succeeding in bringing or defending a claim. If there is a link between expenditure 
and success, then the idea of a capping system gains further credence in that one party 
to a dispute will be prevented from “buying victory.” If there is not such a link, then 
the issue becomes one of “enabling” parties to purchase expert representation, as 
opposed to ensuring that the representation purchased is of equal financial value.
In light of the Iraq war and the subsequent greater involvement of smaller British 
construction businesses in international redevelopment, a further issue for research is 
the comparison of domestic dispute resolution to international methodology. In
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particular, one might question whether those businesses engaged in international 
contracts have a predisposition towards a particular method of dispute resolution and 
whether their preference is affected by whether the dispute is an international or 
domestic dispute.
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this work to consider such points in detail, their 
examination is a necessary building block that will further facilitate the understanding 
of dispute resolution and its influencing factors in the United Kingdom.
Methodological Evaluation
The empirical research conducted by this work has focused upon primary quantitative 
analysis, with qualitative research methodology being employed at the design stage of 
the research and also following completion of the fmal research tranche so as to 
clarify with respondents any ambiguous or interesting points arising out of their 
replies to the questionnaires.
The reasoning behind such an approach is that whilst recognising the need for 
qualitative research to give direction and focus to the initial design of the 
questionnaires, in the final research tranche the writer was keen to obtain information 
that would facilitate a robust statistical analysis of dispute resolution in the 
construction industry. Hence qualitative data was of secondary importance to 
quantitative research findings.
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Although not initially intended, fortuitous circumstances have also enabled the writer 
to conduct covert-observation methodology. That is, since the conclusion of the 
empirical research, the writer has been in the position to observe the conduct of legal 
practitioners in the resolution of disputes without impacting upon their behaviour. 
These observations have been used to inform the various proposals put forward for 
reform.
Whilst such methodology is robust and has delivered the results sought, upon 
reflection there are two potential modifications to the methodology that could have 
been made: the use of semi-structured interviews; and the conducting of a longitudinal 
study.
It is accepted that in addition to quantitative research, semi-structured interviews may 
also have contributed to the fabric of the research. This is because semi-structured 
interviews can be used to elicit more detailed and occasionally more sensitive 
information than may otherwise be collated by way of electronic or postal 
questionnaire. There are however, limitations to semi-structured interviews, namely 
that of “interviewer bias”. This is where the interviewer inadvertently or deliberately 
influences the responses to the questions posed, either by tonal inflections in the way 
questions are phrased, or by body language. For this reason, semi-structured 
interviews were not incorporated into the research, although their potential 
contribution is recognised and accepted.
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Further, with time-permitting, the conducting of a longitudinal study would also have 
been of interest. As rather than supplying a snap shot of dispute resolution, one could 
have documented any temporal changes witnessed in the various methods of dispute 
resolution and sought to establish a link between such changes and external factors. 
To be of recognisable value, however, an interlude of approximately five years 
between each research tranche would have been necessary -  a practical impossibility 
to the work in hand. Further, one would have to implement safeguards to prevent the 
situation whereby respondents to the study are depleted over time, thereby affecting 
the validity of the findings.
Thus, whilst the research methodology employed may have been modified and 
enhanced in a number of ways, the methodology used was by no means “deficient” 
and therefore the results generated may be relied upon as being of genuine statistical 
significance.
Concluding Remarks
It is clear from the theoretical evaluation and empirical research into arbitration, 
adjudication and litigation that reform is needed if dispute resolution in the United 
Kingdom is to facilitate access to justice.
JC
In the inaugural Barlow Lyde & Gilbert Litigation Lecture, Lord Woolf warned that:
“slowly but surely, step by step, we are introducing the complexity that the 
civil procedure rules [were] meant to get rid o f ’
75 See “Woolf Get Tough Plea” (2006) Gazette p.6
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Lord Woolf went on to comment that although litigation is becoming the mechanism 
of last choice, the court system remains too expensive and the scale of litigation being 
conducted is now a process of injustice.
Such a high profile call for change may initiate a further round of reform, although as 
Lord Woolf himself acknowledged, it is the attitude of those engaged in dispute 
resolution proceedings that needs to change, as opposed to procedural reform being 
passed.
Should this call for difference mark an attitudinal change on the part of the judiciary, 
arbitral tribunals, adjudicators, legal practitioners and their lay clients, then the British 
construction industry will have witnessed the biggest reform yet. As to whether such 
an attitudinal change will be achieved -  only time will tell.
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ANNEXE 1: RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN BY 
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY COUNCIL
The Mechanics of Adjudication
As exemplified by Figure 1, the median level o f  fee being charged by adjudicators at 
the end o f 2001 was the category £81 to £100 an hour.
Levels of fees charged
Figure 1
Evidence as to the possible circumvention o f the spirit o f adjudication can be seen in 
Figure 2. For when questioned, adjudicators reported 66 occasions in which they 
encountered “oppressive terms” in the adjudication contract.1 Thus, 3% o f all 
adjudication decisions were made on the basis o f an oppressive agreement.
1 For example, the referring party pays both parties costs whatever the outcome.
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Oppressive Contract Terms Encountered
3%
□  Yes
□  No
97%
Figure 2
As exemplified in Figure 3, adjudicators reported seeking legal or technical advice or 
using a legal or technical assessor in 193 adjudication proceedings. Thus, 9% o f 
decisions were formulated on the basis o f third-party expert opinion.
Adjudications in Which Advice Sought
9%
□  Advice Sought 
■  Advice not Sought
91%
Figure 3
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Figure 4 provides evidence to suggest that the majority o f adjudications proceed on a 
document only basis. For only in 41% o f cases were meetings convened.
Meetings
□  W ith Meeting 
H W ithout Meeting
Figure 4
The Nature of Disputes
It can be seen from Figure 5 that in 78% o f adjudications, the amount in dispute was 
£200,000 or less.
Value of the Dispute
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358
As exemplified by Figure 6, disputes proceeding to adjudication are varied in their 
context. Aside from payment disputes, the matters most frequently in contention are 
variations; loss and expense; extension o f time; and points o f law.
However, it was reported by respondent adjudicators that 73% o f their workload 
involved allegations o f non-payment under Sections 109-113 o f the Act.
Nature of the Dispute
5% 3% 18%
22%
13% 11%
□  Non-payment of Final Account
■  Non-payment of Interim 
Account
□  Design
□  Extension of Time
■  Loss & Expense
□  Points of Law
■  Provision of Information
□  Variations
■  Workmanship
□  Other
Figure 6
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Figure 7 exemplifies that in 81% o f adjudications, the referring party was lower in the 
contractual chain than the party against whom the reference was made. Indeed, the 
largest number o f references has been made by the sub-contractor against the 
contractor, followed by the contractor against the employer.
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The Decision of the Adjudicator
Figure 8 provides information on the ways in which adjudication proceedings are 
brought to an end. It can be seen that whilst in the embryonic stages there was little 
difference between the numbers o f proceedings that concluded due to a decision2,
abandonment
emerged.
or non-adjudication , by the end o f 1999 a vast difference had
Indeed, by September 2001 79% o f adjudications proceeded to decision, with just 
over 11% o f proceedings being abandoned and little more than 9% resulting in non­
adjudication.
“ Decision means a decision written by the A djudicator
! Abandoned means abandoned or settled at a late stage before writing the decision 
4 Non-adjudication means abandoned or settled at an early stage before proceedings really com menced
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As exemplified by Figure 9, most adjudication proceedings are completed within the 
statutory 28-day timescale. For in 76% o f proceedings, the adjudicator completed his 
task in forty hours or less.
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Adjudicators were asked to recount the number o f  occasions in which their decision 
broadly favoured the referring party, the responding party, or both parties to the 
proceedings. As exemplified by Figure 10, there were 1470 instances^ in which 
decisions were granted in favour o f  the referring party. Only in 295 cases did the 
adjudicator reach a split decision.
Adjudicators Found in Favour of:
14%
□  Referring Party
D Responding Party
□  Split
Figure 10
As can be seen in Figure 11, in 73% o f proceedings the adjudicator provided the 
parties with the reasoning behind their decision.
3 68% o f decisions
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Reasons
□  W ith Reasons 
B  W ithout Reasons
Figure 11
Finality of the Adjudication Award
Upon the introduction o f the Construction Act, concern was expressed as to the 
finality o f adjudication proceedings. However, as illustrated by Figure 12, that 
concern has yet to come to fruition. For in only 18% o f nominations were 
jurisdictional challenges launched.
Percentage of Nominations in Which Jurisdictional 
Challenge Made
18%
82%
□  Challenge Made 
■  No Challenge Made
Figure 12
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Such a contention is further supported by Figure 13, which demonstrates that there 
was only 90 reported incidences o f complaint concerning the conduct o f the process 
or the decision made. Thus, only 4% o f decisions were considered by the parties to be 
objectionable.
Numbers of Complaints Made
4%
96%
□  Complaint Made 
■  No Complaint Made
Figure 13
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ANNEXE 2: RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH UNDERTAKEN BY 
CALEDONIAN UNIVERSITY
Feedback from the Adjudicator Nominating Bodies
As exemplified by Table 1, since the introduction of the Construction Act in 1998, the 
Association of Independent Construction Adjudicators (formerly the Academy of 
Construction Adjudicators) has been the most frequently utilised Adjudicator 
Nominating Body, with the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators following in second 
place.
Moreover, whilst the number of adjudicators registered with Adjudicator Nominating 
Bodies stabilised around mid-2000, the latter half of 2001 to early 2002 witnessed a 
slight increase of just below 3% in the number of registered adjudicators.
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Association o f 
Independent 
Construction 
Adjudicators*
200 219 202 209 182 182 194
Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators
105 105 120 130 147 147 147
Confederation o f
Construction
Specialists
25 30 25 30 30 32 25
Construction Industry 
Council
95 95
*m00 138 142 146 170
Institution o f Chemical 
Engineers
5 5 5 5 NR NR N R
Institution o f Civil 
Engineers
79 79 84 84 84 81 80
Royal Institute o f  
British Architects
59 61 75 73 71 69 70
Royal Institution o f  
Chartered Surveyors
72 72 72 94 104 112 107
3A ’.s Poly con AIMS 
Ltd
36 36 36 36 36 36 33
Institution o f 
Mechanical Engineers
8 8 8 2 2 2 NR
Chartered Institute of 
Building
10 20 46 49 46 46 53
Construction
Confederation
60 60 65 47 40 56 43
Scottish Building 8 8 11 11 11 11 12
Royal Incorporation o f  
Architects in Scotland
19 19 21 22 22 22 14
Royal Institution 
Chartered Surveyors in 
Scotland
0 26 27 30 35 35 47
Centre fo r Dispute 
Resolution
NR NR 40 40 48 48 48
Institution o f  
Electrical Engineers
NR NR 20 NR NR NR NR
Technology & 
Construction Solicitors 
Association
NR NR 60 114 117 117 128
Chartered Institute of 
Arbiters (Scotland)
N R NR 6 12 22 22 22
The Law Society o f  
Scotland
NR NR 6 6 5 6 10
Technology and 
Construction Bar 
Association
NR NR NR NR NR NR NR
Total 781 843 1012 1132 1144 1170 1203
Table 1 -  Number o f  Adjudicators
* Formerly the Academy o f construction Adjudicators
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Moreover, as can be seen by virtue o f Table 2, the primary discipline o f those 
adjudicators nominated since August 2000, is that o f Quantity Surveying. Indeed, 
since that date, the ranking o f the top five disciplines has remained unchanged in the 
nomination stakes.
Discipline No. as at Aug No. as at Feb No. as at Apr % as at May
Quantity Surveying 458 467 481 30.9
Lawyers 227 212 234 24.0
Civil Engineers 155 213 234 15.6
Architects 125 119 132 8.3
Cl OB/Builders 38 47 45 3.6
Project Engineers 19 1 1 0.7
Construction 13 9 6 2.7
Consultants
Structural 12 18 17 2.3
Engineers
Mechanical 11 7 13 2.8
Engineers
Specialist 9 0 0 0
Constructors 
Building Surveyors 9 10 19 2.3
Electrical Engineers 7 3 4 2.7
Chemical Engineers 6 1 1 0.1
Planners 3 4 4 0.8
Project Managers 3 2 4 1.4
Materials Testing / 3 3 3 0.7
Quality Inspectorss 
Contracts 2 0 23 0.6
Consultants
RTPI 2 1 1 0
Geo Technical 1 5 7 0.4
Engineers
Independent 0 1 1 0
Mediator_______________________________________________________________________________
Table 2 - Primary Discipline o f  Adjudicators (as staled by ANBs)
Trends in Adjudication
As exemplified by Table 3, the period 1998 to 2001 witnessed a dramatic increase in 
the number o f adjudications implemented by the construction industry. However, 
whilst there can be seen to be an initial explosion in the use o f adjudication, the 
number o f adjudications since mid-2001 can be seen to have stabilised.
YEAR 1-May 98-A p r  99 187 -
YEAR 2 -  May 99 -  Apr 00 1156 518%
YEAR 3 -  MayOO - Apr 01 1869 62%
YEAR 4 -  May01 -  Apr 02 1924 3%
Table 3 -  Adjudications by Consistently Reporting ANBs
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Geographical Distribution
It can be seen in Table 4 that the overwhelming majority o f adjudication proceedings 
are located in the South o f England. However, this is unsurprising given that 
demographically, the South o f England plays host to the bulk o f construction activity.
It is important to note that the Midlands region was included in the statistics as a late 
addition. The Adjudication Reporting Centre has stated that the Midlands figures 
have been mostly taken from what was previously categorised by the ANBs as North 
England. Thus, very little has been taken from South England figures.
It should also be noted that due to the inconsistent reporting o f some ANBs as 
compared to the consistent reporting o f  the Scottish ANBs, the results o f the study 
might be somewhat unbalanced and therefore not representative o f fact.
In support o f the statistics contained in Table 3, Table 4 can be seen to exemplify a 
significant decline in the use o f  adjudication nationally.
Area May 98- May 99- Mar 00 -  Sept 00 -  Mar 01 -
South England 54 58 53.6% 43% 51%
North England 33 28 23.1% 21% 11%
Midlands** 15% 10%
Wales 6 6 3.1% 1% 3%
Scotland 4 9 19.7% 18% 24%
Northern Ireland 0.5% 2% 1%
* Decimal places used to include figure from Northern Ireland
** Midlands added as category from September 2000
Table 4 -  Geographical Distribution o f  Adjudications
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M onitoring o f Adjudicators Performance
It can be seen in Table 5 that the total number o f complaints made against 
adjudicators in the period May 2001 to April 2002, was 40. When compared to the 
total number o f  adjudications undertaken in this period, this represents a 
dissatisfaction rate o f  2% - a rate consistent with the proceeding period.
O f the total number o f complaints made, however, only 15.6% were upheld. It is 
contended that given the small numbers involved, such a statistic appears worse than 
the reality.
Complaints Made 15 9 16 24
Complaints Upheld 2 1 4 3
Table 5 -  Number o f  Complaints Against Adjudicators
The Adjudication Reporting Centre also asked Adjudicator Nominating Bodies if 
there was any subject or trend that they had noticed in relation to the adjudication 
procedures which had not been addressed in the questionnaire. Their responses to 
Report Numbers 4 and 5 have been summarised below:
• It was noted that there was an increase in the number o f representatives being 
used in adjudication proceedings, for example solicitors and contract 
consultants.
• ICE reported examples o f ambushes in December 2001
• There has been an increase in the number o f challenges to the jurisdiction o f 
the adjudicator at the appointing stage
• More disputes seem to be settled prior to notice o f adjudication or appointment 
o f an adjudicator.
• Academy o f Construction Adjudicators reported that they had noted a 
tendency for main contractors to find ways o f circumventing adjudications
• The nature o f disputes being referred to adjudication are becoming more 
varied and in some instances, more complex
• Chartered Institute o f Building reported that jurisdiction and costs remain the 
usual bone o f  contention
• Parties often are not satisfied with the ‘cost’ side o f things. There have not 
been complaints o f adjudicators decisions, just comments concerning the fact 
o f  why costs are not provided for in the Act
3 6 9
F e e d b a c k  fro m  A d ju d ic a to r s
The Disputing Parties
As can be seen in Figure 6, main contractors and their domestic subcontractors are the 
main protagonists o f adjudication, followed by main contractors and their clients.
Interestingly, whilst disputes between main contractors and their domestic 
subcontractors can be seen to be reducing in frequency, disputes between all other 
important contracting pairs are increasing. Moreover, whilst the number o f disputes 
between main contractors and their domestic sub-contractors used to be more than 
twice the amount o f  disputes than that between the client and main contractor, this 
gap has now been significantly reduced.
Parties Engaged in Adjudications
□  To Feb 00
□  At O ct 01
Contractual Relationships
Figure 6 -  Parties Engaged in Adjudications
a>o>
ft!■*-»
C0)oi—03
CL
I u 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10
370
As exemplified in Figure 7, it is the domestic sub-contractor who can be seen to be 
the main referring party to adjudication. However, in line with Figure 6, the number 
o f disputes referred to adjudication by the domestic sub-contractor has significantly 
reduced. Conversely, disputes referred to adjudication by the main contractor can be 
seen to be on the increase, as is those referred by the client and sub sub-contractor.
Given that it was the intention o f Latham to redress the imbalance o f power suffered 
by domestic subcontractors, the declining referral rate o f the domestic subcontractor 
should give cause for concern.
Parties Initiating Adjudication Proceedings
o>
□ To Feb 00
□ At Oct 01
sub sub­
contractor
consultant nominated 
sub­
contractor
domestic
sub
contractor
clientmain
contractor
Party
Figure 7 -  Parties Initiating Adjudication Proceedings
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When is Adjudication Initiated?
It was the intention o f Latham that disputes be resolved as soon as they arise, so as to 
prevent festering problems from damaging the commercial relationship.
However, as can be seen in Figure 8, the intended initiation point for adjudication has 
not taken place. For only 33% o f adjudications are invoked during construction 
works, with 67% commencing after practical completion o f the project.
Timing of Adjudication Referrals
□  During Construction 
a  After Practical Completion
Figure 8 -  Timing o f Adjudication Referrals as at Report 4
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Were the Parties Represented?
As exemplified by Figure 9, it was the contention o f  adjudicators that 63% o f 
construction parties were represented at adjudication proceedings, with 37% being 
self-representing.
Representation of Parties
□  Represent themselves 
E3 Represented by others
Figure 9 -  Representation o f Parties as at Report 4
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Who are the Winners and Who are the Losers?
As exemplified by Figure 10, when asked for whom they found in their adjudications, 
the adjudicators indicated that in 69% o f cases they found for the claimant, in 22% for 
the respondent and in 9% o f cases their decision was split.
Successful Parites in Adjudication Decision - Report 5
9%
□  Claimant
m Respondent
□  Split decision
Figure 1 0 -  Successful Parties in Adjudication Decision
As can be seen in Figure 11, since the production o f the fourth report, the number of 
decisions found in favour o f the claimant have fallen, whilst there has been an 
increase in the success rate o f the respondent.
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Comparison of Successfu l Parties to Adjudication
Claimant Respondent Split Decision
Figure 1 1 -  Comparison o f  Successful Parties to Adjudication
However, it is important to note that not all the reported adjudications resulted in a 
win, lose or split decision. For Report 5 noted an adjudication settlement rate o f  21% 
with 7% o f cases being abandoned.
Subjects of the Disputes
It can be seen in Table 12 that the main subject o f  dispute has shifted from being that 
o f failure to comply with payment provisions, to the valuation o f variations. 
Conversely the valuation o f the final account has risen in significance to account for 
27% of disputes as opposed to the previous figure o f 17%. Indeed, it would appear 
that post-contract activity now accounts for more adjudication proceedings than 
events occurring during the life o f the project.
Failure to comply with Payment Provisions 26% 24%
Valuation o f Variations 23% 36%
Valuation o f Final Account 17% 27%
Extension o f Time & Loss and Expense Combined 10% 3%
Loss & Expense 10% 7%
Defective Work 4% 2%
Valuation o f Works 4% -
Determination 3% -
Withholding Monies 2% -
Non Payment o f Fees 1% -
Services & Values 1% -
Entitlement to Interest - 1%
L & A Damages - 1%
Table 12 -  Main Subjects o f  Disputes Between Parties
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Lack of Compliance with the 1996 Act
During the study by the Adjudication Reporting Centre, adjudicators were asked 
whether the adjudications that they had dealt with had shown areas where the 
provisions o f the 1996 Act and the Scheme for Construction Contracts were not being 
fully implemented.
Their responses are contained in Table 13, which exemplifies that the adjudication 
provisions o f the Scheme are being relied upon largely by default. However, it is 
important to note that during the last year, the number o f adjudications conducted in 
accordance with complaint provisions has increased. As contended by the authors o f 
the Report, this is perhaps due to the numbers o f  standard form contracts now being 
utilised and coming into effect.
Com pliance with the Act (& Scheme) % in Rpt 4 % in Rpt 5
How many adjudication decisions have been made 43% 51%
using compliant contract Adjudication provisions? (ie 
not the Scheme)
How many adjudication decisions have been made by 57% 49%
defaulting to the procedures o f the Scheme for
Construction Contracts?__________________________________________________________________
Table 13 -  Common Instances o f  Non-Compliance with the 1996 Act & Scheme
Matters of Procedure
As can be seen in Table 14, adjudicators are persistently adopting a documents only 
procedure. O f interest, however, is the fact that in Report 5, 11% o f adjudication
procedures included a site visit -  a phenomenon not witnessed in earlier periods.
Could such a fact indicate an increasingly inquisitorial approach on behalf o f the 
adjudicator?
Adjudicator employed a documents only procedure 56% 52%
Adjudicator employed an interview procedure with only 3% 0.3%
one party present*
Adjudicator employed an interview procedure with both 35% 21%
parties present
Adjudicator carried out a fu ll hearings procedure 6% 6%
Adjudicator carried out a site visit - 11%
Adjudicator employed other type o f procedure - 1%
Table 14 -  Procedures Adopted by Adjudicators
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Compliance with the statutory timetable for adjudication proceedings is a fundamental 
aspect o f the Construction Act. In Report Number 4, the Adjudication Reporting 
Centre asked adjudicators to report their experiences o f compliance with the time 
limits.
Decisions given within 28 days 69%
14 day extension o f time applied for 27%
Extension o f time beyond 42 days applied for 4%
Table 15 -  Compliance with Time Limits
As exemplified by Table 15, 69% o f adjudications were completed within the 28-day 
timescale, with 27% requiring an extension o f 14 days. The success rate in applying 
for extensions o f  time in the case o f  a 14-day extension was 72% and in the case o f 
applications for extensions beyond 42 days, the success rate was 91%
As can be seen by Figure 16, however, October 2002 witnessed an increased length in 
adjudication proceedings. As submitted by the authors o f the Report, such a 
phenomenon may indicate a shift from relatively simple adjudications to those that are 
more demanding and require more time to complete.
60%
25 hours or 26 - 50 hours 51 - 75 hours 76 -100 hours 101 - 125 126- 150 151 -175 176-200
less hours hours hours hours
Figure 16- Hours Spent by Adjudicators on Each Adjudication
The numbers o f experts appointed by adjudicators taking part in the study are shown 
in Table 17. The most frequently utilised adviser was the lawyer.
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Solicitors 26 13
Quantity Surveyor 2 -
Programming & Technical 
Adviser
2 3
Delay Analyst 1 -
Building Surveyor - 2
Structural Engineer - 2
Architect - 1
Drilling Engineer - 1
Fire Protection Engineer - 1
M&E Engineer - 1
Table 17 -  Number o f  Expert Advisers Employed
Figure 18 shows some variation in the fees charged by adjudicators -  the most 
common grouping being £76 to £100 per hour followed by £101 to £125 per hour. It 
will be noted that the past year has witnessed an increase in adjudicator’s fees at the 
higher end o f the spectrum, correlated with a decrease in fees at the lower end o f the 
scale. As submitted by the authors o f the Report, perhaps the increasing number o f 
larger adjudications demand a higher skill level and hence an ability to command a 
higher price through proven experience.
□  April 2001
□ October 2002
£76 -£100 £151 -£175 £176 -£200 over £200
60%
Figure 18 -  Hourly Fees Charged by Adjudicators
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ANNEXE 3: EXAMPLE OF PILOT STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE -  
ADJUDICATION QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO CONSTRUCTION
PARTIES
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ADJUDICATION QUESTIONNAIRE (PARTIES)
ABOUT YOUR ORGANISATION 
0 1
Would you describe your organisation as being: 
Please answer parts L II  and III
I
□  Employer
□  Main Contractor
□  Sub Contractor
□  Other..................................................................
II
□  Large international organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Large domestic organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Medium international organisations 
(annual sales figures of approx. 201,000,000)
□  Medium domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of approx. 193,000,000)
□  Small international organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 53,000,000)
□  Small domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 49,000,000)
III
□  Located nationally
□  Located mainly in Southern England
□  Located mainly in Northern England
□  Located mainly in Wales
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Q2
In so far as the adjudication provisions of the Housing Grants 
Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 are concerned, are you:
□  Very familiar
□  Fairly familiar
□  Unfamiliar
YOUR ADJUDICA TION EXPERIENCE 
Q 1
Has your organisation ever been a party to adjudication proceedings:
□  Yes
□  No - proceed no further with this questionnaire 
Q 4
How often were you engaged in construction adjudications in the 
year 1999:
□  None
□  1 time
□  2 to 3 times 
n  4 to 6 times
□  7 to 9 times
□  10 + times
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Q5
Would you say that your participation rate for construction 
adjudication in the year 1999, was representative of the annual level 
of participation in construction adjudication for the period 1990 - 
1996 inclusive:
□  Yes, the participation rate for the year of 1999 was representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1990-1996
□  No, the participation rate for the year 1999 was not representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1990 - 1996 - it was higher
□  No, the participation rate for the year 1999 was not representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1990 - 1996 - it was lower
Q 6
Would you say that your participation rate for construction 
adjudication in the year 1999, was representative of the level of 
participation in construction adjudication for the years 1997 - 1998 
inclusive:
□  Yes, the participation rate for the year of 1999 was representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1997-1998
□  No, the participation rate for the year 1999 was not representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1997 - 1998- it was higher
□  No, the participation rate for the year 1999 was not representative of 
the participation rate for the period 1997 - 1998 - it was lower
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Q1
How would you describe your level of participation in construction 
adjudication proceedings for the year 1999:
□  Frequent
□  Fairly often
□  Infrequent
□  None
m
Would you describe your organisation as being:
□  A frequent user of adjudication
□  An infrequent user of adjudication
£22
How would you describe the majority of construction adjudication 
disputes in which your organisation has been involved:
□  Financial disputes
□  Defective works disputes
□  Contractual disputes
□  Other...................................................................................................
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ABOUT YOUR ADJUDICATION OPPONENT(S)
010 - Please answer either question 10a OR question 10b 
OlOa
If you have described your participation in adjudication as being 
infrequent from your experience would you describe your 
opponent(s) as being:
Please answer parts L IL III and IV
I
□  Employer
□  Main Contractor
□  Sub Contractor
11
□  Large international organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Large domestic organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Medium international organisations 
(annual sales figures of approx. 201,000,000)
□  Medium domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of approx. 193,000,000)
□  Small international organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 53,000,000)
□  Small domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 49,000,000)
III
□  Located nationally
□  Located mainly in Southern England
□  Located mainly in Northern England
□  Located mainly in Wales
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IV
From vour experience. would you suggest that your “opponent” was a:
□  Repeat user(s) of adjudication
□  Infrequent user(s) of adjudication
OlOb
If you have described your participation in adjudication as being 
fairly often or frequent from your experience would you describe 
your opponents as generally being:
Please answer parts LIL III and IV
I
You may select more than one of the following:
□  Employers
□  Main Contractors
□  Sub Contractors
II
You may select more than one of the following;
□  Large international organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Large domestic organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Medium international organisations 
(annual sales figures of approx. 201,000,000)
□  Medium domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of approx. 193,000,000)
□  Small international organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 53,000,000)
□  Small domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 49,000,000)
385
Ill
□  Located nationally
□  Located mainly in Southern England
□  Located mainly in Northern England
□  Located mainly in Wales
IV
From your experiences, would you suggest that your opponents are 
generally:
□  Repeat user(s) of adjudication
□  Infrequent user(s) of adjudication
m i
When engaged in adjudication, have:
YOU (you may tick more than one)
□  Been legally represented
□  Been represented by a commercial / industrial expert
□  Unrepresented / self-representing
YOUR OPPONENT (you may tick more than one)
□  Been legally represented
□  Been represented by a commercial / industrial expert
□  Unrepresented / self-representing
012
From your experience, how would you describe the attitude of the 
majority of your adjudication “opponents” towards the dispute in 
hand:
□  Litigious in approach
□  Conciliatory in approach
□  Neutral
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ABOUT THE AD JUDICATION PROCESS ITSELF
013
When engaged in adjudication, were the procedures followed:
□  Those provided by the construction contract itself
□  Those contained in a standard form contract
□  Those provided by The Scheme for Construction Contracts
□  Other......................................................................................................
014
In your opinion, who is generally the driving force behind matters of 
procedure:
□  Both parties
□  One party
□  Legal representatives
□  Expert representatives
□  Adjudicator
015
If your answer to Q14 was that on average, it tends to be only one 
party who is the driving force behind matters of procedure, are these 
parties generally:
Please answer parts L //»III and IV  
I
□  Employer(s)
□  Main Contractor(s)
□  Sub Contractors(s)
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II
□  Large international organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Large domestic organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Medium international organisations 
(annual sales figures of approx. 201,000,000)
□  Medium domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of approx. 193,000,000)
□  Small international organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 53,000,000)
□  Small domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 49,000,000)
HI
From vour experience, would you describe these parties as being:
□  Repeat-user(s) of adjudication
□  Infrequent user(s) of adjudication
IV
From vour experience, were these parties generally;
□  Legally represented
□  Represented by an expert
□  Self-representing
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0 1 6
Whether engaged in adjudication frequently, fairly often or 
infrequently, would you describe the adjudication procedure 
followed as:
□  Formalistic
□  Legalistic
□  Rigid
□  Adversarial (legal reps, presented facts and the law to the adjudicator)
□  Informal
□  Commercially orientated
□  Flexible
□  Inquisitive (adj’cator attempted to ascertain facts and law for himself)
□  Other......................................................................................................
017
With which of these commonly held statements do you most agree:
□  Adjudication is a means of settling disputes according to defined and 
formal principles and procedures
□  Adjudication is a means of settling disputes in a flexible manner
□  Adjudication is a means of settling disputes in a flexible fashion, but 
with regard to certain defined principles and procedures
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With which of these commonly held views do you most agree:
□  Adjudication is very similar to litigation, in that there are two “sides” 
who battle it out, each seeking to win
□  Adjudication is a process whereby each party has the opportunity to 
express their grievances and whoever has the more reasoned 
argument, shall be granted an adjudication award in their favour
□  Adjudication is a form of alternative dispute resolution and should be 
approached with a conciliatory attitude
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019 - Please answer either question 19a OR question 19b:
Q19a
If engaged infrequently in adjudication, how much time was spent 
pre-commencement of proceedings, in preparation for adjudication?
□  1 - 7 days
□  2 -3  weeks
□  1 month +
□  Other
Q19b
If engaged fairly often or frequently in adjudication, how much time 
in general is spent on the preparation of proceedings pre­
commencement of adjudication?
□  1 - 7 days
□  2 - 3 weeks
□  1 month +
□  Other
0  20
As regards the appointing of an adjudicator:
□  Was the identity of the adjudicator specified in the construction 
contract
□  Was an appointing body specified in the contract to select an 
adjudicator
□  Was the identity of an adjudicator agreed upon by the parties once a 
dispute had emerged
021
From your experience, are the majority of adjudicators of a:
□  Legal background
□  Construction background
□  Other......................................................................................................
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022
From your experience, how long is the average period of time from 
the giving of notice of intention to refer a dispute to adjudication, 
until the appointment of an adjudicator:
□  1 day
□  2 - 3 days
□  4 - 5 days
□  6-7 days
□  7 + days
023
From your experience, what is the average period of time from the 
appointment of an adjudicator, until the referral of the dispute to the 
adjudicator:
□  1 day
□  2 - 3 days
□  4 - 5 days
□  6 - 7 days
□  7+days
THE ADJUDICA TION A WARD
024
On average, how long is the period of time from the commencement 
of adjudication proceedings, to the consideration of the award by the 
adjudicator:
□  1 day
□  2 - 7 days
□  7-14 days
□  14-21 days
□  21-28 days
□  28+ days (please specify........................................................................)
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What would you anticipate as being the reason for such a timescale 
(you may select more than one of the following)
□  Over complex procedures
□  Delay or non-compliance by one party
□  Delay or non-compliance by both parties
□  The adducement of complex evidence
□  Other.....................................................................................................
□  Simple and effective procedures
□  Full compliance by the parties
□  The adducement of simple forms of evidence
□  Other.....................................................................................................
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If your answer to Q25 was “delay or non-compliance by one party”, 
would you describe these parties as being;
Please answer parts L IL III and IV
I
□  Employer(s)
□  Main Contractor(s)
□  Subcontractors)
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II
□  Large international organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Large domestic organisations
(annual sales figures in excess of 300,000,000)
□  Medium international organisations 
(annual sales figures of approx. 201,000,000)
□  Medium domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of approx. 193,000,000)
□  Small international organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 53,000,000)
□  Small domestic organisations
(annual sales figures of less than 49,000,000)
IS
From vour experience. would you su2sest that these parties are;
□  Repeat-user(s) of adjudication
□  Infrequent-user(s) of adjudication
IV
From vour experience. are these parties;
□  Legally represented
□  Represented by an expert
□  Self-representing
027
How would you describe this time taken from commencement of 
proceedings to the consideration of the award by the adjudicator:
□  Too lengthy
□  Fairly lengthy
□  Adequately swift
□  Very short
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What is the average time taken by adjudicators to reach a decision:
□  1 day
□  2 - 7 days
□  7 -14  days
□  14-21 days
□  21-28 days
□  28+ days (please specify........................................................................)
029
How would you describe the time taken by adjudicators to reach a 
decision:
□  Too lengthy
□  Fairly lengthy
□  Adequately swift
□  Very short
030 - Please answer either question 30a OR question 30b 
Q30a
Where engaged in adjudication infrequently, on what grounds was 
the adjudication award made:
□  According to law
□  According to other considerations
Q30b
Where engaged fairly often or frequently in adjudication, in general, 
on what grounds are adjudication awards made:
□  Mainly according to the law
□  Mainly according to other considerations
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If your answer to Q30 was “other considerations", what were these 
considerations:
032
What is your view of the grounds upon which adjudication decisions 
are being made:
□  Satisfactory
□  Fairly satisfactory
□  Unsatisfactory
Reason.........................................................................................................
033
In your opinion, was the adjudication award:
□  Fair
□  Just
□  Unfair
□  Biased (towards whom..........................................................................)
□  Unjust
□  Legally Unacceptable
□  Other.......................................................................................................
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034 - Please answer either question 34a OR question 34b
Q34a
If engaged infrequently in adjudication, was an appeal launched 
from the award?
□  Yes
□  No
034b
If engaged fairly often or frequently in adjudication, what was the 
approximate percentage of awards that resulted in appeal:
□  Less than 5%
□  Between 5% and 10%
□  Between 20% and 30%
□  Approximately 50%
□  Between 60% and 70%
□  Above 80%
035
From your experience, would you describe the incidence of appeals 
under the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 
as:
□  Too frequent
□  Fairly frequent
□  Infrequent
□  Non-existent
036
From your experience, to whom are appeals launched:
□  Appeals against an adjudicators decision are made to court
□  Appeals against an adjudicators decision are made to an arbitral 
tribunal
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What is your view of the incidence of appeals:
□  This is a satisfactory situation
□  This is an unsatisfactory situation
Reason..................................................................
038
As regards adjudicators themselves, would you describe their 
conduct and case management as:
□  Professional
□  Effective
□  Unprofessional
□  Ineffective
□  Too “hands-on”
□  Not “hands-on” enough
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As regards any legal / expert representatives employed during the 
adjudication proceedings:
Please answer parts I  and II
I
How would you describe the conduct of YOUR representatives 
You may select more than one of the following:
□  Professional
□  Effective
□  Unprofessional
□  Ineffective
□  Too “hands-on”
□  Not “hands-on” enough
□  Litigious in approach
□  Conciliatory in approach
□  Neutral in approach
II
How would you describe the conduct of vour “OPPONENTS’1 
representatives
You may select more than one of the following:
□  Professional
□  Effective
□  Unprofessional
□  Ineffective
□  Too “hands-on”
□  Not “hands-on” enough
□  Litigious in approach
□  Conciliatory in approach
□  Neutral in approach
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040
From your experience(s), how would you describe the overall 
financial demands placed upon adjudication parties by adjudication:
□  Costly
□  Inexpensive
041
From your experience, would you suggest that adjudication is:
Please answer parts I  and II
I
□  More expensive than litigation
□  Just as expensive as litigation
□  Less expensive than litigation
□  Have never been a party to litigation / have no knowledge of litigation 
expense
II
□  More expensive than arbitration
□  Just as expensive as arbitration
□  Less expensive than arbitration
□  Have never been a party to arbitration / have no knowledge of 
arbitration expense
399
042
Which commonly held statement most accords with your view of 
adjudication (you may select more than one):
□  Adjudication offers a valid alternative to litigation, which is expedient 
and inexpensive
□  Adjudication is little different from litigation in terms of cost and 
procedure
□  Adjudication is successful due to the fact that it is the parties 
themselves who determine matters of procedure, making it simple and 
easy to understand
□  Adjudication is in reality governed by legal representatives and / or 
the adjudicator, giving the process a formal character
□  Other......................................................................................................
043
From your experience, which of the below would you suggest is of 
greatest importance:
□  Procedure - the greatest concern is to ensure that the procedure is fair 
& equitable
□  Result - the greatest concern is to ensure that the result is fair & 
equitable
□  Procedure & Result - both the procedure & the result must be seen to 
be fair & equitable
□  Other.....................................................................................................
044
Did you experience a change in attitude towards adjudication post 
adjudication proceedings, as compared to your pre-commencement 
of proceedings stance:
□  Yes, I was more in favour of adjudication as a method of dispute 
resolution post award than pre-commencement of proceedings
□  Yes, I was less in favour of adjudication post-award than pre­
commencement of proceedings
□  No, my views on adjudication remained the same throughout the 
proceedings
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What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the present system 
of adjudication:
401
ANNEXE 4: RESULTS OF THE PILOT STUDY RESEARCH
The current study was conducted in order to test the validity of the experimenter- 
compiled questionnaire, as well as a preliminary investigation into the adjudication, 
arbitration and litigation processes.
Various methods of analysis were employed in an endeavour to observe relevant 
statistical associations, relationships and differences between groups and the answers 
provided in response to the experimenter-compiled questionnaire. Therefore, chi- 
square tests of associations, Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient and 
Independent Sample T-Tests were used.
It must be remembered, however, that the current investigation was a pilot study 
which targeted adjudication, arbitration and litigation questionnaires at a small, yet 
representative cross-section of the construction industry and those concerned with the 
dispute resolution process. Due to limited sample size, when analysis was calculated 
for association, relationship or difference, the majority of significant findings were 
unreliable. Therefore, the results section has been restricted to an exposition of those 
calculations where a pattern can be found.
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T h e  A r b itr a tio n  P ro c ess
Initially, Chi-square tests o f associations were calculated for potential associations 
between the questionnaire answers and the groups belonged to, be that arbitrators, 
lawyers or parties. Initial investigations found significant differences between certain 
variables. However, when one observed the expected count was less than 5, it became 
apparent that the calculations were insignificant. Nonetheless, when cross-tabulation 
tables were examined, certain potential associations between the group belonged to 
and the answers provided became evident.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations
Cross-tabulation calculations found a number o f  potential associations between the 
group belonged to and some questions posed in the experimenter-compiled 
questionnaire.
An interesting result was found between group and whether the arbitrator was the 
driving force behind arbitral procedure (see Table 1 below).
Table 1
group 41 arbitrator driving force behind procedure 
Crosstabulation
Count
arbitrator driving force 
behind procedure
Totalyes no
arbitrator 4 4
group lawyer 1 4 5
party 4 1 5
Total 9 5 14
For the category o f arbitrator it was found that this group in its totality responded 
positively towards this question, with the majority o f arbitral parties following suite. 
Lawyers on the other hand, tended towards a negative response.
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An interesting result was also found between group and whether arbitral proceedings 
consisted o f a legally represented party against an expertly represented party (see 
Table 2 below).
Table 2
group * legally rep arb party v expertly rep arb 
party Crosstabulation
Count
legally rep 
expertly rei
arb party v 
d arb party
Totalno
arbitrator 1 3 4
group lawyer 5 5
party 4 1 5
Total 5 9 14
Whilst lawyers in their entirety and the majority o f arbitrators responded negatively 
towards this question, it can be seen that the category o f party tended towards a 
positive response.
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.021 <0.05) between the group belonged to and whether the arbitration procedure 
was seen to be legalistic (see Table 3). In view o f the fact that the group contains 3 
categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 2 options, it is 
not possible explain where this significant relationship lies.
Table 3
Correlations
group
arbitration 
procedure 
is legalistic
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.607 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .021
N 14 14
arbitration procedure 
is legalistic
Pearson Correlation -.607 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 •
N 14 14
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 3 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 4 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and whether the arbitration 
procedure is seen to be legalistic. That is, arbitrators and lawyers in their totality 
answered the question in the negative. However, the response o f the category o f
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parties can be seen to be split, with the majority o f  respondents opting for a positive 
response to the question.
Table 4
group * arbitration procedure is legalistic 
Crosstabulation
Count
arbitration procedure is 
leaalistic
Totalyes no
arbitrator 4 4
group lawyer 5 5
party 3 2 5
Total 3 11 14
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.021 <0.05) between the group belonged to and whether the arbitration procedure 
was seen to be rigid (see Table 5). In view o f the fact that the group contains 3 
categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 2 options, it is 
not possible explain where this significant relationship lies.
Table 5
group
arbitration 
procedure 
is ricjid
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.607 *
Sig. (2-tailed) • .021
N 14 14
arbitration 
procedure is rigid
Pearson Correlation -.607 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .
N 14 14
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 5 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 6 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and whether the arbitration 
procedure was seen to be rigid. That is, arbitrators and lawyers in their totality 
answered the question in the negative. However, the response o f the category o f 
parties can be seen to be split, with the majority o f respondents opting for a positive 
response to the question.
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Table 6
group * arbitration procedure is rigid Crosstabulation
Count
arbitration p 
rio
rocedure is 
id
Totalyes no
arbitrator 4 4
group lawyer 5 5
party 3 2 5
Total 3 11 14
A significant correlation was found at the 1% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.008<0.01) between the group belonged to and the statements o f the respondents as 
regards the settlement o f disputes (see Table 7). In view o f  the fact that the group 
contains 3 categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 3 
options, it is not possible explain where this significant relationship lies.
Table 7
group
respondents 
statements re: 
settlement of 
disputes
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.676**
Sig. (2-tailed) • .008
respondents statements 
re: settlement of disputes
Pearson Correlation -.676** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 7 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 8 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and the statements o f the 
respondents as regards the settlement o f disputes. That is, the category o f arbitrators 
in their totality responded that arbitration is a means o f settling disputes in a flexible 
yet defined fashion. Conversely, the category o f parties tended towards the response 
that arbitration was a means o f  settling disputes according to defined and formal 
principles and procedures. Lawyers on the other hand, provided a range o f responses 
across the board.
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Table 8
group * respondents statements re: settlement of disputes 
Crosstabulation
Count
respondents statements re: 
settlement of disputes
Total
defined 
and formal flexible
flexible yet 
defined
arbitrator 4 4
group lawyer 2 2 1 5
party 4 1 5
Total 6 2 6 14
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.017<0.05) between the group belonged to and the percentage o f awards that result 
in appeal (see Table 9). In view o f the fact that the group contains 3 categories and 
the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 5 options, it is not possible 
explain where this significant relationship lies.
Table 9
group
percentage of 
awards that 
result in 
appeal
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.645 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .017
N 14 13
percentage of awards 
that result in appeal
Pearson Correlation -.645 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .
N 13 13
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 9 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 10 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and the percentage o f  awards 
that result in appeal. That is, whilst the category o f  parties in their entirety responded 
that the percentage o f awards that result in appeal was less than 5%, arbitrators and 
lawyers tended towards the response o f 6%-20%.
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Table 10
group * percentage of awards that result in 
appeal Crosstabulation
Count
percentage of awards 
that result in appeal
Totalless than 5 6 - 2 0
arbitrator 1 3 4
group lawyer 1 3 4
party 5 5
Total 7 6 13
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient -  Lawyers & Parties
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.031 <0.05) between the group belonged to and the opinion o f the arbitral decision 
reached (see Table 11). In view o f the fact that the group contains 2 categories and 
the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 5 options, it is not possible 
explain where this significant relationship lies.
Table 11
group
opinion of 
decisions 
reached - 
lawyers & 
parties
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.597 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .031 i
opinion of decisions 
reached - lawyers & parties
Pearson Correlation -.597 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .031 •
*• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 11 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 12 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and the opinion o f  the arbitral 
decision reached. That is, whilst the category o f parties tended towards the response 
that the arbitral decision reached was fair and just, the response o f the category 
lawyers was divided.
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Table 12
group2 * opinion of decisions reached - lawyers & parties 
Crosstabulation
Count
opinion of decisions reached - lawyers & 
parties
Totalfair & just
legally
unacceptable other
lawyer 1 1 1 3yr uufj/c
party 4 1 5
Total 5 2 1 8
Frequencies -  Lawyers & Parties
Where a response to a multiple-choice question is wholly singular in its return, it is 
not possible to calculate a cross-tabulation. For a cross-tabulation requires a 
minimum o f two values to be equated. Hence in such circumstances, the only 
possible means o f evaluation is that o f the frequency table.
As can be seen from Table 13 and Table 14 below, when questioned as to their views 
on the conduct o f the arbitrators, lawyers and parties in their totality (except for 1 
missing value) responded that in their experience, arbitrators were professional and 
effective.
Table 13
conduct of arbitrators - lawyers & parties
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
professional & effective 10 71.4 71.4 71.4
Valid not applicable 4 28.6 28.6 100.0
Total 14 100.0 100.0
Table 14
group2
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
lawyer 4 28.6 44.4 44.4
Valid party 5 35.7 55.6 100.0
Total 9 64.3 100.0
Missing System 5 35.7
Total 14 100.0
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Independent Sample T-Tests
Although t-tests were calculated between group belonged to and all the questions 
posed in the experimenter-compiled questionnaire, no significant differences were 
found. As explained above, the small sample size is the most likely explanation for 
the lack of significant difference found. However, it is anticipated that the full study 
will produce a larger sample size and therefore, significant difference will be found.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations Based Upon the Size of the Disputing Party
Cross-tabulations were calculated using the size of the disputing company as the 
controlling variable, although due to the low party response rate, no differences could 
be found. It is anticipated, however, that upon receipt of a larger response rate, cross­
tabulations will be successfully computed.
The Adjudication Process
Initially, Chi-square tests of associations were calculated for potential associations 
between the questionnaire answers and the groups belonged to, be that adjudicators, 
lawyers or parties. Initial investigations found significant differences between certain 
variables. However, when one observed the expected count was less than 5, it became 
apparent that the calculations were insignificant. Nonetheless, when cross-tabulation 
tables were examined, certain potential associations between the group belonged to 
and the answers provided became evident.
As discussed above, a small, yet representative sample size was employed in the 
preliminary investigation. However, of the 50 adjudication questionnaires piloted, 
only 12 participants responded. That is, 6 adjudicator respondents, 4 lawyer and 2 
party respondents. In view of the low party response rate, discussion has been 
restricted to adjudicators and lawyers alone. This was so as to ensure that analysis 
was representative and to minimise the skewed nature of the data.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations
Cross-tabulation calculations found a number of potential associations between the 
group belonged to and some questions posed in the experimenter-compiled 
questionnaire.
An interesting result was found between group and whether adjudication users were 
sub-contractors (see Table 1 below).
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Table 1
group * adjudication users are sub contractors 
Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication users are 
sub contractors
Totalyes no
adjudicator 6 6
group lawyer 2 2 4
party 2 2
Total 10 2 12
As can be seen, whilst adjudicators in their entirety answered the question positively, 
lawyers were equally split in their response.
Table 2 elucidates an interesting result between group and whether adjudication users 
were medium international organisations.
Table 2
group * adjudication users are medium 
international orgs Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication users are 
medium international 
orgs
Totalyes no
adjudicator 6 6
group lawyer 2 2 4
party 2 2
Total 2 10 12
It can be seen that whilst adjudicators in their totality answered the question in the 
negative, lawyers were equally split in their response.
Table 3 can be seen to provide information between group and whether the 
adjudication process was composed o f repeat adjudication users against infrequent 
adjudication users.
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Table 3
group * repeat users v infrequent users Crosstabulation
Count
repeat users v 
infreguent users
Totalyes no
adjudicator 6 6
group lawyer 3 1 4
party 1 u 1 2
Total 4 8 12
Whilst adjudicators in their entirety responded negatively towards this question, 
lawyers can be seen to tend towards answering the question in a positive fashion.
An interesting result was also found between group and whether both parties were 
legally represented in the adjudication process (see table 4 below).
Table 4
group * both adj parties legally represented 
Crosstabulation
Count
both adj parties legally 
represented
Total^es no
adjudicator 1 5 6
group lawyer 4 4
party 1 1 2
Total 6 6 12
For the category o f lawyer it was found that this group in its totality responded 
positively towards this question, however, adjudicators tended towards a negative 
response.
Table 5 below provides information as to group and whether provided the result is in 
their favour, adjudication parties are unconcerned with the justice o f  the procedure.
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Table 5
group * parties unconcerned with justice of procedure, only if 
result favourable Crosstabulation
Count
parties unconcerned with justice of 
procedure, only if result favourable
Totalyes no not applicable
adjudicator 3 3 6
group lawyer 3 3
party 2 2
Total 3 6 2 11
As can be seen, whilst adjudicators were equally split in their response to this 
question, the category o f  lawyers in their entirety answered the question in the 
negative.
An interesting result was also found between group and whether adjudication was 
considered to be an expedient and inexpensive alternative to litigation (see Table 6 
below)
Table 6
group * adjudication alternative to litigation, 
expedient & inexpensive Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication alternative 
to litigation, expedient & 
inexpensive
Totalyes no
adjudicator 6 6
group lawyer 3 3 i
party 1 1
Total 7 3 10
For the category o f adjudicator it was found that this group in its totality responded 
positively towards this question, however, lawyers in their totality provided a negative 
response.
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0 .014<0.05) between the group belonged to and time spent in preparation pre­
commencement o f proceedings (see Table 7). In view o f the fact that the group 
contains 3 categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 4 
options, it is not possible explain where this significant relationship lies.
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Table 7
group
time spent in 
prep 
pre-commen 
cement of 
proceedings
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.683 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .014
time spent in prep 
pre-commencement 
of proceedings
Pearson Correlation -.683 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 7 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 8 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and time spent in preparation 
for adjudication, pre-commencement o f proceedings. That is, adjudicators were more 
likely to believe that only the party commencing the action spends more time in 
preparation for proceedings. However, it was the over-riding belief o f  lawyers that 
both parties spend some time in preparation for proceedings.
Table 8
group * time spent in prep pre-commencement of proceedings Crosstabulation
Count
time spent in prep pre-commencement of proceedings
Total
both parties - 
not much time
both parties 
- some time
both parties 
- much time
only party 
commencing 
action spends 
much time
adjudicator 1 5 6
group lawyer 1 3 4
party 1 1 2
Total 1 4 2 5 12
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.017<0.05) between the group belonged to and whether the adjudicator was the 
driving force behind adjudication procedure (see Table 9). In view o f the fact that the 
group contains 3 categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 
2 options, it is not possible explain where this significant relationship lies.
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Table 9
group
adjudicator 
driving force 
behind 
procedure
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .671 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .017
adjudicator driving force 
behind procedure
Pearson Correlation .671 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 9 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 10 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and whether the adjudicator 
was the driving force behind adjudication procedure. That is, adjudicators were more 
likely to believe that they were the driving force behind adjudication procedure. 
However, it was the over-riding belief o f lawyers that it was they (the lawyers) who 
were the driving force behind adjudication procedure.
Table 10
group * adjudicator driving force behind procedure 
Crosstabulation
Count
adjudicator driving force 
behind procedure
Totalyes no
adjudicator 5 1 6
group lawyer 1 3 4
party 2 2
Total 6 6 12
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.037<0.05) between the group belonged to and whether the adjudication procedure 
was seen to be adversarial (see Table 11). In view o f the fact that the group contains 
3 categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 2 options, it is 
not possible explain where this significant relationship lie.
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Table 11
group
adjudication 
procedure is 
adversarial
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.605 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .037
adjudication procedure 
is adversarial
Pearson Correlation -.605 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 11 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 12 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and whether the adjudication 
procedure was seen to be adversarial. That is, adjudicators were more likely to 
believe that the adjudication procedure was not adversarial in nature. However, 
lawyers were equally split in their opinion as to the adversarial nature o f the 
adjudication procedure.
Table 12
group * adjudication procedure is adversarial 
Crosstabulation
Count
adjudication procedure 
is adversarial
Totalyes no
adjudicator 1 5 6
group lawyer 2 2 4
party 2 2
Total 5 7 12
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.044<0.05) between the group belonged to and whether provided the procedure was 
seen to be equitable and just, the disputing parties would accept the adjudication result 
even if it went against them (see Table 13). In view o f the fact that the group contains 
3 categories and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 2 options, it is 
not possible explain where this significant relationship lie.
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Table 13
group
parties accept 
adj decision 
provided its 
equitable & 
just
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .615*
Sig. (2-tailed) . .044
parties accept adj 
decision provided 
its equitable & just
Pearson Correlation .615* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .044 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 13 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 14 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and whether provided the 
procedure was seen to be equitable and just, disputing parties would accept the result 
even o f it went against them. That is, lawyers were more likely to believe that 
disputing parties would accept the result provided the procedure was seen to be 
equitable and just. However, adjudicators were equally split in their opinion as to 
whether disputing parties would accept the result, even were the procedure to be 
equitable and just.
Table 14
group * parties accept adj decision provided its equitable & just
Crosstabulation
Count
parties accept adj decision provided its 
equitable & just
Totalyes no not applicable
adjudicator 3 3 6
group lawyer 2 1 3
party 2 2
Total 5 4 2 11
A correlation was found at the 1% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.000<0.01) between the cost o f adjudication as compared to arbitration and the cost 
o f adjudication as compared to litigation (see Table 15). In view o f the fact that the 
questionnaire allowed for 4 options, it is not possible explain where this significant 
relationship lie.
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Table 15
compared to 
litigation, 
adjudication is
compared to 
arbitration, 
adjudication is
compared to litigation, 
adjudication is
Pearson Correlation 1.000 1.000**
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
compared to arbitration, 
adjudication is
Pearson Correlation 1.000** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 15 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 16 below 
highlights associations between the cost o f adjudication as compared to arbitration 
and the cost o f adjudication as compared to litigation respectively. It can be seen that 
in both instances, nine respondents described adjudication as being less expensive, 
with only one respondent contending that adjudication is just as expensive.
Table 16
compared to litigation, adjudication is * compared to arbitration, 
adjudication is Crosstabulation
Count
compared to arbitration, 
adjudication is
Total
just as 
expensive less expensive
compared to litigation, just as expensive 1 1
adjudication is less expensive 9 9
Total 1 9 10
A significant correlation was found at the 5% level o f probability for a two-tailed test 
(0.047<0.05) between the group belonged to and the respondents views o f 
adjudication (see Table 17). In view o f the fact that the group contains 3 categories 
and the answers provided in the questionnaire allowed for 3 options, it is not possible 
explain where this significant relationship lie.
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Table 17
group
respondents 
views of 
adjudication
group
Pearson Correlation 1.000 -.582 *
Sig. (2-tailed) . .047
respondents views 
of adjudication
Pearson Correlation -.582 * 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 •
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
In an endeavour to understand the correlation in Table 17 above, it is necessary to 
observe the answers provided in a cross-tabulation calculation. Table 18 below 
highlights associations between the group belonged to and the respondents views o f 
adjudication. That is, lawyers were more likely to view adjudication as being similar 
to litigation, in that there are two “sides” who battle it out, each seeking to win. 
However, adjudicators were more diverse in their view o f adjudication.
Table 18
group * respondents views of adjudication Crosstabulation
Count
respondents views of adjudication
Total
similar to 
litigation
equalopp & 
reasoned arg adr
adjudicator 2 3 1 6
group lawyer 4 4
party 2 2
Total 8 3 1 12
Independent Sample T-Tests
Although t-tests were calculated between group belonged to and all the questions 
posed in the experimenter-compiled questionnaire, no significant differences were 
found. As explained above, the small sample size is the most likely explanation for 
the lack o f significant difference found. However, it is anticipated that the full study 
will produce a larger sample size and therefore, significant difference will be found.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations Based Upon the Size of the Disputing Party
It was intended that cross-tabulations using the size o f the disputing company as the 
controlling variable, could be computed. Due to the low party response rate, this test 
was unable to be undertaken. It is anticipated, however, that a fuller response rate 
will be attained by the full study and upon receipt o f an increased number o f 
respondents, such cross-tabulations will be successfully computed.
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T h e  L it ig a t io n  P ro c ess
Initially, Chi-square tests o f associations were calculated for potential associations 
between the questionnaire answers and the groups belonged to, be that lawyers or 
parties. Initial investigations found significant differences between certain variables. 
However, when one observed the expected count was less than 5, it became apparent 
that the calculations were insignificant. Nonetheless, when cross-tabulation tables 
were examined, certain potential associations between the group belonged to and the 
answers provided became evident.
As discussed above, a small, yet representative sample size was employed in the 
preliminary investigation. However, o f  the 50 litigation questionnaires piloted, only 9 
participants responded. That is, 6 lawyer respondents, and 3 party respondents. Thus, 
by necessity discussion has been restricted to lawyers and parties alone.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations
Cross-tabulation calculations found a number o f  potential associations between the 
group belonged to and some questions posed in the experimenter-compiled 
questionnaire.
An interesting result was found between group and the subjects familiarity with the 
Civil Procedure Rules (see Table 1 below).
Table 1
party * Familiarity with Civil Procedure Rules 
Crosstabulation
Count
Familiarity with Civil 
Procedure Rules
Totalvery familiar fairly familiar
lawyer 5 1 6
Part} party 3 3
Total 8 1 9
It can be seen that the majority o f lawyers and parties in their entirety, deemed 
themselves to be very familiar with the Civil Procedure Rules.
Table 2 provides information as to the nature o f  disputes brought to litigation 
proceedings.
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Table 2
party * describe the majority of disputes Crosstabulation
Count
describe the majority of disputes
Totalfinancial contractual
all of the 
above
lawyer 4 1 1 6
party 3 3
Total 4 1 4 9
Interestingly, whilst the majority o f lawyers found litigious disputes to concern 
financial matters, litigation parties in their entirety did not view litigious disputes as 
being so neatly defined. Rather litigation proceedings were seen to encompass a 
variety o f subject matter.
Information as to the identity o f users o f the litigation process can be found in Table 
3.
Table 3
party * litigation user is employer Crosstabulation
Count
litigation user is 
employer
Totalyes no
lawyer 5 1 6
party 2 1 3
Total 7 2 9
It can be seen from Table 3 that the overwhelming majority o f  the category o f  lawyer 
and the category o f party viewed the users o f litigation as holding the contractual 
position o f “employer” .
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Further information as to the contractual position o f  litigation users can be found in 
Table 4 below.
Table 4
party * litigation user is main 
contractor Crosstabulation
Count
litigation 
user is 
main 
contractor
Totalyes
lawyer 6 6
party 3 3
Total 9 9
It can be seen that both the category o f lawyers and parties in their entirety viewed the 
users o f litigation as holding the contractual position o f main contractor.
Information as to the size o f litigating organisations can be found in Table 5 below.
Table 5
party * litigation user is large international org 
Crosstabulation
Count
litigation user is large 
international ora
Totalyes no
lawyer 4 2 6
party 3 3
Total 7 2 9
It can be seen that whilst the category o f party in their entirety viewed litigation users 
as being large international organisations, only two thirds o f the category lawyer held 
such a notion as to the identity o f litigating parties. Nevertheless, the net result o f 
such answers is that on balance, questionnaire respondents viewed users o f the 
litigation process as being large international organisations.
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Further information as to the size o f  litigation parties can be found in Table 6.
Table 6
party * litigation user is small domestic org 
Crosstabulation
Count
litigation user is small 
domestic org
Totalyes no
lawyer 5 1 6
v party 2 1 3
Total 7 2 9
It can be seen from Table 6 above that the majority o f  lawyers and parties viewed 
litigating parties as being small domestic organisations.
An interesting result was found between group and the experience o f litigation parties 
in court proceedings (see Table 7 below).
Table 7
party * both parties repeat users Crosstabulation
Count
both parties repeat 
users
Totalyes no
lawyer 4 2 6
party 1 2 3
Total 5 4 9
Whilst 2 out o f the 3 party respondents answered that they did not believe litigating 
parties to be repeat users o f the process, two thirds o f the category lawyer answered 
the question in the positive. The net effect o f such was that the majority o f 
respondents viewed the users o f litigation as being “repeat users” o f the process.
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Further information appertaining to the litigious experience o f litigation users can be 
seen in Table 8 below.
Table 8
party * frequent user v infrequent user Crosstabulation
Count
frequent user v 
infrequent user
Totalyes no
lawyer 2 4 6
' 7 party 2 1 3
Total 4 5 9
Whilst 2 out o f the 3 party respondents stated that they believed frequent users to be 
opposing infrequent users in court, three quarters o f the category lawyer disagreed 
with such a contention. The net result o f  which was that a marginal majority o f 
respondents did not view court proceedings as consisting o f a frequent user against an 
infrequent user.
An interesting result as to the locus o f litigating parties can be found in Table 9.
Table 9
party * litigation user located 
nationally Crosstabulation
Count
litigation
user
located
nationally
Totalyes
lawyer 6 6
party 3 3
Total 9 9
It can be seen that both the category o f lawyer and the category o f party in their 
entirety viewed litigating organisations as being located on a national basis.
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An interesting result was found between group and the time spent in preparation for 
litigation proceedings (see Table 10 below).
Table 10
party * time spent pre-commencement in preparation for lit 
Crosstabulation
Count
time spent pre-commencement In preparation for lit
Total1-7 days 15-21 days 22-28 days 1 month +
lawyer 1 1 4 6
P ° rty 1 2 3
Total 1 1 1 6 9
It can be seen that for both the category o f lawyer and the category o f party, the 
majority o f respondents answered that time spent in preparation for litigation 
proceedings exceeded one month.
Table 11 can be seen to provide information on the effect that active case 
management by the judiciary has upon the settlement rate o f disputes.
Table 11
party * active case management by judiciary has meant Crosstabulation
Count
active case manapement by judiciary has meant
Total
maj of cases 
settle out of ct 
before PTR
maj of cases 
settle at PTR
maj of cases 
proceed to trial other
lawyer 3 1 1 1 6
party 2 1 3
Total 5 2 1 1 9
It can be seen that whilst the category o f  lawyer were equally divided in their opinion 
as to the effect o f active case management by the judiciary, the net effect o f the 
responses to the questionnaire was that a significant proportion o f respondents viewed 
case management as leading to an out o f court settlement o f  the dispute before the Pre 
Trial Review.
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Table 12 provides information on the effectiveness o f out o f court settlements in 
settling the dispute in hand.
Table 12
party * effectiveness of out of ct settlements in settling dispute
Crosstabulation
Count
effectiveness of out of ct settlements in 
settling dispute
Totalvery successful
fairly
successful unsuccessful
lawyer 5 1 6
P3rt> party 2 1 3
Total 7 1 1 9
It can be seen from Table 12 that a significant majority o f respondents answered that 
out o f court settlements were “very successful” in terminating the dispute.
An interesting result was found between group and the view o f the respondent 
towards the litigation procedure itself.
Table 13
party * describe litigation procedure Crosstabulation
Count
describe litigation 
procedure
Totalformalistic adversarial
lawyer 6 6
party 3 3
Total 3 6 9
It can be seen from Table 13 that whilst the category lawyer in their entirety viewed 
the litigation procedure to be “adversarial”, the category o f party in their entirety 
viewed the procedure to be “formalistic” .
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Interesting information was found between group and the views held by questionnaire 
respondents o f judicial case management (see Table 14).
Table 14
party * experience of case management 
Crosstabulation
Count
experienc
manac
'e of case 
ement
Total
substantially 
reduces time 
and expense
had little effect 
upon time and 
expense
lawyer 3 3 6
party 3 3
Total 3 6 9
It can be seen that whilst the opinion o f the category lawyer was equally divided as to 
whether or not judicial case management substantially reduced the time and expense 
o f litigation proceedings, the category o f party in their entirety contended that case 
management had little effect upon such factors.
Table 15 can be seen to provide information appertaining to the penalties imposed for 
breach o f the case management timetable.
Table 15
party * penalty for breach of case management 
timetable- unless order Crosstabulation
Count
penalty for breach of 
case management 
timetable- unless order
Totalyes no
lawyer 3 3 6
party 3 3
Total 6 3 9
It can be seen that whilst only 50% o f the category o f lawyers stated the penalty 
imposed for a breach o f timetable to be an unless order, the category o f party in their 
entirety answered that this was indeed the case. The net result is therefore that two 
thirds o f respondents believed an unless order to be the penalty imposed for a breach 
o f the case management timetable.
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An interesting result was found between group and the period o f time from 
commencement o f litigation proceedings to the consideration o f the award by the 
judiciary (see Table 16).
Table 16
party * period of time from commencement to consideration 
of award Crosstabulation
Count
period of time from commencement to 
consideration of award
Total1-6 months 7-12 months 2 years+
lawyer 1 4 1 6
party 2 1 3
Total 1 6 2 9
It can be seen from Table 16 that two thirds o f the category o f lawyer and the majority 
o f the category o f party, stated the period o f  time from commencement to 
consideration as being 7 - 1 2  months.
Table 17 can also be seen to highlight an interesting result between group and the 
approximate percentage o f litigation awards that result in appeal.
Table 17
party * approximate percentage of awards that result in 
appeal Crosstabulation
Count
approximate percentage of awards 
that result in appeal
Totalless than 5 6 - 2 0 21 -50
lawyer 4 2 6
party 3 3
Total 3 4 2 9
It can be seen that whilst the category o f lawyer were diverse in their answer, stating 
that between 6-20 % and 21-50 % o f awards result in appeal, the category o f party in 
their entirety stated that less than 5% o f awards result in appeal.
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Table 18 can be seen to provide information as to the respondents views o f  judicial 
conduct.
Table 18
party * conduct of judiciary - 
professional & effective Crosstabulation
Count
conduct of 
judiciary - 
profession 
al & 
effective
Totalyes
lawyer 6 6
pony
party 3 3
Total 9 9
Interestingly, it can be seen that both the category o f iawyer and the category o f party 
in their entirety viewed the conduct o f the judiciary as being professional and 
effective.
An interesting result was found between group and the perceived cost o f litigation 
proceedings (see Table 19).
Table 19
party * cost of litigation Crosstabulation
Count
cost of 
litigation
Totalcostly
lawyer 6 6
party 3 3
Total 9 9
It can be seen that both the category o f lawyer and the category o f party in their 
entirety viewed the cost o f litigation proceedings as being “costly” .
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient
Correlation calculations were undertaken between the group belonged to and the 
questions posed in the experimenter-compiled questionnaire. However, whilst a 
number o f 2-tailed calculations prima facie appeared to be o f statistical significance, 
upon examination o f the Pearson Correlation test it became apparent that this was not 
the case. For none o f the calculations achieved the .6 significance level that is 
required if such a small sample size is to be deemed statistically significant.
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Independent Sample T-Tests
Although t-tests were calculated between group belonged to and all the questions 
posed in the experimenter-compiled questionnaire, no significant differences were 
found. As explained above, the small sample size is the most likely explanation for 
the lack of significant difference found. However, it is anticipated that the full study 
will produce a larger sample size and therefore, significant difference will be found.
Cross-Tabulation Calculations Based Upon the Size of the Disputing Party
It was intended that cross-tabulations using the size of the disputing company as the 
controlling variable, could be computed. Due to the low party response rate, this test 
was unable to be undertaken. It is anticipated, however, that a fuller response rate 
will be attained by the full study and upon receipt of an increased number of 
respondents, such cross-tabulations will be successfully computed.
Discussion
As will be recalled, the overriding objective of the research undertaken was to 
establish whether legislative reform had effected a meaningful increase in procedural 
expediency and efficiency. Moreover, it was also anticipated that any potential 
unilateral advantage enjoyed by a particular category of “user”, would also be 
uncovered. These objectives have been achieved.
Arbitration
As regards the process of arbitration, it can be seen prima facie that the ambition of 
the Arbitration Act 1996 and hence W oolfs definition of access to justice, has 
reached fruition.
That is, if one examines the contents of Table 1, it can be seen that despite the dissent 
of the category of lawyer, the categories of arbitrator and party both viewed the 
arbitrator as being the driving force behind procedure. When it is considered that in 
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 both the category of arbitrator and lawyer in their totality stated 
that the arbitral procedure was neither legalistic nor rigid in its approach, it is possible 
to assert that the Legislature’s ambition to increase the fluidity of arbitral procedure 
has been achieved. This in turn could be seen to have an effect on procedural 
expediency and efficiency. It should be noted, however, that the attitude of the 
arbitral parties towards the legalistic and rigid nature of arbitration was somewhat 
divided and thus caution must be exercised in the stating of such findings as statistical 
fact.
Furthermore, as elucidated by Tables 7 and 8, although arbitrators in their totality 
viewed arbitration as being a means of settling disputes in a flexible fashion with 
regard to certain defined principles and procedures, construction parties in their 
majority stated that arbitration is a means of settling disputes according to defined and 
formal principles and procedures. In contrast to the findings in Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
the responses of the category of lawyer were somewhat dispersed, ranging from 
defined and formal to flexible in approach. Thus, although prima facie the Arbitration
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Act 1996 can be seen to have achieved its ambition in permitting a more effective and 
flexible approach to dispute resolution, preliminary findings do not wholly support 
such a theory.
The Arbitration Act 1996, however, can prima facie be seen to have attained its 
ambition in limiting the number of appeals resulting from arbitral proceedings. For as 
elucidated by Table 9 and Table 10, the category of parties in their totality responded 
that less than 5% of awards result in appeal, with the majority of arbitrators and 
lawyers responding that between 6%-20% of awards result in appeal. In short, it may 
be contended that this finality of arbitral awards will have an impact upon the 
efficiency and expediency of arbitral procedure. For costly delays and increased 
procedural expense will be of limited incidence.
Some concern has been expressed, particularly amongst the academic sector, that in 
limiting the number of appeals launched, affronts to justice may go undetected. 
However, the results as detailed in Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14 would appear to allay 
such fears. For when questioned as to their opinion of the decisions reached, the 
majority of arbitral parties responded that they believed the award to be fair and just. 
The category of lawyer, however, was not so forthcoming in their response, providing 
a diverse range of answers to the question raised. Thus, caution must be exercised in 
the stating of such a finding as statistical fact.
However, Table 13 and Table 14 can be seen to provide further supporting evidence 
for such a theory. For when questioned as to their perception of the conduct of the 
arbitral tribunal, arbitral parties and lawyers (except for one missing value) in their 
totality responded that the arbitral tribunal was professional and effective in its 
approach.
A further concern expressed within academic circles was that of the juridification 
debate. Interestingly, as exemplified by Table 2, the category of party tended towards 
a response that in their experience of arbitral representation, one arbitral party would 
be legally represented, whilst the other party would be expertly represented. Thus, 
prima facie it would appear that there is little support for the juridification debate. 
However, it must be noted that the category of lawyers in their totality and the 
majority of arbitrators responded to this question in the negative. Thus, caution must 
be exercised in any assertion that there has not been a juridification of arbitral 
procedure.
Adjudication
It will be remembered that a small, yet representative sample size was employed in 
the preliminary investigation into adjudication. However, of the 50 adjudication 
questionnaires piloted, only 12 participants responded. That is, 6 adjudicator 
respondents, 4 lawyer and 2 party respondents. In view of the low party response 
rate, discussion has been restricted to adjudicators and lawyers alone. This was so as 
to ensure that analysis was representative and to minimise the skewed nature of the 
data.
431
As regards the process of adjudication itself, it may be asserted that prima facie, the 
adjudication provisions of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996 have failed to achieve their ambition.
For upon analysis of Table 3, it would appear that there is cause for concern as to the 
presence of unilateral advantage. That is, whilst the category of adjudicators in their 
totality declined the suggestion that it is usual for repeat users of adjudication to be 
engaged in proceedings against infrequent users, the majority of lawyers tended 
towards a positive response.
Moreover, as detailed in Table 7 and Table 8, the majority of adjudicators tended 
towards the opinion that it is only the party commencing adjudication who spends 
much time in preparation for proceedings. Thus, it would prima facie appear that the 
adjudication process is falling victim to those wishing to gain tactical advantage. 
However, it is important to note that such a view was not universally held. For the 
majority of those falling within the category of lawyer deemed it likely that both 
parties spend some time in preparation for adjudication, with one legal respondent 
advocating that both parties spend little or not much time in preparation.
In so far as the juridification debate is concerned, it can be seen from Table 9 and 
Table 10 that the majority of adjudicators consider themselves to be the driving force 
behind adjudication procedure, to the disagreement of the category of lawyers. Whilst 
it may be contended that this lack of consensus may be due to factors of personality 
and ego, it may also be taken to be an indication that the stranglehold of the legal 
profession is not such that it has taken a hold of the adjudication process in its 
entirety.
Moreover, as elucidated by Table 4, it was the experience of adjudicator respondents 
that it is uncommon for both adjudication parties to be legally represented at 
proceedings. However, as contended by the category of lawyers in their entirety, 
historically both disputing parties have been legally represented at adjudication.
When this is considered in line with the diversity of views as expressed by the legal 
profession in Tables 11 and 12, it becomes clear that the waters are somewhat 
muddied as to the juridification debate. For despite the contention of adjudicators that 
the adjudication procedure was not adversarial in nature, the legal profession can be 
seen to be in disagreement in that only half of those questioned denied the adversarial 
existence of adjudication.
Illustratively, when questioned as to their views of adjudication (see Tables 17 and 
18), the category of lawyers in their totality stated that the nature of adjudication was 
such that there were two “sides” that battled it out, each seeking to win. Even the 
category of adjudicators found support for such an approach, albeit in their minority.
Respite from such a theory can be found, however, in Table 5 and Tables 13 and 14. 
For both adjudicators and lawyers were divided in their opinion as to whether 
provided the procedure was seen to be equitable and just, disputing parties would 
accept a result even if it went against them. Moreover, lawyers in their totality and 
half the number of adjudicator respondents disagreed with the contention that parties
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were unconcerned with the justice of procedure, only keeping interest and seeking 
satisfaction in a favourable result. Thus, it cannot be asserted with any degree of 
accuracy that disputing parties themselves harbour beliefs that are incompatible with 
the spirit of alternative dispute resolution.
Some doubt may be cast, however, upon the success of the adjudication reforms in 
achieving an effective and efficient system of dispute resolution. For as exemplified 
in Table 6, whilst adjudicators in their entirety agreed that adjudication is a valid 
alternative to litigation, which is expedient and inexpensive, the category of lawyers 
in their totality disagreed with such a submission.
When considered in the light of Table 15 and Table 16, however, it becomes clear that 
the failing of adjudication may be in the realms of expediency rather than lessened 
expense. For when compared to both arbitration and litigation, respondents over­
whelmingly contended that adjudication was the less expensive.
Indeed, upon examination of Tables 15 and 16, it can be seen that respondents viewed 
the litigation and arbitration mechanisms as being identical in terms of cost. For a 
correlation was found at the 1% level of probability for a two-tailed test (O.OOOO.Ol) 
between the cost of adjudication as compared to arbitration and the cost of 
adjudication as compared to litigation. Such significant findings are a clear indication 
that the adjudication provisions of the Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration 
Act 1996 have achieved financial efficiency.
Given that the majority of users of the adjudication process hold the contractual 
position of sub-contractor (see Table 1) and that they may / may not hold the position 
of a medium international organization (see Table 2) such financial efficiency is vital. 
For due to the nature of the construction industry, a free flow of finance is vital for the 
survival and growth of business. Without such, the sea of financial constraint and 
eventual bankruptcy may drown the small contractor.
Thus, there would prima facie seem to be some hope of success for the adjudication 
process. However, due to the conflicting nature of the early indications, whether the 
procedure can be seen to attain W oolfs definition of access to justice remains to be 
established. It is contended that for such an in-depth analysis of its success or 
otherwise to be undertaken, further and more in-depth information is required.
Litigation
So as to afford an effective analysis of arbitration and adjudication, it is imperative 
that some form of “control” be established against which a standard may be 
formulated. Given that such procedures were intended to offer an alternative to court 
procedure, the nature of litigation must by necessity be that control.1
The pilot study has indicated a number of characteristics associated with the nature of 
disputes that result in litigation. It can be seen by virtue of Table 2 that whilst it was
1 However, due to the pilot nature of this study, such a comparison shall not be undertaken here. It 
shall be reserved for the final and more detailed empirical work.
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the view of the legal professionals that litigious disputes were financial in nature, 
construction parties believed the subject matter of disputes to be more varied.
A profile of litigating parties can also be seen. For as exemplified by Tables 3 and 4, 
litigation users are typically employers and main contractors and as demonstrated by 
Tables 5 and 6, organisations utilising the process are typically large international and 
small domestic organisations. Table 7 can be seen to suggest that litigating parties are 
repeat users of the process who are located nationally (Table 9).
Evidence as to the nature of litigation proceedings also emerged. As exemplified in 
Table 10, time spent in preparation for litigation was typically in excess of one month. 
However, due to the case management timetable, the majority of cases were believed 
to settle out of court before pre-trial review (Table 11) and such settlements were 
understood to be “very successful” in terminating the dispute (Table 12).
However, it is interesting to note that despite the settlement rate under the case 
management timetable, the majority of respondents stated that such a judicial tool had 
little effect upon the time and expense incurred by parties engaging in litigation 
(Table 14). Indeed, as exemplified by Table 16, the period of time from the 
commencement of proceedings to consideration of the award by the judiciary was 
stated as being between seven to twelve months. Furthermore, respondents described 
the proceedings as being “costly” (Table 19).
There are perhaps two reasons that may account for the lack of judicial impact upon 
the efficiency and expediency of proceedings. Firstly, if the nature of the dispute 
referred to litigation is particularly contentious or complex, the dispute will need to 
run its natural course, despite how protracted this may seem. For the artificial 
compression of such a dispute cannot lead to an equitable and just resolution.
Secondly, the penalty imposed for the breach of the case management timetable by 
the judiciary was stated to be that of the “unless order” (Table 15). Had cost 
sanctions been utilised or some other such sanction, then it is arguable that 
expediency would take on a renewed importance to the litigating parties. In either 
event, it would prima facie appear that the new Civil Procedure Rules have had little 
impact upon the time and expense traditionally associated with litigation proceedings.
However, such a fact must not be mistaken for indicating that disputing parties are 
dissatisfied with the revised procedure. For whilst there was some disparity as to how 
litigation proceedings were viewed by various parties to the action (Table 13)2 the 
majority of respondents reported an appeal rate of less than 20% (Table 17). 
Furthermore, the conduct of the judiciary was described as being professional and 
effective (Table 18).
Given early indications as to the time, expense and complexity associated with 
litigation procedure, it remains to be seen whether the process can be said to attain 
W oolfs definition of civil justice. Perhaps the answer lies in assessing of the 
proportionality of costs as compared to the nature of the dispute in hand.
2 For it was the belief of the legal profession that litigation proceedings were adversarial, whilst 
construction parties categorised them as being formalistic
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Methodological Evaluation
Upon examination of the methodology employed in the pilot study, several areas for 
improvement have been highlighted.
Firstly, upon the undertaking of statistical tests in SPSS, several questions included in 
the pilot study have been exemplified as being subject to requirements. That is, for 
example, a number of questions showed little or no statistical significance. It may be 
said that such findings were due to the limited sample size. However, upon 
discussion and review of the questionnaire with construction professionals, it was 
decided that these questions ought be removed from the full study as they were 
deemed to be of little practical importance to dispute resolution proceedings. In 
removing such null questions, it is submitted that the length of the questionnaire will 
be reduced, thereby facilitating an increased response rate.
Moreover, it was found that the multiple-choice answers to questions were on 
occasion too numerous. The over-provision of responses often meant that certain 
response variables were unselected by respondents and therefore of little value. 
Furthermore, the spread of answers over a large number of response variables limited 
the likelihood of establishing any statistical significance to the question. Hence it is 
contended that in the full study, the number of response variables be limited to no 
greater than four to a question, except where dictated by necessity.
For ease of analysis, it has also been decided that singular questionnaires be prepared 
for adjudication, arbitration and litigation. For upon the inputting of data into SPSS, 
it was found that the slight variation in questionnaires for arbitrators, lawyers and 
parties for example, caused experimenter difficulty in creating the SPSS data set. In 
producing a generic questionnaire for each of the dispute resolution mechanisms, such 
experimenter difficulties will be overcome.
Initial concerns as to the validity of a singular questionnaire for each process (ie the 
ability of lawyers as opposed to parties, to read into questions should a generic and 
comprehensive questionnaire be compiled), may be overcome by the analyzing of the 
data set in its entirety and the subsequent analysis of the data set with each group 
removed in turn. The comparison of the results of each will thereby highlight any 
adverse effect of invalid responses upon the data set as a whole.
Pilot Study Final Comment
It can be seen prima facie that whilst arbitration may be deemed to have achieved its 
ambition and hence meet with W oolfs requirements for access to justice, the 
adjudication reforms may not have been so fortunate. As will be appreciated, 
however, whilst clear trends can be viewed within the data set, due to the small 
sample size caution must be exercised in the pronouncement of any such findings as 
lore. Moreover, before any such assertion can be made, a comparison of the two 
mechanisms would need to be undertaken against the control “litigation”. It is 
anticipated that with a greater sample size, such restrictions will be overcome and 
statistical findings will be not only of interest, but of statistical significance also.
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ANNEXE 5: ADJUDICATION, ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION
FINAL STUDY QUESTIONNAIRES
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ADJUDICATION QUESTIONNAIRE
ABOUT YOU______________________________________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q1. Would you describe yourself as being (please tick all that apply)
I I Adjudicator
I I Lawyer
I I Construction Professional - Large Company - Annual Sales > £300m
I I Construction Professional - Medium Company
I I Construction Professional - Small Company - Annual Sales < £5 lm
Q2. In so far as the adjudication provisions of the Construction Act 1996 are 
concerned, are you: Please select
Q3a. How would you describe your level of participation in construction adjudication 
proceedings for the year 2001: Please select
Q3b. Would you say that your level of participation in adjudication proceedings has 
increased since the introduction of the Construction Act 1996:
Please select
Q4. How would you describe the majority of construction adjudication disputes:
Please select
Please continue on to Q5 below
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ABOUT PARTIES TO THE ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE
Please answer each question by ticking all_ boxes that you believe apply:
Q5. Would you describe the majority of “users” of adjudication services as being:
a) Contractual position Q  Employer
I I Main contractor
I I Sub Contractor
b) Size of organisation Q  Large Organisation -  Annual sales > £300m
I I Medium Organisation
I I Small Organisation -  Annual sales <£51 m
c) Experience of adjudication Q] Both parties are repeat users of adjudication
I I Both parties are infrequent users of adj
I I Repeat users of adj -v- infrequent users of adj
d) Representation at proceedings Q  Both parties are legally represented
I I Both parties are represented by industrial expert
I I Both parties self-representing
I I 1 party legally represented & other expertly rep
I I 1 party legally represented & other self-rep
I I 1 party expertly represented & other self-rep
ABOUT THE ADJUDICATION PROCESS_____________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q6. When engaged in adjudication, were the majority of procedures followed: 
Please select
Q7. Who in your opinion is the driving force behind matters of procedure in the 
majority of cases:
Please select
Q8. Would you describe the majority of adjudication procedures followed as being 
Please select
Q9. How long would you say that parties spend in preparation for adjudication, 
PRIOR to the commencement of proceedings:
Please select
Q10. As regards the appointing of an adjudicator, is it usual for their identity to be 
specified:
Please select
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Q11. From your experience, are the majority of adjudicators of a:
Please select
Q12. from your experience, how much is the average period of time from the giving of 
notice of intention to refer a dispute to adjudication, until the appointment of an 
adjudicator: Please select
ABOUT THE ADJUDICATION AWARD________________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q13. On average, how long is the period of time from the commencement of
adjudication proceedings, to the consideration of the award by the adjudicator: 
Please select
Q14. What would you anticipate to be the reason for such a timescale as specified in 
Q13:
Please select
Q15. How would you describe this time taken from commencement of procedures to 
consideration of the award by the adjudicator:
Please select
Q16. What is the average time taken by the adjudicator to reach a decision:
Please select
Q17. How would you describe the time taken by adjudicators to reach a decision:
Please select
Q18. From your experience, on what grounds are the majority of adjudication decisions 
made:
Please select
Q19. In your opinion, are the majority of adjudication awards:
Please select
Q20. From your experience, what is the approximate percentage of awards that result in 
appeal:
Please select
Q21. Would you describe the rate of appeal as being:
Please select
Q22. From your experience, to whom are appeals launched:
Please select
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Q23. Which do you believe to be of greatest importance with regard to adjudication 
proceedings: Please select
Q24. From your experience, how would you describe the overall financial demands 
placed upon adjudication parties: Please select
Q25. From your experience, would you suggest that as compared to litigation and 
arbitration, adjudication is:
L i t i g a t i o n  Please select
/\  r bit rat ioni Please select
Q26. From your experience, how would you describe the conduct of those involved in 
the adjudication process:
A c t i o n s  o f  a d j u d i c a t o r s  arc:  Please select
A u i u n i c  o f  a d j u d i c a t o r s  t o w a r d s  d A p u i e  arc:  Please select
\ c t A ; n  o f  e x p o r t  - l e g a l  i c p r c s c n t a i i \ o s  arc:  Please select
\ uin.nl..' i>f i v p r e ^ e m a t b .  t o w ard.s d i s p u t e  arc:  Please select
Actions ot adjudication panic.-, are: Please select
A u i n . n L -  o f  a d j u d i c a t i o n  j nui i c: ,  t o w a r d s  d i s p u t e  are:  Please select
Q27. With which of these commonly held statements do you most agree:
I I Adjudication is a means of settling disputes according to defined & formal
principles & procedures 
I I Adjudication is a means of settling disputes in a generally flexible manner
I I Adjudication is a means of settling disputes in a flexible fashion but with
regards to certain defined principles & procedures
440
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
To e-mail us your results please do the following:
- please copy this procedure exactly, as failure to do so will result in your responses not being returned 
to us
• Highlight and “copy” this e-mail address -  k.s.beynon@s\van.ac.uk 
© Go to “File” on your toolbar at the top of this page
• Select “Send to”
•  S e l e c t  “ M a i l  R e c i p i e n t  ( A s  A t t a c h m e n t ) ”
• Paste the e-mail address into the e-mail address bar
• Click “Send”
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ARBITRATION QUESTIONNAIRE
ABOUT YOU______________________________________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection front each drop down box
Q1. Would you describe yourself as being (please tick all that apply)
I I Arbitrator
I I Lawyer
I I Construction Professional - Large Company - Annual Sales > £300m
I I Construction Professional - Medium Company
I I Construction Professional - Small Company - Annual Sales < £5 lm
Q2. In so far as the arbitration provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 are concerned, 
are you: Please select
Q3a. How would you describe your level of participation in construction arbitration 
proceedings for the year 2001: Please select
Q3b. Would you say that your level of participation in arbitration proceedings has 
increased since the introduction of the Arbitration Act 1996:
Please select
Q4. How would you describe the majority of construction arbitration disputes:
Please select
Please continue on to Q5 below
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ABOUT PARTIES TO THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
Please answer each question by ticking qil_ boxes that you believe apply:
of “users” of arbitration services as being:Q5. Would you describe the majority
a) Contractual position O□□
b) Size of organisation O□□
c) Experience of arbitration Q□□
d) Representation at proceedings Q□□□□□
Employer 
Main contractor 
Sub Contractor
Large Organisation -  Annual sales > £300m
Medium Organisation
Small Organisation -  Annual sales <£51m
Both parties are repeat users o f arbitration 
Both parties are infrequent users o f arb 
Repeat users o f  arb -v - infrequent users o f arb
Both parties are legally represented 
Both parties are represented by industrial expert 
Both parties self-representing 
1 party legally represented & other expertly rep 
1 party legally represented & other self-rep 
1 party expertly represented & other self-rep
ABOUT THE ARBITRATION PROCESS_________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q6. When engaged in arbitration, were the majority of procedures followed: 
Please select
Q7. Who in your opinion is the driving force behind matters of procedure in the 
majority of cases:
Please select
Q8. Would you describe the majority of arbitration procedures followed as being 
Please select
Q9. How long would you say that parties spend in preparation for arbitration, PRIOR 
to the commencement of proceedings:
Please select
Q10. As regards the appointing of an arbitrator, is it usual for their identity to be 
specified:
Please select
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Q11. From your experience, are the majority of arbitrators of a:
Please select
Q12. From your experience, how much is the average period of time from the giving of 
notice of intention to refer a dispute to arbitration, until the appointment of an 
arbitrator: Please select
ABOUT THE ARBITRATION AWARD__________________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q13. On average, how long is the period of time from the commencement of arbitration 
proceedings, to the consideration of the award by the arbitrator:
Please select
Q14. What would you anticipate to be the reason for such a timescale as specified in 
Q13:
Please select
Q15. How would you describe this time taken from commencement of procedures to 
consideration of the award by the arbitrator:
Please select
Q16. What is the average time taken by the arbitrator to reach a decision:
Please select
Q17. How would you describe the time taken by arbitrators to reach a decision:
Please select
Q18. From your experience, on what grounds are the majority of arbitral decisions 
made:
Please select
Q19. In your opinion, are the majority of arbitral awards:
Please select
Q20. From your experience, what is the approximate percentage of awards that result in 
appeal:
Please select
Q21. Would you describe the rate of appeal as being:
Please select
Q22. Which do you believe to be of greatest importance with regard to arbitral 
proceedings: Please select
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Q23. From your experience, how would you describe the overall financial demands 
placed upon arbitral parties: Please select
Q24. From your experience, would you suggest that as compared to litigation and 
adjudication, arbitration is:
I .! i i g a i i o n  Please select
A d j i u l i u a i i o n  Please select
Q25. From your experience, how would you describe the conduct of those involved in 
the arbitration process:
A c t i o n s  o f  a r b i t r a t o r s  are:  Please select
A t t i t u d e  o f  a r b i t r a t o r s  t o w a r d s  d i s p u t e  are:  Please select
A c t i o n ' ,  o f  e x p e r t  / l e g a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  are:  Please select
A t t i t u d e  o f  r o p r e s e n t u t h  e s  t o w a r d s  d i s p u t e  are:  Please select
V ' A e o o i  .* 11 bit red p a r t i e s  a re :  Please select
\ U  i n  o f  a r b i t r a l  p a r t i e s  t o w  a r d s  db- .pute  are:  Please select
Q27. With which of these commonly held statements do you most agree:
I I Arbitration is a means of settling disputes according to defined & formal
principles & procedures 
I I Arbitration is a means of settling disputes in a generally flexible manner
I I Arbitration is a means of settling disputes in a flexible fashion but with
regards to certain defined principles & procedures
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
To e-mail us your results please do the following;
- please copy this procedure exactly, as failure to do so will result in your responses not being returned 
to us
• Highlight and “copy” this e-mail address -  k.s.beynon@swan.ac.uk
• Go to “File” on your toolbar at the top of this page
• Select “Send to”
© Select “Mail Recipient (As Attachment)”
• Paste the e-mail address into the e-mail address bar
• Click “Send”
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LITIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE
ABOUT YOU______________________________________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q1. Would you describe yourself as being (please tick all that apply)
I I Judiciary
I I Lawyer
I I Construction Professional - Large Company - Annual Sales > £300m
I I Construction Professional - Medium Company
I I Construction Professional - Small Company - Annual Sales < £51m
Q2. In so far as the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 are concerned, are 
you: Please select
Q3a. How would you describe your level of participation in construction litigation 
proceedings for the year 2001: Please select
Q3b. Would you say that your level of participation in litigation proceedings has 
increased since the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998:
Please select
Q4. How would you describe the majority of construction litigation disputes:
Please select
Please continue on to Q5 below
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ABOUT PARTIES TO THE LITIGATION PROCEDURE
Please answer each question by ticking q![ boxes that you believe apply:
Q5. Would you describe the majority
a) Contractual position O□□
b) Size of organisation □□
c) Experience of litigation Q□□
d) Representation at proceedings Q□□□□□
of “users” of litigation services as being:
Employer 
Main contractor 
Sub Contractor
Large Organisation -  Annual sales > £300m
Medium Organisation
Small Organisation -  Annual sales <£51m
Both parties are repeat users of litigation 
Both parties are infrequent users of lit 
Repeat users of lit -v- infrequent users of lit
Both parties are legally represented 
Both parties are represented by industrial expert 
Both parties self-representing 
1 party legally represented & other expertly rep 
1 party legally represented & other self-rep 
1 party expertly represented & other self-rep
ABOUT THE LITIGATION PROCESS______________________
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q6. Who in your opinion is the driving force behind the litigation process in the 
majority of cases:
Please select
Q7. Would you describe the majority of litigation procedures followed as being 
Please select
Q8. How long would you say that parties spend in preparation for litigation, PRIOR to 
the commencement of proceedings:
Please select
Q9. In your experience, how often is the Statutory Timetable for the service of 
Statements of Case (particulars of claim and defence) exceeded:
Please select
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Q10. Where the Statutory Timetable for the service of Statements of Case (SoC) has 
been exceeded, to what would you attribute this non-compliance in the majority 
of cases:
Please select
Q11. With regard to the Statements of Case (particulars of claim and defence) with 
which of the following commonly held views do you most agree:
I I it f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  fa i r  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  d i s p u t e s  a s  it p r e v e n t s  u n d u e  d e l a y s
I I I ' u r e a l i s t i c a l i y  s h o r t  d e a d l i n e s  p r e s e n t  p r o p e r  c a s e  p r e p a r a t i o n
Q12. From your experience, would you suggest that as a result of “active case 
management” by the judiciary:
Please select
Q13. How would you describe the settlement rate of cases under the Civil Procedure 
Rules 1998:
Please select
Q14. Where there has been a breach of the Case Management Timetable, which of the 
following penalties were imposed by the judiciary:
Please select
Q15. With regard to the production of evidence in construction cases, from your 
experience, would you suggest that the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 have:
Please select
Q16. Which of the following pre-trial actions are most commonly utilised by the Court 
in construction proceedings:
Please select
Q17. From your experience, which of the following pre-trial actions are the MOST 
effective in disposing of a case or facilitating settlement:
Please select
Q18. From your experience, which of the following pre-trial actions are the LEAST 
effective in disposing of a case or facilitating settlement:
Please select
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ABOUT THE LITIGATION AWARD
Please answer each question by clicking on one selection from each drop down box
Q19. On average, how long is the period of time from the commencement of litigation 
proceedings, to the consideration of the award by the judiciary:
Please select
Q20. What would you anticipate to be the reason for such a timescale as specified in 
Q19:
Please select
Q21. How would you describe this time taken from commencement of procedures to 
consideration of the award by the judiciary:
Please select
Q22. What is the average time taken by the judiciary to reach a decision:
Please select
Q23. How would you describe the time taken by the judiciary to reach a decision: 
Please select
Q24. From your experience, on what grounds are the majority of litigation decisions 
made:
Please select
Q25. In your opinion, are the majority of litigation awards:
Please select
Q26. From your experience, what is the approximate percentage of awards that result in 
appeal:
Please select
Q27. Would you describe the rate of appeal as being:
Please select
Q28. Which do you believe to be of greatest importance with regard to litigation 
proceedings: Please select
Q29. From your experience, how would you describe the overall financial demands 
placed upon litigating parties: Please select
Q30. From your experience, would you suggest that as compared to arbitration and 
adjudication, litigation is:
Arbi t ra t ion  Please select
A dju di ca t io n  Please select
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Q31. From your experience, how would you describe the conduct of those involved in 
the litigation process:
Act i o n s  o f  ju d ic ia ry  are: Please select
Att i t ude  o f  ju d ic i a ry  towards  d ispute is: Please select
A c t i o n s  o f  exper t  / legal represen tat ives  are: Please select
A tt i tud e  o f  represen ta t ives towards  d i spute  are:  Please select
A c t i o n s  o f  l i t igat ing part ies are: Please select
A tt i tud e  o f  l i t igat ing part ies towa rds  d i spute  are: Please select
Q32. With which of these commonly held statements do you most agree:
I I Litigation is a means of settling disputes according to defined & formal
principles & procedures 
I I Litigation is a means of settling disputes in a generally flexible manner
I I Litigation is a means of settling disputes in a flexible fashion but with
regards to certain defined principles & procedures
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
To e-mail us your results please do the fo llow ing:
- please copy this procedure exactly, as failure to do so will result in your responses not being returned 
to us
• Highlight and “copy” this e-mail address -  k.s.beynon@swan.ac.uk
•  Go to “File” on your toolbar at the top of this page
• Select “Send to”
® Select “Mail Recipient (As Attachment)”
•  Paste the e-mail address into the e-mail address bar
• Click “Send”
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